SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

VIA: AIR
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. EGL-A-4676

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

10 AUG 1953

Date

To : Chief, EE

Info: COM

From : Chief of Base, Pullach

Subject: general– ZIPPER/Operational
specific– Glossary

The attached glossary of numerical, letters, abbreviations and names of projects or of sections in use at POB 1946 to 1953 was compiled from old files and with the assistance of various members of POB. The names of individuals given in connection with various projects or administrative sections, are the names of the individuals who were originally associated with that project or section. This glossary does not claim to be complete; some dates were not known or arrived at by deduction rather than from records; and other items were remembered by POBers and did not come from the records. However, it is felt that this glossary will be of assistance to all individuals working with material on ZIPPER.

Approved:

7 August 1953

DIST:

3 - EE w/1 attach (3cy) - Direct
3 - COM w/1 attach (3cy)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical Designations
as used at POB 1946 to 1953

Aug 5

Numerical Designation	Description	Dates in Use	Changed to
1	personnel section, headquarters, LOEWE	15 Jul 49 to 19 Dec 49	32
3	organization group	15 Jul 49 – 1 Nov 49	33
7	operations, headquarters staff, SCHACK	15 Jul 49 – 4 Jan 51	31
13	general agency, WAGNER Salzburg	15 Jul 49 – 14 Apr 50	GV A
17	Central European sub-hqtrs under 7, WAGNER	15 Jul 49 – 1 Nov 49	dissolved
20	Mr. "Marshall" (compound name for [redacted])	25 Oct 49 – 24 Oct 50	25
22	district agency, Sovsons RITTER, Esslingen	15 Jul 49 – 1 May 51	BV K
25	Mr. "Marshall"	24 Oct 50 – present	
25.	when preceding a number indicates the American section opposite to the German section with that number		
27	sub-hqtrs under 7	Nov 48 – spring 49	
27	American operations staff	Oct 49 – Jan 52	25.38, 25.39
29	field offices	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.1	field office, Berlin	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.2	field office, Frankfurt/M	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.3	field office, Berchtesgaden	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.4	field office, Stuttgart	4 Jan 51 – 26 Feb 52	
30	Dr. "Schneider" (compound name for UTILITY)	25 Oct 49 to present	formerly 34
31	operations	1 Nov 49 – 4 Jan 51	formerly 7; some transfers 24 Oct 50; 38,
32	personnel	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 1
33	headquarters organisation	1 Nov 49 to present	
33.3	"LS" llan officer, CHRISTERN	? to present	
33 Ku.	courier section (kurier)	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 3 K
34	Dr. "Schneider"	15 Jul 49 – 25 Oct 49	became 30
34	special missions – stay-behind net	4 Jan 51 to present	formerly F-net
35	special connections	15 Jul 49 to present	
36	communications, [illegible]	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly N
37	finance, budget, administration	1 Nov 49 to present	
38	tactical intelligence; Soviet Zone Germany	24 Oct 50 – 28 Nov 51	formerly part of 31; became 50D

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Numorical Designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953 TO GERMANY ONLY

- 2 -

39	strategic intelligence section, satellites/USSR	24 Oct 50 - 26 Nov 51	formerly part of 31, became 50S & 50R
40	CI/CE, [illegible]	24 Oct 50 to present	formerly LIII, 45/III; 40/III,
40/A	deputy chief, CI/CE	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/F	chief, CE branch	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40.III
40/F-1	CE officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/F-2	CE officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/P	chief, political branch	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/P1
40/P-1	political intelligence officer	Oct 50 to present	formerly 45/P
40/P1	chief, political branch	to Oct 50	became 40/P
40/Si	security branch of 40	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/Z and 40/III/Z
40/Z	incidents and tracing officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/K	chief, central card files	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III,
40/E	chief, research and analysis	October 50 to present	
40/KP	communist party specialist	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III,
40/S	satellite IS specialist	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III,
40/W	CI economic section, illegal trade	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III,
40/R	RIS specialist	Oct 50 to present(actually ceased to exi for brief period after estab. of 40/E).	
40/V	CI "government connections"		
40/IIIa	deputy chief, CI/CE	to Oct 50	became 40/A
40/IIIb	chief, CE branch	to Oct 50	became 40/F
40/III,1	communist party specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/KP
40/III,2	RIS specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/R
40/III,3	satellite IS specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/S
40/III,4	CI economic section, illegal trade	to Oct 50	became 40/W
40/III/Z	incidents and security	to Oct 50	became 40/Z and 40/Si
40/III/K	chief, central card files	to Oct 50	became 40/K
41	economic cover procurement GERLACH	15 Jul 49 to present	
41/Ro	KRUGER, Hans Felix		
42	legal matters, [illegible]	4 Jan 51 to present	formerly 75
43	camp security	9 Apr 51 to present	formerly part of 67

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

44	intelligence activities in USSR, UHERDAHL	21 Nov 51 - 28 Dec 51	formerly 39/R became 50/R
45	evaluation group	15 Jul 49 to present	
45.1	military evaluation, army		became 45M
45.1L	military evaluation, air		became 45L
45.1T	transportation and supply		became 45T/V
45.2	political evaluation		became 45/P
45.3	press evaluation		became 45Pr.
45.5	translation		became 45D
45.7	economic evaluation		became 45W
45.6	"professors group"	1 Nov 47 - 31 Aug 49	dissolved
45.8	CI evaluation	prior to Oct 50	became 40/III
45 M	military evaluation, army	to present	formerly 45.1
45L	military evaluation, air	to present	formerly 45.1L
45 T/V	transportation and supply	to present	formerly 45.1T
45 P	political evaluation	to present	formerly 45.2
45 Pr	press evaluation	to present	formerly 45.3
45 D	translation section	to present	formerly 45.5
45 W	economic evaluation	to present	formerly 45.7
46	special intelligence advisor to 30, USCHLACK	26 Nov 51 to present	
50	positive operations	28 Nov 51 to present	formerly 38,39 and 44
50 M	naval (Marine) sifting	28 Nov 51 - Oct 52	became 50/Sich/M
50 M	naval operations	Oct 52 to present	formerly 431
50/Sich/M	naval sifting	Oct 52 to present	formerly 50 M
56	agent radio operations system UBANNER	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 136
57	radio monitoring system UBERNHARD	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 236
60	psychological warfare, research and planning	Oct 52 to present	
66	sub agency, UMERKEL, Tegernsee	Aug 46 - Nov 48	part became BV 7 of GV C, part became GV C
67	camp administration	15 Jul 49 to present	divided 9 Apr 5 into 67 and 43
75	administration and legal ULEGNER	15 Jul 49 - 4 Jan 51	became 42
97	district agency under 4711 ZAHN and GLASENAPP (deceased) Tegernsee	15 Jul 49 - ?	formerly Org 850 became BV ND of

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

99	field agency, HENGL	1949 - 1 Nov 49(?)	became GV C
100	strategic planning, BREUER	ca. Apr 47	became 39(then 50S)
101	district agency, Sovzone GROTH, Wetzlar	15 Jul 49 - ?	? became GV G hqrs in Munich in 1953
102	district agency, Sovzone GEHRENS, Grossostheim	? - ?	became BV 80 of GV H
103	district agency, Sovzone GEROLL, Stuttgart	- 1 Jul 53	became BV 90 of GV H
107	training center, under operations, KOERNER, Murnau	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 131
114	CI field agency under LEIDL, Karlsruhe	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became GV L
120	field agency, BOSSELT Stuttgart	Feb 47 - 14 Apr 50	GV E, BVS, CSW
130	southwest German liaison, DEHNERT, Stuttgart; existed as a small part of 29.4a	26 Feb 52 to present	
131	schools	1 Nov 49 to present	
136	agent radio system	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 56
177	hqs. op NORTH, Garmisch "basket"	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became sleeping net
178	district agency, subordinate to 120; SEIFERT, Chiemsee	Jun 46 - ?	
231	PW interrogations	24 Oct 50 - 28 Dec 51	became 50/V
236	monitoring system	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 57
331	reproductions and documents	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 9999
431	advisor on navy	1 Nov 49 - 1 Nov 52	formerly 785 became 50 M
500	org. headed by HENGL	Jun 46 - 1 Nov 49	became GV H
531	hqrs investigations team HOEMER	1 Nov 49 to present	
631	screening of compromised agents	24 Oct 50 - 1 Oct 51	became 733
733	screening of compromised agents	15 Oct 51 to present	formerly 631
785	naval operations, DUERKHEIM, Bad Toelz	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 431
999	hqrs operations	15 Jul 49 - ?	?

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

3000	Residentura - Bulgia under 101	29 Jul 49 - ?	?
4711	agency, @ROTH, Frnakfurt/M	15 Jul 49 - 14 Apr 50	became GV G
4913	agency, @SCHAEFER, Austria	15 Jul 49 - 14 Apr 50	became GV A,
8500	sub-org, GLASENAPP (deceased)	- 15 Jul 49	became sub or
9999	reproduction and documents, @SAIBERG, Pullach	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 331

Latin numerals

I/V	hqs ops, operated the GVs @KRAMER, and @GRUENWALD	15 Jul 49 - ?
III/Pol	CI political	

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Letter Designations, Abbreviations and Names
in Use POB 1946 to 1953

6 Aug 53

(The letter designations were instituted about 1 Sept 1949 replacing the early numbering system. Staff personnel continued to have numbers.)

Designation	Description	Dates in Use	Changed to
BV	(Bezirks Vertretung), district field agency under a GV		
BV B	(BALLING), under GV G synonymous with NB, placed under BV E in Jun 53	1 May 51 - Jun 53	
BV E		1 Sept 51 to present	formerly GV E
BV M	(Mitte)	1 May 51	
BV NB	(Nieder Bayern)	1 May 51	
BV S	(SCHAEFER) CI field unit in Austria, operationally under Sec 40, was originally under GV A	to present	
BV 80	under GV H	3 Mar 52	
CSW	(Czechoslovakia - WEBER) executive agency of 50	4 Jan 51 to present	
F	Orf F, (Freedom or Fritz BARANOWSKI), field agency	1949	was project 57 dissolved
F-net	(Funk-net) stay-behind or sleeping net	1949 to 4 Jan 51	became 34
Filiale	sub-agencies or nets under UVs	1949 to present	
G	Org. G (GLASENAP), under Org 5	to end Oct 48	became part of sub org 97
GV	(General Vertretung), general agency		
GV A	strategic, Austria/Satellites	1 Nov 49 - 1 Jun 51	dissolved
GV B	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Jun 51 to present	
GV C	mostly strategic, some tactical	1 Jun 51 to present	
GV E	tactical, over BV B, BV M and BV NB	1 Nov 49 - 14 Sept 51	became BV E/ tactical and strategic
GV G	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Nov 49 to present	
GV H	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 500
GV L	CI/CE field agency, operationally under Sec 40	1 Nov 49 to present	
H	Hauskapelle, under L/III	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 531
H	(Heer), army		
HRF	sub orgs under GV C	- Apr 50	UVs
Haupt Forscher Gruppe MALLNER	forscher for Sec 50	1 Jun 51 to present	

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Letter designations, abbreviations and names in use [illegible]

- 2 -

K (or GV K)	field agency, UK/NÜRNBERG also called "basket"	1949 - 1 Nov 49	became GV H
K (or 40/K)	(kartei) central card files		
K or Ku	(Kurier), courier, was under 3	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 33 Ku
Project Kranich	- stay-behind net	1949 to Jan 51	became 34
Residentura K	- was under 101	26 Jul 49 - ?	
L	(Luft), air		
L-I	hqrs ops section (Leiter - I, I type work)	15 Jl 49 - ?	
L/III	hqrs CI section (III type work)	15 Jul 49 - 24 Oct 50	became 40
MEZ	(Mitte Europaische Zentrum) field agency under WAGNER	falll 1946 - 15 Jul 49	became GV A
MF	independent agency	1 Nov 49 - ?	
MK	(Meldekopf) communications center		
MK Berlin	communications center, Berlin on 26 Feb 52 became Berlin field office (however this never appears to have taken over)	1949 to present	
N	(Nachtrichten), communications existed as a section prior to 1 Nov 49, became 36		
PE	(Polen - GELLERT) executive agency of 50 for satellites	4 Jan 51 to present	
39/Pl	planning section	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 51	part of 50
Q	(Quelle), source evaluation	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 51	50/Q
RB	(Russland - BALLING), executive agency of 50	Nov 51 to present	previously BV
RL	(Russland - LEITNER), executive agency of 50; Baltic ops	April 52 to present	
Si	(Sicherheit) security		
Res S-Y	sub org	to 14 Apr 50	became UV Y of GV C
Stein gruppe	unattached group in Berlin	26 Jul 49 - ?	
T	transportation		
UN	(Ungarn - MAYER) was under GV A now executive agency of 50; Hungary and Sovzone Austria ops	1 Sept 51 to present	
UV	(Unter Vertretung) sub agencies under BVs	Apr 50 to present	
Wi	(Wirtschaft), economic		
Wi/L	(Wirtschaft/Luft), economic/air		

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY



Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56

Part I: CIA's Contemporary Information on the Gehlen Organization

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Senior Representative for Germany 31 July 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

ZIPPER

Briefing for [redacted]

Reference: MGKA-29951

1. Transmitted herewith are brief summaries of ZIPPER operations and activities, plus POB activities pertaining to ZIPPER.

2. A number of the attachments list type activities rather than operations and do not necessarily conform to the sample outline shown in reference. However, due to the unique function and operational responsibility of POB supporting and subsidizing ZIPPER, it is our opinion that such brief summaries will serve to elucidate POB activities.

3. The following activities and operations are attached:

a. The Organization of ZIPPER
b. The Future GIS
c. ZIPPER Connections to Remilitarization
d. A ZIPPER Connection to Western IS
e. Post-Hostilities Program
f. [redacted]
g. ZIPPER Communications
h. POB Finance Functions to ZIPPER
i. Rose Activities
j. "NEPTUN" - ZIPPER Navy (431 Section)
k. ZIPPER 331
l. JUPITER - ZIPPER Sovzone OB Collection
m. ZIPPER Satellite Activities
n. USAGE
o. ZIPPER General Agency A (GV A)
p. ZIPPER - U/M
q. ZIPPER Operation "Garbage"
r. Project 117
s. Project 73
t. Project 124
u. Operation CARTILAGE
v. The Syrian Case
w. CI/CE and Political Reports
x. [redacted]
y. WIRBEL, Zipper D/A-CI Operation

[redacted]

~~ATT~~ BCO	FI	E/G
~~25~~	DOCT	
ABSTRACT ✗	INDEX	

26 NOV

Encl

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET CONTROL
CS COPY

GATS- 556
COPY No. 3

~~TOP~~ SECRET CONTROL

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

z. "HOFFMANSTHAL", Zipper D/A Operation
✓aa. WG Ruhr
bb. [redacted]
cc. "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung"
dd. Operation KUFSTEIN
ee. ADLER, D/A Operation
✓ff. [redacted]
gg.

[redacted]

Distribution:

SRFG - 2 w/1 cy attach
FBM - 1 w/1 cy attach
COS - 1 w/1 cy attach
POB - 2 w/1 cy attach

NOTE: For security reasons, we are not forwarding all of the above listed briefings with this memo. Attached hereto are the summaries listed (a, b, c, d, f, h and i). The remainder will be forwarded in separate pouches.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY
~~TOP~~ SECRET CONTROL

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

THE ORGANIZATION OF ZIPPER

1. **ZIPPER Headquarters Organization:** (Attachment #1)

ZIPPER Headquarters is located in the Pullach Compound. Headquarters staff strength is given as approximately 550. This figure does not include German maintenance and service personnel working in the Compound who are employed from Munich Military Post. It does include field personnel of the 34 and 36 Groups.

Attachment #1 is a schematic diagram of the ZIPPER Headquarters Organization. A solid line indicates direct supervision/command; a dotted line indicates advisory/coordination function. The cover names of the leading personnel together with a brief outline of the highlights of their careers follows:

30. German Chief of ZIPPER, Dr. SCHNEIDER, General Staff Corps

Born 4 March 1905 in Erfurt. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. December 1923. War Academy Berlin, 1933-35. First General Staff Officer, 10th, Fortifications, 1937-38 Aide to Chief of German General Staff. Chief of Eastern Military Intelligence (Fremde Heere Ost) 1942-44. Promoted to Brig. General December 1944. Dismissed by special order of Hitler 9 April 1945. Not a Party member.

√ 30a. Advisor on Administrative and Organizational Matters, Mr. WENDT, General Staff Corps

Born 17 August 1912 in Berlin-Schoenberg. Entered the German Army 1930. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1933. From 1933 to WWII, various staff positions with artillery units. During WWII became Chief of the Organization Department of the General Staff. Not a Party member.

30b. Advisor on Intelligence Matters, Mr. WOLLMANN, General Staff Corps

Born 18 January 1897 in Munich. Entered German Army 1916. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1917. During WWII, Chief of Staff of a German Army Group. At the end of the War, Deputy Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW), with rank of Lt. General. Not a Party member.

30c. Administrative Assistant, Mr. LANGENDORF

√ Born 21 June 1903 in Berlin. Entered the German Army 1937. During WWII attained the rank of Colonel. Not a Party member.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Encl - 1

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET/RELEASE SECRET
TO GERMANY ONLY

30d. **Trouble Shooter, Mr. KOENNIG, General Staff Corps**

Born 17 December 1894 at Huenern, Prussia. Entered the German Army 1914. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1915. Various ground force assignments, 1921-27. Russian Department of the General Staff 1927-29. Instructor at the General Staff Academy 1932-33. Senior Military Attache to Tokyo 1940-45. Promoted to Major General 1942. Under US "protective custody" in Japan 1945-47. Undertook unspecified assigmments for General Willoughby. Returned to Germany early 1948. Not a Party member.

32. **Personnel Group, Mr. LOEWE, General Staff Corps**

Born 23 December 1917. During WWII became Deputy Chief of the Personnel Section of the German General Staff, attaining rank of Major. Not a Party member.

33. **Organization Group, Mr. DIEHL, General Staff Corps**

Born 20 July 1904 in Tilsit, Prussia. Entered the Army 1924. Commissioned 1928. Attended the War Academy 1935-36. During WWII became Chief of Staff of the Rear Services High Command. Not a Party member.

34. **Stay-behind Activities, Mr. HAMMER, General Staff Corps**

Born 3 November 1920 in Munich. Entered the German Army in 1939. Commissioned 1941. Adjutant of an Intelligence Section of an Army Group 1944. Not a Party member.

35. **Special Connections, Mr. MERKER**

Born 31 July 1898 in Hanover. Entered the German Army 1915. Assigned to General Staff 1937. Attache Section of the General Staff 1938-43. Division commander on the Russian Front 1943-45 finally becoming an Army Commander with rank of Lt. General. Not a Party member.

36. **Communications, Mr. HOSSEL, General Staff Corps**

Born 15 August 1907 in Ulm. Entered the German Army 1925. Commissioned 1929. Attended the War School Munich 1935. Attended War Academy Berlin 1937. During WWII various ground forces staff assignments in Rumania, Crete, Russia and Italy. Nervous breakdown 1944. Not a Party member.

37. **Administration and Finance Group, Dr. STAHL**

Born 4 May 1910. Doctor of Philosophy in Agriculture. Worked in various German Government agriculture departments. Served in German Army 1940-45. Chief of the special train of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW)

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONL

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

38. Tactical Intelligence Group, Mr. KUEHNE, General Staff Corps

Born 21 July 1910, Oppeln, Prussia. Entered German Army 1930. Commissioned 2nd. Lt. 1933. German Armistice Commission to France 1940-41. Various staff assigments including section chief in Eastern Military Intelligence 1942-45. Not a Party member.

39. Stratetic Intelligence Group, Mr. SCHACK

Born 6 July 1887 in New Ulm. Following service in Germany Army WWII, Chief of the Afghanistan General Staff Academy. Wide range of experience in the Middle East. Early in WWII, Chief of the Abwehr office in Athens in charge of Abwehr operations in the Middle East. Later moved to Sofia, where continued to conduct operations against the Allies in the Balkans and the Middle East. Not a Party member.

40. CI/CE Group, Dr. KLAUSNER

Born 17 February 1914, Bielitz, Austria. Doctor of Philosophy from University of Vienna. Curator for Army Museum in Vienna, 1934-37. Entered Austrian Army 1937. German Army 1938. Assigned to the Abwehr (CI/CE) 1942. Various assignments in the USSR to the end of WWII. Party member.

41. Economic Cover, Mr. GERLACH, General Staff Corps

Born 1 December 1887, Berlin. German Army WWI. Publishing and printing business 1920-40. Reentered German Army 1943, became Chief of Staff of an Army Corps with rank of Colonel. Not a Party member.

42. Legal Advisor, Mr. WEGNER

Born 10 August 1909, Berlin. Lawyer 1932-37. Entered German Army 1937. Became Chief of Administration of General Staff Headquarters with rank of Lt. Colonel. Party member.

45. Reports/Evaluation Group, Dr. HORN, General Staff Corps

Born 4 August 1893, Holzminden/Weser. Entered German Army 1915. Commissioned 1916. Various ground force assignments 1920-27. General Staff training program 1927-30. Became General Staff Corps member 1932. Ground force assignments 1930-37. Assigned to Plans and Operations of German Army High Command (OKH). Became Chief Plans and Operations, OKH with rank of Major General. On 20 July 1944 arrested for participation in the Hitler Plot. Released in ten weeks for lack of evidence. Put on inactive status and kept under surveillance. In addition to ZIPPER duties, presently a member of the German delegation at the Petersburg remilitarization talks. Not a Party member.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

131. Schools and Training, Mr. KOERNER

Born 15 December 1893, Wohlau, Schlesien, Occupation, art critic, Abwehr officer (Major) with experience in Poland, France, Russia 1939-45. Not a Party member.

231. Interrogation Project, Mr. KRAMER

331. Documentation Group, Mr. SALBERG

Born 7 May 1912, St. Petersburg, USSR. Lived in USSR before WWII. In Siberia for one year as political prisoner. Drafted into Red Army. Deserted to the German Army. Became Deputy Chief of the Documents Section of Eastern Intelligence (WALLY I). Occupation: artist, painter. Not a Party member.

431. Naval Group, Mr. DUEHRING

Professional German Navy officer. Last rank, Captain. Important assignments in Navy weapon development programs. Not a Party member.

631. Screening Center, Mr. SUHR

Abwehr officer during WWII with most of his experience on Eastern Front.

2. ZIPPER Field Organisation: (Attachment #2)

In the field, the ZIPPER organization is characterized by a formal, rather rigid stratification with a military-type chain of command. The organization of a typical ZIPPER field agency is diagramed below:



SECRET TO GERMANY ONL

SECRET/RELEASI

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

ZIPPER has six General Agencies, one independent District Agency and three so-called Project Agencies which are approximately the size of a District Agency and are operating in the Iron Curtain countries other than the Soviet Zone, Germany. A brief breakdown of ZIPPER field agencies follows:

Agency	Location of Hqs.	Area of Operation	Staff Personnel*	Agent Personnel
GA "A"	Salzburg	Balkans	24	120
CE/Rm GA "B"	Bremen	Soviet Zone	73	139
cd/hms GA "C"	Chiemsee	CSR, USSR, Poland	60	78
CE/Rm. DA "E"	Ulm	Soviet Zone	33	67
CE/Rm GA "G"	Frankfurt/Main	Soviet Zone	102	336
CE/Rm GA "H"	Frankfurt/Main	Soviet Zone	164	195
cd/hms GA "L"	Karlsruhe	CI/CE, Western Germany, Soviet Zone	73	83
CE/Rm PA "CSW"	Holzhausen	CSR,	18	61
cd/hms PA "PE"	Munich	Poland	9	41
✓ PA "RB"	Munich	USSR	2	32
Non [redacted]		TOTAL	558	1152

* . Includes couriers and staff personnel on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

** Includes sources and sub-sources but not casual or one-time informants.

These figures represent the situation as of 1 May 1951 and are only rough approximations.

It might be noted that General Agency "A" is in the process of a drastic re-organisation. Basically it involves the creation of two Project Agencies; one in the CI/CE field, and one running positive operations in the Balkans. Both of these agencies will be directly responsible to the appropriate ZIPPER Headquarters group.

Prepared by [redacted]

w/attachments.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEAS TO GERMANY ON

1.5.1951

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY


30
Field Agencies of:
B
G
H
E
Tactical J.S.
PE
A
C
CSW
RB
Strategic J.S.
L
C.J. / C.E.

Explanations

30 : German Chief
A,B,C,G,H,L : General Agencies
E : District Agency
PE,CSW,RB : Project Agencies

Remarks: GV A to be dissolved in project agencies beginning at 1 June 1951
GV E to be established up to 1 June 1951

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

STAFF ORGANISATION


30
30a
Co-worker for General and Fundamental Affairs
30b
Co-worker for IS
30c
Personnel Office
30d
Co-worker for Special Missions
32
Personnel Group
33
Organisation Group
36
Communications Group
37
Administration and Finance Group
41
Economic Cover
42
Legal Adviser
67/43
Camp Administration, Security
631
Screening Center
45
Evaluation Group
38
Tactical IS Group
39
Strategic IS Group
40
CI/CE Group
131
IS Schools
231
Interrogation
331
Document Section
431
Naval Section
34
Special Funds
35
Special connections

REL Ger
Secret

Secret
REL Ger

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

The Future GIS

1. The ambition of ZIPPER to emerge as at least the dominant factor in a future GIS is abundantly documented. The present situation is that UPGROWTH has recognized this ambition and has instructed his lieutenant, Dr. GLOBKE, to participate with a representative of AIS in discussions relative to the "how" and the "when" of an eventual transfer of ZIPPER from American to German authority. Close cooperation already exists between ZIPPER and the VS. The principal obstacle at the moment is the bitter antagonism which exists between ZIPPER and the intelligence group in the office.

2. The situation in general can be described as satisfactory. Political obstacles remain, but they do not seem impossible of solution.

3. POB staff officers:

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Encl. 3

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

ZIPPER Connections to Remilitarization

1. ZIPPER's interest and involvement in German remilitarization is a natural outgrowth of two basic factors:

a. ZIPPER's concern that the influential people in the top level of a future German army be well disposed towards ZIPPER and sympathetic to its desire to emerge as the future GIS; and

b. the presence within the ZIPPER organization of many former officers who have a natural interest in German military affairs and some of whom will want to find births within the future German military setup, some of them outside the G-2 framework.

Thus far, ZIPPER has been fortunate in the selection by of his military advisors. With the downfall of the rather anti-ZIPPER in the fall of 1950, the positions of influence on the advisory scene have been occupied exclusively by men close to ZIPPER, notably Dr. HORN and General SPEIDEL, who is a very special connection. A further favorable circumstance is the fact that General Adolf KUNTZEN, who appears slated to have the final say in personnel matters, is also a close special connection.

2. The present situation can be regarded, from the ZIPPER point of view, as satisfactory.

3. POB staff officer: ,

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Encl -3

Trails Country
Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

A. ZIPPER Connection to Western IS

1. ZIPPER maintains unofficial liaison with the intelligence services of , and intelligence information is exchanged with and . We receive information copies of ZIPPER's contribution to these services. It has long been a matter of policy, understood and agreed to by ZIPPER, that they will keep us informed of their connections with foreign intelligence services and of the nature of these connections. We are satisfied that ZIPPER has generally observed this commitment.

2. We have not yet agreed to the establishment of ZIPPER liaison with the British, and ZIPPER has not, to the best of our knowledge, violated this restriction, although they have consistently and over a long period of time pressed us for approval for the establishment of such liaison, either on our initiative or theirs. As a result of recent ZIPPER-UPGROWTH negotiations and as indicated by recent conversations, it seems likely that the establishment of ZIPPER-liaison may soon be deemed advisable.

3. POB staff officers:

extracted for
Contacts with
Foreign Intelligence
dossier

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Encl -

~~TOP~~ SECRET CONTROL

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

POST-HOSTILITIES PROGRAM

1. Definition of the Program

In general terms, the program encompasses planning for, and establishment of, an intelligence apparatus in Western Germany which will be activated upon the outbreak of hostilities and which will be controlled and serviced by a combined POB/ZIPPER staff operating from a rear base. It further involves the selection and special preparation of elements of the existing Soviet Zone operation adaptable for post-hostility operations.

2. Basic Assumptions

It is assumed that ZIPPER, while retaining its structural integrity, will be almost completely dependent upon the AIS for all types of logistical and operational support and subject to a much greater amount of direct control by the AIS than is now the case. Because of the great advantage ZIPPER holds over other foreign agencies in working with Germans, it is assumed that ZIPPER's primary mission is the collection of information in Germany. It is anticipated that this effort will expand into other German speaking areas of Central Europe. It is further assumed that ZIPPER will be integrated into the overall collection effort and intelligence planning of SHAPE. An attempt by ZIPPER to maintain close liaison with a German Government in exile is to be expected.

3. Special Considerations

Both POB and ZIPPER have agreed that the program must not be allowed to distract from, or in any way impede current operations. This is expedited by the existence of a special ZIPPER staff whose sole responsibility is the Project. The need for maximum operational security is realised by all. This is being achieved by the isolation and insulation of the project from all other current operations, by restricting the number of POB/ZIPPER staff members engaged in the Project and by stressing the need for maximum security in the recruitment and training of agent personnel. Because of the limited human and financial resources, it has been necessary to assign priorities within the Project itself. Finally, and different from most other ZIPPER activities is the true joint POB/ZIPPER nature of the Project. Thus it has been possible from the beginning of this major ZIPPER operation for POB to exert an overall influence, direction and operational control which is highly desirable, and which has been much more difficult to develop with other older ZIPPER components.

4. Phases of the Project

Following are the various phases of the Project listed roughly in the order of the priority assigned to them:

SCO 26 NOV 1968
~~TOP~~ SECRET CONTROL

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

~~TOP~~ SECRET CONTROL

(1) Establishment of dormant W/T stay-behind networks in Western Germany (see also Commo Review).

(2) Examination and analysis of current ZIPPER Soviet Zone operations for the purpose of selecting the most productive and stayable elements for post-hostilities use. Preparations for tying these portions into dormant communication channels which will be activated upon the outbreak of war.

(3) Neutral burials of radio equipment and other supplies (see also Commo Review).

(4) Establishment of a radio base station in OSMOSIS (see also Commo Review).

(5) Survey of the logistical problems incidental to the operation of the rear operations base and continuation of the intelligence effort following displacement.

(6) Procurement of maps, factory plans, charts and other technical aids for use at the rear base in the immediate post-hostilities period.

(7) The recruitment of qualified individuals who will be given preliminary training and then evacuated in case of hostilities for later commitment on special missions or to broaden coverage.

(8) Accumulation of selected operational assets including safe houses and letter drops and the selection of suitable air-drop and sea-landing areas in Western Germany.

POB Case Officers - Project - [redacted]

Commo - [redacted]

Operations/Security - [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

~~TOP~~ SECRET CONTROL

SECRET SECRET/RELEAS
TO GERMANY OI

[redacted]

1. The cryptonym [redacted] is assigned to a headquarters approved program of orientation visits of key ZIPPER members to the United States. Originally conceived with emphasis on intelligence training and orientation of ZIPPER members by [redacted] training staff, shortage of training personnel and facilities modified the [redacted] program virtually to the status of sight-seeing visits intended to show off the physical magnitude and impressiveness, the industrial and technical efficiency, and the general democratic atmosphere of the United States. In addition, specific intelligence emphasis was to be gained by appropriate introductions of the ZIPPER members involved to key [redacted] personnel, by limited intelligence briefing by [redacted] and G-2, and by visits to specialized overt technical installations, such as the FBI, US communications facilities, etc.

2. It is felt that the headquarters budget allocation of $43,000 will be sufficient to carry out the proposed program of five groups of about five ZIPPER members each. The last group should have completed its tour during the spring of 1952.

3. The program is being carried out in close coordination with FDM, who in turn has the complete cooperation of [redacted] domestic facilities and has further cleared the program with appropriate departments of the US government. The actual task of accompanying ZIPPER members while they are in the US has been assigned to members of POB staff, whose normal home leaves have been so arranged as to coincide with ZIPPER visits.

4. These tours are being carried out under the cover of HICOG orientation visits of German police officials, and no difficulties have been encountered in this respect, since such a program actually exists, and POB use of this cover is fully coordinated with HICOG. Excellent cooperation has been forthcoming from the US Consulate General in Munich in the matter of documentation.

5. The first group of ZIPPER members, recently returned, have reported their amazement at the entirely efficient manner in which the operation was carried off within the United States. Obviously all travel and accommodations reservations had been arranged entirely in advance, and the group had but to follow the scheduled itinerary. The

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY SECRET

Encl - 5

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
SAMPLES FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" ARCHIVES OF PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET/RELEASE SECRET
TO GERMANY ONLY

group was very favorably impressed with their cordial reception and briefing by [redacted] representatives, and with the intelligence briefing accorded the group in the Pentagon. Based upon the very positive favorable reaction of the first returned group and the high anticipatory enthusiasm of the members of groups scheduled to follow, POB is certain [redacted] will prove to be an excellent AIS investment in ZIPPER (and future GIS) good will and increased pro-American feeling, the result of which is already easily discernible in ZIPPER-POB relations.

POB Staff Officer: [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

POB FINANCE FUNCTIONS TO ZIPPER

[redacted], POB Finance Officer, functioning in the capacity of Comptroller to the ZIPPER project is responsible for reviewing the financial policies and procedures employed internally in ZIPPER to insure adequate accounting of U.S. Government funds placed in this subsidized project. Since September 1949, two months after the date our agency assumed responsibility for this project, ZIPPER has progressed from rudimentary cash journal financial records to detail accounting, including double bookkeeping accounts down to the District Agency level.

Pay and travel regulations have been standarized throughout the organization, effective 1 July 1951, to provide permanent staff employees of ZIPPER with equal benefits consistent with those received by employees of the Federal Republic at Bonn. Although they are at minor variance with agency regulations they are acceptable for subsidy type financing.

A detailed monthly financial statement, prepared by ZIPPER and subject to spot check and audit at POB, is forwarded to headquarters for its operational value to FDM and also as documentary evidence in support of our POB accounting with headquarters for ZIPPER project funds required by the subsidy committee. The originals of these statements, together with all individual receipts, etc., remain at POB for analysis and operational study by POB case officers. It should be noted that these records have been particularly useful in analyzing ZIPPER activities in the field of "Special Connections".

The following provides a brief summary of the U.S. financial support given to the project.

[illegible] [redacted]

A. U.S. Financial Support:

1. Agency Support - Fiscal Year 1950/51

   a. $2,300,000.00 less $150,000.00 returned in March 1951.

2. Army Support

   a. ID EUCOM

      1. Approximately DM 100,000.00 annually.
         This is for use in paying organization members employed in administrative jobs at Nicolaus, namely, guards.

   b. Munich Military Post

      1. Approximately DM 550,000.00 annually.
         Used in paying salaries of*red badge employees in connection with the maintenance of Nicolaus Camp.

*Non-Zipperites; indigenous employees

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Encl -6

Falls Country Reporter & Productions
COMPILED FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

ECRET/RELEASE
GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

B. **Logistical Support:**

1. Agency

a. Routine administrative equipment needed for the POB staff.

b. Limited operational Commo equipment.

2. Army

a. 186 EUCOM vehicles, parts, etc.

b. 420 rations until 30 June 1951.

c. Normal supplies and equipment needed to maintain Nicolaus Post, CAPITOL, and other American controlled installations.

d. Requisitioned Property

i. 80 houses and apartments outside of Nicolaus

ii. 65 houses and apartments in Nicolaus.

e. Gasoline - 12,000 gallons monthly - without cost.

f. R.T.A. - approximately 2,000 per month without cost.

C. **Cost of Project**

1. Combined costs, in terms of cash outlay, is approximately DM 1,000,000.00 monthly for normal running expenses (thru CIA).

a. Breakdown of Expenses

i. Overhead

Headquarters staff - 26%
Field Agencies - 50%

ii. Strategic - 6%

iii. Jupiter - 13% (Since Korea)

iv. "34" (Stay-behind Burial Program) - 5% $75,000.00 Jan-June 1951)

b. Evaluation of total Army logistical support - approximately DM 10,000,000.00 annually. (Including requisitioned property).

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
O GERMANY ONL

C. Cost of Project continued:

2. Future Commitments

a. 1951/52 - Budget DM 14,000,000.00.

b. Special costs included in budget

i. Legalization - Cover Firm support

ii. Housing - Welfare Fund

iii. Motorization - Present ceiling allows for 35 new vehicles. We anticipate that all this cost can be borne from current fiscal year funds, thus allowing for extension of this program in the next fiscal year assuming our budget estimates are approved.

iv. Building construction - Commo ($30,000. Base Station).

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Tails Country Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

ZIPPER COMMUNICATIONS

1. The organization (see attached chart) is composed of the following:

    (a). Organization 136 (Agent Radio Program).

    (b). Organization 236 (Monitoring and Intercept).

    (c). STORCH (Staybehind Program, Radio).

2. The attachment, entitled "ZIPPER COMMUNICATION ASSETS", includes pertinent facts about each organization and program. Senior POB Commo Officer: [redacted].

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

ZIPPER SECRET



Staff, 36

Leader, 36
Deputy

36.0	36.1	36.2	36.3	36.4
Monitoring System Radio CI, Personnel Financial Admin.	Agent Radio Staff Commo Signal Eqpt. Transportation Radio Station	Telephone and Teletype Comm.	Files, Typist Translation	Cipher Factory
1 Chief	1 Chief 3 operators 1 mechanic	1 Chief 6 TTY operators 4 Telephone operators	1 Clerk	1 Chief

ORGANIZATION 136

Leader, 136
Deputy

136.0	136.1	136.2	136.3	136.4
Personnel E-Preparations	Signal Operation	Laboratory	Administration Photo Laboratory	Financial Administration
1 Chief	1 Chief 2 Base Sta.Chiefs 3 Instructors 15 operators 1 Typist 3 Mechanics	1 Chief Engineer 1 Engineer 4 Tech'ns.	1 Chief 1 Driver 1 Auto Mech 1 Photo Tech	1 Chief 3 House-keepers

ORGANIZATION 236

Leader, 236
Deputy

236.B	236.2	236.3	236.4	236.5	236a
Monitoring and Final Evaluation	Personnel E-Plans	Cipher	Admin. and Fiscal	Technical Section	Radio CI
1 Chief 2 Section Chiefs 2 Eval. Aids 13 Monitor.Ops 1 Typist 3 DF Sta.Chiefs 12 DF operators	1 Chief 1 Typist 2 Teletype operator	1 Chief 4 Clerks 1 Expert 1 Typist	1 Chief 1 MotorPool Officer 1 Mechanic 2 Drivers 5 Household	1 Chief 1 Mechanic	1 Chief 3 operators 1 Eval, Aid 1 Admin.Pers. 1 Housekeeper

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEA
GERMANY O

ZIPPER COMMUNICATION ASSETS

I. PHYSICAL INSTALLATIONS.

2 Agent Radio Base Stations - Organization 136 (Chiemsee and Butzbach)
1 Agent Radio Base Station - STORCH
1 Fixed Radio Station - West Berlin
1 Fixed Radio Station - NIKOLAUS
1 Monitor & Intercept Station - Organisation 236 (Frankfurt/Main)
1 Monitor & Intercept Station - 236a (Ulm)
3 D/F stations - Organization 236 (Bremen, Bustbach, Chiemsee)
Numerous Radio Schools (locations change periodically)
1 Burial Workshop (manufacture of containers and packing)
1 Cipher Factory (new)
1 Laboratory - NIKOLAUS
1 Teletype Network

II. COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL.

Staff 36	20 persons
Organization 236	67 persons
Organization 136	44 persons
Berlin W/T operators	3 persons
Commo Officers (Field)	11 persons
Total:	145 persons

STORCH (F-Net) Personnel:

Headquarters Staff	7 persons
Field Staff	12 persons
Total:	19 persons

GRAND TOTAL: 164 persons

Radio training personnel (General Agencies and STORCH) throughout the Field.

III. Agent Radio Program (Organization 136).

A. Five active radio operators in the Soviet Zone at following locations: Frankfurt/Oder, Halberstadt, Letzlinger Heide, West Berlin (2). The first three have been groomed to provide "early warning." The radio base listens for them several times each day.

B. A radio agent will be in full active status soon in Halle.

C. Thirteen additional radio agents are in various stages of training. This number includes ten for the Soviet Zone, two for Poland, and one for the CSR.

D. The Agent Radio Program is improving rapidly due to:

(1). Better ZIPPER administration.
(2). Additional Field Communication Officers and Radio Trainers.
(3). Mechanical aids for training.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

IV. STORCH (F-Net). (This is a SATURN activity and mentioned in the SATURN report.)

A. Eight 2-member teams have had full training and have taken part in extensive maneuvers.

B. It is expected that about 15 additional radio operators will participate in the summer maneuvers.

C. Estimate for future:

July 1951 - 23 teams or operators
Jan. 1952 - 38 teams or operators
Jan. 1953 - 60 teams or operators

V. BURIALS. (This is a SATURN activity and mentioned in the SATURN report.)

A. Nine radio burials in the Berlin area have been completed in June. Others will follow at various places in the US Zone during the summer.

B. Radio equipment, ciphers, signal plans, foodstuffs, and valuables for barter are being buried.

C. All containers are filled with dry nitrogen for best possible preservation.

D. There are two types of burials:

(1). Reserve - for known agents.
(2). Neutral - for unknown agents.

VI. E-CASE.

We have OSMOSIS and 52 potential operators and communication officers. The station will be split: two locations, receiving installation and transmitting installation. Ten to fifteen operating positions are planned. A skeleton staff will be maintained at the station, the staff to be augmented quickly if war starts. All signal plans, ciphers, and operating instructions for use at OSMOSIS are being held in "safe storage" in the U.S.

VII. COMMUNICATION COSTS.

36)
136)
236) - - about DM 1,087,920 per year.
236a)
Lab)

STORCH 720,000 per year
OSMOSIS 42,000 per year
350,000 per year (estimate) - Equipment from Home Office
DM 2,199,920 (roughly $439,984.) per year - estimated total less one-time costs for improvement of base station, rehabilitation, etc.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY SECRET

TransCountry Records & Productions

SECRET

CRET/RELEASE
GERMANY ONLY

ROSE ACTIVITIES

The operational mission of this project is the procurement of "Roses" for the German station and headquarters. Other eastern European currencies are also purchased through these same sources at the direction of the Finance Officer at Karlsruhe.

Roses are procured from various types of black market operators in Berlin. Principal subsources to live and operate from the Munich and Linz areas.

Since the inception of this project a total of approximately 1,000,000 units have been procured through these sources. The advantages to our agency in using these cutouts are threefold: (1) this is the only source, in the entire organization, which has produced Roses in appreciable quantities; (2) Security and (3) Economy.

[redacted], has directed this operation since June 1950 as a special project separate and apart from his his functions with ZIPPER.

Charted
for Roses dossier

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Encl -

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

"NEPTUN" - ZIPPER Navy (431 Section)

REF: MGLA-6053

1. NEPTUN involves ZIPPER contacts and connections to German naval circles, ZIPPER attempt to run boat landing operations over the Baltic Sea into the Baltic States, and various aspects of ZIPPER involvement into German maritime matters. The principle ZIPPER personality is DUERKHEIM (cover name) who is the leader of the 431 section. This section is also responsible for the sifting and evaluation of naval reports collected by ZIPPER field agencies. The 431 section consists of not more than six staff members and no agent personnel as such.

2. The 431 section has a covert connection to the [redacted] sponsored Hydrographic Institute in Hamburg and receives considerable material from them, i.e.: ships, freighter movements world wide, [redacted] collection, etc. Several contacts are maintained to the German Admirals group presently employed by [redacted]. Included is Admiral Patzig, a long time contact of [redacted] and also special consultant to ZIPPER on naval matters, and is carried on the regular ZIPPER payroll. Other connections of the 431 section include contacts to the "Bundesgrenzschutzpolizei", the Waterways Traffic Ministry of Bonn, ZIPPER connections to Post Hostilities plans.

3. The navy section has a staff payroll of DM 29, 655 per quarter, which does not include payment to Special Connections and one-time payment for services rendered.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

extracted for Org 431

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Trails Country Reports & Productions

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

ZIPPER 331

1. The numerical designation 331 is assigned by ZIPPER to the ZIPPER operational aids, or documentation, shop. Consisting of twelve persons including a chief and all appropriate documentation technicians (such as photo expert, photo technicians, artists, printers, etcher), 331 is set up in a reasonably complete shop located within a physically secure and sound building in Nikolaus Compound at Pullach.

2. The chief of 331, Mr. SAALBERG, initiates EEI's based partly upon requirements received from TAD but largely upon documentation requirements of ZIPPER operations. These EEI's are forwarded through the ZIPPER operational agencies, ultimately reaching individual agents. In return, all documentation or document intelligence collected by ZIPPER operations is funnelled to 331 for evaluation and exploitation. On the basis of completed evaluations, 331 prepares regular documentation bulletins by country, and these are routed to TAD.

3. Within 331 is performed all necessary photo work, artistic copy work, printing and binding of reproductions, as well as final numbering and filling-out. Many of 331's supplies are obtained through direct connections on the German market. Certain cachet work is done in a commercial shop partially controlled by 331. TAD supplies much paper and cover stock, particularly special watermarked papers, all Secret Writing materials, and some photographic supplies to 331. TAD and 331 regularly exchange sample original and duplicate documentation for study and files. 331 forwards to TAD two copies of all documents reproduced by 331, and sample impressions of all cachets produced by 331.

4. The actual documentation production of 331 is considerable, probably comparing favorably with that of TAD. The quality of 331 reproduction work is excellent, as witnessed by increasing eagerness of TAD and OAD to accept 331 reproductions for operational use by [redacted]. As an example, TAD recently described 331's new version of the East German Personalausweis as the best yet made, and this document has been previously duplicated both by TAD and OAD. According to TAD, 331 documentation files are excellent. Based upon observable experience, the committment of ZIPPER agents with 331-produced reproductions has had quite acceptable results, particularly in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The careful 331 planning and recording of details which goes into the assignment of cover story and any specific documentation given to an agent is noteworthy.

5. The total cost of 331 is $ 2,000 per month, which sum is, of course, included within the overall cost of ZIPPER.

6. One of the most cooperative sections of ZIPPER, 331 consistently urges upon us a closer liaison with TAD than the relatively close one which presently functions. In the opinion of POB, headquarters ought to consider seriously according 331 complete access to TAD documentation files. If TAD

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

should be moved to the Munich vicinity, POB believes that a partial 331-TAD amalgamation could be pulled off which would be mutually beneficial, and which would have the highly desirable result of bringing an important ZIPPER technical section under close American supervision. If some step in this direction is not taken soon, POB fears 331 may be among the first ZIPPER assets to be lost by transfer to a German governmental agency. In the absence of the close collaboration which 331 desires, POB has attempted to maintain 331's pro-American attitude by inclusion of Mr. SAALBERG in the [redacted] program. During his trip to the US, SAALBERG will be shown American commercial documentation facilities, but the chief attempt will be to allow him to expound to his heart's content his thesis concerning the importance of organizing a Western IS pool of documentation intelligence to appropriate [redacted] documentation representatives.

7. POB case officer for 331 is [redacted].

TriCountry Reporter & Productions
COMBINING THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PREVIOUS PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

JUPITER - ZIPPER Sovzone OB Collection

JUPITER is the name of a ZIPPER project designed to intensify OB coverage and expedite intelligence reporting in the Soviet Zone of Germany, following the outbreak of war in Korea. In coordination with EUCOM and USAFE requirements for certain priority targets which heretofore were not or only insufficiently covered, ZIPPER was instructed to proceed with the recruitment of suitable sources for these targets. Thus from 1 August 1950 to 1 July 1951 a total of about 500 new sources have been activated in the Sovzone for ground, air, transportation, and economic targets. Originally Washington allocated a sum of DM 60,000 monthly which, with the additional sources, rose to about DM 100,000 monthly by 30 June 51. For the next fiscal year an additional monthly appropriation of DM 66,500 was approved with the clear understanding that this sum is not to be spent for further expansion but for an improvement of sources in the Sovzone. The JUPITER program is based on the proposal system, i.e. each new source to be recruited must first be proposed and only after a thorough scrutiny of the target to be covered, suitability of source, and cost involved, will the proposal be approved by the American Staff Officer. This can best be illustrated by an example:

JUPITER Proposal No. 79/G of 7 May 1951:

1. Recruiting of an eye observer for military targets in the restricted area of Peenemuende - Karlshagen.

2. 4325: German, married, one child (still in Poland), former weapons expert in the German army, Russian PW from the fall of Stalingrad until February 1950. Until a month ago source was employed as mechanic in the motorpool of a ground crew battalion of the Soviet air force in Peenemuende (island of Ruegen). He is unemployed at present and working in his father's repair shop at Zinnowitz, but expects shortly to be reinstated in his former job. Source is still in possession of a Soviet pass permitting free access to the restricted area of Peenemuende. Source is violently anti-Russian, both by conviction and as a result of his long imprisonment.

3. Source is led by agent leader 12911 of GV G and reports to him by secret writing, through a courier, or occasional trips to Berlin.

4. 12911.6 is the courier who about twice a month empties the letter-drop in Zinnowitz and carries the reports to 12911 in Berlin.

5. Monthly cost:

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4325 -	compensation	DM 180.--
	traveling and incidental expenses	90.--
12911.6 - courier:	compensation	100.--
	traveling expenses	90.--
	Total amount approved:	DM 460.--

Approximately 50 - 75 proposals are processed in this manner every month.

POB Case Officer: [redacted].

Extracted for Jupiter Dossier [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

N

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

USAGE

Born in 1910, this controversial German Baron has since pursued the life of a soldier of fortune with varying success. After leading an expedition in search of buried WW I gold in Palestine, he was barred from Germany and later re-admitted. During WW II he appeared as chief of German political intelligence in Bucharest. An SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, he married a Jewess. Intimate with certain of the July 1944 plotters, he was imprisoned by Himmler. He fought with the Austrian resistance (O-5), worked briefly for OSS, and was recruited by ZIPPER. He defected from GV A and ZIPPER in early 1949 in favor of a direct US contact. Relying entirely on our financial support, and ardently desiring eventual emigration to the US, a type of control exists. He receives $3300 quarterly, plus a short term allowance of $500 monthly for a developmental Hungarian plan.

His comprehensive knowledge of intelligence personalities and activities in Austria has been of considerable value, but his reports, originally Austria political, met with varying reactions, and were generally conceded to be of little POB interest. His targets are now Austrian Sovzone OB and CI/E. In addition, he is attempting, with as yet no tangible results, to establish penetrations into Hungary and Rumania. Although he has no effective cover, he has maintained superior security for an agent in Austria, and his contacts with the Austrian Chancellory, Ministries, and police, together with a collection operation controlled by an Austrian colonel, are producing Sovzone OB which is favorably commented on by USFA. His CI/E reports are of sporadic local interest, due possibly to limitations on distribution.

From leading Hungarian Jesuits, with whom USAGE holds the very best contacts, we have a number of names and locations of willing collaborators in Hungary. So much difficulty has been encountered in breaking the Austro-Hungarian border crossing problem, however, that the operation will be dropped if no tangible results are forthcoming by 1 September. In this event it may be necessary to re-examine the position of USAGE to determine if his retention is worthwhile to POB, and if not, if his internal Austrian activities and potentialities might not better be handled by and of more interest to our Austrian station.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

- 4

ZIPPER Satellite Activities

ZIPPER Satellite activities are directed on the Headquarters Staff level by the office of 39. Here overall central guidance and control of strategic operations in the Satellite areas are exercised. Area desks are established and specific areas for coverage have been assigned to individual subordinate ZIPPER agencies.

These units and their field of coverage, which together indicate ZIPPER's present charter, along with the names of the POB Case Officer concerned are as follows:

Org.	Target Areas	POB Case Officer
CSW	CSR	
GV C	Balkans, CSR Yugoslavia (High Political)	
	Poland	
	USSR	
U/M	Hungary	
PE	Poland-Baltic	
RB	USSR	

Three operations exist today on full Field Project status. These are:

Project 73	GV C	Penetration Sov Forces Austria
Project 117	RB	Mail Penetration - German Scientists in Russia
Project 124	GV C	Short-range Penetration - New Poland - Poland

In addition between 30 and 40 proposed or planned operations are in the formative stage of discussion between the field agencies and the POB Case Officers.

In the matter of funds the ZIPPER Ops Chief, 39, is allowed modest leeway in financing general area spade-work. In the case of each basic plan, operation and project, however, all sums must be approved monthly

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

beforehand by the POB staff. In every case, full and accurate post facto accounting is demanded. The past allocation for Satellite Operations has been circa $250,000 per year. The present rate is approximately $50,000 per quarter which is sufficient in view of the paucity of full field projects.

POB Case Officer for Satellite Ops Coordination: [redacted].

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

This page was left blank intentionally.

Falls Country Reporter & Productions
THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

0,

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

extracted for GVA

[redacted] 15 Oct ✓

ZIPPER General Agency A (GV A)

This is at present a 113 man staff (previously known as Organisation 13) comprising the Austrian Wing of ZIPPER with headquarters in Salzburg, now in process of dissolution.

Its top man is Herbert Mailner, former Abwehr captain, Austrian citizen, engaged WW II IS activities Rumania. 36 years of age, explosive temperament, hypercritical of US efforts with whom rapport steadily disintegrated. Is a controversial figure of certain capabilities but with whom a two-year assessment has shown it is impossible to work.

Its activities in the past have ranged from widespread OB collection in Soviet Zone Austria, large-scale CI/CE coverage of Austria, and variegated coverage and operations into Rumania, Hungary, Jugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In more recent times under our control and based upon evaluation and examination the OB coverage was cut almost to nothing as being superfluous and basically outside the province of ZIPPER. Jugoslav operations died rather violently as a result of inner weaknesses and insecurities. The balance of Balkan activities shrivelled up from a complication of insecurity, non-control, extravagence and lack of guidance. The result is that during the period September 1950 and June 1951 the decision to dissolve GV A became inescapable.

Apart from the operational reasons set forth, it was realized that the whole concept of a semi-overt Austrian Wing of a German Intelligence Organisation physically located and operating in, through, and out of Austria, with or without AIS support, was basically inimical to the success of any future permanent relationship between the Bonn and Vienna Governments.

This decision is now being implemented. Understandably it will be a slow process involving the salvation, reassignment and redesignation of certain modest assets both in personnel and operations. (See U/M and BV S.)

Cost of this operation from birth to dissolution, four and one-half years, has been circa one-half million dollars.

It was further decided that since ZIPPER fathered the thing it was up to ZIPPER to carry out the dissolution. The matter was put squarely up to the ZIPPER Chief and is being closely watched by Wallop. The actual details are supervised by ZIPPER's Ops Staff and by

POB Case Officers: [redacted].

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

P.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Extracted for UN
[illegible] Oct

[redacted]

ZIPPER - U/M

This is the code designation for a 60-man Hungarian Group which constitutes a potentially worthwhile asset to be salvaged from the dissolution of GV A. It is to work directly under 39 of the ZIPPER Staff for operational guidance and control with a close tie-in to 40 of ZIPPER Staff on CI/CE matters.

The group is headed by MAYER II as operations chief. He is Austrian, 41 years old, living Salzburg, soon to move to Germany. Former SS Hauptsturmfuhrer, AMT VI F, SD Wien. Balkan expert. GV A Hungarian Group leader. Has good war-time experience and knowledge of area and good connections. He is intelligent and it is believed potentially capable if segregated from GV A and given firm and sound guidance.

MAYER II's immediate office comprises a staff of eight people including himself. Under this staff are three other staffs: (1) for research, with three people; (2) for training, with one person; and (3) for security, with one person.

There are five groups for the collection of positive information and three groups for the collection of CI/CE information, as follows:

Project Group 17588 - consisting of 12 people for the collection of military information on Hungary and Soviet army and air forces in Hungary.

Project Group 17579 - consisting of 15 people for the collection of military information on Hungary and Soviet army and air forces in Hungary and also for the collection of economic information in Hungary.

Interrogation Group 17569 - consisting of two people for the collection of information of a military, economic and political nature on Hungary by interrogations of Displaced Persons, refugees and emigres inside Austria and West Germany.

Operation Group 516 - consisting of 4 people for the collection of army and air Order of Battle information in the Soviet Zone of Austria along the Austro-Hungarian border area.

Operation Group 19331 (P) which consists of two people for the collection of information on and penetration of Soviet armed forces in Austria.

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

6

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Project Group 17578 which consists of 5 people for the penetration in Hungary, Austria and West Germany of the Hungarian Intelligence Service.

Operation Group 19337 which consists of 4 people for the penetration by way of the Austrian Communist Party's Central Committee of the People's Democracies Missions and IS in Vienna.

Operation Group 19338 (P) consisting of 2 persons for the penetration of the Cominform by way of the Austrian Communist Party and People's Democracies.

The quarterly costs of U/M are not firmly fixed as yet but will be approximately DM 30,000.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

9

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

extracted for file
18 Oct 51

ZIPPER Operation "Garbage"

1. Operation "Garbage" is the name given by ZIPPER to the systematic collection of original Russian documents by any source and from any place. ZIPPER has about 15 regular sources collecting these documents and about 50 sources who have occasional access to such material. The documents are collected from places in or near Soviet installations in Germany and Austria, mainly from garbage dumps, furnaces, wastepaper baskets, toilets, Soviet trains. For example, agent V-11213 of ZIPPER Project 73 in Vienna hired two charwomen at 1000 Schillings each a month to furnish him with all the papers they find while cleaning the trains arriving from the USSR. The original material is carefully screened by ZIPPER for its intelligence value, and any stamps, signatures, etc. are forwarded to TAD for reproduction. The remainder of the material is then filed away.

2. It occurred to us that some of this material might have considerable propaganda value since it frequently describes intimate details of everyday life in the Soviet Union. Most of the material consists of correspondence (practically uncensored) between members of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany and Austria, and relatives and friends in the USSR. Two batches of these documents were forwarded to Washington, and we are expecting their assessment in the near future.

3. It is difficult to give a cost estimate of this operation because, with the exception of the example mentioned above, every ZIPPER agent is instructed to collect whatever original material he can obtain in the course of his specific intelligence activity.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

-7

R.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

extracted for file
45 Oct 51.

ZIPPER Project 117

The object of this project is to screen the correspondence exchanged between German scientists in the USSR and their relatives and friends in Germany. The correspondence mainly reveals the names of other scientists in the USSR, their locations, and the type of work they perform, all of which is rated highly valuable intelligence information. However, the ultimate objective of this project is to induce one or more of these scientists to correspond in secret code with their correspondents in Germany in order to answer specific questions prepared by ZIPPER technical experts. Several attempts have been made in this respect but all to no avail so far. At the end of last year some 1000 German technicians returned to Germany from the USSR, and every intelligence agency in Germany, including ZIPPER, started to pounce on these people to debrief them. This caused a great deal of friction between ZIPPER on the one hand and the American and [redacted] agencies on the other. It was therefore decided to coordinate the ZIPPER efforts with MIS who in turn are coordinating their activities with the [redacted]. It is believed that a satisfactory compromise can be reached. The project is in charge of a new ZIPPER staff member by the alias of DORBACH who controls the project leader 2473 alias BALLING. Three former aeronautical experts, 12 230, 12 267, 12 274, screen the correspondence of about 20 correspondents in Germany and arrange the interrogations with returnees. The cost of this project amounts to about DM 5000 a month.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

S

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY SECRET

extracted for file
18 Oct 61

ZIPPER Project 73

This project concerns one man, 11 213, a Polish Ukrainian, who was drafted into the Red Army in 1944 and released in 1946 in Budapest with orders to return to Poland. Instead of returning, 11 213 came to Vienna, where he first lived on the black market and was recruited by ZIPPER late in 1949. His specific task is to attempt to defect Soviet occupation personnel in Austria. 11 213 uses the following technique for approaching Russians in Vienna. He regularly cases the Vienna railroad stations where Russians usually arrive from the Soviet Zone. 11 213 accosts likely candidates and offers some pornographic pictures for sale, at the same time suggesting that he could also procure a girl for him. To this end 11 213 recruited an Austrian girl, described as "neither a saint nor a prostitute", who is willing to take Russians to her discreet apartment. Usually 11 213 accompanies the pair pretending to be the girl's brother and while the Russian is in a state of undress, 11 213 either photographs his papers or simply steals them. Thus about six weeks ago 11 213 procured a soldier's "Soldbuch" (identity book) which was turned over to TAD, and for which 11 213 received a bonus of $150 in US currency. 11 213 intends to recruit 2 or 3 additional girls for similar operations at other places in Vienna where Russians congregate. ZIPPER has not yet been able to find a suitable representative in Vienna who could control 11 213 and teach him the rudiments of security. Meanwhile 11 260 and 11 126 of General Agency C have to make frequent trips to Vienna to keep 11 213 out of trouble. The cost of this project amounts to about 16,000 Austrian Schillings a month.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

-9

Halls Country Reporter & Productions
COMPILED FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

ZIPPER - Project 124

Project 124 involves a penetration into New Poland and consists of three separate phases.

Phase I is the collection of data about military and railroad traffic by V-11 731, a German railroad employee in Kuestrin-Kietz, who acts also as interpreter for Poles and Russians at the Kuestrin RR station, and is allowed to cross the Polish-German border at will. He has regularly supplied reports about military movements and ordinary railroad traffic thru this station. His reports, which have been found accurate and of value, are brought to Berlin by V-11 732, his wife; it is planned, however, to send them via a letter-drop in Berlin-Ost in the event travel between Kuestrin and Berlin should become curtailed. V-11 732 is receiving training as a radio operator in Berlin, and has already been on a test circuit with ZIPPER headquarters. It is planned to use her as a warning and stay-behind agent in case of emergency; she will also transmit especially important transportation reports from V-11 731 by radio to the Berlin station.

Phase II is a border crossing action. d-51 is a German professional fisherman on the tidal waters of the Oder. His brother, who is also a fisherman, has a house located near Kietz, about 100 meters from the tidal waters; no other habitation lies between the house and the river. d-51 and his brother own an eight meter long flat fishing boat, which d-51 uses for ferrying agents across the river. His first assignment, the guiding of V-11 192 onto Polish soil, was carried out successfully in September 1950.

Phase III is the establishment of a courier line from Kuestrin to Berlin by way of the British Zone. This line, which is meant as an alternate communication line for V-11 731 is still in the developmental stage. It leads from Kuestrin to letter-drops in Waren-Rathenow-Thale. The mail is carried from here by courier into the British Zone, and is then forwarded to a cover address in Berlin through the regular postal channels.

The average cost of this project is at present DM 4200 per quarter. This does not include premiums to the border crossing guide, who receives DM 300 for each crossing.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

extracted for
Proj. 124 dossier

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

u

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Operation CARTILAGE

CARTILAGE is designed as a one-time operation, the purpose of which is to obtain a TU-4, MIG-15, or Type 27 (in order of priority). ZIPPER has made three attempts to accomplish this mission. The first attempt, Operation PELIKAN of GV O, was in essence a swindle perpetrated by the supposed chief agent. The second attempt, Operation MAUSI, directed by the same general agency, was revealed as a Soviet-directed double-play only after Soviet intelligence had gained some operationally useful information. The third attempt, Operation AUTOLAK of GV H, initially appeared more promising; but it now seems probable that future developments will expose a swindle or double play in this case as well. Present plans are to put the chief agent on CARRIAGE.

A 30-day CARTILAGE freeze was in effect, as a result of the possibility that the pilots of the two American jet planes in Czech possession would be held as hostages were we to succeed in our purpose. We are asking the Air Force whether rumors to the effect that a MIG-15 was recently acquired are correct. Because of the nature of the assignment, costs cannot be estimated on a quarterly basis.

POB Case Officer: [redacted]

Extracted for Cartilage Dossier/ [redacted]

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

-11

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

The Syrian Case

1. ZIPPER's relationship to the German Military Mission in Syria is now closer than it has ever been before, and the Syrian Desk of [redacted] has indicated its interest in making the exploitation of this group a long-range, joint GIS-AIS project. No intelligence operations are now being conducted, and we have expressed our agreement with the ZIPPER contention that the main initial problem is to see the German Military Mission in Syria firmly established in a position of confidence with the Syrian Government. Our only objective at the moment is to establish a sure means of communication between [redacted] and the German Military Mission, and the German Military Mission and ZIPPER. The office of the MA in Damascus maintains contact with the German Military Mission, which the Syrian Desk does not consider secure and which will not be exploited in the communications system which we hope to establish.

2. POB staff officer: [redacted].

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

CI/CE and Political Reports

1. Processing and dissemination of the ZIPPER CI/CE and political reports presents a special problem to POB. Because these fields of intelligence are rather closely related and often of interest only to select customers, and because ZIPPER's treatment of them is still influenced to a considerable extent by old German Intelligence Service concepts, POB processes these reports separately from the regular ZIPPER positive production.

2. ZIPPER reports in the CI/CE and political categories cover primarily the following targets: the KPD and its front organisations, with special emphasis on the intelligence activities of the party as well as on clandestine Communist organisations in Western Germany; the KPOe together with its front organisations and its clandestine branches; the SED and the various governmental departments of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) with special emphasis on the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its subsidiary the State Security Service (SSD); the intelligence services of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. Reports on the KPD and the KPOe are, for the most part, not given ditto dissemination because, strictly speaking, these are not primary ZIPPER targets; moreover, the number of customers with a primary interest in them is rather limited. Copies of these reports are sent to COS and FDM. Information copies of them are normally passed to ID EUCOM by COS. The principal value of these reports to [redacted] lies in their contribution to the card files. Reports on the SED and the DDR government including the SSD are normally given regular ditto dissemination. Reports on the intelligence services of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, being purely CE in nature, are not given ditto dissemination but copies are forwarded to COS and FDM. Customers with a primary interest in these reports are limited and their content generally is of such a nature as to make a wide dissemination inadvisable. As indicated above, an exception to this rule is made in the case of the SED because of the wide interest in this target on the part of customers in Germany.

3. The volume of reports of a strictly political nature (exclusive of those on activities of the KPD) is rather low because reporting in this field is limited primarily to items of special interest, generally from a fairly high level; these reports are normally given regular ditto dissemination by POB.

4. Also handled by the ZIPPER CI/CE Reports Staff are reports on trade connections between Western firms and firms in the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries. These reports are given regular ditto dissemination.

5. The problem of dissemination of the ZIPPER CI/CE production is under study by COS and FDM at the present time.

6. Handling the screening, editing and dissemination of the ZIPPER CI/CE production for POB is [redacted].

extracted for Report and CI-CE reports dossiers [redacted]

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Lewis County Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

~~TOP~~ SECRET U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted]

1. The POB Operations Office receives from ZIPPER a wide variety of requests for documentation and travel papers which includes requests for German Kennkarte, German Temporary Travel Documents, Rail Travel Orders (2000 per month), Air Travel Orders for Berlin, German and Austrian Frontalier Permits, Housing Permits, Weapons Permits, letters of recommendation or protection issued under the names of the military cover units etc. In addition, the Operations Office maintains a Master List of the Organization which theoretically lists all field agency staff and agent personnel by agent number. As acondition for the fulfillment of these various requests and under the guise of "routine administration", the Operations Office has been able to amass over the past year a considerable amount of information on ZIPPER staff and agent personnel operating outside of the Iron Curtain. This information is recorded for the POB Card File and is also forwarded on a monthly or bi-monthly basis to COS/FDM. The Operations Office has been assisted in this particular CE approach to ZIPPER by a compartmentalization of ZIPPER Headquarters. The ZIPPER personnel office which provides documentation and travel for all ZIPPER personnel is an independent office separate from other ZIPPER operations offices and has its own channels to the field agencies as well as its own card files. Experience has proven that an approach to the Personnel Office on ZIPPER personnel is usually more successful and arouses less suspicion than an approach to an operations office. Furthermore, the Personnel Office apparently does not coordinate with other ZIPPER offices.

2. The POB CE office maintains card files on ZIPPER addresses and telephone numbers ([redacted]); as time permits, CIS (through CLS) is asked to identify the subscribers of the numbers to which long-distance calls have been made by ZIPPER. This project is hampered by lack of the requisite man-hours; likewise, there has been no opportunity yet to ask for name traces (the obvious necessary next step) on subscribers identified by CIS. Another as yet abortive project would involve carding and name tracing the residents listed in city directories at addresses known to us to be occupied by or used as legal cover by ZIPPERites -- here again the requirements of man-hours exceed availability.

Another possibility is the exploitation of our inside knowledge to establish CIS coverage on selected addresses and telephones. This we have done only on an exceptional basis, because of the magnitude of the risk that ZIPPER will be informed, sooner or later,

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

as REVISED 26 NOV 1968

~~TOP~~ SECRET U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

~~TOP~~ SECRET U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

because of insecurity of CIS operations. We are not aware, positively, of any such leak, as yet, but consider it merely a matter of time, inasmuch as CIS installations and operations are obvious CE targets for both ZIPPER and the VS, and that completely all-American handling is not within the present capabilities of CIS. Thus we lose another golden, but fleeting, opportunity. POB CE officer: [redacted].

Extracted for [redacted] dossier / [redacted]

Dist:
1 - SEFG
~~2~~ - COS
✓1 - FDM
2 - POB

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

"HOFFMANSTHAL", ZIPPER D/A Operation

Ref: MGLA-6735

1. This case involves a 26-year old KPD member who was recruited by ZIPPER in February of 1950 to penetrate the KPD in Amberg. In February 1951, while traveling by train between Amberg and Nuernberg, this agent by chance made the acquaintance of a man who subsequently made him an offer of employment by Czech IS. Upon advice of his ZIPPER case officer, the agent accepted the offer and has made several trips to the CSR to contact his Czech case officer, to whom he makes his reports and in turn receives EEI's and payment for his work.

2. Although admittedly a low level case, this operation offers the possibility of producing information on the working methods of Czech IS in the border area between the CSR and Bavaria as well as Czech IS target interests and identities of Czech agents (several have already been identified). Also, the ZIPPER agent has promised an opportunity for a short training course in the CSR which, if made good, should produce additional interesting information.

3. The long-range value of this agent as a ZIPPER KPD source is believed to be considerably greater than the assets which might be derived from this particular operation; therefore, repressive action against any enemy agents exposed through the operation should be undertaken only after very careful consideration.

4. Handled for POB by [redacted]. Financed by Czech IS and by general operating fund of GV L.

attached to
HOFFMANNSTAHL doc.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Dist:
1 - SRFG
~~1~~ - FDM
~~2~~ - COS
2 - POB

SECRET

SECRET U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted]

Ref: MGL-A-7080

1. [redacted] CE Case centering around a ZIPPER Special Connection, who is a [redacted]. [redacted], in addition to being manager of a firm set up in Munich by ZIPPER, maintains an office in a French bank in Paris. He is a 57-year old German, born in Russia, who has been described to us by ZIPPER as a leading engineer in the German armaments industry, with outstanding knowledge of Soviet economy, who--through his extensive Europe-wide connections--would be invaluable in the control of Soviet arms smuggling to the West. We provided travel documentation (when it was not to be procured any other way) and awaited reams of wonderful reports on illegal East-West trade and arms traffic; they did not materialize. We soon gained the strong impression that either ZIPPER did not know or did not want to tell us about the activities of [redacted], presumably the latter. For almost a year we have had CIS coverage on [redacted], which has shown him to be very active indeed in the arms business, with contacts directly or indirectly into every West European country, several satellite countries (especially Rumania), and to be involved in mysterious deals with Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, Africa, inter alia. A number of [redacted] contacts have been linked to illegal East-West trade. The intelligence aspect of these operations, if any, has not appeared in the intercepts, though this is anything but determinative; however, UTILITY has been listed in an open code key used by another (but linked) Special Connection in correspondence with a [redacted] whose activities have drawn queries from the [redacted].

2. [redacted] ZIPPER case officer is @ Hans ROGER, whose job it is to deal with industrial connections of ZIPPER and to arrange for and review ZIPPER's economic cover. Perhaps ZIPPER is uncommunicative in this field because engaged in establishing long term economic cover, which is to be kept secret from us, for use in future activities as a national and independent secret intelligence service--frankly, we do not know yet. ROGER is also of interest to us because he is in communication with an organization, located in Liechtenstein, which concerns itself with the development of very sensitive equipment. In addition, we have received a report to the effect that a firm of which ROGER is at least co-owner has been engaged in illegal East-West trade in ball bearings.

3. No cash outlay has been required, but our observation of the [redacted] has been minimal, largely because of lack of personnel. POB CE officer: [redacted].

Dist:
1 - SRFG
1 - FDM
2 - COS
2 - POB

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET

**SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY**

WG RUHR

Ref: MGLA-6402

1. This case concerns the clarification of a source of GV H (BV 80) who has been supplying what are believed to be fabricated reports on a clandestine Communist resistance movement in the Ruhr area known as WG Ruhr (Wiederstands Gruppe Ruhr). The reports indicate the existence of a very active resistance movement with W/T, Volkspolizei and sabotage units. The reports have not been confirmed by any other sources and their nature is such as to arouse strong suspicions concerning their genuineness.

2. The source of the reports is a miner in the Ruhr area who was recruited by a prominent CDU functionary of Gelsenkirchen who in turn is a contact of GV H. The miner claims to be serving the resistance group as a courier, and when he has the opportunity he makes copies of the documents which he carries and passes them to the CDU functionary.

3. Similar reports which reached AIS channels in the Mannheim area in February 1949 subsequently proved to be fabrications when their source was subjected to carriage. Other reports also reached AIS channels through Belgium; these reports were not only strikingly similar to the WG Ruhr reports but almost certainly came from the same source.

4. Recently a new member of GV H took over the case from the CDU official and established direct contact with the miner. This new GV H case officer is a well-known former GIS officer who was considered an expert in counter espionage and during World War II was active in Holland. ZIPPER feels confident that he will be able to solve the case.

5. This case is financed from the general operating fund of BV 80. The miner receives DM 300 per quarter.

6. Handling the case for POB is [redacted].

Extracted for RUHR dossier

**SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY**

Dist:
SRFG - 1
COS - 2
✓ FDM - 1
POB - 2

SECRET

SECRET U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

ADLER: D/A Operation

Reference: MGL-A-7223

1. The principal personality in this operation is a 32-year old Hungarian of German descent who served as a pilot in the German Air Force in the last war, was a business man in Hungary for a time after the war, and finally in January 1949 came to Austria where he was recruited by GV A as an agent and sent back to Hungary in February 1949. When he applied for acceptance into the Hungarian Army, ADLER was promptly recruited by the Katpol for an intelligence mission against the West, which involved collecting OB on the U.S. Forces and, as a long-range goal, enlisting in the new German Army when organised. Upon returning to Salzburg in April 1950, ADLER reported immediately to the GV A case officer who had dispatched him on his original mission to Hungary, and the D/A play was started with ADLER settled in Heidelberg and directed by the GV A (now UV M) case officer in Salzburg.

2. ADLER's training by HIS extended over the period from late September 1949 to early April 1950 and included W/T training. Communications between ADLER and the Katpol are maintained by prearranged code in brief post card messages, secret inks and meetings with Katpol couriers in Munich. The Katpol has expressed its intention of equipping ADLER with a W/T set; however, this has not as yet been done. The principal short-range asset offered by this case is the possibility of monitoring W/T communications between the Katpol and ADLER in event the latter is supplied with a W/T set. Aside from that, a certain amount of information on HIS target interests in Western Germany and HIS personalities (particularly couriers) can be expected. As for long range considerations, there is the possibility (though admittedly perhaps somewhat remote), that after serving the HIS faithfully as an agent in Western Germany for a period of time, ADLER will find it possible to talk his employers into bringing him back to Budapest and making him a Katpol officer.

3. A case almost identical to this one [redacted]. Indications are that both agents are being run by the same Katpol case officer; at any rate, it has been established that the false identity documents issued both agents were produced in the same shop. Both cases are under study by COS and FDM at the present time for the purpose of determining the best manner of handling the two cases to insure adequate coordination. POB takes the view that unless the [redacted] can be taken over from [redacted] and run directly by DAD, it should be turned over to ZIPPER for

noted for ADLER dossier [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

ADLER

running along with the ADLER case. Such action seems to be indicated in view of the fact that the potentialities of both cases involve monitoring of Katpol agent W/T communications and possible penetration of the Katpol in Hungary itself. Such operations appear to be clearly outside of the realm of responsibility of [redacted].

4. Approximate cost per quarter of this operation is DM 1500.

5. The POB case officer handling this case is [redacted].

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Dist:
1 - SRFG
1 - FDM
2 - COS
2 - POB

SECRET

[redacted]

**SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY**

"Organisation Uebergangsanweisung"

REF: MGL-7292

1. This case involves the penetration, by two GV L sources, of a clandestine Communist organisation which extends throughout Western Germany. This organisation, known as "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung", is under the direct control of a special functionary on the SED Central Committee, and, at the present time, appears to be concerning itself primarily with illegal traffic in personnel and propaganda literature across the border between the Soviet Zone and Western Germany. Its Western German headquarters is in Duesseldorf. There have been indications that higher ranking functionaries in the organisation regard it as the basis for the illegal Communist apparatus which is to go into action in Western Germany in event the KPD is outlawed. According to one report the organisation headquarters in Duesseldorf serves also as a clearing station for courier mail, presumably originating in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and destined for such places as Amsterdam, Paris and Ghent.

2. ZIPPER's penetration of "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung" dated from the time the organization was first established in Bavaria in October 1950 and was effected through a ZIPPER agent who had succeeded in penetrating the KPD in Coburg. This agent has been assigned the code designation "Traverse" by ZIPPER; he is approximately 31 years of age and is an ethnic German from the Baltic. He is described as being well educated and unusually clever. These qualities have enabled him, despite his strong anti-Communist sentiment, to win the favor of high-ranking KPD functionaries in Bavaria as well as of leading figures in the illegal organization itself. At the present time "Traverse" is responsible for organizing and directing all of the illegal border traffic in the area of Coburg; however, there are good prospects that he will be promoted to a higher post in the near future.

3. Fragmentary parts of the reports submitted by "Traverse" on "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung" were confirmed by reports from police sources in the area of Coburg; however, more complete confirmation was recently obtained as the result of the recruitment by GV L of another source in the organization. The new source, whom ZIPPER calls "Schleuse", is the deputy of "Traverse" in "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung"; however, insofar as is known, neither source is aware that the other is reporting to a Western IS. The new source describes "Traverse" as one of the most fanatical Communists in the organization.

**SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY**

This County Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4. The principal value in this case is believed to lie in the prospect which it offers for a fairly high level long-range penetration of what is likely to become the principal underground Communist apparatus in Western Germany. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that, under no circumstances, any action is taken which might tend to compromise the sources. One likely hazard lies in the possibility that CIC may succeed in penetrating "Organisation Uebergangsanweisung" and then apply repressive measures. Action has been initiated to attempt to determine the extent of CIC's knowledge of the organisation without cutting CIC in on the project in any way.

4. The case is financed by general operating funds of GV L. The total sum paid per quarter to the sources is approximately DM 750.

5. Handling the case for POB is [redacted].

noted for
Org. Uebg. dossier [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Kufstein file
15 Oct 51

Operation KUFSTEIN

REF: MGLA-7009

1. This is an operation involving a possible Soviet intelligence deception mill. It is considered of special interest to AIS because its product is strikingly similar to that of an operation known as the Baden/Wien Case which was run in 1949 and early 1950 by Organisation "F" (BARANOVSKI), a ZIPPER subsidiary recently dropped. The Baden/Wien reports consisted primarily of supposedly fairly high level information on the MGB in Austria as well as on the Central Committee of the KPOe. The source was quite obscure and the channel through which the reports reached ZIPPER was devious. Finally, before the case was dropped completely, it was learned that one of the principal sources had been dead for more than a year. The case was never solved.

2. In February 1951 ZIPPER began receiving, through GV C, the current counterpart of the Baden/Wien material and the new case was christened KUFSTEIN. By way of example of the type of material received, some of the reports deal in the movements and missions of MGB officers in such places as Warsaw and the Near and Middle East. The principal source of the Kufstein material is a KPOe member who is quite well known in intellectual circles in Vienna and who obtains the material for his reports through direct personal contact with MGB officers and high KPOe officials in Vienna. Acting as intermediary between the source and the GV C case officer in the case is a Russian emigre who is the wife of an orchestra leader in Vienna. Repeated attempts by the GV C case officer to establish direct contact with the source were rejected by the latter on the basis that he (the source) was under constant observation.

3. At present POB is awaiting evaluation of the KUFSTEIN material by Washington. No efforts will be spared to obtain a complete clarification of this case. Under active consideration is a plan to bring the [redacted] Station of [redacted] into the operation from an investigative view point, without the knowledge of ZIPPER.

4. The approximate cost per quarter of this operation is $760.00.

5. Handling the case for POB is [redacted].

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

[redacted] (V-12753.1)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Reference: MGB-A-9274

1. [redacted] is a ZIPPER CE case in which ZIPPER took over a private, free-wheeling, attempted penetration of the Karlshorst MGB by V-12753.1. In March 1951 he went to East Berlin; he has not returned and no news have been obtained of him; he is presumed arrested by the Soviets. The case is dead unless [redacted] reappears or if the Soviets attempt to recruit his wife, who resides in the British Zone. Examination of possible causes of arrest and final reporting pending.

2. V-12753.1, a 30-year old former Nazi war correspondent, lately a Socialist and psychology student at the Bonn University (with parents in the Sovzone), had offered his services to the Karlshorst MGB, which gave him CE EEIs. ZIPPER's GV G then recruited V-12753.1 as a D/A, run by V/4168, a WW II Abwehr III F official who had considerable experience in the direction of D/A cases (especially against the Western Allies). Handled for POB by [redacted].

3. In view of the short duration of this case and inasmuch as the Soviet side of this play was a CE officer, little was learned concerning the Soviet IS. While active, the case cost DM 400 per month.

[redacted]

Dist:
1 - SRFG
1 - FDM
2 - COS
2 - POB

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted] /

Reference: LONDF-9506

1. [redacted] CE/Compound security case involving an attempt by the Soviets to penetrate the ZIPPER headquarters. [redacted], a ZIPPERITE, reported to [redacted], which advised her to pretend to be amenable to the salesmanship of the Soviet IS recruiter, [redacted]. She indicated her willingness to cooperate and has since been awaiting contact by a person, unknown, who will present an identification token. [redacted], has been briefed and arrangements have been made to undertake surveillance whenever we give the word. Pending arrival of the Soviet IS contact, the case is dormant. In the meanwhile, POB has had CIS coverage on [redacted], as an extra check on her bona fides.

2. a. [redacted] is a 27-year old Silesian refugee who has worked at the ZIPPER headquarters compound as a secretary since November 1945, when it housed Civil Censorship Division (CCD); when ZIPPER moved in she joined the latter, which employment has continued ever since. It was during her employment with CCD that she met [redacted], a fellow employee of CCD, then generally known as a Communist.. Our source has applied for emigration to the USA and is believed, on the basis of previously reliable service to the POB security officer as a security informant, to be rather pro-American, to the occasional disadvantage of ZIPPER. She is a witting source, who has been photographed and who has submitted a personnel questionnaire; she is not paid by POB.

b. [redacted] is a 50-year old Communist, formerly a German merchant seaman, now an official of the DDR in Berlin. During the Nazi regime he was arrested by the Gestapo and deported. Subsequently, in 1943, he was selected by the [redacted] for a long-term [redacted] operation; allegedly (according to the [redacted]), [redacted] dropped him in 1944, because of bad health. From 1945 to 1947, as a [redacted], he was employed in charge of the CCD dining hall, Pullach, Germany, where his divorced wife, son and daughter still reside. Thereafter, he moved to Berlin where, as an SED man, he obtained official posts. He has made a number of illegal trips back to Pullach since then; also he has been visited by his son and daughter in Berlin, where he lives with his second wife, an East Berlin secretary.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted]

3. [redacted] originally reported to [redacted]; since April 1951 the POB CE case officer has been [redacted].

4. Costs so far: none. Assistance in normal processing of USA immigration promised. If Soviet IS contact established, expenses will be paid.

[redacted]

Dist:
1 - SRFG
✓1 - FDM
- COS
2 - POB

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

3

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

U.S. OFFICIALS O

Zipper History

WIRBEL, ZIPPER D/A-CI Operation

Ref: MGLA-6497, MGLA-7445

1. The principal personality in this project is a former Abwehr Colonel who lives in Luebeck and has close contact with the Schleswig-Holstein VS. The project is based on the recruitment by him in December 1950 of the following personalities:

   a. A 30-year old woman journalist with ADN in Luebeck who, although not a convinced Communist, joined the KPD in 1947 in order to obtain employment as a correspondent for a Communist newspaper. She is in contact with a close friend in Schwerin who is a courier for, and mistress of, an MGB major who, in turn, recruited the woman journalist as an agent. The latter has made several trips to Schwerin where she was debriefed by the MGB; the MGB in turn gave her EEI's on British OB and assigned her the mission of recruiting radio operators in the British Zone of Germany.

   b. A 33-year old former Abwehr officer who spent the closing days of the last war in the Reichschancellery bunker and published a book on his experiences there. After the war he became active in the Bruderschaft, and through his activities in the latter organization he came into contact with the chief of the section for Western German affairs of the DDR Information Office, a responsible ADN journalist in Hamburg, and with the Russian Ambassador to the DDR.

2. The woman journalist and the Bruderschaft member are acquainted and each is aware that the other is reporting to the same Western intelligence service. Neither individual is a confirmed Communist and both are believed to have become involved with the Communist movement as a result of circumstances.

3. Although developments in this operation have been proceeding at a rather slow pace, the operation holds the possibility of producing information on Soviet IS targets in Western Germany and also possibly supplying the identities of Soviet agents, including W/T operators, operating in Western Germany. In addition, it should provide valuable information on the Bruderschaft complex and Soviet interest therein, as well as information on the organisation of the ADN in Western Germany.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONL

SECRET CON

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4. After the operation had been running for some time it developed that the Bruderschaft member had been a [redacted] agent for approximately three and one half years and that his D/A play was started with [redacted] blessings. He voluntarily admitted this to his ZIPPER case officer stating, however, that it would be difficult for him to break with [redacted] at this time. From talks between the POB and [redacted] case officers involved in the case, it was established that [redacted] considers the Bruderschaft member a valuable agent and certainly does not feel inclined to drop him. In a joint [redacted]-POB interview with the Bruderschaft member the latter stated that, if compelled to work for only one service, he would choose ZIPPER because here lay his chances for a career in the future German IS. Final agreement with [redacted] for future handling of the case has not been reached.

5. The operation is under the supervision of the CI/CE staff officer of GV C. Handled for POB by [redacted].

6. The operation costs DM 3,900 per quarter.

extracted for WIRBEL dossier [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET CONTROL

Courier MGLA-7892

SECRET/RELEASE CONTROL
TO GERMANY ONLY

1P

21 August 1951

SRFG

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

Briefing for ———

Reference: MGLA-7543

MICROFILMED
AUG 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Transmitted herewith are four additional brief summaries of ZIPPER activities; the Baranovski organization, Polonaise, BV S, and ZIPPER Interrogation Effort.

Distribution:

SRFG - 2 w/1 cy attach.
PDM - 1 w/1 cy attach.
COS - 1 w/2 cy attach.
POB - 2 w/1 cy attach.

AN NJD	
AB	
IN	
PS P2	
BX 2	
~~DES~~	~~NFD~~
FI	
RID	RPU

RESTRICTED TO 602

IR COPY

[redacted]

1AH.

SECRET/RELEASE CONTROL
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET CONTROL

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

MICROFILMED
AUG 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

The BARANOVSKI Organisation

Reference: PULL-2315

1. A ZIPPER subsidiary which demanded special attention from the POB staff for some time was the organization of Nikolai BARANOVSKI, sometimes referred to as Organization F. BARANOVSKI, also referred to as Fritz, is a well-known Russian Monarchist in Munich who has specialised in collecting CI/CE information from among Russian emigre circles in Western Europe. In addition, Fritz also developed other sources as opportunities for such presented themselves.

2. Fritz's position, with respect to ZIPPER, was somewhat unique in that he received very little operational guidance or control. Aside from furnishing name traces to ZIPPER upon request, it was simply a matter of ZIPPER furnishing Fritz with certain monthly sums of money and, in return, receiving whatever Fritz was able to produce in the way of reports. ZIPPER was not furnished with personality identities or operational details except in rare and very special cases.

3/ Fritz has frequently been denounced as an intelligence fabricator, which however, is not too surprising in view of the fact that slander campaigns are frequent occurrances in Russian emigre circles. No concrete proof that he ever fabricated intelligence himself or wittingly passed such material has ever been obtained.

4. One of BARANOVSKI's cases which drew widespread attention and which was running in early 1949 and 1950 was the so-called Baden/Wien Case which allegedly involved penetration of an MGB network with headquarters in Baden near Vienna. This penetration ostensibly was affected through the secretary of the chief of the net who furnished carbon copies of all reports which she typed; these reports reached BARANOVSKI allegedly through a devious courier channel. The reports appeared suspicious from the beginning and, after some time, it was learned that the person who had been named as chief of the net had been dead for some time. The case was finally dropped without being clarified. At present ZIPPER is receiving material from a Vienna source which bears a striking similarity to the Baden/Wien material. It is hoped that clarification of this new case (Kufstein) will shed some light on the old Baden/Wien Case. ZIPPER is of the opinion that if the material in the latter case was fabricated, which appears highly probable., Fritz was not the fabricator nor was he aware that the material was fabricated. In general, POB is in accord with this view. Quite obviously the basic faults can be traced back to the concept of operational free-wheeling which characterised the ZIPPER-ID NUCOM relationship prior to mid-1949 and which, in turn, was reflected in even greater measure in the ZIPPER-Fritz relationship.

5. Aside from reasons of lack of operational control, the ZIPPER-Fritz relationship was never a healthy one. Naturally enough, Fritz, a Russian emigre, was not happy with working for a German organization.

CS COPY

H/W att. 1 to MGLA - [illegible]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted]

POB established direct contact with Fritz in late 1950 for the purpose of extracting from him the identities of the members of his organization, obtaining whatever clarification possible of the Baden/Wien source and determining Fritz's possible future value to AIS. In this relationship Fritz was given the impression that AIS was investigating the practicability of a direct Fritz-AIS relationship, a prerequisite for which would be complete clarification of Fritz's organization to the satisfaction of AIS. Fritz supplied extensive data on his personnel and, in the opinion of POB, told what he knew about the Baden/Wien case. In the meantime ZIPPER had made preparations to sever connections with Fritz.

6. On the basis of his wide connections in all sections of the Russian emigration and his extensive knowledge of activities and personalities in those circles, which in turn is supported by his files containing approximately 20,000 carded names, POB is of the opinion that, if properly handled, Fritz could be a definite asset to the AIS CI/CE effort in Western Germany. Granted that there may be some reason for misgivings concerning his integrity, these suspicions still remain to be substantiated. Moreover, it must be admitted that if intelligence operations were conducted only through individuals of impeccable character, production would virtually be nil.

7. POB believes that Fritz could be run most appropriately by MOB ([redacted]) who undoubtedly would benefit most from his CI/CE production on the Russian emigration. At the time Fritz was being dropped from the ZIPPER payroll POB approached him (on the recommendation of FIM) with an offer to continue to support his organization at the rate of DM 9000 per month (the sum he received from ZIPPER) until a more permanent working arrangement with AIS could be concluded (i.e., until MOB could take over). Although emphasizing that he was still definitely interested in working for AIS, Fritz refused to accept this type of support stating that he would consider only a concrete proposal for working for AIS. POB thereupon recommended that MOB (now briefed on the case) establish contact with Fritz at an early date.

8. Representing POB in dealings with BARANOVSKI were [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted].

attached to BARANOVSKI dossier /[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

„SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY

Tri-County Reporter & Productions

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

"POLONAISE"

Reference: MGL-A-5948

1. "POLONAISE" was an embryo ZIPPER CE D/A case in which it was hoped to penetrate alleged clandestine Polish IS activities of the Communist-front cultural organisations: CHOPIN COMMITTEE and Helmut von GERLACH SOCIETY. The case now appears to be a swindle; field analysis of the latest reports and their incorporation in a swan-song report by POB are pending.

2. The D/A involved, V-694, a 37-year old official of the CHOPIN Committee and WW II Abwehr II officer, was handled by ZIPPER's V-950, a former Abwehr III F officer, experienced in CE operations against the Polish IS

3. From V-694 and other sources ZIPPER produced a 5-page CE report dated 6 April 1951 re the "Helmut von GERLACH-Gesellschaft und CHOPIN Komitee". This same report was sent by ZIPPER to Bonn Verfassungsschutz.

4. Initially, costs were estimated at DM 1693 monthly, of which DM 850 were for V-694.

5. The POB case officer is [redacted].

extracted for
Polonaise dossier

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Trails Country Productions

SECRET

BV S (The SCHAEFER Organization)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Ref: FULL-2185

1. BV S (District Agency S) under @Dr. SCHAEFER was formerly the CI/CE group of GV A and was retained when that organization was dissolved. It is now under the direct supervision of ZIPPER headquarters. With its headquarters moved from its previous location in Salzburg to Bad Reichenhall, the principal mission of BV S is to secure the lines of all ZIPPER operations running through Austria. This is effected primarily through investigators located at critical points whose principal duty it is to make routine investigations, upon request, of personalities or other matters relating to ZIPPER operations which demand clarification; in this connection police sources are also utilized. In addition BV S runs some relatively low level CI/CE sources primarily against the Austrian Communist party. Though low level, these sources have been retained principally because they represent some sort of an opening into the KPOe; their cost is relatively low.

2. BV S is divided into three UVs (Sub-Agencies) each consisting of a UV leader together with his agent sources and/or investigators. One of these, located in Linz, has seven sources in the KPOe in Linz, Urfahr and Graz and one police source in Linz. Another, with headquarters in Klagenfurth, has two police sources in Klagenfurth and an investigator together with a CI/CE source in Carinthia. The largest of the UVs is located in Salzburg; it has three investigators in Vienna, one in Salzburg and one in Styria, and in addition has police sources in the Tyrol, Vienna, Salzburg and Bruck-Neudorf near the Hungarian border.

3. Approximate budgetary allotment per quarter for BV S is 100,000 schillings.

4. Representing POB in matters concerning BV S is [redacted]

Extracted for BVS -
File. [redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Twin Country Reporter & Productions
COMPILED FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

ZIPPER Interrogation Group

1. The ZIPPER complex in Western Germany presently includes a group of 63 persons engaged in the interrogation effort of ZIPPER field agencies. Of this total number, 56 are German speaking, conducting interrogations of selected PW's, German returnees, Sudetan and Silesian German refugees, and any other German speaking refugees who arrive in West Germany. Their interrogation effort is conducted for a dual purpose, (a) for the procurement of positive intelligence from those countries where refugees come from (particularly German speakers from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, etc.; and (b) for the procurement of operational information required to successfully conduct agent operations into the satellites. Point (a) above undoubtedly duplicates AIS coverage through the same means and contributes very little to overall collection requirements, however, ZIPPER operates in a vacuum in that generally we do not provide them with information procured by any AIS or other agency, and ZIPPER requires this information for background data, current situations within the various countries, and the sundry other reasons an intelligence organization must possess detailed data to successfully conduct their assigned mission.

2. Most of the interrogators operating in the US Zone of Germany utilize POB sponsored cover as members of the "Historical Research Division, Statistical Branch," and has worked satisfactorily to date. The interrogators operating in the British Zone are under various German cover, i.e., VS, Ministerium fur Fluechtlingswesen, refugee camp officials, etc. ZIPPER is gradually effecting overall German cover, and will proceed as rapidly as the legalization of the ZIPPER organization.

3. The present policy regarding interrogations is to phase out the PW interrogation, place greater emphasis on refugee, returnee, illegal border crossers interrogations, and create a centrally controlled "Contacts Branch" type of debriefing of German officials who travel into the satellites for various reasons.

4. The program as presently constituted (it is extremely fluid in the number of interrogators) costs 94,650 DM per quarters.

5. The responsible POB case officer is .

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

**SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY**

VIA: AIR
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. EGL-A-4676

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

Date 10 AUG 1953

To : Chief, EE

Info: COM

From : Chief of Base, Pullach

Subject: general– ZIPPER/Operational
specific– Glossary

The attached glossary of numerical, letters, abbreviations and names of projects or of sections in use at POB 1946 to 1953 was compiled from old files and with the assistance of various members of POB. The names of individuals given in connection with various projects or administrative sections, are the names of the individuals who were originally associated with that project or section. This glossary does not claim to be complete; some dates were not known or arrived at by deduction rather than from records; and other items were remembered by POBers and did not come from the records. However, it is felt that this glossary will be of assistance to all individuals working with material on ZIPPER.

Approved:

7 August 1953

**SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY**

DIST:

✓3 - EE w/1 attach (3cy) - Direct
3 - COM w/1 attach (3cy)

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical Designations
as used at POB 1946 to 1953

Numerical Designation	Description	Dates in Use	Aug 5 Changed to
1	personnel section, headquarters, LOEWE	15 Jul 49 to 19 Dec 49	32
3	organization group	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	33
7	operations, headquarters staff, SCHACK	15 Jul 49 - 4 Jan 51	31
13	general agency, WAGNER Salzburg	15 Jul 49- 14 Apr 50	GV A
17	Central European sub-hqtrs under 7, WAGNER	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	dissolved
20	Mr. "Marshall" (compound name for [redacted])	25 Oct 49 - 24 Oct 50	25
22	district agency, Sovzone RITTER, Esslingen	15 Jul 49 - 1 May 51	BV N
25	Mr. "Marshall"	24 Oct 50 - present	
25.	when preceding a number indicates the American section opposite to the German section with that number		
27	sub-hqtrs under 7	Nov 48 - spring 49	
27	American operations staff	Oct 49 - Jan 52	25.38, 25.39
29	field offices	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.1	field office, Berlin	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.2	field office, Frankfurt/M	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.3	field office, Berchtesgaden	4 Jan 51 to present	
29.4	field office, Stuttgart	4 Jan 51 - 26 Feb 52	
30	Dr. "Schneider" (compound name for UTILITY)	25 Oct 49 to present	formerly 34
31	operations	1 Nov 49 - 4 Jan 51	formerly 7; some transfer d 24 Oct 50; 38,
32	personnel	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 1
33	headquarters organisation	1 Nov 49 to present	
33.3	"E" Plan officer, CHRISTERN	? to present	
33 Ku.	courier section (kurier)	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 3 K
34	Dr. "Schneider"	15 Jul 49 - 25 Oct 49	became 30
34	special missions - stay-behind net	4 Jan 51 to present	formerly F-net
35	special connections	15 Jul 49 to present	
36	communications, HAUSL	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly N
37	finance; budget, administration	1 Nov 49 to present	
38	technical intelligence; Sovzone Germany	24 Oct 50 - 28 Nov 51	formerly part of 31; became 50)

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Numorical Designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953

- 2 -

39	strategic intelligence section, satellites/USSR	24 Oct 50 - 26 Nov 51	formerly part of 31, became 50S & 50R
40	CI/CE, [illegible]KLAUSER	24 Oct 50 to present	formerly LIII, 45/III; 40/III
40/A	deputy chief, CI/CE	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/F	chief, CE branch	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40.III
40/F-1	CE officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/F-2	CE officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/P	chief, political branch	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/P1
40/P-1	political intelligence officer	Oct 50 to present	formerly 45/P
40/P1	chief, political branch	to Oct 50	became 40/P
40/Si	security branch of 40	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/Z and 40/III/Z
40/Z	incidents and tracing officer	Oct 50 to present	
40/K	chief, central card files	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/E	chief, research and analysis	October 50 to present	
40/KP	communist party specialist	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/S	satellite IS specialist	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III
40/[illegible]	CI economic section, illegal trade	Oct 50 to present	formerly 40/III,
40/R	RIS specialist	Oct 50 to present(actually ceased to exi for brief period after estab. of 40/E).	
40/V	CI "government connections"		
40/IIIa	deputy chief, CI/CE	to Oct 50	became 40/A
40/IIIb	chief, CE branch	to Oct 50	became 40/F
40/III,1	communist party specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/KP
40/III,2	RIS specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/R
40/III,3	satellite IS specialist	to Oct 50	became 40/S
40/III,4	CI economic section, illegal trade	to Oct 50	became 40/[illegible]
40/III/Z	incidents and security	to Oct 50	became 40/Z and 40/Si
40/III/K	chief, central card files	to Oct 50	became 40/K
41	economic cover procurement [illegible]GERLACH	15 Jul 49 to present	
41/Rb	[illegible]RUGER, Hans Felix		
42	legal matters, [illegible]	4 Jan 51 to present	formerly 75
43	camp security	9 Apr 51 to present	formerly part of 67

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

44	intelligence activities in USSR, UHERDAHL	21 Nov 51 - 28 Dec 51	formerly 39/R became 50/R
45	evaluation group	15 Jul 49 to present	
45.1	military evaluation, army		became 45M
45.1L	military evaluation, air		became 45L
45.1T	transportation and supply		became 45T/V
45.2	political evaluation		became 45/P
45.3	press evaluation		became 45Pr.
45.5	translation		became 45D
45.7	economic evaluation		became 45W
45.6	"professors group"	1 Nov 47 - 31 Aug 49	dissolved
45.8	CI evaluation	prior to Oct 50	became 40/III
45 M	military evaluation, army	to present	formerly 45.1
45L	military evaluation, air	to present	formerly 45.1L
45 T/V	transportation and supply	to present	formerly 45.1T
45 P	political evaluation	to present	formerly 45.2
45 Pr	press evaluation	to present	formerly 45.3
45 D	translation section	to present	formerly 45.5
45 W	economic evaluation	to present	formerly 45.7
46	special intelligence advisor to 30, USCHLACK	26 Nov 51 to present	
50	positive operations	28 Nov 51 to present	formerly 38,39 and 44
50 M	naval (Marine) sifting	28 Nov 51 - Oct 52	became 50/Sich/M
50 M	naval operations	Oct 52 to present	formerly 431
50/Sich/M	naval sifting	Oct 52 to present	formerly 50 M
56	agent radio operations system UBANNER	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 136
57	radio monitoring system UBERHARD	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 236
60	psychological warfare, research and planning	Oct 52 to present	
66	sub agency, UMERKEL, Tegernsee	Aug 46 - Nov 48	part became BV 7 of GV C, part became GV C
67	camp administration	15 Jul 49 to present	divided 9 Apr 5 into 67 and 43
75	administration and legal UWEGNER	15 Jul 49 - 4 Jan 51	became 42
97	district agency under 4711 ZAHN and GLASENAPP (deceased) Tegernsee	15 Jul 49 - ?	formerly Org 850 became BV ND of

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

- 4 -

99	field agency, uHENGL	1949 - 1 Nov 49(?)	became GV C
100	strategic planning, uBREUER	ca. Apr 47	became 39(then 50S)
101	district agency, Sovzone uGROTH, Wetzlar	15 Jul 49 - ?	? became GV G hqrs in Munich in 1953
102	district agency, Sovzone uGEHRENS, Grossostheim	? - ?	became BV 80 of GV H
103	district agency, Sovzone uGEROLL, Stuttgart	- 1 Jul 53	became BV 90 of GV H
107	training center, under operations, uKOERNER, Murnau	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 131
114	CI field agency under uLEIDL, Karlsruhe	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became GV L
120	field agency, uBOSSELT Stuttgart	Feb 47 - 14 Apr 50	GV E, BVS, CSW
130	southwest German liaison, uDEHNERT, Stuttgart; existed as a small part of 29.4a	26 Feb 52 to present	
131	schools	1 Nov 49 to present	
136	agent radio system	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 56
177	hqs. op NORTH, Garmisch "basket"	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became sleeping net
178	district agency, subordinate to 120; uSEIFERT, Chiemsee	Jun 46 - ?	
231	PW interrogations	24 Oct 50 - 28 Dec 51	became 50/V
236	monitoring system	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 57
331	reproductions and documents	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 9999
431	advisor on navy	1 Nov 49 - 1 Nov 52	formerly 785 became 50 M
500	org. headed by uHENGL	Jun 46 - 1 Nov 49	became GV H
531	hqrs investigations team uHOEMER	1 Nov 49 to present	
631	screening of compromised agents	24 Oct 50 - 1 Oct 51	became 733
733	screening of compromised agents	15 Oct 51 to present	formerly 631
785	naval operations, uDUERKHEIM, Bad Toelz	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 431
999	hqrs operations	15 Jul 49 - ?	?

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Numerical designations as used at POB 1946 to 1953:

3000	Residentura - Bulgia under 101	29 Jul 49 - ?	?
4711	agency, @ROTH, Frnakfurt/M	15 Jul 49 - 14 Apr 50	became GV G
4913	agency, @SCHAEFER, Austria	15 Jul 49 - 14 Apr 50	became GV A,
8500	sub-org, GLASENAPP (deceased)	- 15 Jul 49	became sub or
9999	reproduction and documents, @SAIBERG, Pullach	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 331

Latin numerals

I/V	hqs ops, operated the GVs @KRAMER, and @GRUENWALD	15 Jul 49 - ?
III/Pol	CI political	

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Letter Designations, Abbreviations and Names
in Use POB 1946 to 1953

6 Aug 53

(The letter designations were instituted about 1 Sept 1949 replacing the early numbering system. Staff personnel continued to have numbers.)

Designation	Description	Dates in Use	Changed to
BV	(Bezirks Vertretung), district field agency under a GV		
BV B	(BALLING), under GV G synonymous with NB, placed under BV E in Jun 53	1 May 51 - Jun 53	
BV E		1 Sept 51 to present	formerly GV E
BV M	(Mitte)	1 May 51	
BV NB	(Nieder Bayern)	1 May 51	
BV S	(SCHAEFER) CI field unit in Austria, operationally under Sec 40, was originally under GV A	to present	
BV 80	under GV H	3 Mar 52	
CSW	(Czechoslovakia - WEBER) executive agency of 50	4 Jan 51 to present	
F	Orf F, (Freedom or Fritz BARANOWSKI), field agency	1949	was project 57 dissolved
F-net	(Funk-net) stay-behind or sleeping net	1949 to 4 Jan 51	became 34
Filiale	sub-agencies or nets under UVs	1949 to present	
G	Org. G (GLASENAP), under Org 5	to end Oct 48	became part of sub org 97
GV	(General Vertretung), general agency		
GV A	strategic, Austria/Satellites	1 Nov 49 - 1 Jun 51	dissolved
GV B	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Jun 51 to present	
GV C	mostly strategic, some tactical	1 Jun 51 to present	
GV E	tactical, over BV B, BV M and BV NB	1 Nov 49 - 14 Sept 51	became BV E/ tactical and strategic
GV G	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Nov 49 to present	
GV H	mostly tactical, some strategic	1 Nov 49 to present	formerly 500
GV L	CI/CE field agency, operationally under Sec 40	1 Nov 49 to present	
H	Hauskapelle, under L/III	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 531
H	(Heer), army		
HRF	sub orgs under GV C	- Apr 50	UVs
Haupt Forscher Gruppe WALLNER	forscher for Sec 50	1 Jun 51 to present	

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Letter designations, abbreviations and names in use [illegible]

K (or GV K)	field agency, [illegible] also called "basket"	1949 - 1 Nov 49	became GV H
K (or 40/K)	(kartei) central card files		
K or Ku	(Kurier), courier, was under 3	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 49	became 33 Ku
Project Kranich	- stay-behind net	1949 to Jan 51	became 34
Residentura K	- was under 101	26 Jul 49 - ?	
L	(Luft), air		
L-I	hqrs ops section (Leiter - I, I type work)	15 Jl 49 - ?	
L/III	hqrs CI section (III type work)	15 Jul 49 - 24 Oct 50	became 40
MEZ	(Mitte Europaische Zentrum) field agency under [illegible]	falll 1946 - 15 Jul 49	became GV A
MF	independent agency	1 Nov 49 - ?	
MK	(Meldekopf) communications center		
MK Berlin	communications center, Berlin on 26 Feb 52 became Berlin field office (however this never appears to have taken over)	1949 to present	
N	(Nachtrichten), communications existed as a section prior to 1 Nov 49, became 36		
PE	(Polen - GELLERT) executive agency of 50 for satellites	4 Jan 51 to present	
39/Pl	planning section	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 51	part of 50
Q	(Quelle), source evaluation	15 Jul 49 - 1 Nov 51	50/Q
RB	(Russland - BALLING), executive agency of 50	Nov 51 to present	previously BV
RL	(Russland - LEITNER), executive agency of 50; Baltic ops	April 52 to present	
Si	(Sicherheit) security		
Res S-Y	sub_org	to 14 Apr 50	became UV Y of GV C
Stein gruppe	unattached group in Berlin	26 Jul 49 - ?	
T	transportation		
UN	(Ungarn - MAYER) was under GV A now executive agency of 50; Hungary and Sovzone Austria ops	1 Sept 51 to present	
UV	(Unter Vertretung) sub agencies under BVs	Apr 50 to present	
Wi	(Wirtschaft), economic		

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY



Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56

Part III: ZIPPER Operations and Counterintelligence

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TO : Foreign Branch S

FROM : Foreign Branch M

SUBJECT : Emigrant Groups

3 August 1949

1. As a direct result of the investigation of Odeum conducted in December 1948, there was obtained the considered opinions of Odeum on the subject of emigrant groups. Odeum's classifications and comments are attached as also are two charts on Russian emigration and anti-soviet resistance movements in the American zone of Germany.

2. It is believed that the attached information will be of interest to officers in FBS who may be studying emigre movements. Attention is invited particularly to paragraph 6 in which Odeum concludes that the entire OUN, UHVR, UPA complex bears watching but deserves little consideration in terms of material support and intelligence usefulness.

Richard Helms

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONL

EMIGRANT GROUPS

1. ODEUM makes three broad classifications of emigrant groups:

   a. Russian groups;

   b. Ukrainian, Polish, and other non/Russian groups within the Soviet Union; and

   c. Balkan groups.

RUSSIAN GROUPS (see Attachment 1).

2. Until recently, a clear/cut distinction was made between the so called "Old Emigration" and the "New Emigration." Recently, however, the two groups began to come together in the AZODNR (Anti-Communistic Center for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples). Nonetheless, ideological convictions are usually all that remains to emigres, and one common characteristic, therefore, of all emigrant groups is the adherence to a narrow ideology, all deviations from which are hated and slandered. Despite partial unity obtained in the AZODNR, therefore, strong suspicions and antipathies still exist between the two groups, with the "new" emigration accusing the "old" of being politically disinterested and living primarily for its own well-being, or that its political views are based upon ignorance and lack of experience with present developments in the Soviet Union; or on the other hand, the common accusation leveled by the "old" against the "new" emigration is that it is unfamiliar with non-Bolshevistic, i.e. democratic concepts, and that it is not really anti-Communistic, but that it is merely fighting excesses of communism. (For this reason, ODEUM, when evaluating the claims and counter-claims of one group vis-a-vis another, habitually extracts 50 -60% of the contents as being unreliable).

a. The Old Emigration in the main is comprised of organizations formed between the Revolution and 1922, and its ranks are primarily filled with veterans from White Russian armies. The three principal organizations are:

(1) WMS (Supreme Monarchist Council), a small faction of old-timers adhering to the concept of Czarist rule. The monarchist idea is not popular, and the group is therefore small. Nonetheless, it has some clever individuals, the most important of whom is a Mr. S. KURIEN, and it is determined to play an active part with the New Emigration. Due to its activity it does, in fact, play a larger role than that to which its numerical following should entitle it.

(2) NTS (National Workers' Union), described by ODEUM as an honorable and reliable group whose principal preoccupation is with the vocational training and placement in various Western European countries of its second generation. It has taken great care to avoid penetration by the Soviets.

(3) ROVS (General Russian Veterans' League), established in the early 1920's in Sofia, and composed of the majority of emigrants veterans who fought the Communists during the Russian Revolution. Its

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

leadership is quite old, being headed by General ARCHANGELSKI, who is over 80 years of age.

b. The New Emigration received its organization impetus in 1944 with the publication of the so-called "Vlassov Manifesto" in Prague which outlined two main points, the over-throw of Bolshevism, and the right of self-determination of future government(s). Since that time the principal groups which have arisen or have been modified are:

(1) KONR (Committee for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples), founded by Vlassov, and out of which two main subordinate groups developed:

(a) ROA, the political element of the KONR; and

(b) BSM (Fighting League of Russian Youth), the militaristic and youthful element of the KONR.

(2) SBONR (Fighting League for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples), an outgrowth of the BSM, which developed intelligence and propaganda functions.

(3) SAF (League of Andrews Flag), which contains elements of the earlier ROA, and which also has close associations with the SBONR. Considerable influence is exercised on this group by General GLASENAP.

(4) AZODNR (Anti-Communistic Center for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples), formed recently and claiming leadership of all groups, not only of the New Emigration, but of the Old as well. It is recognized by the majority of the groups, derives its leaders primarily from the Old Emigration, and its followers primarily from the New, and is, in a sense, the nucleus for a united Russian Government-in-exile. After its formation, however, a split occured between two of the important leaders, KROMIADI and GLASENAP, and the latter withdrew from AZODNR, together with his principal associates. AZODNR, however, retained control of SAF by decree. Because it is the strongest central authority in the over-all Russian emigration, AZODNR, together with SAF and SBONR, appears to have been fairly well penetrated by the Soviets (see names in red on Attachment 1).

3. Politically, ODEUM considers that the [illegible] is the most representative of all Russian groups, although its leadership is not unchallenged, and although it is to a slight degree penetrated. The latest declaration of the plenum asking for support of the emigres and for a definite statement from the Western Powers as to how they intend to handle the Russian peoples after the defeat of the USSR indicates that the AZODNR is definitely seeking unofficial backing. ODEUM is at present translating a study [illegible] this question which was initiated as a result of discussions on this subject four or five months ago with Mr. Dulles, Mr. Offie, a Mr. Davis, and others.

UKRAINIAN GROUPS (see Attachment 2):

4. The political complexion of the various exiled Ukrainian groups ranges from the leftist UHDP (Revolutionary Democratic Party), with an even more leftist and suspect sub-group, the UHDP(s) in Regensburg, to the extreme rightist OUN(R) party of Bandera, standing for the fascistic principle of a one-party government and one-party state.

5. After the war, the problem faced by the various groups (see attachment) within the Ukrainian emigration was one of effective unification. Finally in July 1948, the UNC (Ukrainian National Council) was revived with the support of all groups except the Hetman Party. To get Bandera's cooperation, UNC made the concession that Bandera should be responsible for partisan activities in the Ukraine and that he should still be entitled to continue UHVR (Ukrainian Insurgents Army). UNC then proceeded to the election of UNR (Ukrainian National Government). Sometime thereafter, both the leftist parties and Bandera withdrew their support from the UNR with the result that today UNC is supported by all parties except the Hetman, but UNR, under UNC, cannot rely on the wing parties.

6. ODEUM is beginning to believe that UPA and UHVR have been highly overrated, citing the fact that when the Soviets started their last attempt to smash UPA in the Ukraine, UPA personnel trickled out by the dozens only. In ODEUM's opinion the influx into western areas would have been far more considerable were there in fact strongly organized and numerically large UPA bands operating in the Ukraine. Even within OUN(R) (Bandera) the same doubts appear to be gaining circulation, particularly at the "followers" level, and questions have been raised as to what courier channels exist to the Ukraine, as to where money collected from Bandera supporters is going, etc. A ODEUM agent, described as "absolutely reliable," and a member of UNR, has also informed ODEUM that he doubts the existence of UPA in any form other than small groups hiding in woods for self-protection, and that UNR's lip-service belief in the existence of well-organized UPA groups is to a large extent due to the desire to secure Bandera's cooperation, and thus to attempt to maintain as united a front as possible within the emigration. The majority of the intelligentsia among the Ukrainian emigration, including those who are post-war emigrants, follow the UNR, and not the Bandera complex. ODEUM points out that these comments and tentative conclusions might not be valid in the event of war, in which case strongest support within the Ukraine would be given to any group or groups, regardless of other political factors, who offered liberation from Russia. At present, however, ODEUM concludes that the entire OUN(R)----UHVR, ZPUHVR, UPA complex should continue to be watched, but deserves little consideration in terms of material support and far-reaching intelligence usefulness. UNC and UNR are cited as the central organs most deserving of support, if any is to be given.

Note: It may be of some interest in comparing these comments and remarks with those contained in MGM-A-793 ([redacted]), to note that the main source of the latter, Hrinioch, together with Lebed, have been fired within the past several months according to an unevaluated ODEUM report.

7. Below the levels discussed above are three main organizations representative of peoples contained within the boundaries of the USSR who are absolutely anti-Russian:

a. ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Peoples' Block), comprised primarily of Ukrainians and at present headed by STETSKO, and propagates the conception of

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

a Greater Ukraine, freed from the Bolshevists.

b. Promethean League of the Atlantic Charter, founded in Warsaw, and propagates the concept of an "inter marium" nation, i.e. from the Baltic to the Black Sea, under the hegemony of Poland.

c. "International of Freedom," which is made up of all Balkan and Caucasian nations, and attempts to include all nations of Slavic origin ruled by Moscow. It appears to be penetrated by the Soviet IS (red-lined names on Attachment 2). The International of Freedom is supported and influenced considerably by a cosmopolitan group meeting generally in Traunstein on a social basis.

d. These three groups sometime ago agreed to form a representative top organ, the ALCN (Anti-Bolshevist League of National Liberation). This, however, never developed beyond the paper stage, and at present seems to be supplanted by the so-called "Federalist Club" which is being founded in Munich under Polish leadership and with a program of self-determination for all non-Russians.

e. Two other groups of minor interest are:

(1) BZR (Byelo-Russian Central Council), headed by one OSTROVSKI, which wants a seperate and independent Byelo-Russian state with friendly relations with a non-communistic Russia; and

(2) RBNR (Council of Byelo-Russian Peoples' Republic), or "Krivichi," which has the same aims, but wants orientation toward Poland. This is an active group, and for some time received financial support from the London Polish government-in-exile. Interesting is the report that recently it got in touch with the Pollish Mission in Regensburg, from which some slight support was received.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

October 1949

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitize
Classify [redacted]
Signed:
R.O. #356 - Unit
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate appropriate.

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Mr. Richard Helms

FROM : Samuel B. Bossard

SUBJECT: ODEUM Stay-Behind Network

1. Before 1 July 1949, the date when this organization became responsible for Operation ODEUM, a project for the development of a stay-behind network to cover the Western Zones of Germany and Austria had been initiated. At the beginning of this year, the progress of the plan as described below was reported to our investigators. As of this date, the American staff has played a passive role in this project, and the plan, therefore, remains geared to the Emergency Plan of EUCOM without particular reference to the special planning of this organization in the event of hostilities. The German staff of Odeum, however, anticipates that immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, it will become an integral part of the American Intelligence Service. As will be seen from the general outline for the evacuation of the ODEUM staff below, it will be possible for American representatives to establish points of contact with the German staff in Switzerland, France, and Spain.

2. Odeum Emergency Plan:

a. The plan presupposes that the first organised line of defense will be along the Rhine, and that approximately fifteen days after the opening of hostilities, there will be direct contact between the ODEUM staff and the U. S. Army.

b. It is contemplated that some 240 persons, key staff personnel including families, will move by truck fleets or by train from Munich under escort of a large detachment of German police to Singen on the Swiss Border at the West end of Lake Constance where it will be escorted across the Swiss Border at an unauthorised crossing point. This arrangement has been made through liaison with the head of the Swiss Police. Alternate plans call for the movement of the Headquarters into Northern Italy through Martinsbruck on the Austro-Italian Border or from Singen into France at Muhlhausen. From Switzerland it is contemplated that the Headquarters will move to Spain should the tactical situation require displacement beyond Switzerland. This move has been discussed with Spanish officials who have given their approval to this eventuality. As far as possible, Spanish air transport will be furnished for this move. General DOERR, former German Military Attache to Spain, is in Spain where he represents ODEUM in all matters.

RID/TSCO 22 NOV 1966

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted]

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

c. ODEUM organisation personnel in Northern Germany who are scheduled for evacuation are to be evacuated by a sea route; arrangements to effect this have been completed. Remaining personnel in the Central Germany areas have been instructed to proceed to designated points west of the Rhine.

d. Movements through western Austria, Switzerland and into France have been discussed with French Military Intelligence Service. Agreements reached with the FIS include detailed provision for the immediate establishment of a liaison radio channel to the FIS from ODEUM for the purpose of coordinating movements.

crazy!

Although the more important details of this plan have been arranged, the ODEUM staff is fully aware of the fact that their ability to implement such a plan will be determined by the time factors involved at the outbreak of war, and the tactical developments immediately thereafter.

3. ODEUM Stay-Behind Network:

The attached chart showing existing stay-behind Networks as well as those in the planning stage is self-explanatory. This shows the status of the project as of approximately December 1948. We were informed at this time that the project is under the immediate supervision of one of the highly experienced ODEUM organisation leaders who was then engaged in the investigation and recruitment of some forty-five radio operators.

It is also anticipated, though not shown on the attached chart, that most of the present agents and informants of ODEUM behind the Iron Curtain would continue their operations relying primarily on Radio communications.

Within the next few months we expect to assign to the ODEUM staff an American representative who is well experienced and highly skilled in clandestine radio communications. It will become one of his responsibilities to examine the communications aspect of the ODEUM stay-behind network and to make recommendations for a coordination of this operation with similar plans of this organisation in the German area.

Simultaneously, American representatives, experienced in agent recruitment, will provide details on agent personnel and prepare overall reports on the facilities and overall organisation of the network.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

AIR TOP SECRET MDL-A-6118

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Chief, Foreign Division M 16 April 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

JUPITER - Status Report as of 20 March 1951

REF: MDLA-5455

1. To give a clear and sensible picture of JUPITER progress through piecemeal reporting has proved to be impossible. Thus it has become necessary to choose an arbitrary date, in this case 20 March, and strike a balance as of that date, to cover the entire range of JUPITER progress and such allied factors as budget, lessons learned, techniques observed, and the like. My first JUPITER report, of late last year, closed with the remark that no monumental progress reports would be prepared in the future. This cannot be avoided; however, I have attempted to break this present report into a group of annexes, each treating one distinct topic. You may be able to use it more easily in this fashion. It must be remembered that these reports are more or less hand-made, in that the data and details must be laboriously mined out of a mountain of operational, support, and administrative activities which, in effect, comprises JUPITER (and, more and more, JUPITER is becoming synonymous with the entire Sovzone military collection apparatus). Mr. KUEHNE and Mr. OAY are gradually sifting and classifying this data, however, and maintaining it in more accessible form; [redacted] and I have made certain that our statistical and operational needs will in the future be met by their categories of data. Still, it has been hand work so far. I would suggest that, after my return to Washington in June, I sit down with the interested party in your shop and prepare an outline for an SOP-type of periodic operational status report covering the Sovzone apparatus. This could be fired back to [redacted] who could then implement the requirement at reasonable intervals.

2. In practise, the efforts which OAY and I expended during March had useful side effects. Besides giving me the material for my end-of-tour report on JUPITER, it caused OAY to shake his data into more useful condition, and the results of our work were presented by OAY at a joint American-German operational staff briefing on 3 April.

TOP SECRET

GLT 495
COPY No. 4

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[illegible] file

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

3. The main purpose of this report is twofold: (a) to show ZIPPER's Sovzone assets in the coverage of army, air, navy, supply, and transportation targets, and; (b) to show what yet remains to be done to achieve what we here consider our minimum responsibilities of these categories of targets. It must be emphasized that the annexes will not reflect ordinary political sources; they will not show economic sources except those few which are clearly military in significance (airfield construction, gasoline production and distribution, etc.); they will not show CE/CI sources. Throughout JUPITER, I have tried to keep our eyes focussed on the target: "military capabilities and intentions of the Soviet military establishment in the Sovzone". Thus you will have a picture of the military coverage only, but then that is the picture you need in order to deal effectively with your Sovzone customers in Washington.

4. In the near future you will be advised in detail of certain structural changes within the GV's, briefly this: BV-25 will be cut off from GV-H, and will be lumped together with those parts of GV-G which are based in the British Zone. This grouping will become a new GV, under Worgitsky, based in Bremen. GV-G headquarters will be moved to Munich and thus a regional placement will have been affected, with the new GV in Bremen, H in Frankfurt, and G in Munich. These GV's will operate in the north, central, and southern Sovzone, respectively. The sum total will, however, be equal to the apparatus described in this report, with the major changes taking place in the western zones, rather than in the Sovzone proper.

5. In addition to carrying out the main purpose, this report will carry along pertinent and non-pertinent data, remarks, and observations. It will also serve as a vehicle for various personal opinions and conclusions of my own, relating only to the Sovzone apparatus, at the conclusion of my tour here. [redacted] will take full control upon my departure, thus the future handling of JUPITER will be in the best possible hands. ZIPPER, I am sure, will continue to cooperate to the limit, as in the past.

[redacted]

DIST:
2 - FDM (with List of Annexes and Annexes A through 6)
1 - COS (with List of Annexes)
2 - File (with 1 copy all attachments)

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEA
TO GERMANY O

List of Annexes to MGL-A-6118

A	GV-G Sovzone Apparatus Roster
B	GV-G Sovzone Apparatus Map
C	GV-H Sovzone Apparatus Roster
D	GV-H Sovzone Apparatus Map
E	GV-E Sovzone Apparatus Roster
F	GV-E Sovzone Apparatus Map
G	Plan "Dampf" of GV-L Roster
H	Intelligence Objectives Not Yet Attained
I	Use of Agent Numbers and Other Designations
J	JUPITER Financial Considerations
K	ZIPPER Operating Techniques
L	JUPITER - Memo to [redacted]
M	Agent Numbers Assigned to GV-H
N	Agent Numbers Assigned to GV-G
O	Agent Numbers Assigned to BV-E

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

G

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER *	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
SCHWERIN	4216	Army (also Air)	EO – General Army targets, also observes airfield. Adequate source.
GROSSENHAIN	642	Air	EO – Covers airfield. Good source.
FUERSTENBERG	12815 R	Army	EO – Travelling source, resides Lubbeck. Procures documentary material from restricted military areas, APO's. Adequate source
	12821 R	Army (also Supply)	EO – Travelling source, musician, resides Greifswalde. Occasional access to spare-parts dump and tank repair shop on Zehdenicker-strasse. Still weak source, needs training.
ROSTOCK and WARNEMUENDE	1071	Navy (also Army)	P-Source – Work in the Neptun Shipyard; observe all repairs and othe work on combat vessels brought there; other marine traffi All report on Army activities when observed.
	1077	" " "	P-Source – As above.
	4212.5	" " "	P-Source – As above.
GARZ/INSEL USEDOM	12815 R	Air (also Army)	EO – Airfield Garz; general Army targets.
	12818 R	Army (also Air)	EO – " " Resides Neubrandenburg.
GUSTROW	No number yet	Army	EO – Travelling source, observes AA training grounds; troop units.
NEUBRANDENBURG	12818	Air (also Army)	EO – Travels, covers Garz, as well, mainly on Air OB, therefore weak on Army OB.
NEUSTRELITZ	9202.10	Army	EO – Observes garrison troop units, collects documentary material, APO's. Adequate source.
LAERZ	4283 R	Air	EO – Resides N. Berlin. Covers Airfield Laerz.
	671 R	"	EO – " " " " " "
	4215 R	"	EO – " " " " " "

* (Red Line Means Jupiter Recruitment)

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
WISMAR	12827	Navy	P-Source - Works in shipyard at Wismar.
	943	Navy	P-Source - Works in Wismar shipyard on navy targets.
SASSNITZ/INSEL RUGEN	980	Navy	ED - Lives on island, covers port activities at Sassnitz, photograp radio and radar installations.
JUETERBOG	4213 R	Army	ED - Reports on TTG, collects APO's. Adequate source. Resides W. Berlin.
	810.2	"	ED - Lives on farm bordering TTG. Attempting to recruit friends work within the TTG.
POTSDAM	4290	Army	ED - Reports on troop units. Considered adequate. First reported Dec 50, still training.
	4215 R	"	ED - Reports on troop units. Resides W. Berlin.
	4213 R	"	ED - " " " " (also in Jueterbog), collects APO's.
	12953	Air	ED - Airfield construction plans from sub-source.
	948	"	P-Source - Central weather station; procures technical data.
WERDER	4264	Air	ED - Reports on Airfield Werder, has sub-sources in Werder who are trained in reporting.
	4240.16	"	ED - Reports on Airfield Werder. (Arrested and released, reports being re-evaluated).
SATZKORN	12931 R	Air (also Army)	ED - Resides Staaken. General Army targets.
RATHENOW	4282	Transport	P-Source - Railway inspector.
	687	Army (also Air)	ED - General Army targets; presently considered weak source due to protracted illness of agent leader. Air reports also presently
	4212.2	Army (also Air)	ED - Collects APO's. Adequate source.
	12938	Army (also Air)	ED - First reported Dec 50, still weak. General Army targets. Resides Berlin.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
FINSTERWALDE	No number yet	Air	EO - Well connected ex-Luftwaffe circles; observes airfields Finsterwalde and Altlonnewitz.
LUCKENWALDE	692.2 R	Army	EO - First reported Nov 50, still training, collects APO's; as carpenter frequently enters Soviet installations; occasionally covers Jueterbog. Resides Berlin.
STAAKEN	12931	Air (also Army)	EO - Weak reporting on kaserne, etc. because area is large and source is one-legged. Good capability. See Satzkorn.
FUERSTENWALDE & BERKENBRUECK	4215 R	Army (and Supply)	EO - Reports on troop units. See [illegible], Lenze. Also reports on Central Medical Supply Dump. Infrequent reports (spread too thin).
	4262	Army	P-Source - Workman in Gartenstrasse Kaserne; will be sent to work at Lieberose TrB during exercises and maneuvers. First reported Sept 50.
	9262 R	Supply	EO - Watchman at the Central Engineer Supply Dump. Resides [illegible]
FRANKFURT/ODER	668	Army	EO - General Army targets.
	668.1	Transportation	EO - Rail traffic reports.
	667	"	EO - " " " Ry. engineer.
	668.2	"	EO - Rail traffic. Travels to and from Brest Litovsk.
	673	"	EO - " " Train conductor operating in Frankfurt area.
	4211.1	"	EO - " " Locomotive engineer " " " "
	4288	"	EO - Supervisor of locomotive brigades. Frequently travels to Brest Litovsk.
	982	"	EO - Railroad engineer travelling to and from Brest Litovsk.
	4613.1	"	EO - Rail traffic reports.
	695	Army (Supply)	P-Source - Works in supply dump. No further details.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
ZOSSEN-WUENSDORF	4213 R	Army	EO – Monitors status of barracks, presently empty but being prepared for occupancy. See Juterbog. Resides W. Berlin.
	795.1	Army	P-Source – Construction worker in Zossen camp; observes troop units.
ROTSCHERLINDE	4212.1	Army (also Air)	EO – Procures documentary materials, APO's, vehicle numbers.
BRANDENBURG	12934.3/BR	Air	EO – A forester whose duties take him close to the Airfield Brandenburg Briest.
BERNAU	12952	Army (and Supply)	EO – General Army targets. Good source.
	9252.5 R	" (also Air)	EO – " " " Does photo work of field. Resides Freu
NEURUPPIN	4269	Army	EO – " " " First report in Nov 50.
	656	"	EO – Has work; too long at work; probably will drop in turn to second
	947.2	Air	P-Source – Cement worker on airfield, also goes to airfield at Werneuchen for work.
ORANIENBURG	4292	Army (also Air)	EO – Observes troop units, airfield Oranienburg, vehicle numbers, etc. Started Jan 50.
	752.3 R	Army	EO – General Army targets. Resides W. Berlin.
	947.4	Air	EO – Airfield Oranienburg.
	671 R	"	EO – " " Resides W. Berlin.
	947.1	Army	EO – Works in Kaserne store which deals with Soviet units; gets APO's, vehicle numbers.
TEMPLIN-ZEHDENICK-GRANSEE Area	9262	Army	P-Source – Year-round employee (civilian) within TTG, troop units, training, vehicle numbers.
	9469	Army	EO – Taxi driver Templin; travels from training grounds to local towns.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
COTTBUS	9245.3 R	Army	General Army Targets. Started Feb 50. Good source. Resides W. Ber
	12955	Transport	P-Source - Works in Ry. station.
LIEBEROSE/COTTBUS	4262	Army	P-Source - See Fuerstenwalde.
WITTSTOCK/SCHWEINRICH	979	Air	P-Source - Charwoman in hospital, Airfield Wittstock. Good source.
	677	"	P-Source - Telephone switchboard operator at Airfield Wittstock.
	977	Air (and Army)	P-Source - Charwoman working in the city and airfield at Schweinrich
	4285	Army	EO - Has access to TTG (as yet unoccupied).
SCHOENWALDE	678	Air	P-Source - Charwoman who works in Soviet officers quarters at Airfie Schoenwalde. Good source.
	12938 R	Air	EO - Resides W. Berlin.
	4213 R	"	EO - " " "
SCHOENFELD	676	"	P-Source - Radio operator at Airfield Schoenfeld.
STRAUSSBERG	4233	"	P-Source - No details known.
VELTEN	4215 R	Army (and Air, Supply)	EO - Observes airfield and fuel dump.
BERLIN-ADLERSHOF	4265	Air	EO - Truck driver who enters airfield Adlershof.
ALTENGRABOW	677.1	Army	EO - Lives near TTG, will observe arrival and departure of troop uni
	677.100	"	P-Source. -Girl friend of above, employed in TTG Kommandatur.
	677.101	"	EO - Forest ranger working in vicinity of TTG.
	4212.1 R	Army (also Air)	EO - Will observe TTG during exercises. Resides Brandenburg.
	4211.3 R	" " "	EO - " " " " " Also Letzlingen.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
DESSAU-ROSSLAU	4265	Air (also Army)	EO - Employed in ry. freight car factory, observes production; also airfield.
KOETHEN	4266 R	Air	EO - Occasionally travels here from Dessau.
	4283 R	Air	EO - Airfield Koethen.
LETZLINGER HEIDE	4211 R	Army	EO - Will observe troop training grounds during exercises. Resides E. Berlin.
	4211.3 R	"	EO - Will observe TTG during exercises. Resides Stendal.
TANGERHUETTE-BITTKAU AREA	4311 R	"	EO - " " " " " " "
SALZWEDEL	4211.1	Army	EO - Observes troop training grounds. Work in this area. See Letzlingen.
STENDAL	4211.4	"	EO - General Army targets. Started Feb 51. Airfield Borstel.
	4311 R	"	EO - " " " Also Tangerhuette.
ALT-LOENNEWITZ	4283 R	Air	EO - Resides E. Berlin.
BERNBURG	4211.3	Army	EO - General Army targets. Also Salzwedel.
ANKLAM, EGGESIN, TORGELOW	437	Air	EO - Covers airfields.
JESSEN	4240.8	Army (Supply)	EO - Observes activities at artillery dump. Resides near Jueterbog
TUTOW	12821 R	Air	EO - See Fuerstenberg. Covers Airfield Tutow.
PRENZLAU	12815 R	Army	EO - Documentary materials, vehicle numbers, APO's.
	439	" (also Air)	P-Source - Procures travel & identity documents.
BAD FREIENWALDE	666	Army	EO - General Army targets. Presently main; agent leader III.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
LUEBBEN	4267	Army (also Air)	EO - General Army targets. Began Feb 51. Also Airfield Briesen.
	4215 R	Air	EO - Airfield Briesen. Resides E. Berlin.
SPREMBERG	4267 R	Army	EO - General Army targets. See Luebben.
BAD SAAROW	4236 R	Supply	EO - General Army targeting; Signal Depot activities.
TREBBIN	4215 R	Army (also Air)	EO - Observes former Labor Service Barracks, now a troop barracks; adequate.
	686	Transportation	EO - Observes ry. traffic on main line.
FALKENHAGEN	4291	Army (Supply)	EO - Activities at munitions dumps. Adequate source, started Jan 5
FRIEDERSDORF	4236	Army (Supply)	P-Source - Has sub-sources within munitions dump.
RANGSDORF	4283 R	Air	EO - Airfield Rangsdorf. Also [illegible].
GARDELEGEN	4311 R	Army	EO - General Army targets; also Stendal.
TANGERMUENDE	4211.3 R	Army	EO - " " " ; also Salzwedel.
ALTENO (LUCKAU)	4215 R	Air	EO - Checking of airfield status.
NEUHARDENBERG	671 R	Air	EO - " " " " Resides E. Berlin.
Other TRANSPORTATION Sources			
BERLIN/SEDDIN	4211.2		P-Source - Works in Seddin marshalling yard, observes Soviet military transports.
BERLIN/WUSTERMARK	4217		P-Source - Works in marshalling yard. Also observes dispatch of trains to the VP supply dump at Berlin-[illegible].
BERLIN	4295		P-Source - Works in Reichsbahnamt 4 (RBA) of the Reichsbahndirektion (RBD) Berlin.
	4284 4321		P-Source - Employee in Technical Planning Section of the RBD, Berlin-Lichtenberg. EO - RBD Berlin.

TOP SECRET

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
BERLIN	4613	Transportation	ED – Rail traffic Berlin area.
	4613.2		ED – " " " " Locomotive engineer.
	4287		P-Source – RBA 5 of RBD Berlin. Produces original material from office of Soviet Control Commission (SKK) attached to the RBD.
	949		P-Source – Reichsbahn Generaldirektion, E. Berlin.
	12751		ED – RBD, Berlin; member of locomotive column.
	9252.9		P-Source – Rail traffic in outskirts of Berlin. RBD Berlin.
	9252.11		P-Source – Employee in Generaldirektion Schiffart (inland waterways, barge traffic), Berlin.
	9252.12		P-Source – As above.
SCHWERIN	782		P-Source – RBD Schwerin.
ANGERMUNDE	679		ED – Rail traffic main line through Angermunde. Military source.
	679.1		ED – Rail traffic main line through Angermunde. Switchman.
	679.2		ED – " " " " " "
ERFURT	10700.1		ED – Rail traffic in outskirts of Berlin. RBD Berlin.
FORST	685		ED – Postal employee working in Ry. station at Forst, on main line Cottbus-Forst-Sommerfeld.
Other GENERAL Sources			
BERLIN	9245.A	Economic	P-Source – Works in section of Masonry Supplies of the State Planning Commission, DDR. Gets data on shipment of masonry supplies for barracks, fortifications, airfields, railways, bridges.

TOP SECRET

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENT
BERLIN	795.3	Navy	F-Source - Ship inspector with German-Lloyd. Data re new ship construction.
	954	Economic	B-Source - Chief of Material Supply Section of the Dept of Bridges and Roads in the Transportation Ministry, DDR. Supplies original data on bridge and road construction.
	4286	Economic	F-Source - Works in Ministry of Trade and Supply, DDR. Furnished original material on production of electrical machinery.
	797.17	Navy	F-Source - Works in Generaldirektion Schiffart. Procures original material on inland waterways traffic, charts of ports, exports. Very good source.
	9288.7	Economic	F-Source - Chief of Material Supplies Section of the State Geological Commission, which is prospecting for new sources of oil, ores, and coal.
	9288.6	Economic	F-Source - High position in Planning Dept. of VESTA (steel trust in the DDR) Berlin. Furnishes original data. Very good.
BRANDENBURG	9288.1	Economic	B-Source - Employed in VESTA, Brandenburg section.
LEIPZIG	9288.4	Economic	F-Source - " " " Leipzig section.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

H Annex

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER *	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
SCHWERIN	9011	Army	BO - Observes occupancy of barracks, procures troop data, FPN's. First reported Sept 1950.
	1597.3	"	BO - Targets as above; weak reporting; still training.
	1243.1	Army (also Air)	P-Source - Military targets - Sov Union.
NEUSTRELITZ	9089	Army	BO - Observes occupancy of barracks, troop units.
	9001.7	"	BO - Targets as above, procures FPN's, vehicle numbers; still training.
GUESTROW	1440.6 H	"	BO - Observes occupancy of barracks, troop units.
ROSTOCK	1597.2	Navy	BO - Has access to the harbor areas at Rostock and at Warnemuende. Good reporting. Translator with HERUTRA.
	9005.1	Navy	BO - Reporter. Provides material on marine and army activities.
LUDWIGSLUST	1415.1 H	Army (also Air)	BO - Observes Army and air targets; resides Ludwigsfeld, near Ludwigslust; still being evaluated as a new source.
PARCHIM	9002	Army (also Air)	BO - Old source, now engaged as Researcher; weak reporting.
	9009	" " "	BO - " " " " " " " "
NEUBRANDENBURG	9006 H	Air	BO - Covers airfield. Resides N. Berlin.
HAGENOW	1243.1 H	Air	BO - Covers airfield. See Schwerin.
	9011 H	"	BO - " " " "
LAERZ	9096	Air	BO - Covers airfield.

* Red Line Means Jupiter Recruitment

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
WISMAR	1283	Navy	P-Source – Former naval officer, occupies high position in VEB shipyard Schwerin. Procures current and planned construction data, as well as info gathered by observation. Good reporting.
	7643-R	Air (also Army)	ED – Covers airfield. Resides Stralsund.
STRALSUND	1268	Navy (also Air)	ED – Works in shipyard Stralsund.
INSEL RUGEN	9086	Navy (also Air)	ED – Travels on island, mainly reports on radar installations.
	7648	Navy	ED – Reports on naval activities in Sassnitz.
PASEWALK	1562	Transportation	ED – Observes, records, and reports ry. traffic over Oder River.
	1558	"	ED – " " " " " " " " "
PUTNITZ	7643 R	Air	ED – Covers airfield. See Wismar.
JUETERBOG	1697	Army	P-Source – Works in TIG [illegible] [illegible]. Adequate source, still training.
	1661	Army	P-Source – Works in laundry in town which handles Soviet clothing etc. from TIG, procures papers, APO's, vehicle numbers.
	1609 R	Army	ED – Very new; no evaluation. Resides W. Berlin.
	7673 R	Air	ED – Covers airfields Altes Lager and Reinsdorf. Resides Luckenwalde. Good.
	1612	Air	ED – Covers airfield Juterbog-Damm, also Air Force Depot.
POTSDAM	1660	Army	P-Source – Works in [illegible] Kaserne. Good reporting.
	1673	"	ED – Observes kaserne, troop units, vehicle numbers.
	1674	"	ED – " " " " " " . Son of 1673.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
POTSDAM	7586	Army (also Air)	RO – Procures documentary materials at Krampnitz, Cavalry School, APO's.
	7587/UQ "ERIKA"	Army	B-Source – Member of the construction staff. Procures new construction plans for military installations, APO's. Good.
DOEBERITZ	7588 R	Army (also Air)	RO – Work in this area. Resides Potsdam.
	8088	Air	P-Source. Stoker at the Kommandatur of the airfield.
STAAKEN	7693	Air	RO – Covers airfield.
	8172 R	"	RO – " " . Resides W. Berlin.
PERLEBERG	1263	Army	RO – Observes occupancy of kasernes, troop units. Will soon be trained in W/T and go on ice. Adequate source.
	9813	Army (also Air)	RO – Targets as above, also airfield. Adequate source.
FRANKFURT/ODER	8946	Army	RO – Occupancy of kasernes, troop units. Good source. Also recruiting.
	9583	Transportation	P-Source – Works in freight station.
	6947	"	P-Source – Works in passenger station.
ZOSSEN, WUENSDORF, TOEPCHIN	1694	Supply	P-Source – Works in freight station which dispatches loads to and from shell-loading plant at Toepchin.
	1693	"	P-Source – Works in shell-loading plant, Toepchin.
	1201 A	"	P-Source – " " " " " ".
NEURUPPIN	1207	Air	RO – Covers airfield.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
ORANIENBURG	8186	Army	EO - Observes troop units, kasernes. Still weak reporting; new.
	8171 R	"	EO - Old source, reports becoming weak; will be transferred to supply targets same area. Resides W. Berlin.
	7551 R	Air	EO - Covers airfield. Good source. Resides Berlin.
COTTBUS	8187	Army (also Air)	EO - Covers kasernes, troop units, airfields Cottbus and [illegible].
	7675 R	Air	EO - Covers airfields. Resides Luckenwalde.
	8189	Economic (also Army)	P-Source - Works in ry. repair shop.
EBERSWALDE/FINOW	9007 R	Army (also Air)	EO - Covers troop units, kasernes, vehicle numbers. Also supply dump activities. Good source. Resides W. Berlin.
	9006 R	Army	EO - Covers troop units, kasernes, vehicle numbers. Weak source. Resides W. Berlin.
	1440 A	Army (also Air)	EO - Observes activities at supply and munitions dumps, also at tank and wagon repair depot located in factory "[illegible]".
WERDER	4911 R	Air (also Army)	EO - Observes activities of air force staff, covers airfield (vehicle numbers, APO's). Resides Glindow, near Werder.
SCHOENWALDE	7551 R	Air	EO - Observes airfield. Resides W. Berlin.
STRAUSBERG	7672 R	Air	EO - " " " " "
	7536 R	Air	EO - " " " " "
WERNEUCHEN	7678 R	Air	EO - Observes airfield. See Strausberg.
	7673 R	Air	EO - " " . See Cottbus.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA.	T-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
TEMPLIN-ZEHDENICK GRANSEE AREA	1274	Army	EO - Reports on troop units, vehicle numbers. Weak.
	1274.1	"	EO - " " " " " " " . Sister of above
	9006 R	"	EO - " " " " " " " . See Neubrandenb
WITTSTOCK	1415.2 R	Army (also Air)	EO - New source, no evaluation yet.
WULKOW	1114.1	Army (Supply)	EO - Reports on munitions dump, Wulkow.
FINSTERWALDE	7696	Air	EO - Covers airfield.
WELZOW	7679 R	Air	EO - Covers airfield. Resides Finsterwalde. See [illegible].
	6167 R	"	EO - " " Resides Cottbus.
	2297 R	"	EO - " " Resides E. Berlin. Good source.
ZEESEN	1696	Army (Supply)	P-Source - Works in Central Vehicle Repair Shop. Good source.
HALLE	4915	Economic	P-Source - Direct access to production and distribution figures for VEB Potash & Salts.
	8978	Army	EO - Covers company of kaserne, troop units.
	8921	"	EO - " " " " " Weak.
	4923	Economic	P-Source - Supplies original documents on bridge status and construct along Elbe River.
MAGDEBURG	8166 R	Army	EO - Supplies original documents on bridge status and construction al Elbe River. Weak, still training.
	8650 R	"	EO - Supplies original documents on bridge status and construction al Elbe River. No recent reports. Resides Schoenebeck.
STENDAL	9592	"	EO - Covers company of kaserne, troop units. Adequate source.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
DESSAU/ROSSLAU	6979	Army	EO – Covers company of kaserne, troop units. Weak
	7556 R	Air	EO – Covers airfield. See Strausberg.
WITTENBERG	8142 R	Air	EO – Covers airfield Pratau. Resides Leipzig. Photo source.
WEISSENFELS	6961	Army	EO – Covers activities in three kasernes, troop units; adequate source.
LETZLINGER HEIDE	1A18	Army	EO – Observes troop activities during exercises.
	1A19	"	EO – " " " " "
KOETHEN	7556 R	Air	EO – Covers airfield. See Dessau.
ZERBST	8166 R	Air (also Army)	EO – Covers airfield and troop units. See Magdeburg.
FALKENBERG/ ALTLOENNEWITZ	7873 R	Air	EO – Covers airfield. See Welzow.
	8142 R	"	EO – " " See Wittenberg.
DRESDEN	9509	Army	EO – Covers military installations, vehicle numbers. Not yet an adequate source; first report Dec 53.
	8922	"	EO – Military targets. No reports since Dec 53; reasons unknown.
	2297 R	Air	EO – Covers airfield Klotzsche. Resides E. Berlin.
LEIPZIG	6967	Army (also Air)	EO – Covers company of kaserne, airfield. Adequate source.
	8142 R	Air	EO – Covers airfields Mockau and Schkeuditz.
	2297 R	Air	EO – Covers airfield Brandis. See Dresden.
	9528	Economic	P-Source – In charge of Sales and Supply Section, Central Radio Laboratories.
	9529	"	P-Source – Secretary in above Laboratory. Supplies Soviet correspondence re radio orders and deliveries.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

II.

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
OSCHATZ	2372	Army	EO - Covers occupancy of kasernes, troop units.
WEISSWASSER	2396 R	Army	EO - Will observe TTG, presently unoccupied. Resides E. Berlin.
WEIMAR	2296	Army	EO - Covers occupancy of kasernes, troop units. Adequate source.
	8988 R	Army (also Air)	EO - " " " " " " Also airfield Weimar-Nohra. Started Nov 53, still weak; resides Halle.
MAGDEBURG	9539	Army	EO - New source; no evaluation. Military targets (kasernes, etc.)
	8961 R	Army	EO - Observes occupancy of kasernes, troop units. Adequate source.
ALTENBURG	2397 R	Air	EO - Observes airfield activities. Resides E. Berlin.
	2399	Army (also Air)	EO - Observes occupancy of kasernes, troop units. New source, not yet evaluated.
PLAUEN	2346	Army	EO - Observes kasernes and units. Adequate source.
CHEMNITZ	2368 R	Army (also Air)	EO - " " " " Also airfield. See Plauen.
BARTH	7643 R	Army, Navy, Air	EO - Attempts to cover all targets in Barth, Putnitz, and Tutow, [illegible]. Resides in Stralsund.
TARNEWITZ	1344 R	Air	EO - Covers airfield. Resides Klutz/Wismar.
BURG	8166	Army (also Air)	EO - Observes military installations; still training. See Magdeburg
ZEITZ	2368 R	Army	EO - Observes military units and kasernes. See Plauen.
ERFURT	2297 R	Air	EO - Covers airfield Bindersleben. See Altenburg.
	8992	"	EO - " " "
	2290/XQ	Army	EO - Observes supply dump at [illegible].
BRIESEN/BRAND	7551 R	Air	EO - Observes airfield. Resides E. Berlin.
	7878 R	"	EO - " " " " "

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

- 8 -

H

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
HOHENSELCHOW	9007 R	Afr	BO – [illegible] airfield. Besides Eberswalde.
SENFTENBERG	7673 R	"	BO – " " Besides Finsterwalde.
Other TRANSPORTATION Sources			
GREIFSWALD	1272		B-Source – Employed in RBD Greifswald.
BERLIN	9516		B-Source – Employed in RBA-6 of RBD Berlin.
	9531		B-Source – Operations engineer and chief of machine-technical section of the Reichsbahn Generaldirektion (top agency). Reports on all types of ry. services, condition of rolling stock, track.
	9547		B-Source – In charge of section which prepares daily reports on rolling stock, RBD (see above).
	1667		BO – Rail traffic, Berlin area. Good source.
	1665		B-Source – Rail traffic, Berlin area. Good source.
	9517		B-Source – Employed in RBD Berlin. Good source.
COTTBUS	9565		B-Source – Employed in RBD Cottbus.
	8167		B-Source – " " " "
	8154		B-Source – " " " " Soon to be transferred to ry. station Vetschau.
KUESTRIN	9521		B-Source – Employed in border ry. station Kietz.
	1657		B-Source – " " " " " "
JUETERBOG	9513		B-Source – Employed in RBA-3, Jueterbog.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

E.

TARGET AREA	T-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	[illegible]
TRANSPORTATION			
MAGDEBURG	1440.9		P-Source - Employed in RBD Magdeburg.
ERFURT	8142		RO - Employed in RBD Erfurt.
PASEWALK	1561		RO - Observes ry. traffic on main ry. line.
	1561.1		RO - " " " " " " "
Other GENERAL Sources			
BERLIN	9742	Economic	P-Source - Employee in Reparations Office of the DDR (German Democratic Republic). Works in Statistical Section.
	4918	Economic	P-Source - Physicist, specialist in medium-frequency radio relay equipment. Works in Radio Transmitter Section of the Central Radio-Technical Laboratory, Koepenick.
	4919	Economic	P-Source - Deputy Leader of Mineral, Oil, and Coal-Tar Section of the Chemical Department of the Ministry of Industry (DDR). Provides original documents on production and distribution of gasoline, fuels, and other synthetic products.
	4920	Economic	P-Source - Furnishes original documents on new bridge construction in the DDR.
	9540	Economic	P-Source - Employee in the Planning Dept. of the Deutsche Notenbank, which has close contact with the Central Planning Office of the DDR. Procures info on foreign trade agreements, planned and actual production and construction statistics, capital investments in various industries.
	1408	Economic	P-Source - In charge of Statistical Dept for Iron & Steel, Metallurgy Dept., Ministry of Industry, DDR. Furnishes data on plant development, and production in iron and steel industries.
ZWICKAU	4921	Economic	P-Source - Has direct access to data on production and distribution figures for Silesian coal.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

R/• Quincy E

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER*	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
DRESDEN	3252.106 R	Army (also Supply)	EO – Observes supply dump on Koenigsbrueckerstrasse. Resides Berlin.
	3252.108	"	EO – " " " " " " "
	3252.102	"	EO – As above. All are new sources being tested, and will receive new targets soon.
ERFURT	3318.2	Transport	P-Source – Works in freight station. New source, promising.
	3399.12	Economic	P-Source – Works in Ministry for Commerce and Supply, in section distributing food to Soviet Army Units.
WEISSENFELS	3576.8	Army	EO – Observes barracks and troop units.
ALTENHAIN	3399.18	Army	EO – Observes activities at munitions dump.
LEIPZIG	3399.19	Army	P-Source – Nurse in Soviet military hospital, procures APO's, names.
	3252.r	Army (Supply)	EO – Has access to vehicle repair shop in former Buessing factory. Truck driver.
	3398	Army (Supply)	EO – General military.
	3363	Air	EO – Covers airfields Mockau and Schkeuditz.
GROSSENHAIN	3252.e R	Air (also Army)	EO – Covers airfield Grossenhain. Resides W. Berlin.
ZWICKAU	3261.7	Economic (Air)	EO – Miner, observes activities of Wismuth LAG (uranium), also airfield.
	3252.101 R	"	EO – Observes rail traffic of loadings for Wismuth LAG; resides Chemnitz.
SCHLEIFE/ WEISSWASSER	3252.n	Army and Supply	EO – Observes fuel dump activities.

* Red Line Means Jupiter Recruitment

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

E

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
WEIMAR	3556 R	Army (Air)	EO – Observes kaserne and troop units. Adequate source. Resides Magdeburg.
JENA	3316	Economic	P-Source – Has access to air force optical developments & production Jena-Zeiss. (Also has access to Army supply dump at [illegible])
	3316.1	"	P-Source – Has access to air force optical developments & production Jena-Zeiss.
	3319	"	P-Source – " " " " " " " " " " "
ALTENBURG	3399.26 R	Air	EO – Observes airfield. Resides E. Berlin.
OHRDRUF	3308.1	Army	EO – Will observe TTB when exercises start. New and untested.
EISENACH/KINDEL	3308.2 R	Army	EO – Will observe TTB when exercises start.
HOHENLEIPISCH	3261.1	Supply	EO – Observes munitions dump.
MERSEBURG	3408	Air (also Army)	EO – Observes airfield and troop units.
EILENBURG	3272.6	Army	EO – Adequate reporting on military installations.
GRIMMA	3366	Army	EO – Covers local military units.
KAMENZ	3252.109	Army	EO – Covers local military units.
	3252.108 R	Air	EO – Covers airfield. See Dresden.
WURZEN	3399.35 R	Army (Supply)	EO – Observes local military units and spare parts dump. Resides Leipzig
	3261.3 R	"	EO – " " " " " " " " ". Started February 1950. Resides E. Berlin.
[illegible]/GLAUCHAU	3252.104 R	Army	EO – Observes status of troops in [illegible] Kaserne. Resides Dresden. Also [illegible] Kaserne in Glauchau.

Secret
REL Ger

TOP SECRET

E

TARGET AREA	V-NUMBER	TYPE OF TARGET	COMMENTS
BORNA	3261.12	Army	EO – Covers Former Kaserne. Since February 1950.
MARKERSDORF/ CHEMNITZ	3266	Supply	EO – Observes activity at spare parts dump Markersdorf. Good source.
BERLIN	3399.7	Army	P-Source – Works in printing plant of Taegliche Rundschau, which also prints Soviet Army newspapers, bulletins. Procures APO's officers' names.
	3399.20	Transport	P-Source – Works in RBD on ry. construction planning.
ANNABERG	3261.11	Army	EO – Uranium ore area. Reports on MVD units and AA units.
GERA/THURINGIA Border Area	3397	Army	EO – Besides Gera, observes military unit activity in border area.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

REL Ger
Secret

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

ANNEX G

Plan DAMPF, a special operation of GV L. Although GV L is normally concerned only with CE/CI matters, the value to be obtained by its exploiting this special transportation source is so great, that an exception was clearly indicated. DAMPF is wholly a positive operation built around a former Generaldirektor of the Reichsbahn in the Sovzone, who fled to the West and who now works for L. He will, during March and April of 1951, establish the sources listed below, all of whom are personally known to him. Some have already reported: evaluation is excellent.

V-2792	The former Generaldirektor.
V-2792.1	Inspector of the railway yards, Frankfurt/Oder. Will cover transit freight traffic through the yards, train numbers, make-up and loads of trains, the Blue Train (Soviet leave train), interzonal military traffic passing through yards.
V-2792.2	Inspector in railway repair and maintenance shops, Frankfurt/Oder. Will cover make-up and dispatch of trains to and from Brest-Litovsk. Also travels to Brest. Has daughter whose husband is a locomotive engineer between Frankfurt and Brest; he will report on rail traffic also.
V-2792.4	Trainmaster in Frankfurt/Oder. Will cover targets as for V-2792.1, and will serve as a confirmation source for him.
V-2792.5	Bureau Chief in the Planning Section, RBGD, Berlin. Will establish railway reporting sub-sources in the RBD's at Berlin, Cottbus, Dresden, Erfurt, Greifswald, Halle, Magdeburg, and Schwerin. Will also report on documents passing through his office.
V-2792.6	Works in RBGD, Berlin. Has access to all publications of the RBGD, such as rail schedules, bulletins on track conditions, improvements, etc.
V-2792.8	Railway inspector, Berlin. Will establish sub-sources at Sassnitz, Rostock, Wismar, and Schwerin; also at Stralsund and Greifswald.
V-2792.9	Technical inspector, RBD Berlin. Supervises utilization of engines in the locomotive brigade assigned to RBD Berlin.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

ANNEX H

JUPITER - Gaps in Sovzone Military Intelligence Coverage

1. You have seen in Annexes A-G the present (as of 20 March 51) capabilities of the ZIPPER Sovzone apparatus on army, air, navy, transport, and supply targets. Within these annexes are indicated those sources which were placed under Operation JUPITER. What remains to be treated is: the coverage which has not yet been attained, but which should be attained, in these fields.

2. Of course, there is an inexhaustible demand for intelligence, and always will be. If the inquiry were widely circulated, a customer would probably emerge who was vitally interested in the production of bath-tubs in the DDR, per se. But there's not enough money, and never will be, and it is at this point that POB's guidance of ZIPPER must reflect the needs of the priority customers and the capabilities of the ZIPPER Sovzone apparatus.

3. By and large, JUPITER has been kept on its intended course geographically and functionally: more coverage toward the Oder, and more penetration sources. We have always recognized that the western portions of the Sovzone, and the areas immediately surrounding Berlin were the objects of much effort by CIC, MID, and OSI. Consequently we have tried to cause ZIPPER to devote more effort to other, more difficult areas. They have readily recognized this rough delimitation, and have tried to guide the field accordingly. Similarly in the field of higher-level sources. Results have been gratifying so far, as you will probably agree.

4. During the course of my March inquiry, I asked GAY to prepare a map showing the coverage which, in the opinion of 38, should be the goal. This was prepared (and used during the 4 April briefing) and reviewed by 45 (Evaluation). I have abstracted the major targets from this map, and have listed them in the last paragraph. It must be understood that this ZIPPER listing comprises an ideal coverage, and not a practical goal. The list is appended without comment; possibly we can discuss the importance attached to these targets by the customers upon my return to Washington and after your study of this entire report.

5. ZIPPER's 38 and 45 staff feel that a penetration source is still needed for each type of target at each of the localities listed. The symbol "W/T" indicates that a radio agent is definitely planned for the locality, and may already be in training. The excellent work of [redacted] has kept that phase of reporting accurate and up-to-date.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Sassnitz - W/T
Barth - Navy
Stralsund - Navy
Wustrow - Army
Rostock - W/T, Air, Supply
Peenemuende - W/T, Air
Heringsdorf - Navy
Guestrow - Air
Schwerin - W/T, Army
Hagenow - Army, Air
Pasewalk - W/T
Laerz - Air
Fuerstenberg - W/T, Army
Perleberg - W/T, Army
Angermuende - W/T
Stendal - W/T, Army
Rathenow - Air
Moeglin - Supply
Schoenwalde - Army
Neuhardenburg - Air
Muenchsberg - Air
Straussberg - Supply
Cottbus - Army
Falkensee - Air, Supply
Doeberitz - Troop Training Ground

Werder - Air
Fuerstenwalde - Air
Wildau - Supply
Rangsdorf - Air
Fuerstenberg - Air
Briesen - Air
Altengrabow - Supply
Magdeburg - W/T, Air, Transport, A
Jueterbog - Air, Supply, Army
Drewitz - Air
Wittenberg - Air, Army, W/T
Kapen - Supply
Barby - Army
Dessau - W/T, Army
Bronkow - Air
Finsterwalde - Air
Senftenberg - Air
Weisswasser - Troop Training Ground
Horka - W/T, Transport
Alt-Loennewitz - Transport
Torgau - Army
Rudolstadt - Army
Mockrehna - Supply
Halle - Air, Transport, Army
Leipzig - W/T

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Weissenfels - W/T

Riesa - Supply, Army

Grossenhain - Troop Training Ground

Koenigsbruck - Troop Training Ground, Army

Meissen - Army

Dresden - W/T, Supply, Air, Transport, Army

Bad Schandau - Transport

Burgstaedt - Supply

Chemnitz - W/T

Jena - Air, Army

Weimar - W/T, Army

Erfurt - Transport

Gotha - Army

Hildburghausen - Army

Eberswalde - Army

Doberitz - Army

Brandenburg - Army

Neuruppin - Army

Neustrelitz - Army

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

ANNEX I

Use of Agent Numbers and Other Designations

1. In examining the rosters and the coverage maps, the following explanations will be of use.

2. Each GV has assigned to it several blocks of V-numbers, which it in turn assigns to its BV's and UV's. Thus any V-number is immediately identifiable from an organisational standpoint. For example, V-7561 is a member of UV-7600 of BV-80 of GV-H, because the block 7550 through 7699 is thus assigned. The entire breakdown of Sovzone agent number blocks is attached. It will be noted that some V-numbers carry decimal suffixes, as V-3252.104. In general this indicates that such an agent is as yet on trial, and will be given a whole number when his effectiveness and dependability justify it, at the discretion of the UV. A decimal number may also indicate a sub-source of a whole-number V-man, the designation being maintained simply to show the reporting relationship. This latter arrangement may persist for an indefinite period, and would probably be ended only by the sub-source's being dropped, or by his being split away to a new reporting channel, in which case he would receive a whole-number.

3. Many abbreviations have been used to save time and space, and are explained thus:

E.O.	Eye Observer. A source who reports only on the basis of his observations from outside the target. Examples: a newstand operator across the street from a kaserne entrance; a person who frequently bicycles past an airfield. A person who has infrequent access to the inside of a target is still classed as an E.O. Example: a boiler inspector who enters a kaserne possibly every two or three months, but otherwise passes the kaserne daily.
P-Source	Penetration Source. An agent who is located within a target or who routinely goes within the target. Examples: a furnace fireman within a kaserne; charwoman in a staff building. These are relatively low-level P-Sources; there are also the more highly placed types within key industries and government offices.
TTG	Troop Training Ground. The exercise and maneuver areas such as Lieberose, Letzlinger Heath, etc.
General Army Targets	By this is meant the observation of vehicle numbers, shoulder tabs, unit designations, equipment, strengths, movements, occupancy of kasernes, collection of APN's, and other general items pertaining to troop units or staffs.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

UQ	Unterquelle. Sub-source.
R	Reisequelle. Travelling source.
DDR	German Democratic Republic. The government of East Germany.
VVB	"Peoples-Owned Enterprise". Socialized or nationalized economic or industrial enterprise of the DDR. Also VEB.
RBGD	Reichsbahn Generaldirektion. Central Administration of Railways, DDR.
RBD	Reichsbahndirektion. A railway division (geographic) under the RBGD.
RBA	Reichsbahnamt. A sub-division of an RBD.

4. Where appropriate, agents concentrate on specific targets (Army or Air or Supply, etc.), but obviously in a great many cases an agent will routinely furnish information on a variety of targets under his observation or may report on items of interest observed during a vacation trip, and so on. In the rosters of this report, the type of target listed is that on which the source is expected to furnish coverage.

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

ANNEX J

JUPITER - Financial Considerations

1. At the outset of JUPITER, FDM approved an additional 7500 DM monthly for the improvement of courier and electrical transmission channels for faster handling of intelligence in the western zones of Germany. At the same time (July 1950) FDM approved a 60,000 DM monthly increase in ZIPPER's Sovzone budget for the development of new sources in the Sovzone. Further, the way was left open for expenditures above this 60,000 DM (relegating the 7500 DM to the category of an administrative expense, which it is) by means of individual requests (from ZIPPER to POB) for money to accomplish specific and defined intelligence objectives. No time limit was imposed on this new activity; we assumed that our increases would ultimately be justified by the overall demand for more and better intelligence. Later events have proved us right, in this regard.

2. As a result of all this activity, the 1951-52 budget for ZIPPER will have to be raised to accomodate these new expenses, which once were extraordinary in character but which now are routine and constant expenses, properly a part of the budget. This paper will show how the financial side of JUPITER has developed, and will show what the plans are for the coming fiscal year.

3. To begin with, it is the considered opinion of the ZIPPER Sovzone staff and ourselves that we are over the hump insofar as attaining our JUPITER intelligence objectives are concerned. We feel that the month of March can be considered the peak month so far as agent recruitments are concerned, and that the rate of agent increases will now trend downward. These conclusions have been arrived at after considering two factors: the suitability of the new coverage already activated in the Sovzone, and, the Sovzone intelligence requirements not yet met (this latter factor is treated separately in Annex H). Future Sovzone increases, especially after the first of the new fiscal year, would be highly selective in character, designed to fill the holes in the picture or to cover new target responsibilities placed upon ZIPPER by the paying customers.

4. The chart in Annex J-2 will prove a useful reference at this point. The baseline represents the 60,000 DM referred to in para 1 above; therefore the amounts indicated by the graphs are additional expenditures. From July through the end of 1950 there was a relatively small increase above the base-line. This was due to the fact that initial expansion was taken care of within the 60,000 DM. In fact, up to about October the CV's were unable to use up their portions of this lump-sum, and actually created reserves from it. Starting in October, however, the CV's had committed their total portions to new recruitments, and by the first of 1951 had

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY SECRET

additionally committed these temporary reserves. Thus in January (Annex J-3) we see a great upsurge of individual proposals which carried the graph significantly above the 60,000 level (to which it will not return). Thus the costs go up until on 1 April 1951 the amount committed through proposals stood at 48,000 DM (round figures will be used; exact figures are kept in our books). As of the time this balance was struck - 20 March - a total of 49,000 was committed for April, 42,500 for May, and 34,000 for June. This sharp downward trend is not wholly dependable, however, for this reason: As a working method, I approve most JUPITER proposals for a period of three months only, to allow ZIPPER agent evaluation before going further. During the latter part of March no proposals were processed here because of our preoccupation with the examination of targets and coverage (Annexes A-G) and 38's work in preparing the briefing of 4 April. Thus many of the February proposals "expired" on paper while requests for their continuation (and new proposals) sat in the in-box. Hence the sharp drop-off. Actually, and this is my best opinion, the curve will drop off, but more gently, during the month of May or June, even after all current proposals are processed. This is the hump I spoke about earlier.

5. Now we're almost ready to talk budget increases, in marks, for the next year. At this point, one must read Annex J-1. ZIPPER was in agreement with this proposal, and we have arrived at the increases mentioned in para 4b of the annex. They are: for GV-O, budgeted forschungsgeld increased from 4,500 DM monthly to 13,000; GV-H, from 5,000 to 15,000; BV-E, from 3,000 to 6,000. Thus a total increase of 21,500 DM monthly for Sovzone forschungsgeld.

6. Now going back to Annex J-2, and pausing, one comment must be added here. During the development of JUPITER, a number of expenditures were made which were not for reporting agent sources, i.e., additional radio operators for the Berlin Meldekopf; additional personnel for parts of 236; a small number of staff increases to handle the increased flow of agent reports. My best computations indicate that the cost of these non-agent expenditures amounts to about 12% of the total JUPITER cost. Now, in the next fiscal year, extra JUPITER money will be used only to serve actual field reporting sources in the Sovzone, and will not be used for supporting activities in the western zones. On the proposal expenditure curve again, a fair estimate is that the fixed costs resulting from sound proposals will level off at about 45,000 DM monthly. Adding 60,000 to this, we have 105,000 DM. Less 12%, there remains 92,400. Add to this the total forschungs ~~increase~~ of 21,500, we arrive at a grand total of 113,900 DM.

12,500
134,000

7. To recapitulate, it will cost approximately 114,000 DM to pay for the 150 new Sovzone agents already recruited under JUPITER, of whom

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

30 are high-level penetration agents. I believe that this is one of our sounder intelligence investments.

8. Thus the new fiscal year should see this present JUPITER increase added to the monthly budget as a continuing expense. It should also see the arrangement left operative, whereby expenditures above this amount may be made under the present JUPITER methods of piecemeal approval. As mentioned earlier, subsequent increases should be rather selective and narrowly controlled so as to reflect more specifically the tailored needs of the customers - the paying customers. Subsequent additions to the overhead staff, as may be necessary to handle the larger intelligence product, should be submitted through ZIPPER channels to [redacted] for consideration. They should no longer be accomodated within the JUPITER framework.

9. Much of my willingness to press for this financial expansion of the ZIPPER Sovzone apparatus is predicated on ZIPPER's apparent ability to gather operational details and control into the headquarters level, and their new desire to do so. I have made it crystal-clear to KUEHNE that he must maintain such records and controls as will enable him to break down the entire 114,000 DM into specific agents covering specific targets, costing thus-many marks, and rendering such-and-such reports. Eventually this type of knowledge must extend to all Sovzone sources, not only those recruited under JUPITER. In other words, this budget increase must not sink down into the Pre-Korea darkness of the old Sovzone operation. KUEHNE agrees completely with this viewpoint, and does in fact recognise his (and our) moral obligation to be able to equate money to results upon request.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Annex J-1

Copy

TO : 38 No. 2183

FROM : 25.0 28 March 1951

SUBJECT: JUPITER - Increase in Forschungsgeld

1. It may be well to confirm our discussions of last week, and to reduce to writing the proposal I made to you concerning an increase of Forschungsgeld.

2. The situation you described was, in essence, the following: The GV's no longer had available funds with which to conduct Forschungs work leading to additional recruitments under the JUPITER program. And the problem: from where should the additional money come. This situation is due to the fact that, before JUPITER, each GV received a fixed amount earmarked as Forschungsgeld; this money was used to explore and test new sources to replace agents lost by normal attrition. At that time the Sovzone apparatus was constant in scope and relatively small in size, and the allotted Forschungsgeld was adequate to maintain this pre-JUPITER apparatus. During the course of JUPITER, however, the increased amount of Forchungs work has rendered the old allotment inadequate.

3. One obvious solution to this problem would be to have the GV's submit to you (and thus to me) individual proposals within the JUPITER framework for the approval of each Forschungs effort and the consequent financial authorization. I am strongly opposed to this method, for the reasons which follow:

a. The opportunities for advantageous exploration and contact in the field are frequently fleeting and easily lost, if action is not taken at once. If the GV's are to be held responsible for building and maintaining effective collection organizations, they must have the money and the authority to take advantage of sudden opportunities. Their flexibility in this regard would be destroyed were they required to engage in a paper exchange with headquarters which might consume weeks of time.

b. In most cases the headquarters will not be competent to judge the chances of success of a Forschungs proposal.

c. If Forschungs activities were to be dependent on a headquarters approval, then the responsibility for an abnormally high rate of failure on the part of a GV could quite correctly be assigned to headquarters. See b above.

d. Strict systems of headquarters control where such control is a hindrance rather than a help will surely inspire evasion and holding-back on the part of the GV's.

e. Lastly, free use of Forschungsgeld will develop a higher level of organisational responsibility within the GV's.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4. In order to provide additional Forschungsgeld, I propose the following steps and principles:

a. Furnish me with a statement of amounts presently earmarked as monthly Forschungsgeld for each of the GV's. Then indicate your estimate of the monthly increases needed by each of the GV's. I assume that you will arrive at these increased amounts after discussions with the GV's.

b. We shall then arrive at mutually acceptable increases.

c. Then you should authorise each GV to free the additional amount from its presently encumbered monthly budget by the paper transfer of old agents (those recruited before JUPITER and before the GV's needed Hq. approval to recruit) to the JUPITER financial account. The GV should select a sufficient number of old agents whose remuneration totalled the amount of the newly authorised Forschungs increase. The money thus freed within the old budget would be at once available for Forschungs work within the GV.

d. In effecting the above change-over, I would suggest that you cause the GV's to submit to you, for each old agent so transferred, the same data presently submitted for new JUPITER recruitments. Obviously, my approval of these transfers would not be necessary.

e. Concurrently, your sifters should screen the lists of Sovzone agents to identify those old sources whose intelligence value is, by present standards, marginal. The GV's should be caused to drop these sources; the money thus saved should revert to headquarters, not to the GV's, and be held as frozen funds.

5. I believe the procedure described above will have a good internal effect on the German organisation. It will: (a) bring more of the Sovzone apparatus under the supervision of headquarters, and (b) give the GV's freedom of action in their Forschungs work. Both of these results will contribute to the institutional soundness of the German organisation.

6. I am at your disposal for the earliest implementation of the above plan, if you are in agreement with it.

25.0

cc: 25.37

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

ANNEX J-2

TO GERMANY ONLY



SECRET

The base line begins at DM 60,000 (monthly), which is the lump-sum increase authorized for ZIPPER at the beginning of JUPITER, in July 1950. The solid-line graph shows the additional amounts committed through individual JUPITER proposals, for monthly costs of extra agent personnel. The cross-lined columns indicate the amounts authorized for one-time expenditures in connection with these individual proposals.

SECRET

ANNEX J-3.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY



Light solid line = agent recruitments (incl. explorers, couriers, agent leaders)
within the 60,000 DM JUPITER monthly increase.
Short-dashed line = dropped agents (normal attrition).
Long-dashed line = agents recruited by individual JUPITER proposals.
"eavy solid line = net agent increase, by month.

SECRET

632

SECRET/RELEASE SECRET
TO GERMANY ONLY

ANNEX K

ZIPPER Operating Techniques - Sovzone

1. We must assume that at least the working sections of ZIPPER will ultimately take their place in a new German Intelligence Service. If we are forceful and fortunate, they shall. Thus transferred in status and removed from the present by some years, they will be an equal service and, we hope, a friendly and cooperating one. But our present favored position will have been lost, and much of our future field contact with ZIPPER will be as a competing service. Thus we must, with our present opportunities, record as much as we can regarding the techniques of ZIPPER's covert collection methods, the touchstones by which their field activities may be recognised.

2. An examination of the Sovzone apparatus will be quite revealing as regards techniques; several unique factors must be pointed out, however. Firstly, the Sovzone is ethnically a German state, and the difficulty of ZIPPER's carrying on clandestine activities there cannot be compared to the difficulties of operating in a truly foreign country, possibly amongst a hostile population. Nevertheless, it is in this ethnic German area that ZIPPER is building up its biggest stock of experience in intelligence collection (particularly military), and techniques which have proved their success in this sector will undoubtedly repeat themselves in other places at other times. German habits are probably harder to break than others. The heavy Abwehr-GSC coloration of ZIPPER will also make the present techniques more persistent as time goes on.

① 3. It might be thought that the relative independence of each of the ZIPPER operating field bases (the GV's) since approximately 1947 would preclude the identification of characteristics which could be observed throughout the organisation. To say this otherwise, a centralised headquarters control has been largely absent during the growth of ZIPPER, consequently a standardised headquarters influence in field operations could also be expected to be absent, and the field agencies expected to burgeon in a wide variety of forms and styles. Actually, the latter development did not take place, largely due to the synthesis of the Abwehr-GSC personalities who, in all significant respects, comprise the staffs of the field agencies as well as the headquarters. For although the headquarters influence was not felt operationally, the same kind of minds were at work in the field, and the net result probably is now about the same as if the headquarters influence had been decisive from the beginning. In fact, direct headquarters control had been so totally lacking that it is likely that only this similarity of mental conditioning has enabled the field and headquarters to tolerate each other at all. And at this reading, they are drawing more closely together organisationally, with the domination of the headquarters gradually being accepted. When this trend began, ZIPPER grew up as an organisation. The cohesiveness it is attaining now will toughen it as well. And as it institutionalises itself, it will become less a creature of its top leadership, and more

TOP SECRET SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

stable and enduring than that leadership.

4. Thus it can be reasonably assumed that many of the operational techniques often described by ZIPPER headquarters people are in fact practised by the field agencies. This assumption is partially borne out by the operational details furnished by the field during the course of JUPITER; they have largely corresponded to headquarters' "approved solutions" for the conduct of such operations. The most readily identifiable techniques are given below, without regard to their being standard techniques or unique to ZIPPER.

5. Firstly, we find, as [redacted] has pointed out, that ZIPPER first uses a forscher, or explorer, to locate a potential source who can securely furnish what is desired and who will probably be susceptible to a positive approach. Enter the recruiter, who makes this approach and puts the proposition. Ideally, the forscher has not been blown during this period, and is still clean for further exploration. The recruiter binds the deal, and may possibly engage in some preliminary training and testing of the new agent. When satisfied, the recruiter puts the agent in touch with his agent leader who, up to this time, probably does not know the new agent. At this point the recruiter drops out and future handling, training, and care are provided by the agent leader. Thus there are almost always three persons involved, though occasionally a regular recruiter will locate and recruit a new agent. This is considered by ZIPPER to be bad form and is discouraged with few exceptions. Almost never does the recruiter actually run the agent.

1 spotter
2. recruiter
3. PA

6. The ZIPPER Sovzone collection people believe that, ideally, an agent leader should run two or three agents; under no circumstances more than five (at the present time, however, this figure is frequently as high as nine). By "agent" is meant a field source; this automatically includes supporting activities such as couriers, letter boxes, and the like. Above the agent leaders, and properly separated by letter boxes, telephone drops, etc., are the so-called filiale leaders. Each filiale, according to best practice, handles two or possibly three agent leaders - no more. At this point the structure becomes less stylised, and we find a wider variety of forms, up to the Sub-agency (UV). Agent leaders may report directly to the UV, or there may be a filiale level in between. Under one UV may be found as many as five or six filiale, or more. Above the UV there is the District Agency (BV) and then the General Agency (GV).

Filiale inside
UV
BV

7. Systems of cut-outs are universally used, and generally in considerable depth. On paper at least, the ZIPPER Sovzone apparatus is organised quite securely, and the planning concerning new Sovzone operations constantly reflects this laudable thinking. In practice, the involved systems of cut-outs has apparently paid off: relatively few Sovzone people have been lost through compromise or arrest, and where

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRE

the latter has occurred, it has generally been a single arrest rather than a wholesale roll-up. For instance, a transportation source in Weisswasser was arrested (for intelligence reasons, though specifically unknown) during late February or early March. However, so far his actual courier and letter box were not blown, to the best of our knowledge.

8. Berlin serves as the transfer point from enemy areas to friendly hands for a large part of the Sovzone product. There each UV maintains a representative of the UV headquarters, who in turn operates central letter boxes which relieve the BV's of their take (the leading is done through another channel). In Berlin one finds a heterogenous mixture of dead letter drops, live drops, and telephone drops, with the latter being the more widely used by agents coming in from the Sovzone. Through a phone drop a meeting is arranged with the agent leader, or else the agent is told to utilize his letter box.

9. There is of course no lateral contact between agents. Within the UV's, however, and even within the BV's, there may be a selective type of lateral contact. As indicated previously, the agent leader is not selected because of his personal knowledge of the agent himself. Their relationship is generally functional, depending on the type of target being covered by the agent and the number of agents already being handled by the leader. Not infrequently an agent is passed from one leader to another; this may be occasioned by the agents being transferred from, say, an airfield target to a supply dump target. Or possibly because the agent leader is being lightened in order to better handle a smaller number of agents. Apparently, at least as regards the ethnically German Sovzone, ZIPPER has seen fit to disregard the psychological advantages of a close and enduring personal relationship between an agent and his leader. And apparently security has not been lost by such transfers.

10. Getting down to the end of the ganglia, we may take as a good example an agent reporting on railway traffic in the Kuestrin-Kietz gateway. He has available to him at least one, possibly two, pre-arranged channels for personal contact with his leader for briefing, training, or other help. This personal contact channel will run through either a letter drop or a phone drop, the latter generally if contact is to be in Berlin. The letter drop is open both ways; the phone drop only to the agent. In addition, there almost always exists a separate contact channel available to the leader, either through a third party unavailable to the agent, or through a stand-by letter drop which the agent frequently checks. The above describes the so-called "leading" channels. The reporting channels are always quite separate from the leading channels. Most frequently they consist of a dead or live letter drop to which reports are physically sent, or of a phone drop where a canned message will produce a courier,

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

who will relieve the agent of his take at a pre-arranged meeting. Further there will always exist a separate channel direct from the agent to a lett or phone drop one level above his leader (though to whom is unknown to the agent) which is to be used in case of danger to the agent (or to the leader) or in the event the leader is unavailable during a crucial time. Thus we have observed that each reporting agent may have as many as three leading and three reporting channels, each separate from the other. However, two of each are more the rule.

11. It has also been noted that ZIPPER believes in a W/T man doublin as an agent and reporting his own observations, and is rather firmly opposed to using a W/T man to serve a net of eye observers by transmitting their reports. I believe that this viewpoint, however, is based on a desire to preserve W/T assets until they are vitally needed. The existenc of Berlin as a collecting center insures prompt handling of hot intelligency, and the use of W/T is not justified. Thus the reluctance to connect a W/T to a net is probably predicated upon the local situation in the Sovzone, rather than on a principle of operation. That this is a logical assumption is further supported by current Sovzone activities: in one example, there has been set up a stand-by system of drops which in an emergency would link three railway observers to a dormant W/T in Frankfurt an Oder. As a matter of practise, all Sovzone W/T agents are dormant except for practise or in an emergency.

12. The above observations are sketchy at best, and were gathered only out of the corner of the eye during the months when attention was being devoted to the over-all soundness and effectiveness of the structure rather than to the myriad techniques used in the building of it. There has not been time to make the exhaustive technical analysis of Sovzone operations that they justly deserve. With JUPITER well on its way toward the attainment of its major objectives, [redacted] will probably have enough time in the future to record more on this interesting and profitable by-product.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

ANNEX L

copy

12 March 1951

MEMO TO : [redacted]

SUBJECT : JUPITER

1. Herewith follow my recommendations for the future handling of JUPITER and for the continuation of our present interest in ZIPPER's Sovzone apparatus and activities. Before going into these recommendations, however, I think the philosophy behind both the handling and the interest must be detailed somewhat, and reduced to writing for the record.

2. The primary and principal purpose of JUPITER remains what it always has been, as stated in MGL-A-2838, of 1 August 1950: "...a program designed to raise the level of quality and timeliness of reports covering Sovzone OB targets and the recognized indicators of imminent hostilities". Thus it remains a construction job, and should remain one until we can state, with reasonable assurance, that the ZIPPER apparatus is of sufficient extent and so placed as to fulfill at least the minimum intelligence requirements placed upon us by the military customers. The "minimum requirements" will probably be left for us to define, through collation of the known requirements of the customers. At any rate, I do not feel that we have yet attained this minimum level and for this reason, as well as for others given below, JUPITER should be continued as a program. Later on, when the basic construction has been completed, the JUPITER procedure should be constantly available for the continued maintenance of the Sovzone apparatus and for the fulfillment of new or changed intelligence requirements. I strongly believe that the procedures set up under JUPITER have, since its inception, proved their value to ZIPPER, to POB, and to the customers, and have made a solid contribution to the effectiveness and reliability of ZIPPER as an intelligence gathering organization.

3. A word about these JUPITER procedures. ZIPPER Hq. now receives specific proposals from the GV's, each proposal describing the placement of a particular agent or a small connected net. These proposals are now prepared in a standard format, and routinely include pertinent operational data, costs, and personalia. The intentions and costs are approved or disapproved at headquarters, actually in my office. The fact that the approvals issue from me is non-pertinent; the facts that ZIPPER Hq. has gradually assumed directing authority and, more important, that the GV's are coming to accept this authority

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

calmly and casually - these facts are indicative of a complete reversal of ZIPPER's previous principles of operations, and reveal a willing acceptance of methods more nearly like our own. WOLLMAN is known to be strongly in favor of the new system, and KUEHNE and GAY could not be more enthusiastic. UTILITY's viewpoint is unknown to me, probably because the details of JUPITER methods are unknown to him, a condition I should not like to see altered. I feel that Hq. acceptance of these methods is fully completed, and the principle of operation has seeped down, unequally as yet, to the GV's and even beyond.

4. In paras 2 and 3 above I have set out the two main reasons why JUPITER should be continued, and repeat them here:

a. To complete the ZIPPER Sovzone apparatus so as to meet the requirements of the military customers.

b. To allow ZIPPER Hq. to extend and perfect its knowledge and control over its most valuable collection asset: the Sovzone apparatus.

The customers will receive early and identifiable value from a, and intangible but lasting benefits from b. At the same time FOB will pump off the agent data of professional interest, a benefit of considerable long range value. At some time in the future the GIS will have at its disposal a rather large number of Germans and other nationalities with extensive experience in clandestine operations; we shall learn much more about these people by keeping the JUPITER technique alive. Independently of the foregoing, [redacted] and I both have had occasions when we have made specific suggestions in the operational phase of a proposal, to the admitted benefit of 38. There is a purpose served here, as well.

5. Therefore, I recommend that any closing out of JUPITER (as you intended, per your last fortnightly letter) be limited to a financial balance being struck as of the end of this fiscal year, and that the past procedures be kept fully operative. After I leave in May, I recommend strongly that [redacted] move right along with the program, doing business at the same old stand (and for the same old purposes). We have seen eye-to-eye on the problem all along, and [redacted] relationship with 38 is excellent. As a rough estimate, objectives a and b of para 4 above should be near completion during the early or middle fall; this might coincide with another change in [redacted] duties, so there would probably be no break in continuity. To prognosticate further would be pointless, at the present time, and further courses of action could more wisely be planned when the goals come in view.

SECRET

6. The method processing and forwarding the personalia take has already been agreed upon between [redacted] and myself.

7. One more point should be touched on here. In JUPITER we have concerned ourselves with the building of an instrument of considerable intelligence value, and have pumped much money and effort into the building. Should war break out, there would at once exist the great danger that we (the Western world) would see this apparatus rendered valueless through our being deprived of contact with it. Probably the greatest service the POB and ZIPPER staffs can render would be the setting up of a shadow plan which, upon activation, could re-establish contact with those parts of the apparatus which may survive a wartime occupation. I realise that SATURN is designed to cover wartime activities of all sorts; it is my strong feeling, however, that no SATURN activity should take precedence over this primary goal: to salvage as much of the peacetime Soviet Zone (and West Zone) apparatus as possible. The coordinated efforts of [redacted], and [redacted] could well and profitably be devoted to this end.

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

* Indicates inactive numbers not yet assigned by the BV as of 1 April 51.

TOP SECRET

ANNEX M


1476
7992
2012
2122
BV – 23
1100–1199
1613
9707
* 9760–9799
* 14100–14129
BV – 1200
1200–1299
BV – 1300
1300–1350
9000–9019
9721–9739
1375
1376
1380
1488
1597
1598
1561
1562
1565
1363
BV – 1400
1400–1412
1431–1450
9020–9040
9080–9099
9740–9759
2013–2999
* 14131
1800–1899
8650–8699
8402
14151–14169
7993–7999
8100–8182
8184–8199
1842
8424
8503
8532
14131–14150
BV – 90
2100–2120
2122–2150
8968
8969
2580–2599
* 9650–9699
8921–8940
8970
9500–9599
8971–8999
9600–9649

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRET

ANNEX N

GV-G (Staff)
4100 - 4199

BV-600	BV-M	BV-HB	BV-Berlin	BV-06	UV-Mitte	BV-71	UV-73
12600-12619	600-1099	9101-9499	4200-4299	12670-12699	4300-4349	4430-4499	4500-4549
12800-12899	10699-11099	20001-20033					
12900-12949	4350-4399	20530-20590					

This chart does not include those parts of G which work exclusively in Western Germany.

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

TOP SECRE

ANNEX O

BV - E (Staff)
3500 - 3599

UV - 73
3600 - 3699

UV - 65
3900 - 3999
3800 - 3899

UV - 129
3401 - 3499

UV - 23
3100 - 3150

UV - 35
3151 - 3200

UV - 127
3201 - 3300

UV - 138
3301 - 3400

TOP SECRE

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH) DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

~~TOP~~ SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M
~~EYES ONLY~~

DATE: 9 June 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— SATURN/ F-Net/OSMOSIS

SECRET/RELEASI
TO GERMANY ONI

1. It is extremely important that our policy vis a vis ZIPPER's role in intelligence activities in the event of war be crystal clear and not subject to divergent interpretations in Washington and Europe. There is considerable evidence that this clarity of understanding has not been achieved. Since we are engaged in an extensive program directly related to this problem and because a tremendous amount of detailed planning and preparatory actions to support wartime activities of ZIPPER are entailed, it is imperative that our position on this matter be re-examined and that any existing confusions be clarified.

2. The ZIPPER Position.

a. ZIPPER's E-Plan envisages the evacuation of 1500-2000 members to the West. The evacuation would be centrally controlled; communications would be retained; assembly areas west of the Rhine have been designated; plans and preparations for resuming collection activities in the Soviet occupied areas east of the Rhine have been and are being completed.

b. The integrity of ZIPPER would be retained; it would hope to gain strength by affiliating itself, for propaganda purposes, with whatever emerges as a German Government in Exile.

c. ZIPPER would be completely subordinated to the American or Allied intelligence structure that would exist under these circumstances. All preparations and plans for such an eventuality are made in closest cooperation with the US staff. ZIPPER recognizes the fact that its present E-Plan is subject to rather radical changes by either SHAPE directives or the tactical and political situation that might exist at the time of implementation of their plan. However, they feel that it is better to have a carefully made plan from which deviations can be made than to have none at all, or to wait for the SHAPE picture to clarify. We on the US Staff with ZIPPER enthusiastically share this view.

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

aa
R10/TS00
25 NOV 1966

~~TOP~~ SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

GLTS. 524
COPY No. 1

CS COPY

[redacted]

d. ZIPPER is in complete agreement that the necessary files (signal plans, ciphers, operating instructions, rosters, etc.) to establish a ZIPPER Headquarters and Base Station at any point where it may be necessary should be in safe storage in US hands. They have never accepted the fact that construction of signal plans and the training of ZIPPER W/T agents should be directed towards facilitating communication with an American base station manned exclusively by American personnel. See MGLA-5088 and 6574, subject "Signal Plans".

e. A ZIPPER outside base station, staffed with a skeletal crew and capable of immediate expansion to meet ZIPPER base station requirements in time of tension or upon the outbreak of war by priority evacuation of 45 available ZIPPER operators to the base station area, is the optimum ZIPPER aim. The minimum ZIPPER aim is an alternate US developed and controlled base station with an adequate number of operating positions to be manned by ZIPPER operators to be evacuated from Germany in time of tension or upon the outbreak of war.

3. The U.S. Position.

a. Six months of discussion between POB and Washington in late 1950 resulted in a decision to permit ZIPPER to develop an outside base station (OSMOSIS) with only material assistance from the U.S. WASHA-24880 gave final approval to develop the ZIPPER outside base station and laid down the principle of no ZIPPER operators in American base stations. A week later, MGKW-7443 (originating in the Commo Office) stated "For planning purposes it is assumed by the Home Office that, in the event of hostilities, the ZIPPER staybehind circuits will be worked into U.S. controlled and operated bases which will preclude the use of ZIPPER base radio operators." Feeling that this indicated a partial conflict, POB asked for clarification in PULLA-1617. WASHA-27784 in late January stated "Basic policy to avoid ZIPPER tie-in AIS where this our best interest....in event hostilities prior establishment ZIPPER outside base, ZIPPER circuits will be worked into U.S. bases...imperative signal plans given ZIPPER staybehinds permit contact with [redacted] base station...staybehind planning should provide for such contingency."

b. We have not previously, among POB, Karlsruhe and Washington, discussed in terms of policy many of the broader aspects of the German position.

4. During the first half of 1951, [redacted], the POB Communications Officer, has been reporting his continuing efforts to have ZIPPER modify its signal plans and procedures

sufficiently to permit the emergency use of an [redacted] base, if necessary. Considerable progress has been made. However, we are not optimistic that this progress in getting ZIPPER to modify its plans is sufficiently fast to ensure, within a reasonable time, that satisfactory communications could be established and maintained between an American controlled and operated base station (perhaps heavily loaded with other commitments) and ZIPPER trained W/T agents in the field. Frankly, we believe that the existing well-trained 45-55 ZIPPER base station operators should be assigned the task of providing communications to ZIPPER agents. More important, ZIPPER has not accepted the principle that they are recruiting and training W/T and agent teams to be individually integrated into the U.S. intelligence effort in time of war. ZIPPER is obviously holding out for the minimum solution - i.e., a packet of ZIPPER Communications Staff going into action in an American controlled base station to work ZIPPER agents. Thus far we have not taken a flat and unalterable position with ZIPPER on this matter simply because it is not entirely clear in our own minds that the basic policy laid down in WASHA-27784 indicates that we should. However, this unresolved issue is now handicapping our efforts to proceed effectively with vital planning and preparations, and the time has come to hold forthright discussions with ZIPPER on the entire SATURN program.

5. In summary, within the limits of the U.S. and German positions, we appear to have several possible solutions; they are:

a. To assist ZIPPER in the development of an adequate outside base station of their own; to base the alternate plan on the use of an American controlled and American operated base station with U.S. operators contacting ZIPPER W/T agents.

b. To assist ZIPPER in the development of an adequate outside base station of their own; to base the alternate plan on the use of individual ZIPPER operators in a US controlled and operated base.

c. To assist ZIPPER in the development of an adequate outside base station of their own; to base the alternate plan on the use of a packet of ZIPPER operators and communication staff members in a US controlled base. (Preferably separated physically from any other U.S. base station.)

d. To assist ZIPPER in the development of a base station (OSMOSIS) capable of handling only limited training and testing F-Net traffic and to base all wartime plans on the use of an American controlled base station staffed with only adequate ZIPPER communication personnel to meet existing ZIPPER requirements.

6. Solution "a" above would appear to be closest to the stated U.S. position. Solution "b" would be consistent with

WASHA-27784, if we interpret the presence of ZIPPER operators in an American station under these circumstances to be "in American interest". If we take the position of either "a" or "b" above, it will be contested by ZIPPER. Solution "c" is obviously the ZIPPER solution. If we reject it we should determine beforehand on what basis we wish to reject it. Is it because we do not agree with the basic ZIPPER concept of retaining their organizational integrity under these circumstances? Is it because of the difficulties we envisage they will encounter in attempting to develop a 10-position base station in OSMOSIS? Is it because of our own security considerations at US controlled and operated base stations? Solution "d" could be stated in several variations - for example, in terms of an inadequate OSMOSIS station and the alternate solutions of "a", "b", or "c". However, it is felt that the various aspects of this problem have been adequately presented.

7. I feel that we should determine the limits of the position that we are willing to discuss with ZIPPER and then initiate here in Pullach discussion designed to clarify and resolve, once and for all, the misunderstanding and outright differences that cloud all of our present planning in this field.

8. A year from now we expect to have trained and prepared to operate approximately 60 W/T agents. At present we have 21 trained W/T F-Net operators; 27 in training. This does not include W/T agents in the Sovzone or Satellite areas who are being integrated gradually into our SATURN plans. See MGLA-6124, 6434, and 6701. Although we know that a number of them would not survive, we feel that we must plan on a base station with approximately 10 operating positions.

9. In general, the entire SATURN program is progressing satisfactorily. The burial program is underway. We believe the technical problems have been solved. [redacted] and [redacted] are currently in Berlin observing burials in that area. We are planning several CPX problems during the summer to check our E-Plan communications. [redacted] is handling this entire matter most effectively.

10. A matter of real concern to us is the fact that we have been almost completely unsuccessful in obtaining Army agreement to plan for logistical or administrative support of our evacuation and subsequent operational plans for ZIPPER. We have lowest priority for road space in the evacuation. We are being promised no trucks. A check with Lt. Col. Leffers, formerly with us and now with the EUCOM Detachment in France and responsible for setting up supplies for a possible evacuation to France of EUCOM units (including the Munich Post personnel), reveals the fact that no consideration is being given to supporting any non-U.S. personnel, and specifically ZIPPER, in France. Equally serious, all reserve

officers on the POB staff have mobilization assignments to EUCOM units. Reliance on their availability is part of our evacuation and subsequent operational planning. Furthermore, if our plans are to work at all, a rather substantial air movement of key personnel would be in order. Insofar as we know, no realistic approach to this problem has been made. These are all problems which will require effective staff work and workable liaison at the EUCOM and SHAPE levels. We are thoroughly aware of the fact that COS in Karlsruhe is at present without a staff to handle these problems. However, they are problems which must be considered and resolved if we are to approach seriously the entire problem of Post-Outbreak-of-War-Operations.

11. Finally, I urge that the ZIPPER F-Net program not be considered out of context. It is part and parcel of an extensive program to leave us with a producing intelligence organization immediately after the outbreak of a war in Europe. Burials; selection of potential drop areas; preparation of detailed maps, sketches of photographs of selected drop areas; selection of safe-houses; selection of agents who by their occupation would probably become not only observers but also actual penetrations agents of agencies of a Soviet occupier; a highly selective program of recruitment of possible drop agents; the evacuation plan; the base station and the entire F-Net and relation communications plans are all designed to emerge as a single plan for the collection of information.

12. We recommend that ZIPPER be encouraged and assisted in the establishment of the primary Base Station in OSMOSIS; that an alternate station in the Mediterranean area be planned; that at a minimum the alternate station be packaged ready for quick installation and that, within the framework of our SATURN effort, plans be made to transfer communication and operational personnel to OSMOSIS or the alternate Base Station. If and when the status of OSMOSIS within the NATO framework is clarified, the OSMOSIS base station should be reexamined to determine the desirability and feasibility of establishing a greater degree of direct American control, more consistent with the US-ZIPPER relationship. This is essentially the recommendation in Para. 5 c. above and will, we feel, ensure the most effective utilization of ZIPPER under the conditions that could be expected to exist.

13. The Outside Base Station is now being shipped equipment by ZIPPER. Many items, including receivers, required for the station exist in ZIPPER stocks or can be procured locally. However, suitable transmitters are not available. [redacted] has indicated that the Hallicrafters type HT-4-G (stocked by Commo Division) transmitter would be ideal. A sea shipment containing eight of this type is requested; priority handling is desirable. The type and quantity of this shipment indicate our intention of

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

going ahead with our material support of ZIPPER to achieve their optimum aim (Para 2 e, above). UTILITY's visit to OSMOSIS and the continuing efforts of his staff responsible for this program seemed to have paved the way for continuing the development of the base station. HOEBEL, the ZIPPER communication chief, predicts that the OSMOSIS base will be ready for limited operation within two months. This being the case, we feel that we should not delay shipping to OSMOSIS (via ZIPPER) the equipment for permanent installation to meet minimum wartime requirements.

[redacted]

[illegible]

7. [redacted]

Dist:
2 - FDM
1 - COS
2 - File
1 - SRFG

[redacted] comments in [illegible] 3000<

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

32W-2-27

SECURITY INFORMATION

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH) DISPATCH NO. MGLA-11357

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

US

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 14 April 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt [redacted]

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Definitions in the CI Field.

REF: (1) MGQW-12913, (2) MGQA-2554.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

1. We submit that the [redacted] definitions are not adequate for our purposes. There are basically two problems involved: one of terminology and one of the delimitation of activities between ZIPPER and the BfV in the "CI" (US terminology) field.

2. Terminology. Recent discussions with ZIPPER concerning the "modern F-Dienst" (a proposal which would amalgamate counter-espionage (CE) and political intelligence into an inseparable definitional entity--rejected immediately by POB and COS) have convinced us of the value, indeed of the necessity for adhering to the classical definitions in the CI field.

a. We agree with par. 2, ref. (1), in rejecting, as confusing indeed, the [redacted] use of "CE" in the dual role of whole and part both. [ ] version (MGKA-35039) of the [redacted] definitions sets up an "intelligence" organization, which collects "information" from overt sources and highly secret "intelligence" (i.e. information) that can be obtained only by clandestine operations, i.e. "espionage". Against this intelligence organization is ranged the "counter-espionage" machine, according to [ ] (We believe that the correct label for the machine countering the intelligence organization should be "counter-intelligence" (CI)). This countering machine had defensive functions of "security" (internal & civil) and aggressive functions of (pure) counter-espionage.

> POB Comment: We believe that CE should be narrowly construed as a part of CI and not used as a term denoting both pure CE and pure CE plus security.

b. ZIPPER uses the old Abwehr numerical designation "III" to denote overall counter-intelligence; as yet ZIPPER has been unable to come up with a fitting term in words. The best word probably would be "Abwehr", but it has acquired an entirely different meaning. At any rate, ZIPPER includes as subdivisions of "III":

(1) "Sicherheit": internal security (formerly bearing Abwehr designations III-H, III-L, III-M and III-N) and counter-sabotage (formerly III-Wi) and

Dist:
2 - EE
2 - COS
1 - SRFG
2 - POB

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

IR COPY [redacted]

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

also security investigations as conducted by the "Waldkapelle".

(2) "Gegenspionage" (formerly III-F): pure CE.

(3) "Ermittlungsdienst" (formerly III-C--"civil security"): counter-subversion (CS), i.e. counter-action aimed at groups and persons not necessarily engaging in espionage (i.e. not pure CE), such as the Communist Party and extrem rightist organizations which might subvert the form of government by unconstitutional means.

c. POB agrees with par. 3, ref. (1), in using CI as the overall term. Included within CI are defensive and aggressive divisions. Within the defensive division, security, are these subdivisions: internal security and civil securi Within the "aggressive CI" division (for which we have no shorter specific title we include CE (as defined in the last sub-paragraph of par. 3, ref. (1)). However we believe that the preceding paragraph of reference includes an additional element of aggressive CI, i.e. counter-subversion (CS), not mentioned therein. The third line of that paragraph should read "or persons engaged in clandestine intelligence or other activities detrimental to the. . ." CE is the action designed to negate clandestine intelligence, i.e. espionage, while CS aims at countering non-espionage ("other") activities. Thus, we use CS as a term to apply, for example, to observation and penetration of the Communist party, which does not necessarily have anything to do with CE, though it does fall within the field of "agressive CI". In addition, we consider counter-sabotage another subdivision of "aggressive CI".

NOTE: The division between CE and the other components of CI has more than theoretical value; it serves the utilitarian purpose of drawing a clear line between Dyclean's exclusive charter in the external CE field and those of other agencies in the CI field, such as Dymacaco and Dymacule. Such a clear distinction is useful to all concerned and is the realistic means of avoiding inter-agency squabbling. Admittedly, there are lapses and overlaps, but, although these are winked at, the charters are clear. There is, unfortunately, no such clear delineation between ZIPPER and the BfV.

3. The CI Roles of ZIPPER and the BfV. It would be easy to theorize, on the normative level, that ZIPPER should confine itself to CE and that the BfV should confine itself to the remainder of the CI field in western Germany. The actualities are more complicated.

a. The internal security of ZIPPER is exclusively ZIPPER's concern at the present; likewise, ZIPPER's role in internal security is confined to ZIPPER.

NOTE: UTILITY, over the past 3 years, has maintained the position that he considers the BfV the agency to handle internal security matters, to include even background investigations for security clearance of prospective GIS employees. However, we doubt that he would agree, at present, to having the BfV, headed by Otto JOHN (considered a BIS agent by ZIPPER), conduct investigations of present or prospective ZIPPER employees.

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

POB Comment: ZIPPER should handle its own internal security, including security clearances.

b. The civil security controls mentioned in par. 3., ref. (1), are clearly not within the ZIPPER province but a matter for the BfV, as the west German security agency working in conjunction with the LfVs and law enforcement agencies, such as police, customs and border guards.

c. ZIPPER's view has been that counter-espionage, both outside and within western Germany, should be the exclusive domain (among German services) of ZIPPER. According to the ZIPPER version (oral) of the ZIPPER-BfV protocol, which has been laying on Minister LEHR's desk for 8 months, it was agreed between ZIPPER and the BfV that all CE cases coming to the attention of the BfV would be passed to ZIPPER, i.e. the BfV acceded to ZIPPER's view. Though both JOHN and UTILITY have made official statements to the effect that the arrangement between ZIPPER and the BfV is satisfactory, ZIPPER states, off the record, that the situation between ZIPPER and the BfV is deplorable; cooperation is almost non-existent: ZIPPER provides the BfV with CE and counter-subversive information and gets almost nothing in return. The BfV has not observed its agreement to turn over CE cases to ZIPPER; instead, BfV has been running CE cases and not passing the CE information to ZIPPER.

> NOTE: GLOBKE, discussing the VS-ZIPPER relationship with [redacted] and [redacted] in Bonn, did not appear to be quite in agreement with ZIPPER's proposition that ZIPPER should have exclusive responsibility for the conduct of CE cases within western Germany. GLOBKE also described the East-West Germany situation as sufficiently unusual to warrant a deviation from any classical concept of clear-cut delineation of "CI-CE" functions. He specifically stated that he foresaw the GIS playing the primary CE role; however, the BfV would not be excluded from the field.
>
> POB Comment: A single and centralized agency should have exclusive responsibility for counter-expionage; this should be the GIS. However both the BfV and ZIPPER are in the CE field now, as competitors, and both can be expected to remain so for some time. There is also a good possibility that the various LfVs will occasionally try to play the game independently too.

d. The counter-subversive field is the most confused of all. Ideally, this would be the exclusive domain of the BfV, which would pass all CE leads to ZIPPER, as well as the background type information necessary for the planning of CE operations. This has not happened; the BfV has not provided ZIPPER with required information; consequently, ZIPPER has engaged in CS work, is continuing to do so and expects to have to keep on doing so for quite a while. The ZIPPER CI/CE budget for the FY 1952-'53 is based on the assumption that the relationship with the BfV will continue bad; that ZIPPER must continue to play a role in the CS field in western Germany, because the BfV will not meet its requirements; that ZIPPER's investigative and surveillance facilities must be expanded because reasonable service is not forthcoming from the BfV.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

„SECRET CO
US OFFICIALS

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4. We must face the fact that there is no really clear-cut delimitation between ZIPPER and the BfV within the offensive CI field; both engage in CE and CS work independently. We doubt if any substantial change will be effected by altering US terminology or by adopting British terminology, which we consider confusing.

5. [redacted] recently took up again with ZIPPER the question of POB access to ZIPPER-BfV traffic. ZIPPER has re-agreed to give us full access thereto; i.e. the green copies of ZIPPER reports to BfV, a copy of all ZIPPER-BfV teletype messages (incoming and outgoing) and the opportunity to examine and reproduce (if desired) incoming reports and name trace requests from BfV.

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

„SECRET CO.
US OFFICIALS

SECURITY INFORMATION

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH) DISPATCH NO. EGL-A-3748

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

22 MAY 1953

DATE:

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach Info: COM

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/ZIPPER

SPECIFIC— Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952.

Reference: EGQW-3301

1. Submitted herewith is the long-delayed report on ZIPPER's Satellite operations for the calendar year 1952. The report consists of nine attachments (A to I) as follows:

a. Attachment A presents a General Discussion by 50 dealing with the general, technical, psychological and area difficulties encountered in the course of the year's activities.

b. Attachment B gives general statistics on the number of agents and reports respectively in and on the target areas for the period plus some general remarks as to plans for 1953.

c. Attachment C breaks down in detail the general figures in Attachment B for the area, Poland, and adds measures and plans for 1953.

d. Attachment D breaks down in detail the general figures in Attachment B for the area, CSR, and adds measures and plans for 1953.

e. Attachment E breaks down in detail the general figures in Attachment B for the area, Hungary, and adds measures and plans for 1953.

f. Attachment F breaks down in detail the general figures in Attachment B for the area, Rumania, and adds measures and plans for 1953.

g. Attachment G reflects the lack of Bulgarian operations and mentions the measures and plans contemplated for 1953.

h. Attachment H is a report of overall organizational and personnel measures in the field of satellite operations.

i. Attachment I is a key to the B-report numbers shown in Attachments C thru G tying them to their respective EGL, EGK or MGL equivalents where applicable.

21 May 1953
DIST:
3-EE w/3 cy of ea. Attach.
3-COM " " " " "

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

2. To assist you in perusing the attachments the following remarks are submitted:

a. While giving due emphasis to the difficulties encountered by way of intensified Satellite security measures (documentation, border restrictions) and psychological measures of control ZIPPER makes sure to emphasize its difficulties re access to potential agents. The reference is of course to ZIPPER's non-preferred position in the initial handling and interrogation of refugees in Western sectors, a rather sore subject with the organization. We have attempted to assuage their feelings by pointing out that this so-called "cream of the refugee crop" has not produced any appreciable number of higher-types.

b. It is our impression that while ZIPPER is able to put its finger on the technical difficulties encountered it is not exerting all of its best efforts to overcoming them (apart from documentation work of course) especially with respect to border restrictions on the Bavarian-CSR border. Specifically we feel that ZIPPER has not devoted sufficient special effort to finding new and improved means of slipping agents into CSR. We feel that all too often the agencies in the field are left on an individual agent-case officer basis to figure out their specific means of entry. We will attempt to encourage ZIPPER to do some operational-aids type of research by its headquarters 331 staff (or others qualified for it) into ways and means of physically breaking thru the zonal barriers into CSR.

c. Of the 47 agents listed in paragraph 1 of Attachment B none were above the low-level category.

d. Of the 232 reports listed as being on Hungary including Soviet Zone Austria (para. 2 Attachment B) less than 10% emanated from inside Hungary.

e. B-reports listed as going to 25.50 staff on operational matters have been reported in normal operational correspondence.

f. Look for increased activity by ZIPPER in the field of legal channels to the Satellites (para. 3 c Attachment B). This is primarily to be sparked by 50 F about whose activities in this field Jenrick will soon report.

g. On reading the attached, ZIPPER's current "Drang nach Osten" concentrating on Vienna becomes quite evident. Rest assured that POB is following up with a critical eye all such declarations and intentions by ZIPPER toward intensification of Vienna operations. The plans for the build-up of the central MK in Vienna as well as the plans for CSW, GV C and UM operations in that city are being closely watched and controlled by us. We will exert every effort to insure that ZIPPER does not run over the brim of its small Viennese pot.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

3. All in all the picture is no great show of success although ZIPPER has managed a handful or two of singleton cross-border type operations. Staff-wise and operational reports-wise the handling of these operations as well as those which did not come off has generally been satisfactory. The SOP for Satellite operations was honored more in the observance than in the breach. Generally speaking ZIPPER deserves an A for effort, and about a C for performance. How this record measures up to that of others in the field, taking into consideration not only the common difficulties encountered but the special ones applying to ZIPPER (not the least of which is the non-affinity of the Satellite people generally to Germans and Germany), is a calculation that we here at POB cannot make. We await word of what you can tell us on this score.

4. In a subsequent pouch as a logical follow-up to this report we will submit a comprehensive list of all Satellite co-workers according to V-number, cover name (s), residence, place of work, and operational area for the same period.

[redacted]

Approved by:

[redacted]

9 Attachments: As listed above

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONL

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

GENERAL DISCUSSION

1.) It must be understood that one cannot get a complete impression through purely statistical evaluation. It is felt that in order to strike a balance, the increased difficulties for intelligence work in all Satellite States during 1952 should be taken into consideration. 50/S is therefore of the opinion that these difficulties should be pointed out again, in detail,as follows:

(A) Intelligence against POLAND was made difficult chiefly through 3 measures taken by the Poles: stricter border-controls; changes in documentation; political developments within Poland.

(1) Increased border controls:

The frontier between the Sovzone and Poland was definitely closed in the Neisse area through barbed-wire entanglements and watch-towers. To cross the border in that area is extremely risky and can only be undertaken by a very courageous and daring individual. The Oder-frontier is not closed in all places by barbed-wire entanglements, but does have watch-towers and regular patrols. The natural obstacle of the Oder River and the marshy region around the lower river require a well-functioning ferrying point, if possible, by Oder-fishermen for any crossing. The fact that fishing at night-time was prohibited is also a great handicap for intelligence activities. The frontier section west of Stettin is made secure by strong barbed-wire entanglements. The coast of the Baltic is guarded by patrols, chiefly on horseback. Watch-towers and beacon lights make any sea-landing well-nigh impossible. Regulations with regard to residence or travel in the frontier areas and in the coastal districts are stricter than ever. Crossing the 20 km wide border zone is only possible at night-time. The frontier guards on the Sovzone side were not noticeably increased. On the Neisse-side Soviet jet patrols were also ascertained.

(2) Documentation:

The changes in documentation in early summer 1952 made all agent activities in Poland impossible for about 3 months as our previous documents were no longer valid due to the new stamps on the Polish registration cards in May. New documents could not be made out before sufficient material was available. In the meantime a new identity card is being issued with the result that it is once more impossible to send agents out before this new document has been procured.

(3) Inner-Political developments:

Through new elections, the acceptance of a new constitution and the formation of a government modelled after the Soviet pattern the Satellite structure of Poland has become even stronger. The Soviet influence is growing. An attitude of resignation is easily under-

Attachment -A

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

standable in view of the Polish character which although easily inflammable for a new idea is also inclined to drop this idea immediately when difficulties appear. For the past 8 years there has been hope for an intervention by the Western powers; although the Soviet propaganda line of hatred always talks about the "imperialistic" war of the Western powers against the Soviet Union and the Satellites, the hope for an early liberation is diminishing. The strong decline of the economic situation, especially the scarcity of foodstuff and the rising prices strongly oppress the population. The struggle for their daily bread keeps the people busy from morning till night; there is hardly any room or time for other thoughts. There is also less readiness for intelligence co-operation due to this poor economic situation. Furthermore the efforts of the secret police to establish a spy-system after the Soviet pattern makes fast progress. Confidence in other persons even in one's own family or among colleagues is shaken. What is more, repeated appeals to all parts of the population are being issued warning them against supporting the espionage of the West in any way. The rigged spy-trials also intimidate the population. The last trial in Cracow in which, for rather scanty reasons, 7 members of the Polish Roman Catholic hierachy were sentenced, 3 of them even to death, will also have the effect of a strong shock on the people.

(4) Recruiting of agents:

The strictness of the border controls allow flight from Poland to the West only on the part of young and strong persons. The majority of refugees arriving in the West are young men trying to get away from military service. Back in Poland, on the other hand, they have no connections to interesting IS circles so that only in a few cases is employment of such persons worthwhile. Persons having left Poland before 1950 cannot be used either as, in the meantime, conditions have changed in Poland to such an extent that they cannot move about without attracting attention.

(B) In the CSR also, technical and psychological measures of all kinds make all illegal border crossings extremely risky. The CSR blocks itself off particularly against the German Federal Republic.

(1) Technical difficulties:

(a) Frontier CSR/German Federal Republic:

Barbed-wire entanglements begun in 1951 were completed in the course of 1952; all gaps still existing in the difficult area of the Bohemian forest were closed. The barbed-wire entanglements were effectively improved by up-ended railroad tracks, electric alarm systems, the mining of favorable crossing points, cutting straight narrow paths in dense parts of the woods, increasing frontier guards and the number of watchdogs, equipping of watchtowers with telephones. The frontier district itself was subdivided into two restricted areas; one a dead zone which was completely evacuated and which nobody is permitted to enter, the other a zone whose inhabitants were politically screened and one which may only be entered with special permits.

(b) Frontier CSR/DDR:

The Western part of the CSR/DDR frontier almost as far as Komotau is a restricted area due to its being a uranium mining district. The patrol measures in connection with the very intensive observation of large contingents of convicts (slave labor in mines) are so stringent that in that area no border-crossing operations can be planned. There were a few border-crossing points near Zinnwald, in the area of the Tetschner mountain, in the "Boehmisch-Saechsische Schweiz", in the Rumburg corner and in the area of the Lausitz mountains near Zittau. The possibilities in these places were used, as far as possible, by ferrying-type operations planned from Berlin. However, with the security situation in the DDR becoming more and more critical and with the increasing patrol activities since the middle of 1952 along the above-mentioned border, opportunities here also are being reduced. Although there are barbed-wire entanglements and RR-track obstacles only in parts of this border section, it is now a closely guarded area where the patrols fire at intruders without previous warning.

(c) Frontier CSR/Austria:

Knowing that a secure protection against "enemy" agents will only be possible when the whole border of the country is hermetically closed, Czechoslovakia has now started to fortify the CSR/Austria border in the same manner as the border of the Federal Republic. In the second half of 1952 the technical fortification of the Austrian frontier made fast progress due to increased working crews. The spots not yet quite closed by winter 1952/53 will be wired and equipped with security installations by Spring 53. There will be up-ended railroad tracks, trip wires with signal releases, increased patrols etc. There will also be the double frontier zone in which complete villages situated in the direct vicinity of the frontier will have to be evacuated.

(2) Technical-psychological difficulties:

The technical security of the frontier achieved by the measures as indicated above has also strong psychological consequences. The border population on the Czech side is hardly interested in the obstacles, the hermetical sealing-off against the outside world is no surprise and has to be accepted as long as the individual is not directly concerned. The effects of the restricted Zone II in which people are still living, but only under restricted conditions, are different. Their freedom to move about is limited, living in this zone is subject to a special stamp in the identity card or a special permit, registration regulations are extremely strict and spying by party officials intensive. Everything is done to intimidate the people living in that zone and to exert psychological pressure on them with the aim of punishing the smallest offence with the loss of freedom or life. The people living in that zone will give no support to transient agents, on the contrary they will do everything to denounce agents to the authorities merely because of the fact that such knowledge if unreported makes them liable to severest punishment.

(3) Psychological difficulties:

There are also the purely psychological difficulties which are the result of artificially created totalitarian atmosphere in the country. This atmosphere is to a large extent determined by the regular rigged spy-trials. It is also an atmosphere of fear, the feeling in each and every inhabitant of being spied upon and observed by unknown third parties everywhere. An atmosphere such as this in which every aspect of private life is under constant control and in which nothing exists which is unknown to the state, is extremely unfavorable and unsuitable for conspiratorial work directed against the regime. Furthermore there are recurrent "disappearances"; exponents of essential enterprises who might co-operate or who are almost recruited or already working for us will disappear usually after some weeks, sometimes after a few months or in the best of cases after a year or so with the result that their unexplainable disappearance makes the feeling of insecurity even greater. A typical example of such a constellation is the SLANSKY-CLEMENTIS trial which by one stroke did not only remove several men undoubtedly conspiring with the West but also determined the liquidation of many men who did not appear to be 100% safe to the regime, by the announcement of several additional connected trials.

(C) Intelligence against Hungary and the Balkans encounters the same difficulties as the work against Poland and CSR. Intelligence against the Balkan states is even more difficult as they are not direct neighbours of the Federal Republic or Austria which means that agents have to be ferried via Hungary or Yugoslavia as well as necessitating the maintenance of complicated courier channels.

2.) Difficulties in the Federal area, Berlin and Austria

Another obstacle to the recruiting of co-workers for strategical intelligence is the fact that besides the German IS numerous IS organizations of the Allies are working in the same area and with the same types. This makes the basis for work rather small as it is not easy under the present difficult conditions to find competent and courageous men for strategical work. Besides, all non-Germans crossing the border from the Satellites to the Federal Republic must be handed over to the nearest Allied authority within a few hours. If they are interesting or competent they hardly get into any contact with German authorities. Many of them are interrogated and then directly sent off to countries overseas; others are recruited for IS-cooperation by Allied IS authorities. Only worthless individuals or people having nothing to offer on the IS sector are sent to the refugee camps. It is our experience that only very few co-workers for the German IS can be selected from this contingent. In the same manner the most essential contingent on the interrogation sector is lost.

3.) It is to be expected that in 1953 the IS situation will be even more critical. In view of this fact 50/S has initiated the various measures as indicated in further attachments (Transfer of strategical work to Vienna and Berlin, finding legal channels to the Satellite states, using the possibilities in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany). Nevertheless it will be necessary in the future also to get a foothold in the Satellites. In view of the greater risk agents and ferrying agents are running, the amounts to be invested will probably have to be much higher than they are today.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

General Statistics--Agents and Reports

1. During report period the following agents were committed successfully with regard to reporting:

   28 agents in Poland against Poland
   6 agents in the CSR against CSR
   12 agents in Hungary against Hungary
   1 agent in Romania

   For details see attachments C thru G.

2. The following reports sent in by agents as indicated under para. 1 above were forwarded under B-Nr.:

   156 reports on Poland
   18 reports on CSR (including operational reports submitted by 50/S/Cs to 25.50)
   232 reports on Hungary including Soviet Zone Austria
   7 reports on Romania

3. Measures for activation of Satellite operations in 1953:

   a. Converting positive "Forschung" results into operations.

   b. Use of border-crossing operations, except for special cases, in the recruitment of native sources in the target areas and the establishment of command and courier-channels to the target areas.

   c. Utilization of legal channels to the Satellites for intelligence purposes (chiefly a job for General Agencies supported by 50/F).

   d. Intensified efforts to uncover jumping-off points for Satellite operations in the Soviet Zone, Germany (code name, EXORIAR) and in Austria (main concentration on Vienna).

The target is for each field office (except for DA.E whose strategical work is to begin in March) to establish 2 to 3 fixed connections in the Satellite states in which the respective field office has to work (GA.B: Poland; GA.G: Poland and CSR; GA.C: Poland and CSR; CSW: CSR; PE: Poland; U/M: Hungary, Bulgaria). The measures initiated, adopted, or intended in the organizational and personnel sector for reaching this target will be seen in attachments B thru G.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Attachment -B

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

POLAND

1.) During report period the following agents were successfully committed with regard to reporting on Poland:

(1) In Poland:

a) GV B

V-9784 (Operation ALBERT)

b) GV G

V-9497 (Operation BETTELSTUDENT)

c) GV H

V-9584 (Forschung FENSTERGUCKER)

d) GV C

V-11 117 (Operation V-11 117)

e) Operation group PE

V-21 323 (Operation EISER)

V-21 418 (Operation STEIGER)

V-21 307 (Operation HAY)

V-21 435 (Operation OBERSCHLESIEN)

V-8709 (Operation MOEWE)

V-21 729 (Operation ALBATROSS)

V-21 730 (" ")

V-21 411 (Operation SEETEUFEL)

V-21 412 (" ")

(2) In West Germany:

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

a) GV B

V-1092 (Forschung POSEIDON)

SECRET

Attachment - C 4 [illegible]

[redacted]

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

V-1093	(Forschung POSEIDON)	
V-10 644	" "	
V-12 646	" "	, formerly V-1179,1
V-12 649	" "	, " V-1179,4

b) GV G

V-1088	(Forschung NORDMARK)
V-1090	" "
V-1098	" "
V-1099	" "

c) GV H

V-4929

V-4938

d) PE

V-21 465	(Operation HANNES)
V-8708	(Operation HEINER)
V-21 415	(Operation CLERK)
V-21 416	" "

2.) The following reports submitted by agents as indicated in para. 1.) above were forwarded under B-Nr.:

a) From Agents committed into Poland:

(1) PE

Source V-21 323

B-13 587 (F 3)
B-14 491 (F 3-4)

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Source V-21 418

B-12 547 (F 2-3)
B-12 547 (F 3)

Source V-21 307

B-12 547 (C 3-4)

Source V-21 435

B-8811 (F 2)

B-8812 (F 2)

B-8957 (F 2)

B-12 008 (F 2)

B-12 093 (F 2)

B-12 118 (F 2)

Source V-8709

B-9340 (C 1)

B-12 376 (C 3)

B-15 310 (C 3-2)

B-13 656 (C 2-3)
13 657

B-15 323 (C 1)
15 324

B-13 647)
B-13 648) (C 1)
B-13 649)

B-15 324 (C 2-3)

B-15 330 (C 3)

B-15 340 (C 3)

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Source V-21 729

B-15 372 (F 4)

Source V-21 730

B 15 372 (F 3)

Source V-21 411/412

B-12 339)
B-12 340) (F 3)
B-12 341)

B-12 339) (F 3)
B-12 341)

(2) GV C

Source V-11 117

B-9884 (F 3)

B-9884 (F 3)

B-11 483 (F 3)

B-12 658 (F 3)

B-12 658 (F 2-3)

B-12 658 (F 3)

B-13 862 (F 3)

B-13 862 (F 3-4)

B-14 367 (F 2-3)

B-15 910 (F 3)

B-13 470 (F 3)

(3) GV B

Source V-9784

B-13 348 (F 4)

B-14 270 (C 3)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

(4) GV G

Source V-9497

B-12 827 (C 3-4)

B-14 055 (C 3)

B-15 910 (C 3)

B-15 910 (C 3)

B-11 870 (F 3-4)

B-13 226 (F 2-3)

B-13 226 (F 2-3)

B-13 348 (C 2-3)

B-13 348 (C 2)

B-13 398 (C 2-3)

B-13 470 (C 2-3)

B-13 470 (C 2-3)

B-13 584 (C 2)

(5) GV H

Source V-9584

B-13 348 (F 3)

B-13 584 (C 3)

B-11 483 (C 3-4)

B-13 898 (C 3-4)

B-14 239 (C 3-4)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

b. From Agent commitments in West Germany and Sovzone Germany:

(1) PE

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Source V-21 465

B-12 792 (F 3-4)

B-12 792 (F 3)

B-13 845 (F 3-4)

B-14 236 (F 3-4)

B-13 845 (F 3)

Source V-8708

B-9394 (C 3)

Source V-21 415

B-12 375 (C 3)

B-13 611 (C 2-3)

B-13 611 (C 1-2)

B-13 611 (C 2-3)

B-13 644 (C 3-2)

B-13 687 (C 2-3)

B-15 330 (C 2-3)

B-15 340 (C 2-3)

B-15 376 (C 3)

B-15 367(C 2-3)

B-15 395 (C 2)

Source V-21 416

B-15 330 (F 3)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

(2) GV B

Source V-1092

B-12 309 (C 1-2)

B-13 689 (F 2-3)

B-15 378 (F 2)

B-15 378 (F 3-2)

B-13 643 (F 3)

Source V-1093

B-12 325 (C 2-3)

B-12 386 (C 3-2)

B-13 607 (C 2)

B-13 638 (C 3-2)

B-13 605 (C 3-2)

B-15 355 (C 2-3)

B-15 363 (C 3-4)

B-15 326 (F 3)

B-13 623 (F 3-2)

B-15 313 (F 2-3)

B-15 313 (F 4)

Source V-10 644

B-12 360 (C 2)

B-15 302 (C 3)

B-15 321 (C 3)

B-15 335 (C 3)

B-15 372 (C 3)

B-15 372 (C 3)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Source V-12 646, formerly V-1179,1

B-15 330 (F 3)

B-15 330 (F 3)

B-15 328 (F 3)

B-15 377 (F 3)

B-15 327 (F 3)

B-15 327 (F 3)

B-15 327 (F 3+)

B-15 327 (F 3)

B-15 330 (F 3)

B-15 327)
B-15 328) (F 2)
B-15 329)

B-15 330 (F 3-4)

B-15 366 (F 3+)

B-15 377 (F 3)

B-15 376 (F 3)

B-15 377 (F 3-2)

B-13 611 (F 3+)

B-13 611 (F 2-3)

B-13 644 (F 3)

B-13 661 (F 3-2)

B-13 611 (F 2)

B-13 661 (F 2-3)

B-15 330 (F 3-4)

B-15 328 (F 3-2)

B-15 330 (F 3)

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Source V-21 649, formerly V-1179.4

B-15 387 (F 2)

B-15 394 (F 2)

(3) GV C Source V-1088

B-15 337 (F 3)

B-15 320 (F 3 +)

B-15 372 (F 3)

B-15 387 (F 3)

B-15 353 (F 2)

Source V-1090

B-12 343 (C 3-2)

B-15 304 (C 2)

Source V-1098

B-15 326 (F 3-4)

Source V-1099

B-13 610 (C 1-2)

B-13 621 (C 3)

B-13 622 (C 2)

B-13 622 (C 2)

B-13 623 (C 2)

B-13 623 (C 2)

B-13 623 (C 2)

B-13 640 (C 2-3)

B-13 641 (C 1-2)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

B-15 319 (C 2)

B-15 338 (C 3-2)

B-15 387 (C 3-2)

B-15 374 (C 3)

B-15 374 (C 3)

B-15 374 (C 3 +)

B-15 374 (C 3)

B-13 664 (C 2-3)

(4) GV H

Source V-4929

One report in process

Source V-4938

B-14 868 (F 2)

Another report in process

3.) Measures and plans on the operational sector:

For 1953, 50/S has the following target:

Development of positive "Forschung" results into connections.
Development of current operations and establishment of nets in Poland.

In detail (only for operations):

a) GA B

Improvement of reporting qualities of operation ALBERT by thorough training of V-9784.

Improvement of reporting qualities of operation POSEIDON by through training of agent leader and sources.

b) GA G

Improvement of reporting qualities of operation BETTELSTUDENT by

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

thorough training of V-9497.

Improvement of reporting qualities of operation NORDMARK by thorough training of agent leader and sources.

c) GA C

Using operation SCHAFFNER, after cancelling operation 11 117, for securing reports through observations of V-11 555.

d) PE

The following commitments for establishment of nets in Poland are being prepared:

V-21 317 (operation HANSEN) (two commitments completed)

V-21 323 (operation EISER) (two commitments completed)

V-21 437 (operation HUGO) (after return from one commitment)

V-21 466 (operation HANNES) (one commitment completed)

An activation of operation HAY is not intended due to the change of profession of V-21 307.

V-21 357 (operation FRAUENFELD) is overdue since September 1952. It is to be assumed that he became a victim of the enemy CI.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1.) During the report period the following agents were successfully committed with regard to reporting on CSR.

(1) In CSR:

a) GV C

V-12 008 (Operation FRANZ)

b) CSW

V-21 617 (Operation FATRA)

V-21 619 (operation JUNIOR)

(2) In Austria:

a) GV C

V-11 540 (Operation ZILLE)

V-11 558 (Operation DONAUFISCHER)

b) CSW

V-21 684 (Operation MOLDAU)

2.) The following reports submitted by agents as indicated in para. 1.) above were forwarded under B-Nr.:

a) From agents committed in CSR:

(1) GV C

	Source V-12 008
B-10 807	B-11 395
B-11 441	B-11 735
B-11 736	

(2) CSW

	Source V-21 617
B-11 871	B-12 764
B-11 872	B-13 201
B-12 677	B-13 256

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Attachment - D

[redacted]

Source V-21 619

B-11 903

B-11 918

B-12 657

b) From Agents in Austria:

(1) GV C

Source V-11 540

Report about conditions in Czechoslovakian frontier district submitted as an operational information report.

Source V-11 558

B-14 563

(2) CSW

Source V-21 684

Report about conditions in frontier district Waldviertel submitted as an operational information report.

3.) Measures and plans on the operational sector:

50/S has the following target for 1953:

Development of positive "Forschung" results into connections:

Extension of current operations and establishment of nets in the CSR. In detail (only for operations):

a) GV C

V-12 008 (operation FRANZ) and V-11 804 (operation THAYA) will continue to be available as roving observers for special cases. In view of the latest experiences, commitments will only be possible by using a ferrying point e.g. ZILLE.

V-11 558 (operation DONAUFISCHER) is committed to establish a small net in Slovakia.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

V-11 540 (Operation ZILLE) will continue to collect information in the frontier district as well as ferrying operations, since only exact knowledge of operational conditions gives any guarantee as to the success of illegal operations.

b) CSW

The following commitments for net establishment in the CSR are being planned:

V-21 617 (operation FATRA) (two commitments completed).
V-22 008 (Forschung CLAUDIUS) (one commitment completed).

Recruiting of higher level sources is anticipated through both commitments.

Operation MOLDAU has already started finding and establishing courier channels for the nets of V-22 008 by observations according to schedule in the frontier area of Austria - South Bohemia.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

SECRET/RELEAS
TO GERMANY ON

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

HUNGARY

1.) During report period the following agents were successfully committed with respect to reporting on Hungary:

V-14 615	(Operation ILONKA)
V-14 693	(Operation VELENCER)
V-14 694	(Operation LEANYKA)
V-14 695	(Operation MEGGY)
V-14 750	(Operation HANNIBAL)
V-14 751	" "
V-14 752	" "
V-14 753	" "
V-14 756	(Operation PJOTR)
V-14 761	(Operation FUNKABHOER)
V-14 763	(Operation ADLER)
V-14 911	(Operation TAUBE)

2.) The following reports submitted by agents as indicated in para. 1.) above were forwarded under B-Nr.:

Source V-14 615

B-12 993
B-12 994
B-13 254
B-14 092
B-14 314
B-14 415

Source V-14 693

B-13 346
B-13 525
B-13 526
B-13 835
B-14 015
B-14 016
B-14 357
B-14 415
B-14 426

Source V-14 694

B-13 354

Source V-14 695

B-13 354
B-13 467
B-14 092
B-14 357
B-14 380

Source V-14 750

B- 9857
B- 9858
B- 9851
B- 9962
B-11 469
B-11 493
B-11 681
B-11 682
B-13 280
B-13 345
B-13 468
B-13 560

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Attachment E

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

B- 9973
B- 9974
B- 9994
B-10 336
B-10 376
B-10 628
B-10 791
B-10 999
B-11 000
B-11 038
B-11 110
B-11 192
B-11 213
B-11 250
B-11 305
B-11 359

B-11 699
B-11 727
B-11 730
B-11 806
B-11 838
B-11 902
B-11 910
B-12 522
B-12 565
B-12 632
B-12 676
B-12 738
B-12 765
B-12 791
B-12 942
B-13 216

B-13 585
B-13 588
B-13 832
B-13 834
B-13 848
B-13 913
B-14 061
B-14 267
B-14 299
B-14 327
B-14 358
B-14 414
B-14 427
B-14 489
B-15 915
B-15 946
B-15 955

Source V-14 751

B- 9851
B- 9852
B- 9871
B- 9872
B- 9873
B- 9962
B- 9963
B- 9993
B-10 336
B-10 376
B-10 628
B-10 671
B-10 701
B-10 736
B-10 791
B-10 811
B-10 812
B-10 882
B-10 883
B-10 935
B-10 936
B-10 999
B-11 000
B-11 001
B-11 038
B-11 053
B-11 063
B-11 106

B-11 319
B-11 359
B-11 360
B-11 415
B-11 416
B-11 469
B-11 493
B-11 626
B-11 681
B-11 699
B-11 727
B-11 730
B-11 782
B-11 806
B-11 838
B-11 902
B-12 522
B-12 613
B-12 632
B-12 676
B-12 688
B-12 740
B-12 741
B-12 742
B-12 791
B-12 832
B-12 852
B-12 874

B-13 345
B-13 418
B-13 440
B-13 468
B-13 525
B-13 560
B-13 585
B-13 588
B-13 832
B-13 834
B-13 881
B-13 894
B-13 893
B-13 912
B-14 061
B-14 133
B-14 190
B-14 267
B-14 299
B-14 327
B-14 358
B-14 414
B-14 415
B-14 427
B-14 489
B-14 498
B-14 499
B-15 403

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

B-11 140
B-11 141
B-11 179
B-11 180
B-11 263

B-12 897
B-12 941
B-13 216
B-13 280
B-13 354

B-15 915
B-15 946
B-15 955

Source V-14 752

B-10 909

B-11 493

Source V-14 753

B-10 336
B-10 628
B-10 671
B-10 701
B-10 736
B-10 791
B-11 416
B-11 626
B-11 681
B-11 699
B-11 727

B-11 730
B-11 806
B-11 838
B-11 902
B-12 565
B-12 632
B-12 741
B-12 852
B-12 942
B-13 216
B-13 280

B-13 345
B-13 354
B-13 418
B-13 440
B-13 468
B-13 525
B-13 541
B-13 560
B-13 585
B-13 588
B-13 832

Source V-14 756

B-13 561
B-13 972
B-13 975

B-14 014
B-14 277
B-14 313

B-14 488
B-15 443
B-15 446

Source V-14 761

B-9831
B-9951

B-10 847
B-11 052

B-11 076
B-11 212
B-11 470

Source V-14 763

B-11 389

Source V-14 911

B-11 052

3.) For 1953, 50/S has the following target:

Development of positive "Forschung" results into connections; extension of current operations and establishment of connections to Hungary.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

In detail the following operations for recruiting connections in Hungary are planned:

V-14 615	(Operation ILONKA) (two commitments completed in Hungary, original plus two commitments in Soviet Zone Austria)
V-14 693	(Operation VELENCER) (three commitments completed in Hungary)
V-14 695	(Operation MEGGY) (two commitments completed in Hungary)
V-14 696	(Operation MARGIT) (one commitment completed)
V-14 694	(Operation LEANYKA) (one commitment) became a victim of the enemy CI during his Hungary commitment.

Intelligence in the outpost area of Soviet zone Austria will be done to the same extent as previously by operation HANNIBAL.

The technical working conditions of the radio interception group could be improved so that for 1953 also a smooth-working interception of the Hungarian police radio service may be expected; thereby material from the Hungarian military radio communications and operational information will be obtained.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

RUMANIA

1. During report year V-14 814 was committed by U/M with success in Rumania.

2. Reports from V-14 814 were forwarded under the following B-Nrs.:

B-11 443
B-11 459
B-11 460
B-12 320
B-12 322
B-12 321
B-12 323

3. V-14 814 is a seaman on the Danube who undertook a lengthy trip in 1952. In February 1953 he returned from another commitment. The recruiting of further seamen sailing on the Danube is underway.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Attachment - F

[redacted]

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

BULGARIA

1. During report year U/M did not commit any agents in Bulgaria.
2. There were no reports from Bulgarian operations.
3. In February 1953, V-14 536 was scheduled to be committed by U/M in the area Sofia and Vidin, as operation "POLDI". Thorough training was previously undertaken. An Austrian suitable for our purposes and well acquainted with conditions in Bulgaria, who is presently conselor of the legation at the Austrian Embassy in Rome, hopes to be transferred to the Austrian representation in Sofia in April 1953. Recruiting through GA "C" is underway.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Attachment - C

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Survey Report of ZIPPER's Satellite Operations for Calendar Year 1952

Overall Organizational and personnel measures:

1.) GV B

V-12 641 was attached as co-worker to staff member in charge of strategical intelligence.

For activation of strategical intelligence V-1198 was attached to leader UV 3200.

2.) GV C

Herr LEXOW of 50 was attached to GV C as assistant deputy of the GV leader.

GV C is presently co-ordinating its staff under command aspects planning to form a command section which will comprise: operations, reports, training, IG and radio.

MK Vienna of GV C is to be completed as soon as possible for intensification of intelligence against Poland, CSR and Sovzone forces. BV 7 will transfer its main concentration of intelligence against Poland to Berlin.

The possibilities in the direction of Poland in Vienna will be used by committing V-11 730 and V-11 117 in Vienna.

In addition an improvement of Forscher- and interrogator -activities is planned by organizational and personnel measures which are not yet determined in detail.

3.) PE

PE has discharged V-21 309 as operations leader in Berlin as being not quite suited for this position, committing instead V-12 805 who had proved himself as an IS leader at GV B as operation leader Berlin.

V-21 309 is now working as interrogator at PE.

Operational Command Munich was newly established with V-4161 as chief. The latter is a man who knows Poland well from his long experiences as merchant and CI-officer and who recently served as 50/F. The new operational command has the task of carrying commitments to Poland which previously PE himself had been directing in addition to his extensive function.

Operational Command 1721 received as its one and only commitment:

Naval intelligence.

Attachment - H

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY O[redacted]

[illegible]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

The main concentration of V-12 805 is the establishment and maintenance of ferrying points and courier channels to Poland.

By a distribution of roles 50/S hopes for an intensification of the individual sections of work.

It is expected that by employing a staff member in charge of CI matters the protection of the operations group will be secured, a more thorough screening of agents will be obtained, and a proper handling of failures and compromises will be guaranteed.

4.) CSW

In the belief that in the present situation intelligence against CSR has its best chances for success via Vienna, CSW has begun to establish an operational command in Vienna (leader V-21 683).

The operational group in Berlin will chiefly be in charge of the establishment and maintenance of ferrying points and courier channels via Sovzone Germany to the CSR. In the West German area only the operation group V-14 178 will be left for directing interrogators in camp VALKA and finding starting points in the West German area. A staff member in charge of CI matters will also be attached to CSW for the same reason as in the case of PE.

5.) On 1 November 1952 BV E took on a staff member in charge of satellite work (V-3175) who, after thoroughly becoming acquainted with his job, was scheduled to be trained at 131 b in early 1953.

6.) U/M has finished the organizational establishment of his MK Vienna, although there are personnel vancies there as well as in the staff of U/M still to be filled.

In addition to dealing with defection cases MK Vienna received instructions from U/M to attempt to penetrate into Bulgaria and to render accessible the Danube route to Rumania and Bulgaria.

In addition there is an operations group Balkan states, at present staffed with V-14 530 trying to find starting points in Western Austria in the direction of Bulgaria.

An operational command for directing intelligence against Sovzone Austria (as an outpost area against Hungary) was newly established with its leader V-14 750.

Operations group Hungary (leader V-14 601) only deals with commitments against Hungary. The interrogators V-14 701 and V-14 703 as well as the radio interception group previously directed by V-14 601 were subordinated to V-14 411 (in charge of Hungary in staff U/M) in order to direct operations group Hungary completely on one target viz. getting a

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

foothold in Hungary.

7.) Additional personnel in the strategical sector will be provided for GA G and GA H in order to intensify satellite intelligence operations.

8. 50/S

a) Employment of one additional co-worker each in the sections Poland and CSR and a second co-worker for 50/S/I. The co-worker in the staff CSR - Herr MENDE - started working on 26 Jan 1953. A Polish desk co-worker will soon be taken on.

Staffing the Poland and CSR sections with two co-workers proved to be urgent due to the re-entry of the GV's, B, G and H, and BV E in the strategical/satellite field intelligence in order to give the staff members in charge of Poland and CSR sufficient time to maintain a close personal contact with the corresponding staff members of the field offices and thereby to be in a position to help and advise them.

b) Establishment of an MK Vienna as support for the field offices of GV C, CSW and U/M working in Vienna. (Utilization of the American courier channel, possibility of forwarding urgent and important messages and instructions by radio channels and assistance in cases of compromise or failure by the representatives of the American side at MK Vienna).

V-14 404 (U/M) was made leader of MK as he appeared to be well suited for the job.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SURVEY REPORT OF ZIPPER'S SATELLITE OPERATIONS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1952

EGL - EGK - MGL

Key to B-# reports from Satellite Operations for

period 1 Jan to 31 Dec 1952

(1) PE

Source V-21 323

EGL-2348	B-13 587
EGL-2132	B-14 491

Source V-21 418

MGL-19832	B-12 547
MGL-19832	B-12 547

Source V-21 307

MGL-19832	B-12 547

Source V-21 435

MGL-18509	B-8811
MGL-18289	B-8812
MGL-18995	B-8957
MGL-18996	B-12 008
MGL-19552	B-12 093
MGL-19556	B-12 118

Source V-8709

MGL-18077	B-9340
MGL-19704	B-12 376
EGL-1701	B-15 310
EGL-898	B-13 656
EGL-897	B-13 657
EGL-1660	B-15 323
EGL-1693	B-15 324
EGL-904	B-13 647
EGL-919	B-13 648
EGL-906	B-13 649
EGL-1693	B-15 324
N.D.	B-15 330
EGL-1864	B-15 340

SECRET

Attachment I

[redacted]

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Source V-21 729

EGK-26	B-15 372

Source V-21 730

EGK-26	B-15 372

Source V-21 411/2

MGL-19456	B-12 339
MGL-19407	B-12 340
MGL-19452	B-12 341
MGL-19456	B-12 339
MGL-19452	B-12 341

(2) GV C

Source V-11 117

MGL-17152	B-9884
MGL-17152	B-9884
MGL-19202	B-11 483
EGL-166	B-12 658
EGL-166	B-12 658
EGL-166	B-12 658
EGL-1268	B-13 862
EGL-1268	B-13 862
EGL-2105	B-14 367
EGL-2173	B-15 910
EGL-1500	B-13 470

(3) GV B

Source V-9784

EGL-946	B-13 348
EGL-2042	B-14 270

(4) GV G

Source V-9497

EGL-973	B-12 827
EGL-1271	B-14 055
EGL-2173	B-15 910
EGL-2173	B-15 910
MGL-19469	B-11 870
EGL-120	B-13 226
EGL-120	B-13 2[illegible]

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

(4) GV G (continued)

EGL-946	B-13 348
EGL-946	B-13 348
KILLED	B-13 398
EGL-1500	B-13 470
EGL-1500	B-13 470
EGL-1965	B-13 584

(5) GV H

Source V-9584

EGL-946	B-13 348
EGL-1965	B-13 584
MGL-19202	B-11 483
EGL-1258	B-13 898
EGL-2130	B-14 239

- - - - - - - - - -

(1) PE

Source V-21 465

EGL-214	B-12 792
EGL-214	B-12 792
EGL-976	B-13 845
EGL-1479	B-14 236
EGL-976	B-13 845

Source V-8708

MGL-18503	B-9394

Source V-21 415

MGL-19708	B-12 375
EGL-450	B-13 611
EGL-450	B-13 611
EGL-450	B-13 611
EGL-804	B-13 644
EGL-1477	B-13 687
N.D.	B-15 330
EGL-1864	B-15 340
EGK-12	B-15 376
EGK-25	B-15 367
EGK-91	B-15 395

SECRET

- 4 -

SECRET/RELEAS
TO GERMANY ONL

Source V-21 416

N.D.	B-15 330

(2) GV B

Source V-1092

MGL-19128	B-12 309
EGL-1655	B-13 689
EGK-88	B-15 378
EGK-88	B-15 378
N.D.	B-13 643

Source V-1093

MGL-19403	B-12 325
MGL-20077	B-12 386
EGL-321	B-13 607
EGL-710	B-13 638
EGL-320	B-13 605
EGK-89	B-15 355
EGK-14	B-15 363
EGL-1865	B-15 326
EGL-713	B-13 623
EGL-1745	B-15 313
EGL-1745	B-15 313

Source V-10 644

MGL-19503	B-12 360
EGL-1658	B-15 302
EGL-1706	B-15 321
EGL-1976	B-15 335
EGK-26	B-15 372
EGK-26	B-15 372

Source V-12 646

N.D.	B-15 330
N.D.	B-15 330
EGL-1866	B-15 328
EGK-27	B-15 377
EGL-1867	B-15 327
EGL-1867	B-15 327
EGL-1867	B-15 327
EGL-1867	B-15 327
N.D.	B-15 330
EGL-1867	B-15 327
EGL-1866	B-15 328
EGL-1862	B-15 329

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Trails Country
Court Reporter & Productions

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

N.D.	B-15 330
EGK-10	B-15 366
EGK-27	B-15 377
EGK-12	B-15 376
EGK-27	B-15 377
EGL-450	B-13 611
EGL-450	B-13 611
EGL-804	B-13 644
EGL-1116	B-13 661
EGL-450	B-13 611
EGL-1116	B-13 661
N.D.	B-15 330
EGL-1866	B-15 328
N.D.	B-15 330

Source V-21 649

EGK-102	B-15 387
EGK-92	B-15 394

(3) GV G

Source V-1088

EGL-1993	B-15 337
EGL-1695	B-15 320
EGK-26	B-15 372
EGK-102	B-15 387
EGL-2208	B-15 353

Source V-1090

MGL-19455	B-12 343
EGL-1653	B-15 304

Source V-1098

EGL-1865	B-15 326

Source V-1099

EGL-387	B-13 610
EGL-711	B-13 621
EGL-453	B-13 622
EGL-453	B-13 622
EGL-713	B-13 623
EGL-713	B-13 623
EGL-713	B-13 623
EGL-807	B-13 640
EGL-802	B-13 641

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

EGL-2159	B-15 319
EGL-1860	B-15 338
EGK-102	B-15 387
EGK-6	B-15 374
EGK-6	B-15 374
EGK-6	B-15 374
EGK-6	B-15 374
EGL-1652	B-13 664

(4) GV H

Source V-4929

No number	No number

(A report on the construction of two new thermo power plants.)

Source V-4938

EGL-2419	B-14 868

Report still in process.

---

(1) GV C

Source V-12 008

MGL-17595	B-10 807
MGL-19072	B-11 441
MGL-18871	B-11 736
MGL-19142	B-11 395
MGL-18961	B-11 735

(2) CSW

Source V-21 617

MGL-19621	B-11 871
EGL-14	B-11 872
EGL-168	B-12 677
EGL-139	B-12 764
EGL-281	B-13 201
EGL-283	B-13 256

Source V-21 619

To 25.50	B-11 903
EGL-15	B-11 918
EGL-176	B-12 657

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

- - - - - - - - -

(1) GV C

Source V-11 540

None

Source V-11 558

EGL-1022	B-14 563

(2) CSW

Source V-21 684

None

- -

Source V-14 615

EGL-944	B-12 993
EGL-945	B-12 994
EGL-485	B-13 254
EGL-1326	B-14 092
EGL-1926	B-14 314
EGL-1930	B-14 415

Source V-14 693

EGL-798	B-13 346
EGL-1498	B-13 525
EGL-1490	B-13 526
EGL-1118	B-13 835
EGL-2024	B-14 015
EGL-2025	B-14 016
EGL-2104	B-14 357
EGL-1930	B-14 415
EGL-2133	B-14 426

Source V-14 694

EGL-1049	B-13 354

Source V-14 695

EGL-1049	B-13 354
EGL-1314	B-13 467
EGL-1326	B-14 092
EGL-2104	B-14 357
EGL-2155	B-14 380

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Source V-14 750

MGL-17062	B-9857	MGL-19104	B-12 522
MGL-17063	B-9858	MGL-19283	B-12 565
MGL-17065	B-9851	EGL-165	B-12 632
MGL-17358	B-9962	EGL-167	B-12 676
MGL-17379	B-9973	EGL-208	B-12 738
MGL-17381	B-9974	EGL-173	B-12 765
MGL-17461	B-9994	EGL-213	B-12 791
MGL-17167	B-10 336	EGL-965	B-12 942
MGL-17413	B-10 376	EGL-81	B-13 216
MGL-17440	B-10 628	EGL-734	B-13 280
MGL-18183	B-10 791	EGL-949	B-13 345
MGL-17899	B-10 999	EGL-1439	B-13 468
MGL-17859	B-11 000	EGL-1966	B-13 560
MGL-17971	B-11 038	EGL-1967	B-13 585
MGL-18178	B-11 110	EGL-2244	B-13 588
MGL-18342	B-11 192	EGL-966	B-13 832
MGL-18341	B-11 213	EGL-1254	B-13 834
MGL-18728	B-11 250	EGL-1117	B-13 848
MGL-18726	B-11 305	EGL-1260	B-13 913
MGL-18875	B-11 359	EGL-1321	B-14 061
MGL-19060	B-11 469	EGL-1920	B-14 267
MGL-19105	B-11 493	EGL-1925	B-14 299
MGL-18583	B-11 681	EGL-1927	B-14 327
MGL-18546	B-11 682	EGL-1928	B-14 358
MGL-18820	B-11 699	EGL-1929	B-14 414
MGL-18956	B-11 727	EGL-1931	B-14 427
MGL-18888	B-11 730	EGL-2108	B-14 489
MGL-19470	B-11 806	EGL-2116	B-15 915
MGL-19525	B-11 838	EGL-2084	B-15 946
MGL-19949	B-11 902	EGL-2085	B-15 955
MGL-19679	B-11 910		

Source V-14 751

MGL-17065	B-9851	MGL-18005	B-10 736
MGL-17249	B-9852	MGL-18183	B-10 791
MGL-17149	B-9871	MGL-17508	B-10 811
MGL-17150	B-9872	MGL-17463	B-10 812
MGL-17151	B-9873	MGL-17656	B-10 882
MGL-17358	B-9962	MGL-17608	B-10 883
MGL-17359	B-9963	MGL-17793	B-10 935
MGL-17477	B-9993	MGL-17808	B-10 936
MGL-17167	B-10 336	MGL-17899	B-10 999
MGL-17413	B-10 376	MGL-17859	B-11 000
MGL-17440	B-10 628	MGL-17858	B-11 001
MGL-17748	B-10 671	MGL-17971	B-11 038
MGL-17788	B-10 701	MGL-18032	B-11 053

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

MGL-18040	B-11 063	EGL-962	B-12 897
MGL-18177	B-11 106	EGL-964	B-12 941
MGL-18261	B-11 140	EGL-81	B-13 216
MGL-18263	B-11 141	EGL-734	B-13 280
MGL-18315	B-11 179	EGL-1049	B-13 354
MGL-18314	B-11 180	EGL-949	B-13 345
MGL-18793	B-11 263	EGL-1224	B-13 418
MGL-18771	B-11 319	EGL-1223	B-13 440
MGL-18875	B-11 359	EGL-1439	B-13 468
MGL-18874	B-11 360	EGL-1498	B-13 525
MGL-18873	B-11 415	EGL-1966	B-13 560
MGL-19015	B-11 416	EGL-1967	B-13 585
MGL-19060	B-11 469	EGL-2244	B-13 588
MGL-19105	B-11 493	EGL-966	B-13 832
MGL-18309	B-11 626	EGL-1254	B-13 834
MGL-18583	B-11 681	EGL-1255	B-13 881
MGL-18820	B-11 699	EGL-1257	B-13 894
MGL-18956	B-11 727	EGL-1256	B-13 893
MGL-18888	B-11 730	EGL-1259	B-13 912
MGL-19103	B-11 782	EGL-1321	B-14 061
MGL-19470	B-11 806	EGL-1327	B-14 133
MGL-19525	B-11 838	EGL-1356	B-14 190
MGL-19949	B-11 902	EGL-1920	B-14 267
MGL-19104	B-12 522	EGL-1925	B-14 299
MGL-20005	B-12 613	EGL-1927	B-14 327
EGL-165	B-12 632	EGL-1928	B-14 358
EGL-167	B-12 676	EGL-1929	B-14 414
EGL-169	B-12 688	EGL-1930	B-14 415
EGL-171	B-12 740	EGL-1931	B-14 427
EGL-172	B-12 741	EGL-2108	B-14 489
EGL-209	B-12 742	EGL-2047	B-14 498
EGL-213	B-12 791	EGL-2048	B-14 499
MGL-19691	B-12 832	EGL-2199	B-15 403
EGL-941	B-12 852	EGL-2116	B-15 915
EGL-963	B-12 874	EGL-2084	B-15 946
		EGL-2085	B-15 955

Source V-14 752

MGL-17741	B-10 909	MGL-19105	B-11 493

Source V-14 753

MGL-17167	B-10 336	MGL-19015	B-11 416
MGL-17440	B-10 628	MGL-18309	B-11 626
MGL-17748	B-10 671	MGL-18583	B-11 681
MGL-17788	B-10 701	MGL-18820	B-11 699
MGL-18005	B-10 736	MGL-18956	B-11 727
MGL-18183	B-10 791	MGL-18888	B-11 730

SECRET SECRET/RELEAS
TO GERMANY ON

MGL-19470	B-11 806	EGL-1049	B-13 354
MGL-19525	B-11 838	EGL-1224	B-13 418
MGL-19949	B-11 902	EGL-1223	B-13 440
MGL-19283	B-12 565	EGL-1439	B-13 468
EGL-165	B-12 632	EGL-1498	B-13 525
EGL-172	B-12 741	EGL-1699	B-13 541
EGL-941	B-12 852	EGL-1966	B-13 560
EGL-965	B-12 942	EGL-1967	B-13 585
EGL-81	B-13 216	EGL-2244	B-13 588
EGL-734	B-13 280	EGL-966	B-13 832
EGL-949	B-13 345		

Source V-14 756

To 25.50	B-13 561	To 25.50	B-14 313
" "	B-13 972	" "	B-14 488
" "	B-13 975	" "	B-15 443
" "	B-14 014	" "	B-15 446
" "	B-14 277		

Source V-14 761

MGL-17143	B-9831	MGL-18262	B-11 076
MGL-17382	B-9951	MGL-18340	B-11 212
MGL-17509	B-10 847	MGL-19201	B-11 470
MGL-18146	B-11 052		

Source V-14 763

MGL-19017	B-11 389

Source V-14 911

MGL-18146	B-11 052

- -

Source V-14 814

MGL-19073	B-11 443
MGL-19106	B-11 459
MGL-19107	B-11 460
MGL-19399	B-12 320
MGL-19447	B-12 322
MGL-19408	B-12 321
MGL-19451	B-12 323

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

EE

P. 1028

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

VIA: ______ (Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. EGLA 4555

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

To : Chief, EE

Date 16 JUL 1953

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COM
BOB

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OPERATIONAL
SPECIFIC— Intelligence Lessons from the June Uprisings in the GDR

1. It is completely false to judge early warning capabilities by the performance of any organization during the days prior to the 17 June riots. None of the characteristics that could be expected to precede the outbreak of hostilities were present.

2. We think ZIPPER's intelligence performance was quite satisfactory although not outstanding. Courier lines through West Berlin failed on the 17th; by the 18th the use of W/T and quickly restored courier channels was providing sufficient information to provide a controlled OB picture. The Soviets could not have effected a major regroupment of troops without our knowledge.

3. The supporters in ZIPPER of a large W/T program feel that the soundness of their position has been proven; emphasis in the next year will be on more and better W/T operations tied in with the best sources.

4. The entire ZIPPER intelligence apparatus has been thoroughly tested during this crisis; dozens of minor changes in communications methods, signal plans, staff procedures, etc., will be made on the basis of lessons learned.

5. The ZIPPER Reports and Analysis staff concentrated on getting out evaluated but fragmentary raw information for the consumption of trained analysts...particularly in the OB field. Thus, PULL cables were not always in useable form for addressees without access to OB analysts. ZIPPER and POB failed in the reporting field by not diverting part of the energy to production of periodic cable summaries of the over-all situation in SovZone; these would have been particularly valuable for Bonn, Berlin, Paris and senior KUBARK officials.

6. Most frustrating to POB were reports that: (a) at USAREUR PULL cables for first ten days after outbreak of riots were erroneously diverted within USAREUR and did not reach OB analysts; (b) at Bonn PULL cables for BACR were undelivered; (c) in Berlin PULL cables were too fragmentary and

DISTRIBUTION
✓3 EE (THRU COM)
3 COM
2 BOB
15 July 53

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted]

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

16—63048-1 GPO

information too raw for immediate dissemination to the Berlin CG; (d) in Paris no arrangement exists for dissemination to SHAPE G-2 and CG.

7. We believe that this is an opportune time to again raise the question of responsibility for the over-all US G-2 estimate in Europe. If USAREUR G-2 does not use SDU reporting in their estimates and EUCOM J-2 is not engaged in preparation of a G-2 estimate on a continuing basis with ZIPPER material included, there is, in fact, no adequate arrangement in Europe today for senior US commander to obtain G-2 estimate based on best available and timely intelligence.

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

15 July 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Trails Country Reprints & Productions



New York Times
Nov. 17, 1953 p. 13.

THE

HUNDREDS SEIZED AS EAST ZONE SPIES

Former Nazi General Linked to Ring—U. S. Is Accused of Financing Agents

By WALTER SULLIVAN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

BERLIN, Nov. 16—East German press reports indicate that several hundred persons may have been arrested in recent weeks on charges of spying, sabotage or anti-Communist agitation.

The current issue of the Democratic German Report says that more than 100 members of one spy ring were seized. This publication is edited by by John Peet, former chief correspondent of Reuters News Agency, who defected to the Communists several years ago. He made it clear his information was from East German Government sources.

The group was alleged to have been headed by Gustav von Gehlen, a former Nazi general now in West Germany and United States-financed. Many former Nazi officers were said to be members of the ring.

A further announcement tonight said more members of this group had been arrested in the last four days. One who was reported to have lived in the American sector of Berlin and to have headed a section of the agency, was said to have been caught laying a telephone wire from the United States sector to the Soviet sector of Berlin.

The wire was said to be of American manufacture and marked "General Cable Corporation 1951."

The Soviet press has daily reported arrests of "agents provocateurs," many of whom were charged with working for groups other than that of Von Gehlen's. Hence it appears that the number of those seized may be several hundred.

The object of the current drive appears to be to cut off the Western world from its contacts in East Germany. While many friends of the West are beleieved to have been caught in the dragnet it will be impossible for the Communists to prevent leaks of information so long as East Germans can visit West Berlin.

There are at least a dozen anti-Communist agencies in West Berlin that welcome visitors from the East and are often swamped with them.

Ever since the anti-Government riots on June 17 there have been reports of anti-Communist agitation among the factory workers, attempts to organize slowdowns and acts of sabotage. This has been confirmed in the Communist press.

Reports in the provincial press of the last two days have told of new arrests or prison sentences in such widespread cities as Halle, Leipzig, Erfurt, Potsdam, Schwerin and Frankfurt-on-Oder.

In Frankfurt-on-Oder a party member in charge of furnishing supplies to the new steel town of Stalinstadt [Fuerstenberg] received a life term on a charge that he was the leader of a group that worked for the West. Those arrested have been accused of planning to blast bridges, government buildings or railway stations, to set factories afire or assassinate officials.

File: Security.

#MS ~~HWS~~ [illegible]

EAST AND WEST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE GEHLEN AFFAIR

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1

November 23, 1953

PRESS SCRUTINY PROJECT

EGQA-
3071

EAST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE GEHLEN CASE

(Sources as indicated)

The reaction of the Nov. 10 - Nov. 15 East German press to the Geyer statements on the Gehlen organization was given three-fold outlet. 1-- Front-page reports on the press conference with Geyer and reprints of his written declaration; 2-- Reprints of and comments on the West German press's reaction to the case; 3-- Editorials.

Front Page Reports

The East German press reported on the press conference held by the GDR government with such headlines as "New Unveilings Of USA Espionage"(1), "USA Espionage Net Unmasked Before Press"(2), "Agent-Branch X/9592 Broken"(3), and others. While most of the East German papers confined their reports to quoting Geyer and the chairman of the conference (1 - 10), Taegliche Rundschau, the Soviet mouthpiece in the GDR, said that this press conference gives a "concrete insight" into the criminal activity of those agent-groups.(1)

The two principal newspapers in the GDR, Taegliche Rundschau and Neues Deutschland, speaking for the East German press, published a complete reprint of Geyer's declaration with the following introduction:

> In the American policy of war preparation an important position is held by the espionage and sabotage organizations in the countries of the peace camp. One of the most important espionage organizations supported by the American CIC is headed by the former fascist Gen. Gehlen who closely cooperates with the Adenauer Government in West Germany and who keeps several branches in West Berlin.(4)

The following is the summarized text of Geyer's declaration:

> I, Hans Joachim Geyer, born June 18, 1901.. ..was deputy chief of the espionage agency in West Berlin which worked under the name "Branch X/9592" and was subordinate to the espionage organization of former fascist Wehrmacht Gen. Gehlen, until Oct. 29, 1953, under the cover-name "Grell."
>
> Today I have...approached the Government of the German Democratic Republic and requested admission to the GDR.....I worked for this espionage organization because I was told that

I was serving the best interests of Germany by this....The chief of this espionage group is the former fascist Gen. Gehlen....His coworkers are, for instance, the chief of the sub-Agency X, Westphal alias Donner, former Luftwaffe lt. colonel, and the chief of the espionage agency X/8970, Gaertner, former Luftwaffe major....This organization turned out to be an espionage organization commanded by the Americans and financed from American funds....These agencies camouflage themselves as harmless business enterprises with covernames such as: The Main Administration -- Firm Herzog; the General Agency -- Firm Hase; the sub-Agency -- Firm Schlosser; the Branch X/9592 -- Firm Nordland, Paulusstrasse 19, Berlin Schoeneberg.

In recruiting agents in the GDR, special value is attributed to persons such as former officers, big landowners, former members of the Gestapo and of the Brandenburg Division, former coworkers of the SD, the SS, the Waffen-SS and coworkers of the former fascist OKW general staff.

The agents are given the following orders: To carry out economic, military, and political espionage, espionage of research work, patents; to procure documents and passes to the different plants and institutions, identity documents and other identity papers of the GDR and other People's Democracies....In particular agents are told to spy on the defense of the transport system, especially bridges.

...under the cover-name 'Depth and Research' there is a plan for infiltrating agents into the countries of the People's Democracies and the USSR, with the aim of disturbing the existing friendly relations between them and Germany and provoking another war... The technical equipment is of American origin...and is made available by the agencies of the American secret service....What we did was for the American secret service which financed this...with American dollars. I found that this...was criminal...and against the German people and my Fatherland.

> I started hating the Americans and... my superiors. I also began comparing the situation in West Berlin with the democratic sector....
>
> Finally I arrived at the conviction that all actions of this espionage organization were serving the preparation of a new war of conquest against the East....Furthermore, I convinced myself...that a number of coworkers of the espionage organization are prepared to work for other secret services tomorrow as they are working for the Americans now....This was certified by a talk between the chief of the espionage agency X/9592, Polster alias Paulberg, with the chief of the section X/III, Heiner Ringe...in which he (the former--ed.) said: "It doesn't mean a bit to me to throw the whole works at your feet and to put myself tomorrow, with the entire agency, at the disposal of another secret service which treats and pays us better. With you, I'll always be the sergeant, my work doesn't count because I was not a staff officer."....His personal ambitions went so far as to omit to report mishaps (arrests of agents) to his superior office....To save my honor I decided to request admission to the GDR...to start a new life, as I love peace as all true Germans do....I myself want to make up by honest and useful work for the wrong that I have done by my activities in the criminal espionage organization of Gehlen which is financed with American funds and is in American employment.(4)

The paper further gives an account of questions asked by reporters of different foreign and domestic newspapers and news agencies and answers by Geyer, Norden, and the representative of the state security secretariat, Col. Borrmann. The discussion centered around the "success" of the State security agencies in smashing espionage and sabotage groups in the GDR, and on the place of the Americans as the "men in the background."(4)

Taegliche Rundschau published the concluding statements of the conference chairman, Prof. Norden. In his statement, Norden referred to Churchill's speech in the House of Commons in which he said that "the Soviet Union is not thinking of expanding her power but only of improving her population's living standard." The same aim applies to his government. Therefore, so Prof. Norden states, his Government holds out no danger to West Germany but "we ambarrass Adenauer by the ideals of German harmony which we serve. Adenauer, however, does not have any ideals to export, therefore he exports crime."

Speaking of the arrests and trials of arsonists and criminals sent into the GDR from the West Norden said: "There is no freedom here for American-hired criminals, for murderers, and murder-apprentices. Whoever makes himself an armed tool of the Americans lives dangerously for a short time and is then rendered harmless for all time."

In conclusion Norden said that "German unity and the peace treaty for this unified Germany must be forced into accomplishment in order to eliminate American military and espionage bases in Germany....If our colleagues of the West German and international press have the courage to publish what facts they have heard here today, they will have rendered the cause of Germany and of peace a considerable service."(1)

Comments on West German Press Reaction

Contrary to usual practice the East German press devoted considerable front-page space to the West German press's reaction to the Gehlen case. Headlining its article "Painful, painful...," one paper reprinted part of an article from the Hamburg paper Die Welt and cited it as proof of the truthfulness of Geyer's statements. The paper is quoted as saying that "Geyer was dispatched to the elite West Berlin Branch after consultation with the Frankfurt district agency of Gehlen." The paper is said to have further reported that "orders by the Munich Central Office and instructions for the use of arms and a secret code for use by the Gehlen radio transmitters in the Soviet Zone were found in the branch office," and that "the chief of the branch was a man bearing the cover-name Paulberg."(11)

The Taegliche Rundschau and other East German papers elaborated on the press conference held in Bonn by the chief of the Bonn press office, von Eckhardt (7,12,13,14), saying that according to Eckhardt, Adenauer was doubtlessly informed about the existence of the Gehlen organization.

The Bonn newsletter Nachrichten und Informationsdienst of Nov. 8 is said to have admitted the existence and aims of this espionage organization "with impudence and effrontery."(11) The newsletter is cited as follows: "Only experts could imagine of what service such apparatus could be, once well used. The Gehlen organization did extraordinary work during the war. It is to the merit of the Americans to have...intercepted and preserved this organization." Further it quoted the paper as saying "Naturally, everybody who is fairly well informed knows that this office was chiefly composed of SS men during the war. One also knows, however, that these circles are willing to serve this (the Adenauer) State. And well-informed agencies know, moreover, that the Gehlen organization has already rendered valuable services to our present State Administration."(11)

The SED and LDP news organs enumerated several facts from this press conference: namely, that 4,200 men are working for the organization; that the American High Commission is financing the group; that in 1950 Gehlen had used 18 million DM, and that 23 million DM were put at his disposal for the next fiscal year. (7,13)

The NDP voice, headlining its article "Western Press is Shocked," said that Mannheimer Morgen had not published a line on the affair. Tagesspiegel, the paper went on, only reported on an "alleged" agent. The RIAS commentator is cited as having said: "No one would believe us should we come out with the assurance that there are no agents and spies working for the West." Frankfurter Allgemeine is said to have blamed the Gehlen organization for a careless selection of its coworkers. "As usual," the paper concluded, "the Telegraf took the cake when, lacking better ideas, it was of the opinion that Geyer had been an eastern agent and had now returned to East Berlin."(14)

Editorials

Only five papers came out with editorials on the Gehlen case. Throughout their editorials, the papers made it a point to call upon the population for intensified vigilance and close cooperation with the State agencies of security. The papers cited other cases in the past where agents and spies were arrested in the GDR.

Most of the papers used the occasion to emphasize the need for greater vigilance in all sectors of the economy and State apparatus. (15,16,17)

In an editorial on the case of a teacher who had picked up a food package in West Berlin, another paper stated that "the purpose of the American 'Aid Program' is the recruiting of agents for the American underground war. For this and for the other espionage and sabotage actions, the Gehlen spy apparatus...was created in West Germany."(12)

Sources

1.	Berlin	Taegliche Rundschau	Nov. 10, 1953
2.	Berlin, LDP	Der Morgen	Nov. 10, 1953
3.	Potsdam, NDP	National Zeitung	Nov. 12, 1953
4.	Berlin, SED	Neues Deutschland	Nov. 10, 1953
5.	Leipzig, SED	Leipziger Volkszeitung	Nov. 10, 1953
6.	Berlin	Taegliche Rundschau	Nov. 11, 1953
7.	Berlin, SED	Neues Deutschland	Nov. 11, 1953
8.	Berlin, LDP	Der Morgen	Nov. 11, 1953
9.	Leipzig, SED	Leipziger Volkszeitung	Nov. 11, 1953
10.	Dresden, SED	Saechsische Zeitung	Nov. 11, 1953
11.	Berlin	Taegliche Rundschau	Nov. 12, 1953
12.	Berlin, SED	Neues Deutschland	Nov. 12, 1953
13.	Berlin, LDP	Der Morgen	Nov. 12, 1953
14.	Potsdam, NDP	National Zeitung	Nov. 13, 1953
15.	Berlin, SED	Neues Deutschland	Nov. 13, 1953
16.	Berlin, National Front	Deutschlands Stimme	Nov. 15 (weekly)
17.	Berlin	Der Sonntag	Nov. 15 (cultural weekly)

WEST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE GEHLEN AFFAIR

(Sources as indicated)

Pankow's announcement on Nov. 9 on the uncovering of a Western spy ring in the GDR and the revelations of Hans Joachim Geyer on the activities of the Gehlen organization in the East Zone have thus far attracted comparatively little attention in the West German press. Most papers confined themselves to publishing factual agency dispatches. Reports on the Geyer affair were generally printed in an inconspicuous manner. An exception was the Communist press which accorded front-page prominence to the Pankow press conference. Editorial comment was infrequent and far between.

Most extensive in their news coverage were two Hamburg publications, which carried rather exhaustive reports on the circumstances that led to Geyer's escape to East Berlin and the subsequent announcement by the Pankow government; yet they refrained from making any statements that may have been indicative of their attitude toward the subject (1,2). One Berlin paper, which briefly reported on the case, referred to Geyer as a "stool pigeon of the State Security Service" (3).

Of the major West German newspapers, only two Frankfurt papers deemed the Pankow announcement worthy of editorial treatment. After having dealt with the history and the present activities of the Gehlen organization, the pro-SPD Frankfurter Rundschau advised the Bonn government against taking charge of this agency should the U.S. occupation forces release it from their jurisdiction after the European Defense Community has come into effect. It emphasized that, with the normalization of the political conditions in the Federal Republic, the "Americans intend to get rid of Gehlen in the most inconspicuous way possible." Apart from the fact, it continued, that an incorporation of Gehlen's organization into the corresponding institution of the Federal Republic would be too costly, it would also not be feasible from a political point of view. "The future of this 'efficient' organization concerns all of us; it is too serious a matter to be left at the discretion of the government alone. It must be borne in mind that such an organization may some day defeat, on the strength of its inherent power, all those whose favor it is at present seeking. After all, this organization is nothing but the product of a totalitarian state; and no one can tell whether it can at all be transplanted into a democracy" (4).

The independent Frankfurter Allgemeine deplored that the Gehlen organization had "frivolously endangered the lives of innocent East Germans," although it is generally acknowledged that "experts who carefully scrutinize the Soviet-licensed press, monitor East

German radio broadcasts, investigate refugees, and establish an extensive file on the basis of the documentary material thus gathered are able to form a precise picture of conditions in the Soviet Zone without imperiling innocent people" (5). A rightist Nuremberg paper voiced a similar opinion when it said that the "unfortunate" people in the GDR who worked for the Gehlen organization out of idealism and patriotic passion have risked their lives for no good cause. The paper blamed the "increasing deterioration and corruption" of the modern intelligence agencies for the "liquidation of hundreds of people" (6).

The attitude of the Communist-sponsored press was typically reflected in the commentary of the mouthpiece of former Reich Chancellor Wirth, which came out with a vehement attack on the "disgusting methods" of the "American-financed" Gehlen organization. The paper claimed that the June 17 riots, the "notorious" activities of the BDJ in Hesse, and the Geyer affair are all indicative of the West's intention to "prepare a world war" (7).

Sources

1. Hamburg	Die Welt	Nov. 11, 1953
2. Hamburg	Der Spiegel	Nov. 18, 1953
3. Berlin	Telegraf	Nov. 10, 1953
4. Frankfurt	Frankfurter Rundschau	Nov. 17, 1953
5. Frankfurt	Frankfurter Allgemeine	Nov. 20, 1953
6. Nuremberg	Nuernberger Nachrichten	Nov. 11, 1953
7. Fulda	Deutsche Volkszeitung	Nov. 11, 1953

DD/P-8025

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

DEC [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: ADN Press Release on the Gehlen Organization

1. The information in the attachment is so detailed that the possibility exists that it is the result of a high level eastern penetration of the ZIPPER organization. The details are being examined at the Pullach Operations Base to determine the date of the information and possible source thereof. No penetration is positively known at the present time.

2. The information could also represent a high level penetration of government circles in Bonn, e. g. the Blank Office. The information which has been used to brief various officials when combined with other items obtained from CE operations by the opposition could result in this expose.

3. The obvious intent of the publication is to panic ZIPPER personnel into moves which will negate the effectiveness of the organization. Therefore every effort will be made to investigate thoroughly, and the utmost secrecy must surround any suspicions we may have.

[redacted]

RICHARD HELMS
~~Acting Deputy Director (Plans)~~

Attachment (1)
ADN Dispatch

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

20.64.

EE/FI/G/DAILY LOG - 19 DECEMBER 1953

The East German news agency, ADN, has published on its East Berlin teletype to the SovZone, 17 December 1953, a lenghty sensational account, credited to recent arrested ZIPPER agents, of U.S. control of ZIPPER. In this report, ZIPPER is identified as an organization of 2,000 official employees who are engaged in support of U. S. war and disruption policy in Germany and the Adenauer Government. Forty U. S. espionage officers have been assigned from Washington to direct and maintain financial control over the organization at its headquarters in Pullach. Gehlen is described as a front man, who has won out over Theodor BLANK's intelligence section in competition for the position of future GIS. In addition to penetrations of the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungschutz (BfV), the Blank Office in the person of General Adolf Heusinger, Gehlen is reported to have a penetration of U. S. Headquarters in Germany, who keeps him informed of U. S. decisions on ZIPPER.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE SECRET
TO GERMANY ONLY

21 DEC 53

Security

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: Report entitled "United States Intelligence Operations in Germany" — regarding General Gehlen's Organization

1. Although the report, "U. S. Intelligence Operations in Germany", from one of Mr. Walter Lippmann's stringers in Germany is essentially accurate regarding the development of the Gehlen organization under U. S. trusteeship from 1945 to date, it does contain striking errors and distorted half-truths on points where source is clearly misinformed.

2. The following is a brief outline of noteworthy misrepresentations as opposed to the facts:

Erroneous Statements	Facts
a) Gehlen's first name is given as "Gustav", an error which has appeared frequently in the U. S. and East German press in recent weeks.	a) General Reinhard Gehlen is well known as the chief of a U.S. subsidized West German intelligence group in both official and unofficial circles in the Federal Republic.
b) Source identifies the U.S.-sponsored West German sabotage organization, exposed in 1951, as an instrument of the Gehlen organization.	b) Source obviously refers to the BDJ, which was exposed in the fall of 1952. Gehlen was in no way involved.
c) Source claims that General Smith went to Germany, following a joint investigation of the BDJ by the Federal Republic and U. S. High Commission, to "clean the organization out".	c) General Smith never went to Germany for this purpose.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

d) Gehlen's staff was indiscriminately selected "starting from a handful of former SS officers and Nazis in 1945"; the Nazi element now dominates the organization.	d) During the war, Gehlen's staff was the G-2 of the Fremde Heere Ost (Eastern Armies). The greatest percentage of his staff is composed of former German General Staff officers and career Abwehr personnel. The few former SS officers and Nazi Party members, who found employment in the organization in the immediate post-war period, have been fired. The remainder have been denazified.
e) U.S. intelligence is dependent upon Gehlen for its Soviet and Satellite OB coverage. Instead of developing its own networks, CIA is relying on the Germans.	e) It is noted that Mr. Lippmann has been reassured that this is not the case. Gehlen's production is of value to U.S. military authorities only insofar as it supplements and confirms our own information.
f) The Americans favor subordination of the Gehlen group to the future West German Defense Ministry following ratification of the Contractual Agreements.	f) It is not our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Adenauer Government. Chancellor Adenauer, himself, has stated his intention to integrate Gehlen's organization into the Federal Chancellory. It is true that Blank and Globke differ on certain details of the proposed legalization of Gehlen's staff.

3. In view of recent, wide-spread publicity on the Gehlen organization and the fact that U. S. sponsorship is now known throughout Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc, it might be advisable to inform Mr. Lippmann that as trustee of the Gehlen

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

organization, CIA has fostered its aspirations to be the central, national intelligence service of a sovereign West German Government. In addition to subsidizing Gehlen's organization, we have provided professional guidance, furnished equipment and information to his staff for the purpose of developing this West German intelligence group to its present professional competence. Chancellor Adenauer has given us his unequivocal assurances that the organization will be legalized when the Contractual Agreements have been ratified. The [redacted] and [redacted] have been advised, officially, of our interests in the Gehlen organization and its future.

[redacted]
DC/EE

Att:
Subject report

EE/FIG/Z/[redacted]
21 December 1953

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DC/EE files
2 - EE/FIG/Z

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Security

COPY

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

At the end of the war, in 1945, the American Army G-2 section assembled in Munich a group of former German officers who had been serving on the Russian front, and set them to work recording all they knew about Soviet military organization and capabilities. They were a rather indiscriminately-chosen lot; one of them in fact remarked that "a lot of us would be in Landsberg if we weren't here." But in any case they were given the job of writing up all they could recall on Soviet order of battle, about individual units and how they fought, about Soviet tactics and weapons, etc., etc.

The senior officer of the group was Gustav von Gehlen, who, with the equivalent rank of brigadier general, had been a German G-2 officer for one of the Army groups on the Soviet front. Gehlen emerged eventually as the director of the Munich operation, which is now known in Germany as the "Gehlen group".

As difficulties with the Russians increased, the Army G-2 section shifted over from merely drawing on past recollections of these officers to the gathering and analyzing of new Soviet Order of Battle intelligence. The evident reasoning of the Americans was that these officers, with their direct battle experience, could fill a gap most effectively in our intelligence on the state of the Red Army. Accordingly, Army funds were put behind the Gehlen group and it was assigned a series of intelligence tasks, which it performed, evidently, very effectively and very well. This situation continued until 1949.

Walter Lippmann, article from a stringer in Germany
handed to the DCI.

In that year, as a result of agreement in Washington, responsibility for the Gehlen group was transferred from Army G-2 section to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Under CIA, the intelligence-gathering functions and the staff of the Gehlen group continued to enlarge. By now, it was placed on a "contract basis" by which the United States provided funds, and the Gehlen group provided military information from Eastern Europe and the satellites.

This contract, however, is limited only to military information, the idea at the time being that the Gehlen group would not be indulging in other fields anyway -- such as operations directed in countries other than the satellites, or the gathering of political or economic intelligence (i.e., East-West trade, or Communist party activities).

The first awkward break on Gehlen group activities came in Germany in the fall of 1951, when the Minister-President of the state of Hesse suddenly disclosed to his parliament that a group of young Germans had been trained in sabotage work at the direction of the American CIA, using a camp in the Taunus Mountains of Germany, and that this group had drawn up a "blacklist" of members of the Social Democratic party and other political leaders in Germany whom they planned to "eliminate" if the Russians should happen to attack.

The facts of the case seem to be that the CIA conceived the idea that trained saboteurs should be left behind in Germany if the American Army ever had to retreat. They should be equipped with supplies for

COPY

blowing up Red Army communications trains, and they turned over to the Gehlen organization the job of forming and training such units in the days immediately after the Korea attack. Only when the group finished its training, it sat up in the Taunus mountains with nothing to do, and so it began preparing lists of people to bump off, as well as railroad bridges, etc. The fact is that the Gehlen group had picked a crowd of ex-Nazi toughs for this job, and the CIA, as well as the U.S. High Commission were caught completely unaware of what was going on, when a copy of the "blacklist" fell into the hands of the Hesse government.

The affair was quickly hushed up, after a week or two of fireworks in Germany, by a "joint investigation" of the Federal Government and the U.S. High Commission. The group was disbanded, and Walter Bedel Smith, then CIA head, made a trip to Germany in an effort to clean the organization out. But by now it had become so compartmentalized and so spidery that not a great deal could be done.

Gehlen himself is generally regarded as a sound, decent ex-professional soldier, but starting from the handful of former SS officers and Nazis in 1945, the Nazi or Nazi-minded element seems to have become dominant in the group. The more serious condition is that the CIA seems to have ignored the problem of "penetrating" the organization on its own, so that CIA does not know much more than superficially just how it operates, or to what channels outside the limits of its contract with the group it might be venturing.

Cooperation is close, without question. The organization has been turning up what the military regards as excellent material on the Russians. But the suspicion, for which there is only circumstantial evidence, is that in addition the Gehlen group has already gone far beyond its original intelligence mission, and is in contact with, if not directing the activities of, the group of German officers who have settled in Cairo, the group of ex-Nazis in Madrid, and the group in Argentina. There were, moreover, public charges at the time of the General Election in Germany that the Gehlen group was wire-tapping and doing political spying against the political opponents of the Adenauer regime.

The problem confronting American authorities at this point seems to resolve itself in two general directions: 1) To what extent are we reliant on the Gehlen group for our military intelligence, and 2) What kind of an organization have we now been caught "sponsoring" and to whom is it to be turned over in Germany?

Taking up the second of these problems first, when the "contractual agreement" with Germany come into force, it will, at that point, be necessary for the United States to cease its independent sponsorship of this German organization, and at that time the intention, or the expectation, is that the Gehlen group will be transferred to the control of the German government. There already exists between the Gehlen group and the German Federal Chancellery a close working arrangement — which has given rise to the charges of "political wire-tapping" by the group, and also to the circumstantial suspicions about its part in German activities in Cairo, Madrid and Buenos Aires.

Within the German government, there is a definite power-struggle afoot as to who is to get control of the Gehlen group. At present, the leader in the race is Hans Globke, the secretary of state for internal affairs under Dr. Adenauer -- in other words, the highest permanent official of the Chancellery. Globke was a senior civil servant under the Nazis, and was responsible for the drafting of the Nazi "race laws". He has returned to position, however, on the general defense that he was nothing but a civil servant, never an active party man and simply did what he was told. He joined the Chancellery when the government was formed, in 1949, and has now displaced Dr. Otto Lenz, a Munich lawyer, as state secretary, thus emerging as the No. 1 civil servant of the government.

Globke is regarded by those among the Allies who deal with him as honest, straight-forward and completely loyal to the Chancellor. Nobody, however, wants to hazard a guess as to his inner "political integrity", or what he himself stands for. They go only as far as saying that he stands for whatever the Chancellor wants -- and indications are that Dr. Adenauer is only vaguely aware of the power struggles which are going on in the civil service far below him.

The second figure in the struggle for the control of the Gehlen group is Dr. Theodor Blank, head of the "security office", and probable defense minister. Blank has proven himself to be a rather passionate and on the whole effective opponent of the old Wehrmacht and "Prussianization" of the new German Army. On the other hand, a natural enemity has sprung up between his office and the Gehlen group, since the Gehlen group has had six or seven years of free-wheeling to bring in any personnel it desired — so long as they were not Communists. Thus, the Gehlen group could be said at this point to represent a nucleus of the old army, where the Blank office represents a nucleus of the new army.

Blank believes that intelligence should be centered in the defense ministry, and is reputedly prepared to "clean out" the Gehlen organisation if he gets control of it. Globke, on the other hand, believes that intelligence should be centralized under the Chancellery. He and Gehlen are working very closely, on the assumption that the Chancellery will eventually get intelligence control. More than that, for the moment, because the Blank security office is only a section of the Chancellery, and not a full-fledged ministry, Globke also has a certain personnel policy-making power over the Blank ministry.

From this there has been evidence that Globke and Gehlen have in fact more or less been operating to "vet" certain of the Blank ministry appointments, to ensure that pro-Gehlen and pro-Globke people are slipped into jobs in the Blank office.

The third figure in the picture is Dr. Otto John, an ex-July 20th plotter, who for three years has headed the "Office for the Protection of the Constitution", which is the internal German security intelligence. It is his job to follow the activities of Nazis and Communists and others threatening the internal or democratic security of the state.

John is regarded as a thoroughly decent and fine man, but equally his friends do not believe that he is tough enough for the sort of power fighting which is going on. At this moment, from his own discussion of this whole problem, it appears that John is aligning himself with Globke in the possible hope that in the end he might replace Gehlen as the head of a combined internal and external service, assuming it does wind up under the Chancellery instead of the Defense Ministry.

The general attitude of the Americans seems to be that to place intelligence under the Chancellery — where it would be more or less civil-service controlled — is too great a concentration of power for the good of Germany, and it should be in the Defense Ministry, where Blank is generally regarded as a better political bet (in the sense of his political integrity; not necessarily his political strength, which is open to question) than Globke, who seems more interested in power than how it is to be used.

But in any case, at some time in the next year, presumably, this decision will be taken, which then raises, for the United States, the even more serious consideration: To what extent are we having to rely on the Gehlen group?

While it is patently obvious that we must have other sources of intelligence on the satellites and the Red Army (for example, our Army radio intercept stations in Berlin that monitor all Red Army wireless traffic), the evidence is that the Gehlen group is regarded as our

COPY

prime source, and because it has turned up good, reliable information over the years, it has moved into top position in the relative weight of sources.

In this we have differed radically from both the British and the French, who have developed their own networks of agents, which they control and direct, whereas the Army and the CIA have in effect let the Germans do the job for us. More than that, to return to an earlier point, we have not even successfully penetrated the Gehlen group, but rather put money in one end and gotten intelligence out the other.

We must therefore face the question of the extent we can justify continued reliance on the Gehlen group (a) in view of its rather dubious personnel and (b) after it becomes the servant of the German government rather than the United States.

The intent appears to be that a "working relationship" is to be maintained with the Gehlen group after it is turned over to the Germans, but the dangers of intelligence "colored" for political reasons are evident, and the United States seems to be confronted with decisions to improve its alternative sources, and equally to try and throw its weight in the question of who in Germany is to get control of the Gehlen group. At the moment, we appear to be drifting into merely continuing what has been an effective intelligence arrangement without much examination or regard as to these conditions now actively coloring the whole future problem.

November, 1953

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This is a critical review of three major security compromises suffered by a West European intelligence organization in 1953. It forcefully recites the need for close adherence to fundamental principles of clandestine activity, individual ambition, zeal, and expedience notwithstanding.

Weaknesses acknowledged by the organization concerned range from inadequate investigation and security practices on the part of the organization to unfettered ambition and boastful indiscretion on the part of a case officer.

These incidents resulted in more rigid application of operational security procedures on the part of the affected organization; nevertheless, in view of the exacting price at which the prompting lessons came, the corrective measures do not render the incidents less regrettable.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

A.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Critique of This Organization's Security Compromises and of the Opposition Propaganda Actions.

1. The operational effort of this organization was endangered during 1953 as a result of a series of compromises described in Section B. Except for these, the number of flaps and losses was kept to a reasonable measure in 1953, considering the number of active sources, the increased difficulty of the work, and, especially, the heightened CE activity of the opposition. For the most part, the causes of the flaps did not lie directly in intelligence activity, but in human inadequacies (gossip, bragging, too high standard of living), dissensions, and thoughtlessness on the part of agents.

2. At the end of September 1953, a propaganda offensive was begun in the GDR against the activities of Western intelligence services. Arrests and sentences were published in the press, on the radio, and in speeches, and the "criminal activity" of these so-called agents was forcibly brought to the attention of the GDR population. By 1 November 1953, the arrests of 98 Western agents (with names given) were made known. Among them were 14 agents of our organization. Up to this time, however, this organization was mentioned only incidentally, and was not attacked in propaganda.

3. From the beginning of November, the bulk of the opposition propaganda offensive was directed against us. The cause of this was the ERHARDT case, in the development of which the opposition was able to bring ERHARDT forth at a press conference as a prosecution witness, and as a result of which they caught numerous agents in a roll-up. In this offensive the opposition brought out flaps which had occurred some time ago, and also attributed compromised operations of other services to us. We were especially accused of sabotage and diversionary activities.

4. The series of announcements and publications about this organization, which took place in the middle of December, must also be seen in this connection. This resulted from a summation and evaluation of a mosaic of bits of knowledge which the opposition had collected in the course of years, from flaps as well as from its counter-espionage. These items were in part incorrect, inexact, or obsolete. These publications had a positive result for us, however, in that the opposition had to make known in this way at least a part of its knowledge, thereby making it possible for us to carry through effective counter-measures (e.g., checking of case officer personnel).

5. Purpose and background of the opposition propaganda offensive:

a. Ernst WOLLWEBER, who succeeded Wilhelm ZAISSER as Minister of State Security, needed results which could be exploited in propaganda

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

in order to strengthen his position. He wanted to prove to the people of the East Zone that Western espionage activity would be destroyed in the East Zone under his leadership, and that a new 17th of June would no longer be possible.

b. Strengthening of the position of the SSD. The people of the East Zone were to be brought to see that the existence of the SSD and its further expansion was necessary.

c. Destruction of the confidence and sense of security of our agents in the Zone, with the purpose of causing them to discontinue their work or to report to the SSD.

d. Frightening the populace of the East Zone from letting themselves be used by Western services, especially by this organization. Propaganda effect on the people, in order to get them to cooperate in the uncovering of Western agents, in the interests of the state.

e. Attempt to confuse and paralyze our Field Bases, making them feel exposed as a result of the publicity.

f. Influencing the Berlin Four-Power Conference, which was scheduled to convene soon.

g. Making political difficulties for our organization in West Germany.

6. The effect of the opposition propaganda on our agents was astonishingly slight. The morale of the agents and their confidence in the organization could, with very few exceptions, not be shaken. Our agents were stuffed for years by the Soviet Zone bosses with propaganda based on lies, so this present action did not make a convincing impression and thus blew up. The SSD's attempts to induce all our agents to report to them was without success. Opposition claims that 31 of our agents had confessed in remorse, are untrue and pure opportunistic propaganda. Not a single case of this is known. Also, no objective proofs could be given by the Soviet Zone authorities.

7. From the technical IS point of view, the opposition succeeded in 1953 in making some penetrations of our organization, and in dealing us a number of severe blows. Much as we deplore the fate of the affected agents and their families, it must be pointed out that this had to do only with certain nets, and, therefore, our espionage operations in general were in no way paralyzed or decisively diminished. On the other hand, the penetrations by the opposition should be a forceful warning to us and a stimulus to learn more from these experiences than before, and to take more effective security measures in the future.

B.

1953 Compromises through which the Opposition Succeeded in Making Serious Inroads.

1. In Attachments 1, 2 and 3, the circumstances and genesis of the MUELLER, ERHARDT and SCHULTZ flaps are briefly portrayed. An overly detailed description was consciously avoided, since thereby (a) allied units would learn unnecessary operational details, and (b) this study would take on too great a circumference. The purpose of the description of the flaps is to recognise the incidents and associations which led to the experiences and conclusions treated in Sections C and D.

C.

Flap Experiences and Sources of Error

1. Assessment of the Opposition.

Our espionage activity stands opposed to a powerful enemy, armed with all the trappings of power—the Soviet IS. The state security services in the satellite states (in which the GDR is included in this instance) carry out their counter-espionage activities under the guidance and at the order of the Soviet IS. The executive organs of the state, and a close meshed control and surveillance system, stand at the disposal of these state security services. Furthermore, extensive opposition surveillance actions in West Berlin, which seemed to have been based on good training and organisation, have been ascertained. In many cases the surveillance was not noticed by those surveilled, but was determined only later (e.g., during the interrogation of agents). The opposition seeks to attain its goal with the use of all CE methods: It infiltrated agents of its service into our organization; was frequently successful in doubling our agents; was in some cases able to work its CE agents up in headquarters of the branch office level; strived to recruit IS case officer personnel located in the West; and turned again and again to violence.

For two years, opposition endeavor has been characterized more and more by dissatisfaction with the arrest of single agents, and the shifting of the main part of their activity toward penetration of handling headquarters in the West, in order to be able to destroy whole nets. The experiences of the 1953 flaps show that the recognisable attacks had as their primary goal the handling offices in West Berlin. A total of three hostile CE agents were directed against the KLEINBACH cell on various levels. The enemy was working here on a long-range plan, and, in its execution, exhibited astounding speed and flexibility in the making of decisions. In the SCHULTZ case, the action against SCHULTZ's wife was carried out within a few hours after his arrest, and the enemy came thereby into possession of documentary material that was most valuable for him.

In all flaps described in Section B, the enemy attempted to press further, and sent individual letters of extortion to blown case officers in the West, suggesting that they come to the East Sector with a promise of complete immunity from punishment. The letters were normally brought by relatives who resided in the Soviet Zone.

The striking power of the opposition executive is also remarkable. As a result of the incident in West Berlin, ERHARDT reported on the afternoon of 29 October to his SSD case officer, and the arrest of all persons mentioned in the personality files (including prospects) followed that night at approximately 2400, throughout the entire GDR.

It would be completely wrong, in the present situation, to underestimate the opposition--especially the SSD. On the contrary, we must assume that the enemy is improving his methods even more on the basis of these experiences, and is training his personnel more intensively.

2. Knowledge gained by the enemy as a result of the flaps.

The knowledge gained by the enemy in the separate flaps is sketched in Attachments 1 - 3.

a. Persons

Knowledge gained about persons is not treated here. The probable consequences have been discussed thoroughly with the competent offices.

b. Construction and Organization

It can be assumed that the organization and structure of our organization, as it existed at the end of 1953, is known to the enemy in broad terms. The extensive correspondence carried on with the KLEINBACH office made an important contribution to this knowledge.

c. Mission and Espionage Targets

The opposition has almost complete knowledge of our EEI's for the GDR, as a result of seized documents, e.g.,

Observation of locations, training areas, and maneuvers of the Soviet Army,

Trails Country
Reporter & Productions
COPIED FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

Collection of captured documents,

Transportation requirements (troops, materiel, fuel, uranium),

Recruitment or defection of German scientists employed in the Soviet Bloc,

Defection efforts against personnel of the Soviet Occupation.

The enemy knows in detail what we want to know concerning the requested targets.

d. Results

The enemy could gain a picture of the results achieved by this organisation from the following documents:

(1) From the seized target background material, which is indeed procured from the production of all of our sources;

(2) From the reports received by the KLEINBACH cell, most of which were received and worked on by ERHARDT;

(3) From the seized EEI's which can be used as an indication of the situation at central headquarters.

e. Methods

The opposition has an almost complete picture of our methods of operation. The following are specified:

(1) Recruitment of agents (use of spotters, investigators and recruiters). Use of certain spotting pools (nationality groups, packet operation, refugee offices). Recruitment and use of high-level, penetration, surveillance and travelling agents.

(2) Getting of reports through acquisition of originals and discarded papers of the Soviet forces (trashcan operation). Use of photography and telescope. Importance of motor vehicle number analysis.

(3) Training of agents on background material. Seized background material contains the most important points of observation, or most favorable means of approach (especially air force).

(4) Coupling of transport, penetration and travelling sources for the following-up of transports.

(5) Delivery of reports in person (frequent, sometimes regular trips to Berlin), by courier (via dead letter drops), by mail or by radio. Passing on of important messages by radio from West Berlin.

(6) Security. Erection of special commo channels in addition to the reports/instructions and supply channel. Methods used in West Berlin (meetings, telephone letter drops, cover addresses). Use of cover legends at the target and on trips to Berlin. Name trace requests.

(7) Support of agents after they have left enemy territory, and measures taken for legalization of agents.

2. Summary

A large part of the EEI's presumably gave the enemy nothing new of importance; e.g., the enemy naturally knew that in the field of transportation we were especially interested in traffic over the Oder border. On the other hand, the opposition, with a comprehensive knowledge of our EEI's and the results of our work, can direct his security efforts primarily toward the targets and groups of persons in which we are interested. The knowledge of our methods of work makes the detection and arrest of our agents easier for the opposition.

It must be pointed out that --independently of the causes of the flaps--this comprehensive knowledge on the part of the enemy results from mistakes in management. Much too much written material was given to the lower field sub bases which are in direct contact with agent personnel; EEI's, instructions, administrative correspondence, etc., were sent out as a matter of routine in unabridged form, and little or no practice was made of destruction or return of documents. The fact that a detailed reason or basis was given in instructions proved to be especially compromising and momentous, e.g., no approach to Mr. X, since already in contact with allied service.

Controls in regard to number and maintenance of documents were carried out only to an insufficient degree.

3. Personnel Selection and Leadership

The choice of staff employees and agents and their psychologically correct handling represent the decisive problem, not only for a further increase in our accomplishments, but also for the security of our organization. It is more than ever necessary to consider the human and personal affairs and the environment of our personnel, in addition to judging their official accomplishments. The case officer must take time to create a personal contact with his immediate subordinates, and must concern himself with their private lives, in order to be able to recognise and interpret any change in their temperaments.

a. Case Officer Personnel

The success and security of our work, and the accomplishments and the lives of our sources, are primarily dependent upon the worth and the unobjectionable character of our case officers, particularly those on the branch office level.

This must be taken as an important point of departure in the selection and use of new case officers. Independent of this, the security system must be so constructed that lies, suppressions and embezzlements can be recognised in good time or avoided. Every possibility for independent checking of the case officer (e.g., questioning of a dropped agent) must be utilized. When shortcomings have been noted, they have not always been attacked with the necessary speed and consistency. In such cases, loss of sources and expenditure of money must also be reckoned with.

Aside from close checking at the time of employment, only continuous watchfulness and controls are of assistance against treason within our own ranks. A critical attitude must be maintained even with competent and proven colleagues. No blind trust. On the other hand, it must be the task and art of the case officer to make sure that control measures, for example, are not taken as mistrust, and that those affected are not antagonised.

In regard to available points of attack, it is necessary to recognize all possible means of pressure, and to nullify those which an unscrupulous enemy could use, under certain circumstances, for his own ends. The creation of a situation of confidence is necessary, so that each employee will report any indication of a hostile approach immediately, and will have the feeling that his superior headquarters will do everything for his protection, and that assistance is available to him.

b. Agents

With agents, the possibility must always be kept in mind that they may come under hostile control in the course of their activities and reveal all of their knowledge, or that they may be turned by the opposition. Therefore the agent should not know any facts that are not absolutely necessary for the execution of his mission. Thus, critical judgment of all reports from the security point of view (fabrication, striking change in level of accomplishment, deficient or non-existent description of method used to obtain information, etc.). Basically, do not make judgments only from subjective impressions, but always look for objective indications and place these in the foreground in the judgment of a person. Noting and checking of all unusual events or other observations (e.g., controls, surveillance, absence from a meeting, etc.).

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4. Radio

a. Opposition Knowledge

The documents in the field of radio which fell into the hands of the opposition were especially extensive and detailed. We must therefore begin with the point of view that the enemy, on the basis of these documents and statements by arrested radio agents, has in his possession considerable detail on radio activities of the organisation. The following points are known to the enemy:

(1) General EEI.

(2) Radio procedure.

(3) Status of radio matters.

(4) Steadfastness in crisis, and related selection of personnel.

(5) Protection and security measures (hiding of sets, set construction, jamming, cover stories used for training).

(6) Course of training.

(7) Money expended.

(8) Details on the places in which radios were to be set up (Halle, Wittenberg, Leipzig, Koenigstein, Koenigsbrueck, Forst).

(9) The instruction of Headquarters: "We need more radio operators".

(10) Equipment with two sets.

(11) Description of the advantages and disadvantages of the sets (3-WU, RS-6, and 12-WG).

(12) Burial of radio sets—protection against moisture with the help of artificial bags, cooking pans, etc.

(13) Headquarters has a department at its disposition which can handle the soldering of radio sets into copper cases.

(14) Instruction for radio operators in times of stress (article published in Soviet Zone press).

(15) Radio operators and novices. Training of novices takes so much time that future planning should primarily include former radio operators (personnel selection).

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

(16) Radio nets: Planning of the connection between sources and radio operators, and the construction of radio residenturas, radio headquarters or radio groups.

(17) Regulation of radio and code matters inside of radio headquarters and residenturas.

b. Results

(1) The security of radio commo procedure is not affected by the fact that the enemy has gained considerable knowledge, since it was developed from the beginning in such a way that no conclusions in regard to other radio channels could be drawn from the knowledge of one radio channel.

(2) The security of the cipher remains completely unaffected by the results of the flaps. All secret messages sent in are drawn up so that the enemy, even with exact knowledge of the cipher, is unable to decipher enciphered messages by the same procedure.

(3) Since the call sign tables which had been used previously were pictured in the Soviet Zone press, it was decided, for purely psychological reasons, to introduce new call sign tables. Since the new call sign tables are easier to use than the old ones, the flaps only gave the final push to their introduction.

(4) Phonograph records for use in Morse code training were probably found with several radio operators who fell into the hands of the enemy. Since we cannot do without these records in the future, new labels will have to be printed. It can be expected that such records will be especially sought after in future house searches.

(5) All types of sets fell into the hands of the enemy as a result of the flaps. The possibility of using these (types of) sets has naturally not suffered thereby, in the purely technical sense.

(6) The kinds of packing or concealment used for the transport of radio sets into the GDR have become known to the opposition. This knowledge will undoubtedly evidence itself in the future in increased danger to our transports of radios. Suggestions for new methods of packing can come only from the field operating bases, since packing and concealment methods must be adapted to the available possibilities of transport.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

c. Summary

The most momentous results of the flaps (especially the ERHARDT case) in the field of radio comms are to be seen in the fact that the enemy has become aware of the existence of an extensive and carefully constructed agent radio network of our organisation. Therefore, we must reckon with a stronger attack on our agent radio operations by the opposition in the future. Technical methods of radio CI (presumably DF-ing) will probably be used more than previously.

5. Technical Aids

Opposition knowledge from the flaps in the field of technical aids, and possible repercussions in our work.

a. Intelligence reporting (sic)

A large number of secret ink processes fell into the hands of the enemy as a result of the flaps. These were among the best which were at our disposal. It is especially significant that not only was secret ink material seized, but that the enemy captured in addition a large number of instructions for secret ink. The processes have probably become completely known to him as a result of that. The following processes were involved primarily:

(1) Odenwald, carbon process

(2) Odenwald for the typewriter

(3) Heidelberg, carbon process--powder for the production of carbon paper oneself.

(4) Augsburg, contact process

(5) Hamburg, dry writing process

(6) C_1 process

(7) C_4 process

(8) B_3 process

(9) B_2 process

(10) A_1 process

(11) A_2 process

(12) A_4 process

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

It can further be assumed that the Spessart process is also known to the enemy. Additional processes compromised are:

(1) "Latent picture" process (Verfahren, "Latentes Bild")

(2) Tannic writing (Gerbschrift) process (Bonn process)

(3) Making dots in newspapers with a copying pencil

(4) Instructions for the preparation of burnt inks

(5) Instructions for the use of the ultra-violet lamp

(6) Censor's solution XXI

The following documents, aside from the above-mentioned secret ink documents, fell into enemy hands:

(1) The spotting EEI for sources in censorship units

(2) Regulation concerning checking of secret ink letters with regard to elapsed delivery time and censorship.

All sources who are provided with these processes must be regarded as endangered. Thereupon, a special check of all outgoing secret ink mail was ordered, and at the same time the order was given that none of these sources was to write with a correct return address, and, in addition, that the content of the messages would absolutely have to be encoded if it specifically indicated the source.

One could assume that the enemy, having learned the processes, would now try even more to penetrate our intelligence communications via censorship. A check of the mail which has gone in in the last few months has shown, however, that no new special measures have been taken in the field of censorship. The elapsed times were approximately the same and the proportion of letters which had demonstrably gone through censorship was no larger than before the flaps. However, one must assume that there will be a sharpening of censorship in the next year.

The resultant situation in regard to the future use of the above-named inks is that they can still be used without hesitation for the time being, as long as care is taken that the sender cannot be found out, even as a result of discovery and decoding of the secret writing. The secret ink processes have generally proven themselves to be quite good up to now, and play a decisive role today in the transmittal of reports by mail and by courier.

b. Documents

As a result of the flaps, a large amount of documentation from the GDR fell into the hands of the enemy. A large number of documents

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

must also be regarded as endangered, at least. In addition to the documents, EEI's for the acquisition of documents from the GDR and Poland, the EEI in regard to the new PAD (East German identity document), and some document instructions and reports also became known to the opposition. As a result of the loss of the EEI's, instructions and reports, the enemy was able to gain a picture of our work in the document field. The EEI's and forms were already obsolescent at the time of their loss, however, and needed a reworking or a new edition. The EEI in regard to the new PAD is, of course, current, but the enemy must have known, even without knowledge of this EEI, that every IS is most interested in the acquisition of the new GDR identity document. At the time of the flaps, new identity documents were issued in Poland as well as in the GDR, and, in this connection, a few general changes were undertaken in the document field. Thus, our documents section would have had to change its issuance of documents regardless of the flaps. Nothing is known to the opposition concerning the status of the new editions being prepared by our documents section. In order to assure as much as possible our continued work in the field of documents, the change in the method of work and distribution of EEI's, which was planned before the flaps, was carried through expeditiously. The requirements of security were treated as primary in all measures taken. All false documentation, with a few minor exceptions, has been withdrawn.

The same thing happened with all papers and records, which have been reduced to a minimum in all field offices. As far as can be determined from reports and from new original material which has gone out since the flaps, neither controls nor other security measures in the document field have been increased by the opposition.

c. Reconnaissance photography

The enemy has probably also increased his knowledge about this organisation in the field of reconnaissance photography. It can be assumed that our wishes in regard to the purchase and acquisition of new Soviet Zone cameras and field glasses were known to the enemy. In addition, the increased use of pre-war cameras has probably become known, the possession of these cameras being more readily explained by a cover story than is the case with a new or West Zone camera.

It can further be assumed that the following instructions have become known, either in written form or verbally as a result of interrogations:

(1) Contact process with the "T" apparatus (Kontakt Verfahren mir dem "T" Geraet)

(2) Expedient reproduction photos (Behelfsmaessige Repro-Aufnahmen)

(3) Development of latent pictures

(4) Use of the Minox with a field glass

(5) Possibilities of use of separate types of film.

Injury to our future photographic work cannot result from the increased opposition knowledge, if the cover story for the possession of a camera is thought out to the last detail, and learned by heart by the possessor. The innovations in the photographic field which are in preparation have not as yet been made known to the field.

6. Organisational and Operational Questions

a. The KLEINBACH branch office grew too much in a short time (3 case officers and over 40 sources). The consequence of this was that the branch office neglected to maintain the necessary records in enough detail and to safeguard them continually. As a result of overly increased demands and an unhealthy expansion of nets, perspective and control were necessarily lost, and insufficient attention was paid to basic security rules. A one-sided striving for success without regard for security is doomed to failure in the long run.

b. In some cases only 14 days elapsed between spotting, investigation and recruitment (also with radio operators). This proves that the necessary means of checking were insufficiently employed.

c. As a result of the investigations into the ERHARDT flap, considerable cross-connections to other Western services came to light, among colleagues in the West as well as among agents. Security questions and widening of the circle automatically arose from this. Conscientious checking of other IS contacts in investigations: In this connection we may point out that every takeover of other nets has ended in failure, and most in an unpleasant flap. Intelligence peddlers are not to be considered for jobs as employees (Mitarbeiter).

d. Flaps were hushed up or not further investigated. Arrested agents or agents who did not appear were simply reported as dropped (Reason: "Can no longer come to Berlin" or "Other professional employment"). If the April 1953 arrests of ERHARDT's nephew and other agents had been reported through the KLEINBACH office and worked on as a flap, the ERHARDT flap would never have arisen, since ERHARDT would then have been recognized as an enemy.

e. Continuing, conscientious maintenance of agent relation and exposure records from the beginning offers the assurance of avoiding a flap or of keeping it from expanding. A new, detailed review of the origin of the operation is nevertheless necessary with arrested agents, or those who have been involved in a flap, in order to learn any previously unknown or hushed-up knowledge on the part of the affected agent, and to recognise the dangers which result therefrom.

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
SAMPLES FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

f. Employees carry out double functions (e.g., courier, spotter, recruiter). This increases the danger not only for the agent but also for those persons who are in contact with him. In exceptional cases where this cannot be avoided, the increased risk must be considered, and must be counterbalanced by appropriate additional security measures.

g. Couriers served several agents at the same time, or were used in another job after their activity had ended. Complications and losses which cannot be excused from a security point of view resulted from the arrest of such a courier. This also holds true for radio transport couriers.

h. Transfer of agents and case officers below the Zweigstelle is to be avoided, since difficulties in both the old and new field bases can arise therefrom.

i. In regard to training quarters (especially radio), we must make sure that a short circuit from one flap cannot carry over into another net via these quarters. In general, only one training area for each radio operator or agent (sic).

j. The IS training of a radio operator (including security training) must be carried out, from the beginning, continuously and according to plan, and may not be neglected in striving for a rapid end to the radio training.

k. The point of departure for our work in the GDR should not be limited to West Berlin alone, since the opposition, because of this knowledge, concentrates the main part of its CE activities there. It was again and again determined that the enemy has a good surveillance system at his disposal. Therefore a general loosening (sic) toward the Federal Republic is necessary. This measure is supported by the easing of interzonal travel regulations. Use of cover addresses in the Federal Republic. Training in the Federal Republic.

l. Personality files on employees of the neighboring branch office, in which KLEINBACH formerly worked, were included among the KLEINBACH documents. As a result of this situation, which resulted from irresponsible action, agents lost their freedom completely unnecessarily, and the flap spread to another branch office. With the erection of each new office or the change of a case officer, the immediately superior office has the responsibility of carrying out a detailed examination of the written material.

m. The ERHARDT and SCHULTZ flaps had far-reaching consequences for agents in the GDR because the card files of agents there were kept in the offices of the branches, and the enemy was able to gain possession of these files. Since the enemy is informed as to the manner of keeping personnel files in the branch offices, it will also be his goal in the future to gain access to these records by force or by the infiltration of

CE agents. Therefore, it is the duty of the separate IS offices to investigate countermeasures, whereby the enemy's access can be avoided: Extent of the files. Method of safekeeping (concealment). Making rapid identification difficult by means of secret inks and codes.

n. The surest protection against kidnapping is concealment of IS activity. No close acquaintanceship between agents and case officers. It was determined that in all kidnapping cases the enemy carried out a detailed study of the habits of the subject. Prior compromise was a prerequisite for that. Change place, time, and method of contacts as often as possible. No routine. Alertness for opposition observation and surveillance.

D

Consequences for our Work

1. General

In the course of the past few years, our organisation, having evaluated prior experiences, has developed a thoroughly thought-out security system for agents who might be subject to opposition arrest. This system has proven itself. It is important, however, not to stop at the level already reached, but to improve and refine the system continually. The roll-up of whole nets by the opposition in the form of a chain reaction, as a result of the arrest of agents, could generally be avoided. In the case of flaps having their origin with agents in the GDR which took on major proportions, it has been definitely determined that the fault lay in a failure to heed our basic security rules.

The flaps described in Section B were caused on another plane (choice of case officer personnel, thoughtlessness, compounding of case officer errors). But the fact that these flaps had the results they did, and that the enemy gained such widespread knowledge concerning our operations, proves that we deviated from the decisive, basic IS rules in the course of time. It was managed partially according to bureaucratic-military rules, but not along the lines of IS principles. The dangers which existed for case officer personnel in the West, whether in the case of treason or as a result of enemy violence, were ignored. It is therefore necessary to subject our methods of operation to a critical examination in this regard, and to operate even in the West in the future in a professional manner and with regard to security principles. It would exceed the scope of this study to give details concerning the change in our operational methods. It is essentially the job of the offices to draw the necessary conclusions, based on the indicated flap experiences and consistent with the mission and the practical work of the office. It is important to avoid any uniformity, and to encourage each case officer in the discovery of new methods which are not known to the enemy.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Therefore, only basic principles in the most important areas are given in the following paragraphs. These should serve as indicators of direction for further work.

2. Checking of case officer personnel

The security situation of our organization is decisively dependent on the selection, training and continual control of case officer personnel. Failure to heed this requirement, paired with neglect of the duty of supervision, considerably simplifies opposition penetration, and can lead to serious losses on account of the greater insight of these persons in the field of operations. An examination of all case officer personnel in the organization was ordered on 1 December 1953. This examination should not represent a unique phenomenon, but should be carried out on a continuing basis. We must be more watchful and critical than before, and control and check continually. Indications of dirty manipulations, IS cross-connections, hushing up of official events, character faults, unclear family relationships, questionable conduct, etc. must be picked up and energetically followed to a solution. It is important, further, to come to a conclusion quickly and effectively when such derogatory information is brought out. Higher requirements must be followed in the hiring of new case officers:

Sponsorship by a reliable person; if possible, by a reliable employee.

Examination by an investigative unit.

Presentation of a police records check.

Obtaining of a graphological (hand writing) assessment.

Detailed investigation of background, character, reliability and suitability.

Thorough check of curricula vitae, with special regard to their completeness.

Practical trial (test mission) in a job with limited scope, if possible.

In addition to character defects, which cannot be overevaluated, the following IS debits must produce in the future an absolute "IMPOSSIBLE":

Very close relatives in the GDR.

Escape from the GDR, leaving close dependents behind.

Temporary arrest by the opposition, or imprisonment of relatives which is still in effect.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Former activity for another IS (exceptions can be made only in exceptional circumstances, with the approval of central headquarters).

Extant criminal charges.

Activity as intelligence peddler or swindler.

Persons who have spent a long time in the Soviet area (including PW status) can no longer be used in the future in the West, if their work would give them a fairly large insight or would entail the possible endangering of a large number of sources in the GDR. This holds especially for agents who have fled from the East, even if they have proven themselves in their work. It must be noted in this regard that the enemy frequently has an entree to these people as a result of their former activities, even if the persons have been investigated and found reliable, and the enemy may use this entree for an approach and attempts at extortion. Remark: Regulations for the hiring of support personnel (Rahmenpersonal) are issued by headquarters personnel office.

3. Compartmentation system

The organizational breakdown represents not only management levels, but also planes of compartmentation. The compartmentation system, horizontal and vertical, must be more strictly adhered to. In case the enemy makes a penetration of a branch office, this must be sealed off horizontally and vertically. Therefore no direct running by the case officer to his superior headquarters, no general discussions among case officers of the same level.

Names of field bases and cover indicators (e.g., for actions, operations and plans) should not be passed down schematically. In the future, the enemy must be prevented from gaining knowledge of management affairs, including names right up to the central headquarters, as a result of a penetration of one branch office.

Each case officer knows the designation only of his immediate headquarters. It is recommended that all offices gradually adopt different designations for use upwards and downwards, e.g., upwards and in the divisions of the central headquarters, "branch office p"; and downwards, simply a number, a name or a firm. We must create organised disorganisation, i.e., the leadership must have a clear view of the breakdown, but the enemy must not be able to see this breakdown from below. Case officers must use various cover names in appearances at different units. Cover designations given out by central headquarters (e.g., Operation WACHT) should no longer be passed down schematically. Individual designations should be chosen by the units for their own use. The same is true for the designation of secret inks.

As a result of the measures delineated above, the enemy will be

Tri-County Reporter & Productions

considerably hindered in the evaluation of facts learned about the organization which will continue to come to him as a result of flaps and his espionage activities in the West, and he will no longer be able to grasp connections between separate IS units.

4. Correspondence

In working against us, the opposition strives to obtain originals or photostats of intelligence correspondence. This not only provides valuable espionage material, but also makes it possible for the opposition to arrest our agents legally and to attack us through propaganda. In order to strengthen our security, a general change in methods with regard to correspondence must take place in the future. The following principles must be followed:

a. Correspondence must decrease from the top down. The lower field sub bases can largely be directed verbally.

b. With the receipt of a message, each office must examine it and decide whether, to whom, with what content and in what form (verbally, in writing, by radio) the message is to be passed on. Each subordinate office should receive only that which is necessary for its work, in the frame of its mission.

c. Written instructions should as a matter of principle be passed only to the immediately subordinate office, which in turn is responsible for further dissemination of the message, in accord with subpara b above. No dissemination of headquarters instructions to lowest echelons.

d. Each written message should be checked as to whether a control indicator (e.g., "for the info of the branch office only" or "no passing to West Berlin", "destroy after assimilation", or better "return after a certain period of time") should be used.

e. Written materials should be continually reviewed in lower offices, in regard to secure maintenance, completeness and destruction. Results of the review are to be reported in writing. The execution of this measure is of decisive importance, especially in the lower field sub bases.

f. Preparatory measures should be checked and firmed up covering the destruction or removal of documents in case of danger.

g. Compromising remarks (especially reasons for things) are to be avoided in the text of written messages. Experience has shown that reasons carry with them the greatest points of danger from the security point of view, and can injure our organisation politically. That does not exclude the possibility of giving necessary reasons verbally later on. No compromising indications of source. Omission of compromising unnecessary formalities. Messages to case officers with the introduction "At the request of central headquarters, in the future...", or "Our Friends (Western service) are very interested in the further clarification of...", show a lack of IS understanding.

5. Strengthening and improvement of CI work

a. It appears to be necessary to accord increased attention to security considerations in the future. Every attempt at an increase in production with concomitant disregard of security principles will finally lead to failure. It is therefore necessary to assign competent, well-trained security officers to all field bases down to the branch offices. These security officers must be properly used, i.e., they must be brought in on all questions in which dangers could arise.

The submission of a quarterly security situation report was ordered in a Directive dated 30 March 1954. Field bases are thereby required continually to draw for themselves a picture of their own security situations, so that they will recognise points of danger promptly. In addition, the security officer should be given the opportunity of giving, within his unit, his interpretations and his judgment.

b. Efforts at espionage coverage of the opposition IS and its measures within enemy territory must be increased throughout the organization, by means of external observation (location of offices, informants, control measures, methods, etc.). Each of our agents active in enemy territory can and, in his own interest, must contribute to this.

c. Observation and planned espionage coverage of the opposition security service is a prerequisite to our own protection. Moreover, there must be a strengthening of CE work, since the opposition espionage (against us) itself offers an opportunity of internal penetration of the enemy IS, and thereby strengthens directly or indirectly our own security situation. Instructions to this effect are following separately.

6. Working on the flaps

The opposition attempts to pick up leads gained from flaps, even after a relatively long time. Insufficiently investigated flaps, and those which have not been intensively gone over, carry within themselves the seed of additional flaps.

Detailed instructions were sent to all field bases in a Directive dated 22 February 1954, which dictated both the form in which the flaps were to be worked up in the future, and the points which should be analysed in detail. All points which are to be treated or previously investigated are included in this instruction.

The flap report itself presents a reflection of the form in which the flap was handled and worked up by the appropriate office. Bringing the CE expert in will be useful and necessary in most cases.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Attachment I

MUELLER FLAP

Case officer MUELLER was kidnapped from West Berlin on 13 February 1953. He was a former police officer, and had been an employee of the Organization in West Berlin since 1948. At the time of abduction, he was deputy chief of one of our CI branch offices. In this capacity, he had knowledge of official connections (legalisation, liaison, etc.). MUELLER was very diligent in his work, and had above average success in the recruitment of productive sources. But he unfortunately possessed a certain need for recognition, which manifested itself, among other ways, in a lack of the necessary secrecy. The warnings from central headquarters in this regard were not heeded by the former chief of the office. MUELLER represented himself as the Organizations CE chief in Berlin, as a result of which he automatically became a target of the opposition IS. An exaggerated cameraderie complex led him to become rapidly over-trusting with his sources.

Since September 1951, MUELLER had been in contact with Horst KIRVES, Director of USIG (Administration of Soviet Property in Germany). It was unknown to the leadership that a personal friendship had also developed between MUELLER and KIRVES, and that they visited one another in their apartments.

At 1800 hours on 13 February 1953, MUELLER and KIRVES met at the restaurant "Moselaner" on Wittenbergplatz. Both left the restaurant at approximately 1930 hours, going in the direction of the subway station. MUELLER has been in Soviet custody ever since.

It has been proven beyond doubt that MUELLER did not desert to the Soviets voluntarily, but that he was kidnapped. Whether this took place through force, with the help of narcotics, or as a result of a trick could not be definitely determined. At any rate, MUELLER was in the prison in Karlshorst, in chains, on 14 February. KIRVES took part in the kidnapping as traitor and helper.

MUELLER had a certain amount of insight into personal and organisational relationships, not only in his office but also in the whole organisation. The necessary protective measures were carried out with the greatest speed, in order not to give the enemy any openings to penetrate our communications system (Meldekopfsystem) in Berlin. Since MUELLER had had several meetings with West Berlin colleagues on the afternoon of 13 February, he had some documents and his notebook with him. On the basis of the indications contained therein, it would have been easy for the opposition to get out of MUELLER, in a planned interrogation, all of his knowledge about his contacts. The arrest of all persons in the East Zone with whom MUELLER had had IS contacts followed in the next few days. In the course of the summer, these persons were confronted with MUELLER.

In the fall of 1953, the Soviets attempted to induce MUELLER's wife

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

and their two children to move to the East Zone. This was avoided at the last minute through our intervention. The purpose of this Soviet attempt was to gain, in the form of the family, collateral in the event of MUELLER's release, which had been promised him by the Soviets for his services, and in order to eliminate MUELLER's fear that his family might be brought into difficulty as a result of his publicized statements against our Organisation.

MUELLER appeared as a prosecution witness in the SCHULTZ trial.

The whole MUELLER case was worked up by the Soviet IS, with the SSD completely excluded.

MUELLER should have been regarded as blown several months before his kidnapping. The necessary consequences of this (protection and security measures) were unfortunately not carried out. Special caution was called for in regard to KIRVES. MUELLER tossed warnings to this effect to the winds in his blind confidence and as a result of their friendship.

At the end of December 1952, one of MUELLER's sources was arrested (a high-level economic source in the GDR government). This source knew MUELLER very well. The failure of this source to appear was explained as rupture of contact (sickness) until the middle of February, and was not treated as a flap. The close acquaintanceship between the two was unknown, and was therefore also not heeded.

The extensive investigations after the flap showed that personal connections existed among the case officers in the West, as well as among the agents, which were not known to the appropriate office and therefore could not be controlled. Thus the necessary protective and security measures could be carried out only after difficult and tedious labor.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Attachment II

ERHARDT FLAP

I. Prior History

From the summer of 1952, KLEINBACH was acting chief of a branch office which carried out economic and military espionage in the GDR. On 1 January 1953 he was officially invested with the leadership of the branch office. On 1 September 1953, KLEINBACH recruited ERHARDT, a resident of Falkensee bei Berlin, as a courier for a border crossing operation planned for the Muehlhausen area. ERHARDT, born in 1901, had been a communal official and a farmer. He drew a pension during his activities for the Organization, and was a representative of a wholesale paper concern in West Berlin. He wrote crime novels in his spare time, using the pen name Erich REUDE. On 1 November 1953, ERHARDT recruited his nephew, who was a lieutenant in the transport police in East Berlin. ERHARDT was released from his mission as border crossing courier, and was entrusted with the running of this transport police source. ERHARDT's nephew brought worthwhile material, including two books containing lists of those persons sought by the East German police. In the course of his activity, ERHARDT recruited two additional persons who, as came out after the flap, were old personal acquaintances of ERHARDT. KLEINBACH, who knew that sources were not approved when such personal connections existed, veiled the origin of the recruitment and represented them as his own discoveries—a system that KLEINBACH used in numerous other cases, in order to recruit persons who otherwise would not be approved, as a result of activity with the French IS, for example.

KLEINBACH's branch office developed in a short time to an unusual size and operated with success. When several agents of the branch office failed to appear at meetings in April 1953, among them ERHARDT's nephew, KLEINBACH simply dropped them, although it became known to him in the course of time that they had been arrested by the opposition. He did not report the arrests to his superior office.

ERHARDT, who now no longer had a mission, was used by KLEINBACH as an assistant. Thus ERHARDT rented a room in the American Sector of Berlin. His DPA (East German identity document) was taken away from him and he agreed to move his family, which still resided in Falkensee, to West Berlin by 1 November 1953.

KLEINBACH lived in the British Sector of Berlin and also had his office there. He was instructed to move the office to the American Sector. Thus KLEINBACH moved his office in July 1953 into the room rented by ERHARDT, and reported at the same time that ERHARDT had been charged with guarding the documents, but that the personnel files still remained in his apartment under special lock and key. After the flap, it was determined that the personnel files were also kept in the office "under ERHARDT's guard".

Through one of his case officers, KLEINBACH was conducting on his own a double agent operation with an MVD office, without the knowledge

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

of his superiors. The enemy had begun this operation by sending a letter to the case officer via his father-in-law, in which the case officer was exhorted to work for the opposition.

At the beginning of May 1953, one of the sources mentioned above, whom ERHARDT had recruited, appeared and stated that he had been turned by the opposition in April.

KLEINBACH, a very ambitious and unscrupulous man, was concerned only with expanding his office and perhaps becoming chief of a next higher office. Therefore he hushed up countless other items which were injurious to the intelligence work of his office, which do not need to be mentioned here in detail.

II. Course of the flap

On KLEINBACH's orders, ERHARDT had placed a classified ad in October 1953, which stated that a secretary with a mastery of Eastern languages (sic) was being sought. The applicants were to come to a cafe. In the absence of KLEINBACH, who was in West Germany at the start of the flap, ERHARDT spoke with the applicants and aroused the suspicion of one. She denounced ERHARDT to the criminal police, and on the afternoon of 29 October they tried to visit ERHARDT in the office. He was absent, and was informed of the visit of the criminal police by the landlady. On the evening of 29 October ERHARDT returned again to his apartment—which was also the office—and then fled into the East Sector of Berlin during the night, taking numerous documents with him.

During the investigation which was then instigated, it was determined that ERHARDT had been in possession of a Minox since September, and had attempted to have a copy made by a West Berlin locksmith of a key to a special compartment of the document cabinet. The locksmith refused the demand. However, we must assume that ERHARDT got the key made by his Soviet case officers.

III. Results

It was determined that the following documents were taken by ERHARDT:

a. Spotting and spotting requirements.

b. EEI's and espionage requirements.

c. Screening (correspondence and composition of reports).

d. Radio

e. CI affairs

f. Special document—background target material

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

g. Secret ink and CI instructions

The following documents were still there:

a. Administration

b. Accounts

c. Correspondence on background target material

d. Personnel files

e. Timetable for emergency meetings (S-Kalender)

f. Secret inks

Since ERHARDT had the Minox mentioned above, however, we must assume that the contents of these documents are also known to the enemy. The personnel files which were still there showed that KLEINBACH had not only kept the files on the active agents of his unit in the office, but also files on those who had become known to him through his prior work with another office, and, in addition, some on persons who had been spotted in his field but had been turned over to another office. Therefore the opposition succeeded in arresting a rather large number of persons by a coup de main on the night of 29 October. Included therein were agents of the branch office and of a neighboring office, dropped agents, and individuals who had been spotted but had not yet worked for us actively.

The documents which fell into the hands of the enemy contained, in addition to the EEI's and espionage requirements mentioned above, detailed correspondence on plans, administrative affairs, personnel matters, etc. It was thus possible for the opposition to make deductions as to organization and method of work, EEI's, points of concentration, and methods.

The attempt to warn the agents of the unit and to instruct them to flee misfired, since the opposition had been able to prepare the arrests long in advance, as a result of ERHARDT's work. KLEINBACH reported that several agents had arrived in West Berlin as a result of the warnings, but it came out later that he had lied here too. Some of these agents had been in West Berlin for over a year, though KLEINBACH had not reported it.

The investigation of the flap showed that ERHARDT had been turned by the opposition, presumably in April 1953, after the arrest of his nephew. He had worked for the enemy since that time.

The work of the opposition service was considerably promoted by KLEINBACH's ambition. As described above, he hushed up facts that were injurious to him or to his office, or portrayed them falsely.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

-4-

Criminal charges were brought against KLEINBACH by the Public Prosecutor. He was very skillful in freeing himself from the charge by deception, and the superior office did not follow up the indictments consistently.

It was learned subsequently that KLEINBACH had contacts to the French IS and to other Western organisations.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Attachment III

SCHULTZ FLAP

I. Prior History

The events of the 17th of June 1953 and the resultant closing off of the Zone and Sector borders showed the necessity for creating connections to sources in the GDR and East Berlin that are crisis-proof.

Therefore the laying out of telephone wires across the border was ordered. One of these wire crossings was to be laid out in Berlin-Treptow, in the arbor area on Kiefholzstrasse. The first preparations were made by the office chief Z., SCHULTZ's predecessor, in September/October 1953.

During the second half of October 1953, SCHULTZ, formerly deputy chief of another branch office, took over as chief of the office. In his former office he had already been initiated in the laying of a wire crossing and in the protective security measures to be taken.

At the beginning of November, SCHULTZ carried out a reconnaissance of the Kiefholzstrasse area and a test laying in the Grunewald, with the others who were taking part in the operation. Taking part in the laying as helpers were: the future West operator, RICHTER, and the future East operator, IMHOF (recruited by RICHTER).

II. Execution of the operation

At about 2130 on 13 November 1953, SCHULTZ left his apartment and went to Treptow for the wire laying.

According to SCHULTZ's testimony at the trial later, the operation developed as follows: Because the garden gates were locked, SCHULTZ was unable to go through the lots in the West Sector to the border trench, in which the wire was to be layed, as he had done during the reconnaissances. Thus he had to go with RICHTER along Kiefholzstrasse in order to begin the laying at the place where the ditch crosses under the street. SCHULTZ followed RICHTER by about five minutes—according to the report of the trial—and was arrested on Kiefholzstrasse in the Soviet Sector. Nothing was mentioned about the arrest of RICHTER or IMHOF, just as nothing at all has been said about these two in any East Zone publications.

The further events of the night of 13 November were described by Frau SCHULTZ: After her husband's departure, Frau SCHULTZ went to bed. At about 0300 the telephone rang and one HINZE told her that he and her husband had been arrested. He said that Frau SCHULTZ could help her husband only by bringing a document case which was in their bedroom to him, HINZE, on Kochstrasse. A letter in the mailbox written by her husband would confirm his instructions.

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Frau SCHULTZ found the letter, in which her husband wrote her to follow HINZE's instructions. Thereupon she brought the document case to Kochstrasse in a taxi, and HINZE got in and took over the case. HINZE tried to go into the East Sector in the taxi, but the driver refused. When the taxi was then stopped by West Berlin police for control as they drove along the sector border, HINZE jumped out with the case and disappeared over the border.

III. Results of SCHULTZ's arrest

The personality files of all of SCHULTZ's agents were among the documents which came into the possession of the opposition. Prompt warning of SCHULTZ's sources was no longer possible since SCHULTZ represented the only channel of communications to them.

IV. Measures

1. Since SCHULTZ was previously deputy chief of another branch office, compromise and consequent exposure to the opposition of the identities of these sources also had to be reckoned with. As a result of immediate warnings through the emergency channels of SCHULTZ's former branch office, all sources were brought to safety.

2. Operatives in West Berlin, of whose existence SCHULTZ had knowledge, were flown out to West Germany, or their addresses and cover names were appropriately changed, so that the enemy would have no openings for a further approach. The offices of the field bases were moved within West Berlin. Cover addresses and reporting places were dropped.

V. Knowledge acquired by the enemy

A part of the EEI's given out by the leadership became known to the opposition from the documents which came into its possession. (Served the enemy as practically only a confirmation of the knowledge learned from the ERHARDT flap).

The loss of some spotting EEI's for radio operators, sources in important places such as border and Elbe River crossing points, airports, and higher KVP units, and for students travelling to the USSR, was especially unpleasant. It was very undesirable, for political-tactical reasons, that documents concerning connections to West Berlin officials and Customs units fell into the hands of the enemy.

The loss of secret inks, with which this branch office was especially richly endowed, and of their processes was especially aggravating for future work.

The arrested sources could give information only about their limited EEI's and the means of passing on reports.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

VI. Judgment

1. It is completely clear today that RICHTER and IMHOF were working for the enemy and that they reported to the enemy the intended laying of the wire on the night of 13 November. Since SCHULTZ did not take any measures to conceal the action, it was simple for the enemy to ambush SCHULTZ. It could not be definitely determined whether SCHULTZ's arrest occurred on West or East Sector territory. We must assume that it took place in the West, since the Prosecutor skipped over this point very rapidly in the trial.

2. In spite of approval of his initiative, which is absolutely necessary in the intelligence field, SCHULTZ cannot be spared from the accusation that he did not prepare the wire laying operation carefully enough. As a result of an understandable ambition to show good results after taking over the branch office, he wanted finally to complete the project, which had been going for some time. In all conscientiousness, he neglected a preemptory examination of IMHOF, and also neglected the necessary security measures for the operation.

3. Frau SCHULTZ was so distraught as a result of the late telephone call in the night and the news of the arrest of her husband, to whom she was very devoted, that she did not think of the immediate—notification of the police precinct station in her own apartment house. In her striving to help her husband, she acted more or less in a trance, without thinking over the consequences.

4. SCHULTZ has kept silent about his knowledge of sources of the branch office of which he was formerly deputy chief. In the trial, he also made misleading statements as to their field of operations. Various statements made by SCHULTZ during the trial were obviously placed in his mouth. No one ever spoke with SCHULTZ about espionage against France, the Saar or China, and never about a new putsch at the beginning of 1954, and such plans never existed.

5. SCHULTZ's excellent character made him absolutely competent to be chief of a branch office. Neither insufficient supervision on the part of his superior office nor lack of training are to blame for the failure of the operation. His keen sense of responsibility, coupled with an extreme desire to succeed and spontaneous initiative, which led to too much blind confidence and too little regard for proper security. Individual seal on the part of a case officer should not be suppressed, but on the other hand it must be clear to everyone that personal courage can be a crime, when others are endangered thereby.

6. The field base responsible for SCHULTZ's net worked on the case with remarkable speed and thoroughness after the flap began, so that measures for the saving of threatened persons were carried out effectively and successfully, and it was impossible for the enemy to expand

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

the penetration. It was possible to execute these measures only because the office had detailed files on the persons taking part, the connections, and agent relations and exposures.

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT : Propaganda Campaign Against ZIPPER

1. Background. Beginning with the flight eastward at the end of October 1953 of a Soviet-ZIPPER double-agent the Communist press has been making a full-fledged effort to destroy the Gehlen organization by means of publicity. As far back as June 1952 we learned that Gerhard Eisler, then the East German Propaganda chief, was in possession of a "brochure" of the Gehlen organization which it was expected he would release. However, the time was apparently not considered opportune for nothing appeared. The Geyer case exposé was the opening gun in a series of releases. It was followed immediately by the publicization of the arrest of Werner Haase for laying a wire across the inter-sector boundary in Berlin. (It is suspected that this may have been a kidnapping and that false charges were published as a part of this campaign.) On the whole, prior to these cases the American press had been quiet on the subject of General Gehlen. European papers have contained sporadic articles for several years, some of them reflecting Communist smear attempts which had appeared in the left-wing press. However, with the publication of the ADN release of 18 December 1953 (Attachment "A") we can expect a rash of articles throughout Western Europe and the United States. The ADN article has a foundation of fact woven into a fabric made up of several propaganda themes which we can expect to appear in western articles. The identity of these themes with the Soviet line should be used to discredit any stories appearing in the western press. (Example: Attachment "B")

2. Propaganda Themes:

"The Gehlen Organization:

a. is engaged in sabotage and anti-democratic activities. Following this line, General Gehlen is tied in with the BDJ incident and is accused of continuing its activities underground.

b. is illegal, i.e. engaged in criminal activities.

c. is Nazi and contains many Nazis and members of the SS and SD among its ranks.

d. is the German General Staff

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

d. is the German General Staff reincarnate bent upon war-mongering. This attack has been based on United States and British war-time propaganda themes aimed at destroying German militarism. In this connection the attacks use war-time organizational terms to describe the organization. It is said to have a "II Section", the war-time term for the sabotage division of the Abwehr.

3. In addition to these four main themes in the attack on the Gehlen organization there will be wedge-driving efforts. To bring fear to our allies, the [redacted] in particular, the American IS will be said to depend entirely on the Gehlen organization for its intelligence on the Soviet Union. It will be implied that the Germans desire war and that their intelligence will mislead us into war. To throw confusion in our own ranks the CIA will be accused of having lost control and to have failed to "penetrate" the organization. To split the German intelligence effort into three parts Gehlen will be accused of internal meddling with the aim of creating a politically powerful intelligence service at the expense of the Blank Office, the future Defense Ministry of the Bonn Government, and the BfV, the German Internal Security Office. The Eastern effort will harp on the main themes and seeds of suspicion planted in western press channels will result in these and other wedge-driving efforts. (Attachment "C")

4. Possible counter-action. We can expect that newspaper stories will be presented to CIA with a query as to their veracity. In answer it is suggested that there should be no absolute denial but merely a reiteration of the necessity for secrecy in intelligence matters. The interested parties should be told of the East German Press propaganda themes and the danger that western recognition of these stories will be taken as "proof of the pudding". Attached is a selection of the Eastern propaganda. The propaganda themes are underlined. The accompanying analysis of the press coverage of the Geyer Case will also clarify the Soviet approach. (Attachment "F")

5. Summary. The entire campaign has its roots in the June 17 uprising. Every effort is being made by the opposition to prove to their own people and the rest of the world that the uprising was not spontaneous; that it was inspired by western espionage organizations. It is conceivable that the Soviets will use the Berlin Conference to pound this propaganda theme home. Attached to this memorandum (Attachment "E") is a factual account of the Geyer Case. Although it does not reflect the propaganda themes of the East it became grist for the propaganda mill when the Taegliche Rundschau (last item Attachment "D") picked it up as proof of their allegations. From this sample it should be clear to all that any publicity is dangerous and to be avoided.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

JOHN BROSS
Chief, EE

Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/EE
2 - EE/FIG/Z

EE/FIG/Z/[redacted]
4 January 1954

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET
Security Information

EGLA 6914

SECRET

5 JAN 1954

Chief, EE

INFO: COM

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/ZIPPER
ZIPPER Operations Berlin/GDR

1. For your advance information only, we are forwarding the following documents:

a. A letter from UTILITY's deputy, MERKER, to [redacted] regarding the rather broad problem of "Interrogations in Berlin."

b. A letter from MERKER to [redacted] titled: "Lessons Learned from the Uprisings, Summer 1953."

2. Both documents are under study at POD. [redacted] will visit Berlin 7 and 8 January to discuss with [redacted].

3. Our comments and recommendations will be forthcoming.

4. Washington and Frankfurt comments are desired.

NOTE: Attachments are POB translation of German originals.

Hq comments
fwd. EGQW-15611
5/5/54 + Policy

[redacted]

Enclosures: 2
as above

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

DISTRIBUTION
3 EE w/1 cy att.
3 COM w/1 cy att.

SECRET
Security Information

Policy
EGQW-15611 prepared
13 april
routed to Comm + ST D for
coordination.

[redacted]

5 Jan 53

SECRET

COPY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

17 November 1953
30a No.148/53 sv

TO : 25

FROM : 30.0

SUBJECT : Interrogations in Berlin

REF : 25 Memo No:8175 dated 2 Nov 1953

In the following we want to sum up once more our problems which eventually could be taken up for discussion in Berlin during a trip of 25 or his representative to that city.

I. 1. It would be appreciated if all Allied IS agencies in Berlin were briefed:

a. in general on the mere fact of our interrogation activities in Berlin,

b. in particular on our activities in the line of emergency admission to the Federal Republic and our cooperation with the department II of the Berlin Police Hq.

Define more specifically

2. Furthermore, a telephone number should be made available in Westberlin, where Allied authorities may receive information regarding our interrogators, if necessary.

which ones? How many? Doing what?

That telephone number must also be given to our interrogator personnel.

Similar arrangements were made for German authorities which were given a telephone number of the Berlin Kripo.

Ambiguous?

3. Request that possibilities be investigated whether and on what conditions our interrogators could receive definite support from the Allies in Berlin providing for interrogations to be held officially in an office without special cover. By such a method considerable advantage would also accrue to positive IS in the SBZ, by obtaining forschungs-tips.

who sees under what circumstances?

-2-

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

Answered by EGQW-16

[redacted]

One such possibility, for instance, would be to have interrogators of the organization assigned to Allied interrogation agencies.

In addition, Allied authorities could be instrumental in getting our people access to refugee camps, such as the foreigners' camp in Wannsee, Am Sandwerder, which can only be entered with a written permission of the US side.

Taken Only out of Czech & Polish field will solve this.

4. It is considered important that a special identification card with photograph of the bearer be issued to interrogating, forschungs and recruiting personnel in Berlin.

Such a card would - toward refugees - serve as documentary evidence that personnel concerned are definitely working for the West. Toward Allied authorities they can always prove their identity by stating the emergency number.

The necessity for such documents results from the fact that in pursuit of their tasks, personnel in question must constantly contact persons not belonging to the organization, and on the other hand, from the fact that the people in Berlin are very careful and alarmed to be approached by Soviet provocateurs.

Corresponding to the West-German identification cards for interrogators, such should also be made out in Polish, Czech and Russian.

II. The present status of negotiations on the German level is as follows:

1. We maintain close cooperation with the agencies handling emergency admission procedures; three interrogators were legally established.

2. We secured the assistance of the senator for social welfare. Thus, we succeeded in establishing one forscher in the refugee reception center and got access to refugee camps of the Berlin senate.

3. Department V of Police Hq. agreed to provide cover for our interrogators and named a telephone number, however, they sofar refused legalization of our own Vopo interrogators within their department. We continue our efforts in that respect.

4. Department II of Police Hq. agreed to provide G- (secret ink) documentation. The first contact was established with the foreigners' police. The fundamental attitude is positive, however, sofar no actual results were reached.

5. For the time being, Vopo interrogations are not yet in progress. With regard to IS matters they are held in the camps, however, this method is not very expedient and often forced our people to submit their emergency numbers etc.

It will be attempted that this part, too, is included into procedures for emergency admission.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

1 December 1953

To: 25

From: 30.0

Subject: Lessons Learned from the Uprising, Summer 1953

Our organization learned valuable lessons during this summer's unrest in Berlin (and the Soviet Zone ?) and was able to spot numerous gaps and insufficiencies which we must now eliminate. A part of these remedial measures could be applied within the spheres of our own organization. The basic questions, however, impinge on areas which demand a preliminary agreement with the 25 staff, or must be decided by 25. Several of the following points have been discussed many times, and have up to now been rejected by the 25 staff. We are convinced, however, that our viewpoints have been justified by the events of the past summer and the experiences arising from them.

1. Orientation of the Organization by the BS. befreundete Seite

a. It would be of great value in estimating the situation, and steering the intelligence collection effort, if the Organization could be briefed on the situation as seen by the BS in the light of information available to them. This need becomes more acute in time of crisis. We request, therefore, that at such times a close contact be established and maintained to exchange information acquired. This would mean above all getting such information to the evaluation section (45) rapidly.

b. We would also welcome an exchange of knowledge in the radio intercept sphere. Up to now we have merely delivered our material, and have had no reaction whatever. It is particularly necessary in time of crisis that radio interception agencies working in the same area, and perhaps on the same targets, keep a close mutual contact. This would unquestionably eliminate duplication of effort, and bring a considerable rise in results. We do not plan to dwell on details here. Once a continuing contact is established, cooperative work on details will develop. The stress on secrecy, usual in radio interception work, should not hinder this cooperation. Security can be achieved through suitable measures to the extent necessary for both agencies.

c. Operational information has particular value to the collection effort in Berlin. The Organization will have operational information collected by the Berlin head exponents, and put directly at the disposal of the Berlin operational leaders. In order to create a means to exchange information here too, mutual orientation by the head exponents in Berlin and a staff member of the BS would be welcomed. We request that you establish this contact.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

2. Leadership within the GVs.

The actual leadership in collecting intelligence is in the hands of the GVs. Research, recruitment, and training of the V-men, leadership during their commitment, and regulation of the means of communication, and support, are all handled by the GVs with complete independence. The HQ merely indicates the targets, gives general directions on commitments of agents, and regulates or watches the use of funds. If the GVs are to carry out their independent functions, they must be given all the means necessary to the fulfillment of this task. The most important of these today are technical aids.

Research (Forschung), recruitment and training of AFUs is also a GV function. They have their own personnel at their disposal, as well as radio schools which have the necessary equipment. It is only in the technical leadership by radio of the radio agent in place that the entire organization must depend on the central head radio station. The GV is, therefore, without any direct effectiveness. This situation is in direct contrast to the system in use throughout the organization. If leadership is decentralized, the means of leadership must also be decentralized.

The centralised radio leadership of the radio agents has already led to friction; and above all to delays in the transmission of orders and of reports. Speedy and supple leadership of the radio agents by the GVs through the medium of a distant radio station which they do not control, is often impossible. The important individual approach to different radio agents cannot be maintained - in spite of the best intentions and efforts of the central radio station - as it could be by a tactical leadership and support through the GVs. One central station, however willing, cannot meet all the wishes of the GVs since these represent an unbearable burden, and will make it difficult to maintain an overall view, and an orderly development of the radio traffic. Technical reasons too require a division of the work by several base stations. The various radio agents could be watched by two base stations simultaneously (GV and Head base station). The traffic lost due to technical difficulties (poor sending conditions, for instance) could be held to a minimum. All of these considerations argue for the construction of several base stations and their attachment or subordination to the GVs. A strong influence would, however, be exerted on them by the head base station.

The development of the Org's radio service, in particular the steadily growing number of radio agents ready for commitment, will force us in 1954 to consider expanding our base station capacity.

3. UKW-Contacts in the Berlin Area.

The uprisings on 17 June showed once more how important it is that we have a means of reaching agents in the East Sector or in the East Zone near Berlin quickly. The best means for this is a one-way ultra short wave contact. In this way agents could receive messages on a normal receiving set, with an ultra short wave attachment, without endangering

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

themselves in any way. They might also be given an ultra short wave set made by the organization. In exceptional cases where the risks run by the radio agent can be reduced to an acceptable minimum, a two-way contact could be considered.

The expense involved would not be very great. Two or three rooms situated in the top floor of a high building or tower, or the possibility to mount a special short wave antenna on the roof of such a structure would be necessary. A four man team would suffice for the present. Getting the necessary equipment would present no problem. These ultra short wave stations could also be used for short wave monitoring. This type of station was sorely missed on 17 June. The ultra short wave traffic of the KVP, of the Soviet Army units converging on Berlin, and of the state police, could all have been easily monitored. On top of this, such a station in Berlin could have monitored ultra short wave traffic of the Soviet air units which cannot be heard in West Germany. The organization would be particularly grateful for support in this matter. Our use of U.S. facilities could be profitable if we could use them to cover the operation of our own instrument. The Project "UKW - Base Station in Berlin" is very high priority and requires basic preparations which require time. For this reason we suggest a start as soon as possible with two or three people.

4. Use of Radio Stations to Send Messages to Agents.

Sending messages to agents through regular radio stations is a method used by the Allies and the Germans before and during the war. In many cases this method was used with considerable success. Various observations lead us to the conclusion that the Soviets are making use of this method on a large scale.

In this case, as in the case of short wave radio, we believe that an intelligence service must utilize all possibilities, and in particular those which have been proved of value over the years.

The German radio stations are unfortunately not available to us at present. RIAS, Berlin is the station best suited for our purpose. We should try this method, even if only with one agent.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

COURIER SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY "SECRET CONTROL" US OFFICIALS ONLY EGL-A-7555

Security

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Chief of Base, Pullach INFO: EE 10 FEB. 1954

Operational

Background Statement on Recent ZIPPER Publicity

REF: SFRAN 3389

1. We have prepared attachment in compliance with your reference request for a factual background summary of the recent ZIPPER DIR flaps and the ensuing publicity.

2. As you will notice, attachment is prepared in a sterilized form which may be handed over directly to the customers you have in mind.

3. POB is of the opinion that there is no security objection to passing attachment as is. It states very little that is not already known by the enemy intelligence services. Aside from the factual summaries of the cases involved, we have included brief comments about the development of the East German publicity campaign which seem necessary to put the facts in proper context and perspective. We leave final compliance with DIR 39861 to COM.

[redacted] [redacted]

Approved by:

[redacted]

Encl: (1) 8 Cys - As Stated Above

Dist:
3 - COM, w/6 Cys Att.
~~2~~ - EE , w/6 Cys Att.

9 February 1954

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

COPY

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

"SECRET CONTROL"
OFFICIALS ONLY

Attachment to
EGL-A-7555

I. The following is an account of the nature, extent and effects of the major SfS/Soviet Intelligence executive actions against the GEHLEN organization since 29 October 1953. A brief description of the ensuing DDR press and propaganda campaign against GEHLEN is also included.

II. During the past three years, the GEHLEN organization has conducted positive intelligence operations in the DDR which utilized an average of 650 agents within the Soviet Zone. This figure takes into account expected turnover, seasonal personnel gains or declines and "normal" security losses to enemy intelligence services of varying but usually rather limited extent. Over this three-year period, and in fact throughout the entire history of the GEHLEN organization, the eastern bloc failed to grasp several obvious opportunities to publicize the GEHLEN service. From time to time, arrested GEHLEN agents were personally identified, but the organization itself was never exposed by Eastern publicity organs, although enemy intelligence services were without doubt capable of supporting such exposes, at least to a limited extent. Any evaluation of the significance of both the actual arrests described below, and the ensuing press and propaganda campaign against the GEHLEN organization should be viewed in this context.

III. Out of a total of just over 700 agents active in the Soviet Zone at the beginning of October, 1953, to date 70 are known or presumed arrested, while 16 fled to safety; their services as agents obviously lost. A number of dropped agents, whose names were unfortunately compromised, were also arrested, but these arrests do not affect current operations. Though total losses were unusually serious, they were reasonably well contained by operational compartmentalization. It is fortunately true that the Eastern propaganda effort was forced to include cases up to three years' old (several such cases were never GEHLEN controlled, but belonged to other Western agencies) in order to make the sudden blow against GEHLEN appear catastrophic.

IV. Presented below is a brief review of the three specific GEHLEN organization cases which incurred the losses described and set the propaganda wheels rolling. No attempt is made to compare or refute the Eastern press versions of these cases.

A. GEYER Case

1. Hans Joachim GEYER was employed by a GEHLEN agent leader named Hermann FOLSTER, alias [illegible], as a courier from Berlin to Thuringia on 1 September 1952. By November, 1952, GEYER had offered his nephew as a transportation information source in East Berlin. At the same time, GEYER offered one Alfred WINESCHAK for W/T training.

2. On 1 March 1953, GEYER was allowed to recruit a courier to a Soviet Zone couple already trained and in place as a W/T team. On 11 April 1953, this courier was arrested and turned by the SfS, but fled to Berlin and reported this fact. The W/T team was warned and fled to safety. GEYER may or may not have been connected with the arrest and subsequent turning of the courier, and this incident is cited merely as a possible indication of the time GEYER himself became an SfS agent. At any rate, GEYER was not connected with this incident by the GEHLEN organization and he so completely gained FOLSTER's confidence that he (GEYER) was installed as an office worker during July, 1953, in the operational office of FOLSTER in West Berlin. The organization was about to promote GEYER when he fled.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

"SECRET CONTROL"
OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY "SECRET CONTROL" US OFFICIALS ONLY

3. On 29 October 1953, the Berlin Kripo made inquiries about GEYER based on a report of suspicion of the POLSTER office by a woman whom GEYER had interview for a secretarial position. GEYER was not present at the time of the Kripo visit was warned by Frau POLSTER of the police interest in him. As an Eastern double ag GEYER understandably jumped to the conclusion that his penetration work had been di covered, made a final unauthorised night check of the office on 29 October 1953, fled with a quantity of files. Presumably, GEYER had SfS assistance in his decisio to flee, since three arrests of POLSTER agents were made during the course of 29 Oc ber. The first DDR bulletins on the "defection" of GEYER were broadcast on 30 October, and were followed by highly detailed press coverage. This coverage consisted of a clever use of the considerable factual material available to the enemy, combined with purely propaganda claims notably including the false assertion that the GEHLEN organization was engaged in sabotage activities.

4. The exact date and circumstances under which GEYER was recruited by the SfS has not been determined. Resulting investigation did reveal that the W/T agent recruited by GEYER had been turned since April, 1953. This agent, when fortunately apprehended and interrogated, was firmly and probably rightly convinced that he had been betrayed by GEYER, therefore indicating that GEYER had been under SfS control at least since April, 1953.

5. Without detracting from the obviously well executed SfS management of GEYER, it should be noted that subsequent investigation indicated that inefficient and actually dishonest operations by POLSTER made possible the entire coup. Ironically, an independent investigation of POLSTER's sub-organization based upon suspicion of financial and operational irregularities was already under way, but not sufficiently advanced to have made any significant discoveries. An organizational weakness which contributed to SfS success was the fact that the POLSTER unit had been allowed to grow to outsized (and incidentally insecure) proportions compared with other GEHLEN units of a similar level. The loss in agent personnel numbered 53 persons.

B. HAASE Case

1. During the night of 13/14 November 1953, a trusted GEHLEN agent leader named Werner HAASE was engaged in preparation of a wire-laying operation intended to establish a clandestine communication link spanning the Berlin sector boundary in the vicinity of the point where Kiefholzstrasse crosses from the American to the Soviet Sector. Assisting HAASE were Heinz BUSSE and Helmut [illegible], who were intended to service, respectively, the west and east terminals of the line once it was installed. Although for various fairly sound reasons the GEHLEN organization labels the HAASE Case a kidnapping and declines to believe the publicized Eastern statements that HAASE was arrested in the East Sector of Berlin, the fact remains that the actual circumstances under which HAASE and his companions came into SfS custody are not known. The three were, nevertheless, captured, along with several items of equipment which were later proudly displayed by the Eastern propaganda experts.

2. A surprisingly few hours after the presumed time of arrest, Frau HAASE received a call from an individual using BUSSE's alias instructing her to bring from her bedroom a briefcase containing HAASE's records by taxi to a point where she would

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY "SECRET CONTROL" US OFFICIALS ONLY be met. As an authenticator, the caller had already caused a letter in HAASE's own handwriting to be placed in the HAASE mail box. The letter, obviously dictated, instructed Frau HAASE to comply, and in a natural state of confusion she did so. She was met by a person who may have been identical with HEUKEL, and conducted to a point at the sector boundary where the person seized the bag and escaped into the Soviet Sector when challenged by a West Berlin policeman.

3. As a result of this incident, a total of 16 agents, including couriers, reporting sources and a W/T operator were either definitely arrested or are presumed arrested. However, an almost equal number were successfully warned. HAASE himself, together with several of his agents have since been subject to a show trial which has been thoroughly reported by the DDR press, and have received long prison sentences (life for HAASE). Instead of treating the simple facts of HAASE's undoubted guilt, the trial, whose political motivation was unmistakable, was an elaborate indictment of the GEHLEN organization.

4. In contrast to the GEHRE case, efficient and careful operation by the GEHLEN field agency supervising HAASE, together with HAASE's own meticulous attention to detail, resulted in well defined operational compartmentalization which made the necessary subsequent GEHLEN investigations and protective measures comparatively easy to complete.

C. Annemarie SCHMITT Case

1. Annemarie SCHMITT was utilized by her husband Gerhard SCHMITT as secretary to handle the paper work connected with his agent leader activities for the GEHLEN organization. On 14 November 1953, despite many previous warnings, Annemarie SCHMITT went voluntarily into the Soviet Sector. She claims that she was simply so concerned for the safety and comfort of her partially disabled mother, who was arriving from Halle at an East Berlin rail station, that she was drawn without thinking seriously of security to meet her mother at the railway terminus rather than at the appointed West Berlin S-Bahnhof. While in the railway station, Frau SCHMITT and her mother were arrested by East Sector authorities who held them temporarily in Berlin and then removed them to Halle where the mother was released, and Frau SCHMITT was intensively interrogated for over two weeks. Frau SCHMITT claims that she was interrogated solely concerning her husband's former activities on behalf of the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, and that only at the very end of her interrogation was she questioned as to her possible knowledge of the GEHLEN organization.

2. On 30 November 1953, Frau SCHMITT was released in Halle with instructions to return to Berlin and to ascertain before the date of an arranged future meeting the nature of her husband's current activities.

3. The GEHLEN organization is still engaged in the interrogation of Frau SCHMITT. For various reasons, it is believed that she has not yet been broken. Her version of her arrest, interrogation and subsequent SfS-assigned mission is inconsistent and illogical. Neither she nor her husband have been cooperative with GEHLEN personnel attempting to clarify the case. The mission which she allegedly received from the SfS does not appear genuine. Yet despite existing doubts, many factors argue against either herself or her husband having been SfS doubles prior to her voluntary venture out of West Berlin. All suspicious aspects to the contrary, it is just possible that her arrest was purely chance, that police coordination turned up

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY
"SECRET CONTROL" US OFFICIALS ONLY

previous record in Halle, that interrogation naturally construed that previous record, and that the interrogators were so preoccupied with the earlier aspect of the case that they neglected to consider seriously the chance that her husband was GEHLEN-connected. Finding Frau SCHMITT of no great use or interest, the SfS may then have released her, having no more in mind than the assumption that her husband must maintain current intelligence connections in West Berlin which would inevitably reveal themselves to an intensively applied surveillance. In fact, Frau SCHMITT was covered for several days in West Berlin by an enemy surveillance which culminated at a crucial meeting held between Frau SCHMITT and GEHLEN interrogators while 13 rather definitely identified surveillants watched the outside of the West Berlin address.

4. Fortunately, Frau SCHMITT only knew the true names and addresses of four GEHLEN agents in the Soviet Zone, and all of these were warned in time. Naturally, these persons are no longer available as informants.

V. Press Exploitation

A. The extremely thorough and effective DDR press exploitation of the above-mentioned cases represented only the first phase of a well planned DDR propaganda action against the GEHLEN organization. Fairly rapidly, older and sometimes non-GEHLEN cases were reported in the DDR press as new SfS successes. Beginning with the trial of HAASE, the considerable knowledge of the GEHLEN organization which the SfS had gained from Wolfgang HOEHER was utilized to good advantage. HOEHER had been kidnapped from West Berlin during February, 1953, and has remained since in Soviet captivity in Karlshorst.

B. The succeeding DDR press campaign soon consisted of general articles designed for purely propaganda effect emphasizing the "criminal" nature of the GEHLEN organization, its "subversive activities," and its alleged Nazi, Fascist and General Staff roots. GEHLEN was accused of operating against the French. Unmasked GEHLEN agents in the DDR were urged to surrender and repent in return for amnesty. Although no thorough analysis can be attempted here, it may be assumed that some of the more obvious objectives were:

1. Fostering of antipathy in the minds of the DDR populace against agent operations;

2. Stampeding of agents as yet undetected;

3. Establishing the reputation of the new WOLLWEBER SfS regime; and

4. Arousing of French fears of the German menace as related to EDC ratification.

C. In the climactic blows against GEHLEN, the DDR press published several general releases on the size, organization, physical location, and personnel of the GEHLEN organization. Though in many details outdated and inaccurate, the releases were certainly of such a nature as to impress the uninformed public and, it must be admitted, to startle thoroughly the GEHLEN organization itself. Nevertheless, careful [illegible] study justifies the conclusion that the releases were not nearly so complete in their implications as had been feared. In short, in virtually every case, analysis revealed the probable means through which item of information found its way into enemy intelligence hands and eventually into the press releases. In no case did a

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY
"SECRET CONTROL" US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

"SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

penetration seem probable. On the other hand the GEHLEN security analysts fully realize any information originating with a penetration in place would undoubtedly have been thoroughly camouflaged. Roughly, the DDR release material, divided by source, is as follows:

1. Relatively widely known and previously publicised (in the West) information on the general structure of the GEHLEN organisation and on its relationship with the Bonn Government and the Americans.

2. Information concerning GEHLEN headquarters and the American staff which filtered down through the GEHLEN training schools and main field bases to chief agent personnel subsequently captured by the SfS or Soviets. Principal person involved here is Wolfgang HOEHER.

3. Personality and organizational information about GEHLEN field agencies known to agent leader personnel now in SfS or Soviet hands.

4. Miscellaneous carded data collected over a considerable period of time in connection with various older flaps assumed by the enemy (partially incorrectly) to be GEHLEN cases.

5. A small number of scattered facts, the method of whose disclosure to the enemy cannot yet be conjectured.

6. Briefs and EEI's sent from GEHLEN headquarters to the field agencies.

Detailed analysis of the general disclosures are still in progress, and corrective organizational, administrative, personnel changes are being accomplished. Understandably, the GEHLEN service is conducting an intensified search for possible penetrations in place.

D. The most recent aspect of the DDR press campaign has been expanded to include all of American intelligence. When considered together with the previous intense anti-GEHLEN effort, this last phase has been interpreted as a possible indication that Western intelligence activities against the DDR may be proposed by the Soviets as an agenda item for the current Berlin Four Power Conference. Conjecture on this point is out of place here.

VI. Direct Effect upon Intelligence Operations of the GEHLEN Organization

A. The direct effect of the SfS/Soviet executive measures against the GEHLEN organization has been described above in the operational terms of agents lost.

B. The impact of the DDR propaganda campaign against the GEHLEN organization (as well as other Western intelligence agencies) with respect to Soviet Zone operations cannot be judged and must be viewed only as one factor which may partially explain such declines in the rate of positive reporting as may occur.

C. To date, the following effect upon GEHLEN positive reporting from the Soviet Zone has been observed:

"SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

"SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

Attach. to EGL-A-7555
Page 6

1. During recent months, reports disseminated by the GEHLEN organization on the Soviet Zone totaled as follows:

May, 1953	326
September, 1953	374
December, 1953.	514
January, 1954	496.

2. The above indicates a slight drop in January in the number of reports received from the Soviet Zone. However, the level of reporting is running ahead of the production during the corresponding period of 1953. The stringent security measures instituted by the GEHLEN organization are in all probability more responsible for the present slight decrease in the number of reports than Soviet action, or the psychological reaction of agents to Soviet disclosures of various security breaches in the GEHLEN organization. The organization reports a general attitude among agents that now "more than ever" they must continue their work.

3. Certain security measures imposed as a result of the flaps described above will be incorporated into new standard operational procedures, and will, therefore, probably have a permanent effect upon reports production.

VII. The American element, SDU, feels unqualified to comment upon the probable over-all effect of all the above on future American intelligence operations in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

„SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. EGLA-8122

TO : Chief, EE
ATTN: [redacted]
FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

DATE: 16 MAR. 1954

INFO: COM

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/ZIPPER

SPECIFIC— ZIPPER Political Reporting

1. ZIPPER political reporting is certainly the most controversial aspect of the German effort. Within both the ZIPPER and POB staffs the ZIPPER effort in this field has been the subject of continuing debate at both working and top echelons.

2. Several years ago when we first gave this problem our attention, it appeared to be reasonably uncomplicated. The ZIPPER field agencies were preoccupied with the production of information for our military customers and had not been subjected to any pressure to produce political intelligence of the type which is stock-in-trade for CIC/Berlin. At the headquarters staff level, political information was processed in the CI/CE office which considered political information only as an integral element of the CI/CE product. The only political effort in the evaluation staff dealt with the analysis of high-level and almost entirely overt material on the USSR which was carried out by BRAEUTIGAM, now head of the Eastern Section in the Foreign Office, or by former Ambassador von DIRKSEN, who was eventually dropped by ZIPPER from his consultant status because of non-authorized political activity. KLAUSNER, ZIPPER's CE chief, is still responsible for passing political requirements to the field. Because he tends to handle these as an element of his CI/CE effort, and because he does not have much stature with the ZIPPER field agencies, political information requirements have never been accorded any priority in the collection field.

3. Our insistence that ZIPPER establish a more systematic evaluation procedure resulted in the establishment of a political evaluation group at the time that HERDAHL became chief of evaluation and Dr. Otto BRAEUTIGAM left ZIPPER for his present Bonn post. KLAUSNER has managed to retain most of his authority and the respective responsibilities of the CE and evaluation staffs remain unclarified. Uebersicht is the product of an ad hoc committee with representation from all ZIPPER staffs which can in any way contribute; normal staff arrangements remain almost as unsatisfactory as heretofore.

4. UTILITY has never shown any interest in resolving this problem. He does not believe that the ZIPPER field agencies, i.e., "G V's", lend themselves to this type of collection. In fact, I am convinced that UTILITY regards the collection of political intelligence on the GDR on behalf of the Americans with little enthusiasm.

Distribution:
3 - EE (DIRECT)
3 - COM

15 March 1954

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

Deadline:		Check one
Hq Action Req.	by cable	
See para	by pouch	
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	
See para	by pouch	
For info and files		✓

[redacted]

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

The whole problem has been greatly complicated during the past year by the development by UTILITY of a number of "independent" [redacted]-type operations which produce a large number of information reports dealing almost exclusively with political matters. A year ago UTILITY was providing his more important Bonn customers, primarily [redacted], with both ZIPPER and [redacted] reports coordinated only by superficial evaluation carried out by @STEURER. This practice produced considerable friction and eventually @KUEHNE, strongly supported by @HERDAHL and probably by @KLAUSNER, persuaded UTILITY that [redacted] material should be integrated with ZIPPER information by the ZIPPER evaluation staff. These reports, with special red-stripe markings and classified in accordance with UPGROWTH security regulations, are now received by @HERDAHL. However, neither he nor @KUEHNE's operational staff are given source information on these reports. In January 1954, one of these original "red-stripe" reports came by accident to me. I utilized this incident to take issue with UTILITY on this entire procedure charging that UTILITY was morally obligated to provide KUBARK with any and all intelligence information on the Soviet Bloc, including the GDR, that came to him through operations controlled by him regardless of the origin of the funds involved. Since that time, @HERDAHL has been instructed by UTILITY to prepare carbon copies of those reports which he feels are of interest to KUBARK, and to forward these copies to UTILITY for concurrence and transmission to us. Off the record, @HERDAHL told me that he has been receiving UJDUSK material on the Soviet Bloc, including the GDR, since the first of the year and has, with few exceptions, found these reports to be general in character and of little or no value, particularly since he has no access to source data.

5. The POB staff has noted a gradual, if small, improvement in ZIPPER political reporting during the past year and does not feel that any change in our present procedure for disseminating political EGKs is indicated. It is extremely important that political reports originating with the UJDUSK operation be considered as a distinct and separate problem. Although we initially disseminated several of these reports passed personally by UTILITY, we now simply accept and forward them as raw material from uncontrolled sources, i.e., [redacted].

6. Unfortunately UTILITY occasionally confuses the situation by taking a regular ZIPPER source report out of the ZIPPER mill and passing it to us with vague reference to "one of my own sources."

7. We have never been able to fathom what subtle purposes UTILITY may have in mind by his repeated and unprovoked assertions that there exists an unbridgeable gap between his and the KUBARK concept of political intelligence. He has repeatedly stated that worthwhile political intelligence can only come from high-level sources and that high-level sources are so sensitive that they cannot safely be identified beyond the immediate agent-handling echelon. Following his proposal regarding coverage of the Geneva Conference (SFULL 7554), I expressed to UTILITY our feeling that most of his so-called political reports were in content so general and with regard to source so vague that no responsible intelligence agency could disseminate them to a customer. I referred UTILITY to several specific reports, including the famous red striped one (EGLA 7201) of January 1954, suggesting that the contents could have been the result of an educated guess produced by any competent student of Soviet foreign policy and that the value of subject report was related solely to the position of the source. To emphasize this point, I asked UTILITY to assume that his

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

office was a political target of a foreign service and that a source, described as "Pullach source," provided a report describing in general terms UTILITY's thinking on the question of ZIPPER legalization in [redacted], including his personal views regarding the relations between [redacted] and the three Allied governments on this particular issue. If the source were identified, for example, as HARTWIG, UTILITY's closest aide and confidant, even a generalized report would have value. However, if the source were any one of the several hundred individuals in the Hqs, who have no access to either UTILITY personally or to his files, it would be most difficult to accept such a report. Yet this is precisely the responsibility that UTILITY expects us to assume in accepting most of his so-called political reports from high-level sources. UTILITY acknowledged that our position was not entirely without merit and immediately retreated into his old argument that there was simply a difference in philosophies which had not been resolved.

8. From the above, which is admittedly a very superficial analysis of a complicated problem, the inescapable fact remains that the UTILITY/ZIPPER/[redacted] complex can hardly be considered well-equipped to produce for KUBARK useful political intelligence. At the same time, we feel that there is very little to be gained by passing on to UTILITY evaluations of the type contained in EGLW 601. POB staff members who have studied [redacted] analysis of this particular Karlshorst report are in full agreement with [redacted] but are divided on their views regarding the advisability of passing to UTILITY this type of evaluation which, if one admits to the errors and/or discrepancies which were noted at the time the report was made, is fairly hypothetical and not based upon inescapable logic. I feel that we should indulge in this type of analysis for our own purposes and to build up ammunition but should not pass it on to UTILITY unless we have a fairly strong case indicating deception and/or fabrication. We should continue to urge ZIPPER to produce a more substantive type of political reporting which will lend itself to more concrete evaluations on our part. On the working level, we will increase our immediate scrutiny of individual reports by particular sources and, where possible, restate our specific interests in individual targets. We will try to sharpen further ZIPPER awareness of reporting techniques such as the frequently far-fetched "field comments." Concurrently we will continue to exercise pressure on UTILITY to bring his [redacted]/ZIPPER house in order and to create ZIPPER procedures for handling political information, including more systematic examination of both source and content data. Then later this summer it will again be time to re-evaluate what we are receiving and whether any improvement has been made.

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Publicity
31 Mar 54

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT: ZIPPER Security

1. Attached is a translation of the summary of a ZIPPER report on the East Zone press releases of December 1953 and January 1954 (EGLA-8017). The full text includes a detailed analysis of the releases, paragraph by paragraph.

2. The details of ZIPPER's countermeasures are not included and will be reported at a later date. The Pullach Base will continue to press for clarification of those points as yet unresolved.

PETER SICHEL
EE/FI

Attachment

EE/FIG/Z/[redacted]
31 March 1954

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - EE/FI files
3 - EE/FIG/Z

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

__ZIPPER Headquarters__: The press reports identifying members of the ZIPPER Headquarters staff by true name seem to be based on information obtained in 1950 rather than 1953. ZIPPER has still not determined how the correct cover designations of these staff members were obtained. ZIPPER feels that these data could have been compiled only by a source within the Pullach compound in 1950.

Information on the location and cover used by ZIPPER Headquarters, as well as on the number of American and German staff members working in the Pullach compound, was undoubtedly obtained through external observation over a long period of time by various workers, drivers and other tradesmen. Names of the American officers stationed at Pullach could easily be obtained by conversing with domestic employees outside the Pullach compound.

ZIPPER is in contact with the Blank Office and the BfV through Adolf Heusinger and Albert Radtke respectively, as was reported in the press. However, the nature of these contacts differs from the description given in the press. The fact that Heusinger and Radtke were both formerly connected with ZIPPER is known to many. ZIPPER has, as reported, personal contact with the President of the Bavarian Landpolizei and the Commander of the West Berlin Schutzpolizei. It is not known how the press learned of these latter two contacts.

Reports on the founding of ZIPPER, its objectives, methods of operation, as well as data on ZIPPER training schools (which were partially inaccurate) were undoubtedly obtained as a result of the recent arrests. Training schools which have been in the same location for a number of years are bound to become known, eventually, to the opposition.

Based on the recent press releases, it would seem that no information on the internal functionings of ZIPPER Headquarters has become known since 1950. Steps must be taken to ensure that all persons within the Pullach compound are completely reliable and security conscious. Good psychological leadership of all staff members and employees will at least decrease the possibility of future penetrations, if not make such penetrations impossible.

__General Agency B (GV B)__: Information on the location of GV B, and identification of some of its leading members (Hans WORGITZKY, Otto SOMANN, Hermann GISKES, Eberhard von NOSTITZ) were undoubtedly obtained as the result of a security incident in the fall of 1953. Reports on other GV B personnel were probably based on a minor flap which took place in the fall of 1952.

__General Agency G (GV G)__: The published reports on GV G do not contain much detailed information on the activities of this

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

Agency. The data on Hans LUTZ, head of GV G, and on Karl GARTENFELD, Berlin representative, seem to have been obtained in the spring of 1953. Undoubtedly both LUTZ and GARTENFELD became known to the opposition as a result of the years they have spent in extensive intelligence activity. The information on two other GV G members was apparently obtained in 1948 and is no longer accurate. Of the eleven members of GV G identified in the press articles, six had been dropped by the fall of 1953; the five remaining members had become known partially due to their lengthy intelligence activity and partially due to various security incidents.

In the case of GV G, as in the case of two other General Agencies, it is of interest to note that the CE staff member was identified as the deputy agency leader. It has not been possible to ascertain why these inaccurate designations seem to follow a pattern. GV G's main office has been in Munich since early 1953, as was accurately reported in the press. It is not known how the opposition discovered this fact.

District Agency E (BV E): The low level and generally insignificant information reported in the press on BV E was undoubtedly obtained through the East German Ministry of State Security interrogation of Werner HAASE. The location of BV E Headquarters, and the true name of the leader of BV E were not known to HAASE, and did not appear in the newspapers. The report identifying Heinz BERGMANN of Berlin-Templehof as a BV E W/T trainer refers to a BV E staff member who used the name "Heinz BERGMANN" in 1950 while training a W/T agent who was later involved in a security incident. The staff member did not use the name "BERGMANN" after 1950, but he did remain at the same address. ZIPPER is now trying to determine how the opposition learned of "BERGMANN's" home address; "BERGMANN" has been evacuated from Berlin. Three other persons identified as members of BV E had been dropped in early 1952 as the result of a security incident.

General Agency H (GV H): The information on GV H personnel was compiled, for the most part, as a result of the Hans Joachim GEYER defection. However, it has not as yet been determined how the true name of the deputy leader of GV H was obtained, or how the names and functions of two other GV H members were learned. All possible security measures are being taken to ensure that the opposition will not be able to obtain any further information on the organization of GV H.

General Agency L (GV L): The most complete press reports on any ZIPPER activity were those dealing with GV L, ZIPPER's CI/CE Agency. Accurate data were presented on the leaders of GV L, and on two of the subordinate offices. Of the nineteen members of GV L

SECRET/RELEASE
SECRET TO GERMANY ONLY

who were mentioned by name, all but three are currently employed by GV L. As a result of the opposition's extensive knowledge, it will be necessary to take immediate steps to ensure that no further damage will be done.

Five members of GV L were compromised as a result of the abduction and successful interrogation of Wolfgang HOEHER by the East German Ministry of State Security. It has not yet been possible to ascertain how the opposition learned the names of the other GV L members, and how they were able to determine, accurately, their dates of birth, addresses and in some cases, even telephone numbers. In general, however, certain minor errors made in these identifications would tend to indicate that this information was obtained not by direct observation, but by verbal reporting.

Drastic measures will be taken to increase the security of GV L. It has been suggested that GV L be completely reorganized, and that each member of GV L be thoroughly reassessed.

General Agency C (GV C): The opposition's knowledge of GV C seems to be rather meagre. The location of the main office of GV C is not in Stocking, as reported, but in Stockdorf. It is not known, however, how the opposition obtained this information. The cover names of the leader of GV C and of his deputy were mentioned in the press reports. These names have been used for many years and therefore could have become known to the opposition through any of a number of ways.

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

EE

MICROFILMED
MAY 25 1981
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

VIA: (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGLA 8437

28

DATE: 6 APR. 1954

TO : Chief, EE

INFO: COM
BONN

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

carded

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— ZIPPER and East/West Trade Intelligence

1. Some months ago I entertained Deputy High Commissioner Walter Dowling, UTILITY, [redacted] at dinner at my home. Sometime after dinner the conversation turned to the subject of Germany's trade prospects with the Soviet Bloc.

2. Both Dowling and [redacted] followed the East/West trade question with some interest in Austria and have, of course, pursued the matter with interest since their assignment to Bonn. They both assured UTILITY that the present economic structure of the Soviet Bloc was such that, disregarding the political implication of East/West trade, no western country could really make trade with the Soviet Bloc a profitable affair. UTILITY replied that this was not entirely consistent with the opinions that he had heard advanced by German experts, including his friend Min Dir Dr Vollrath Frhr von MALTZAHN, head of the Foreign Trade Section of the Economics Ministry in Bonn.

3. UTILITY returned to Dowling's position later that evening after Dowling and [redacted] had departed to catch their special train back to Bonn. He expressed surprise that the Americans had such clear-cut, black-and-white views on the subject and declared his intention of discussing the matter further with von MALTZAHN and other German economists.

4. Against this background and in light of the recent ZIPPER/POB/EE agreement that ZIPPER should direct its efforts more into the "legal" type of operations, we should examine what has long been suspected but can now clearly be labelled as UTILITY's policy regarding ZIPPER reporting to KUBARK on East/West trade. From a sensitive ZIPPER source, we have learned that UTILITY has issued instructions that ZIPPER is to refrain from submission of reports to KUBARK that reveal Federal Republic industrial participation. Allegedly, UTILITY expressed this view some time ago. He desires utmost protection of Federal Republic industries, and maintains that the harm that ZIPPER could do to this trade by keeping KUBARK informed is far outweighed by the value of cooperation with KUBARK in this field. Thus, the collection of intelligence on the Federal Republic concerns engaged in this trade is encouraged, but the resulting reports are not disseminated to KUBARK.

DIST
✓3 EE
3 COM
2 BONN

RI COPY
INDEX

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

[redacted]

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

5 April 54

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

EGLA 8437
5 Apr 54

5. Germany's East/West trade has long been a politically controversial issue; we are not in any way surprised to learn that UTILITY's policy on this question is exactly what we thought it would be. To what extent this will eventually effect our cooperative effort with the ZIPPER intelligence apparatus to utilize for espionage purposes the increasing number of German economic ties to the East remains to be seen. It will certainly be a complicating factor whenever one end of a trade connection is a West German firm. I think that we can expect to get the Eastern Bloc intelligence that results but will gradually be denied the operational data that reveals the West Germany economic interests involved.

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

[redacted]

EE

EGLA 9797

21

3154

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

MICROFILMED
NOV 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Cy # 4 of 7 cys
-9 JUL 1954

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt (Attn: [redacted]) INFO: EE
Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational

ZIPPER Capability for Reporting on SHAPE East Germany Targets

REF: Top Secret Document listing East Germany Targets from a SHAPE Study

1. Reference document which consisted of seven pages of detailed listing of military air and ground intelligence targets in East Germany was hand carried to POB on 1 July by [redacted]. He identified the document as part of a SHAPE document that had been handed to [redacted] by the clandestine planning committee in Paris to determine "what reporting assets KUBARK had which could report on these targets just before and just after the outbreak of hostilities."

2. We have speculated on the purpose of this particular exercise, since it seems to duplicate, to some extent, the ICCO target review and appears related to [redacted] and other arrangements designed to evaluate the U.S. intelligence capability of providing "early warning" information.

3. Attachment #1 is a compilation prepared by the Pullach KUBARK staff of ZIPPER's current reporting capabilities on the targets listed. Concerning this document:

a. It is very sensitive and should not be passed outside of KUBARK.

Att: 3
1. ZIPPER Capability, 8 July 54, OLTS 914, 3 cys of 3 cys
2. Early Warning Study, 29 Nov 53, in duplicate
3. Airfields in East Germany, Czech, Poland, GLTS 914A, 1 cy of 1 cy

DISTRIBUTION
COM cys 1-3 of 7 cys, w/1 cy each of att. 1,2,3 (Att 1, OLTS 914, cy#1 of 3 cys)
(Att 3, OLTS 914A, cy#1 of 1 cy)
✓ EE cys 4-6 of 7 cys, w/1 cy of att 1 and 2 (Att 1, OLTS 914, cy #2 of 3 cys)
POB cy 7 of 7 cys, w/1 cy of att 1 and 2 (Att 1, OLTS 914, cy #3 of 3 cys)

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

9 Jul. 1954

[redacted]

~~ANT~~ TSCO	FI	E/G
PS	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT ~~X~~	INDEX	

2 att. H/W

aa
RID/TSCO 25 NOV 1968

9 July 54

SECRET

CS COPY

D-200-120-3
K 200-6-53

~~95541~~

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

-2-

EGLA 9797
9 July 54

b. Even the most superficial comparison of this document with the military target coverage review made by the USAREUR member at the February 1954 ICCO meeting indicates that a USAREUR report to EUCOM would present a drastically different view. This is because USAREUR G-2, unlike other members of the ICCO, continues to discuss coverage of ground targets in the SovZone exclusively in terms of USAREUR G-2 sources instead of the total coverage available to the U.S. Intelligence Community in Germany.

c. The description of current coverage available from the sources of ZIPPER and other Western Intelligence efforts cannot be utilized to determine "early warning" capabilities without taking into consideration a number of other related considerations. Attachment #2 is a copy of a paper on this subject which I prepared at the request of the EUCOM J-2 while on duty at EUCOM in November 1953. The conclusions are applicable to any effort by U.S. Intelligence, in the broadest sense of the expression, to estimate its capability of providing "early warning" of a Soviet attach.

4. Attachment #3 is the reference document hand carried to POB by [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

~~95541~~

12 R

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

8 JUL 1954

1. In order properly to assess the ZIPPER capabilities for covering the airfields in the following list at the present time, the POB reports staff studied the files in POB on sources, target coverage, and recently-produced reports on the various airfields. The evaluation of the coverage capabilities is a composite of all the materials consulted. The evaluations possible are indicated below:

Excellent:	More than three sources reporting regularly on the activities at the target. The content of the reports indicates that the sources have a good future potential and understand the nature of the target.
Good :	More than three sources reporting regularly. The content of the reports indicates a restricted capability of the source either to report or to gain access to the target area.
Fair :	Three or less sources reporting regularly. Reports indicate that the sources are not in a good position to report all the information desired on a target.
Poor :	No regular reporting. Sketchy reports.
None :	No capability.

East Germany

	Target Name	Evaluation
1.	Altenburg	Fair
2.	Altengrabow New	None
3.	Alt-Lonnewitz	Fair
4.	Barth	None
5.	Bautzen/Litten	Good
6.	Brandenburg/Briest	Good
7.	Brandenburg/Industriehafen	Excellent
8.	Brandis	Good
9.	Briesen	Fair
10.	Cottbus	Good

MICROFILMED
NOV 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[redacted]

[redacted]

G TS- 914
COPY No. 2 of 3

RID/Fcd 25 NOV 1968

~~95541~~

RI Copy

SECRET

~~Attach #1~~ + EGL-A 9797

Att #1 to EGLA-9797

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

	Target Name	Evaluation
11.	Dessau	Good
12.	Doberitz	Excellent
13.	Dresden	Good
14.	Drewitz	Poor
15.	Erfurt/Bindersleben	Excellent
16.	Finow	Good
17.	Finsterwalde	Good
18.	Furstenwalde	Fair
19.	Grossenhain	Good
20.	Hagenow	Fair
21.	Jocksdorf -Bei-Forst	Good
22.	Juterbog	Excellent
23.	Kamenz	Fair
24.	Kothen	Excellent
25.	Mahlwinkel	Fair
26.	Merseburg	Fair
27.	Neubrandenburg	Good
28.	Neuruppin	Excellent
29.	Oranienburg	Excellent
30.	Parchim	Good
31.	Peenemunde	Good
32.	Perleberg	Fair
33.	Putnitz	Excellent
34.	Rangsdorf	Good

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Target Name	Evaluation
35. Rechlin/Lars	Good
36. Rainsdorf	Fair
37. Retzow	Fair
38. Rothenburg	
39. Schonefeld	Good
40. Schonhauser Damm	Fair
41. Schonwalde	Fair
42. Schwerin/Buchhols	Poor
43. Staaken	Good
44. Stendal	Good
45. Strausberg	Excellent
46. Tutow	Good
47. Vietmannsdorf	Excellent
48. Welzow	Fair
49. Berlin/Tegel (Under Allied Control)	Good
50. Berlin/Tempelhof (Under Allied Control)	Good
51. Gatow (Under Allied Control)	Good
52. Werder	Excellent
53. Werneuchen	Excellent
54. Wittstock	Excellent
54A. Zerbst	Excellent

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEAS
TO GERMANY ONL

2. Since the maneuver areas of East Germany occupy large areas and contain many other targets, the ZIPPER capabilities in these areas are covered in railroad, airfield and order of battle reports. The evaluation of the ZIPPER coverage of these targets is noted below:

Excellent:	Fifteen to twenty sources reporting regularly on activities in the target area. The reports give a clear picture of the activities in the area and indicate that the sources are in a good position to report the material. Most of the reported material is corroborated by other information.
Good:	Less than fifteen sources regularly reporting on activities in the area. "Good" also indicates that the sources are in a restricted position to report on the events in the area.
Fair:	Less than fifteen sources reporting on activities in the area. Reports are incomplete or lack desirable details. Sources are not trained to report the events completely or their information is difficult to confirm.
Poor:	Few reports from the area.
None:	No coverage.

East Germany

	Target Name	Evaluation
1.	Wittstock (Tng Area)	Good
2.	Schwerin	Good
3.	Ludwigslust	Good
4.	Salzwedel	Fair
5.	Juterbog	Excellent
6.	Halberstadt	Fair
7.	Nordhausen	Fair
8.	Heilingenstadt	None
9.	Muhlhausen	Fair
10.	Eisenach	Excellent
11.	Meiningen	Good
12.	Saalfeld	Good
13.	Plauen	Fair

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY SECRET

3. In order properly to assess the ZIPPER capabilities for covering the rail center targets in the following list, the POB reports staff studied the POB files on sources, targets and recently produced reports on the rail centers of East Germany. The evaluation of the coverage is a composite of all the materials consulted and attempts to find a common denominator for over-all coverage of a rail center. It should be noted that sources who are reporting on other materials from these areas can easily report on rail traffic, and official records in many areas record the activities in other areas. Possible evaluations are indicated below:

Excellent:	Three or more sources reporting regularly on activities in the target area. The reports indicate that the sources are in position to report properly and that they know the nature of the target. All targets which are indicated to be covered "Excellent" have corroborative information from other rail points.
Good:	Three or more sources reporting on activities in the target area. The content of the reports indicates that the sources are in a position which restricts their capabilities to report activities in the target area.
Fair:	One or two sources reporting regularly. The content of the reports indicates that the sources are not in a good position to report the information desired on a target.
Poor:	No regular reporting. Sketchy reports.
None:	No coverage.

__Through East Germany__

Track No. 1a:	Stettin	Fair
	Pasewalk	Fair
	Gustrow	Fair
Track No. 2a:	Stettin	Fair
	Eberswalde	Good
	Templin	Good

SECRET/RELEASE SECRET
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

	Lowenberg	Poor
	Neuruppin	Good
	Pritzwalk	Good
	Perleberg	Good
	Wittenberg	Good
	Ludwigslust	Good
Track No. 3a:	Kustrin	Excellent
	Berlin	Excellent
	Neustadt	Fair
	Wittenberg	Good
Track No. 4a:	Frankfurt/Oder	Excellent
	Berlin	Excellent
	Rathenow	Good
	Stendal	Good
	Potsdam	Good
	Magdeburg	Excellent
	Belzig	Fair
	Gutergluck	Fair
	Magdeburg	Excellent
Track No. 5a:	Guben	Excellent
	Forst	Good
	Cottbus	Excellent
	Berlin	Excellent
	Luckenwalde	Fair

SECRET SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY ~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

	Halle	Good
	Aschersleben	Fair
	Halberstadt	Fair
Track No. 6a:	Nieder Bielau	None
	Gorlitz	Fair
	Dresden	Excellent
	Chemnitz	Good
	Saalfeld	Fair

Important Points

River Crossings

Over the Oder-Niesse:

Stettin	Fair
Guben	Excellent
Zittau	Fair
Kustrin	Excellent
Forst	Good
Gorlitz	Fair
Frankfurt/Oder	Excellent
Nieder Bielau	None
Horka	Good

Over the Elbe:

Stendal	Good

Complex of:

Magdeburg	Excellent
Wittenberg	Good

~~5541~~

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Schonebeck	Fair
Torgau	Good
Dessau	Good
Riesa	Fair

In East Germany:

Frankfurt/Oder	Excellent
Dresden	Excellent
Leipzig	Excellent
Magdeburg	Excellent

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

4. ZIPPER capabilities to report on major Soviet headquarters in East Germany have been assessed on the basis of number of sources reporting, nature of reports, and time interval between reports. Almost all of ZIPPER's reports indicate that the sources are German and that the information is based on observation and some very fragmentary documentary material.

Because the coverage of these headquarters is tied to general military movements in the area, a specific capability for the headquarters is difficult to determine. The following is the key to the evalaution of ZIPPER capabilities to cover major Soviet headquarters:

Excellent:	Three or more sources reporting regularly on activities in the area. The reports indicate that some important movements at or near the headquarters are regularly observed and that the sources are conscious of the nature of the target.
Good:	Three or more sources reporting regularly on activities in the area. Reports indicate a restricted source capability to observe and report.
Fair:	Some regular reporting by less than three sources from the area, but reports lack details.
Poor:	Irregular and sketchy reports.
None:	No coverage.

East Germany

Target Name	Evaluation
Furstenberg	Good
Eberswalde	Good
Magdeburg	Excellent
Dresden	Excellent
Nohra	Good
Juterbog	Excellent

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

Wunsdorf	Good
Werder	Excellent
Wittstock	Excellent
Wittenberg	Good
Finsterwalde	Good

SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET

~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

5. In addition to sources who report on harbor and port installations, other sources in the target areas occasionally report on these targets. The evaluation of ZIPPER capabilities takes this into consideration. The possible evaluation of ZIPPER's present capabilities as extracted from sources, types of reports and period of reporting is as follows:

Excellent:	Three or more sources reporting regularly on events in the target area. Reports indicate sources are in good position to report the events observed and are conscious of the nature of the target. Other sources occasionally confirm events in the area.
Good:	Three or more sources reporting regularly on events in the target area. Reports indicate that sources are in a restricted position to report events. "Good" also indicates that in addition to these regular sources, other sources report occasionally from the target area.
Fair:	Two or less sources reporting from the area.
Poor:	Occasional reports only. Sketchy reports.
None:	No coverage.

East Germany

	Target Name	Evaluation
1.	Warnemunde	Good
2.	Eckernfoerde	None
3.	Flensburg	None
4.	Stralsund	Good
5.	Peenemunde	Good
6.	Swinemunde	Good

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

~~95541~~

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

6. ZIPPER occasionally reports on ports and repair activities in West German ports. It also covers movements of Russian and Iron Curtain vessels as they move in the Baltic Sea or through the Kiel Canal. No evaluation of ZIPPER capabilities to report on such targets in West Germany can be made since there is so little material available for assessment.

Evaluation of ZIPPER's capabilities in East Germany which was made on the basis of sources reporting, type of reports, and reporting periods is made as follows:

Excellent: Three or more sources reporting regularly on activities in the target area. Reports indicate that sources are in a good position to observe events and are conscious of the nature of the target. Other sources occasionally confirm materials reported by regular sources.

Good: Three or more sources reporting regularly on activities in the target area. Reports indicate a restricted capability to observe events.

Fair: Less than three sources reporting on the area. Reports lack detail and do not come at regular intervals.

Poor: Only occasional reports. Sketchy reports.

None: No coverage.

Baltic

Target Name	Evaluation
Stettin	Fair
Swinemunde	Good
Stralsund	Good
Warnemunde	Good
Rostock	Good
Wismar	Good

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

[redacted]

SECRET
SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

EGLA-11919

22 DEC 1954

Chief, EE
Acting Attn: [redacted]
/Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COM

Emigres

Operational

New York Times Article on Vlassov Veterans' "Aid Group"

1. The 12 December issue of the "New York Times International Edition" carried an article by Albion Ross describing how "ex Nazis" have organized an "agency" to aid the large number of "former Eastern European collaborators with Hitler," as well as Hungarians, Rumanians, or Slovak "Fascists" or former Nazi "agents" in Czechoslovakia. These people, now located largely in Bavaria, are to be aided by a group supported by "former members of Alfred Rosenberg's 'Eastern Ministry' now in the Bonn Foreign Ministry."

2. This is the gist of the article signed by Albion Ross covering the meeting held in Munich last week end of the aid group for former Vlassovites which @ Herdahl is interested in. The repeated use of "Nazi," "Fascist," and Hitler, particularly in the lead paragraph, gives Ross's article a decidedly caustic slant.

3. I showed @ Herdahl the article this morning and he flatly blew all his fuses. He was outraged by the impression of political and particularly Nazi and Fascist activity that the article appeared to indicate for the group. He reiterated that only former Vlassovites were involved and that by no means were Hungarians, Rumanians, or Czechs, or any former Nazi agents included. He stressed that he and many others had put extensive time, energy, and money into this group (@ Herdahl mentioned that the meeting had cost him alone 200 DM) to keep the aid group non-political and actually to help the former Vlassov people, aside from keeping them on the string for the future.

4. Several other KIPPERites are involved, according to @ Herdahl, including @ Dorbach and @ Bermuth and "several others in Buro Bavaria."

5. The mention of former members of the Rosenberg Ministry, @ Herdahl felt, was particularly a reference to @ Bermuth; and "people now in the foreign office," @ Herdahl felt, was a reference particularly

Distribution:
3 - EE w/attachments
3 - COM

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

COPY

[redacted]

15 December 1954

SECRET

Trails Country Reporter & Productions
COMPILED FROM THE "WAY BACK WHEN" PREVIOUS PUBLIC DOMAIN FILES

SECRET

SECRET/RELEAS
TO GERMANY O

to von Herwath, the Protocol Chief in Heuss' Office. Further, Theodore Oberlaender was never in the Rosenberg Ministry, as stated.

6. @ Herdahl was particularly disturbed about the reaction of people in Bonn to the article. He called me several times during the course of the morning to talk about the background or connections of Albion Ross and to hypothesise on where he got his information. He reviewed the list of Americans who were invited to be present, a list kept small so that it would not appear that U.S. aid was being solicited. He recalled only two Americans from the Consulate---one named Jones (fnu) and the other with an Armenian name, something like "Abidjian." He asked for any assistance I might give him in revealing the background for what he considers a vitriolic attack on a basically charitable enterprise.

7. [redacted] Comment: @ Herdahl is extremely interested in this aid group which he described to me as being composed principally of former German liaison officers to the Vlassov units. Of these @ Herdahl is now senior in past German military rank, since Gen. Koestring's recent death. He had anticipated an attack on the group from various quarters, particularly East Zone or even SPD. Obviously any group, no matter how charitable, involving defected Russians from World War II, has political implications, if not immediately, then certainly in the future.

8. Attached is the article, also a copy of the press release prepared by the aid group at the time of the meeting, emphasizing the non-political nature of the group.

9. Comments on Ross, or suggestions, are invited.

[redacted]

Approved:

[redacted]

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONL

[redacted]

SECRET

FASCIST REFUGEES AIDED IN GERMANY

Ex-Nazis in Government and In Coalition Parties Set Up Agency for Hitler Allies

By **ALBION ROSS**,

Special to The New York Times.

MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 11—Former Nazis now in the Bonn Government have started a movement here for closer relations with former Eastern European collaborators with Hitler.

In southern Germany, notably Bavaria, there is a large number of former members of the forces raised in the Soviet Union to fight on the German side and of Hungarian Fascists, Rumanian Iron Guardsmen, Slovak collaborators with the Hitler regime and some Czech agents of the National Socialist regime in Bohemia. They fled westward and took refuge in this part of Germany toward the end of World War II.

A congress of the "former voluntary bands" has just been held here. The name refers to Eastern Europeans, including Ukrainians Russians, who were on Hitler's side as volunteers in the war. The new German organization set up to aid these people and establish better relations with them is the Aid Office for Homeless Foreigners.

Refugees Held Neglected

The movement has support, moral or otherwise, from former members of Alfred Rosenberg's East Office under the National Socialist regime who now are in the eastern section of the Bonn Foreign Ministry. They are members of the All-German bloc, a party that is a member of the ruling coalition. Apparently support comes also from the Minister for Refugees, Dr. Theodor Oberlaender, also a former member of Rosenberg's East Office.

The organization evidently takes the stand that these people, who were on Germany's side during the war and now are refugees in Germany, have been neglected during the Allied occupation.

T[illegible] German group already has [illegible] helpful to Rumanian and Hungarian Fascist refugees here. Certain of the Fascist groups publish periodicals and are organized on a mutual-assistance basis. They maintain relations with elements among German minority refugees from Eastern Europe and with the Sudeten German refugees.

These relations have brought them into contact with the All-German Bloc and the Refugee party, and they now seem to enjoy increasingly the protection and patronage of those groups.

New Social Status

The group of former officials of Rosenberg's East Office who are in the Bonn Government's service or associated with the Government coalition are men who generally disapproved of the persecution of Eastern Europeans. They held that everything should have been done to win the people over to support for Nazi Germany. This deviation from what became the Government's policy of terror got some of them into trouble.

Certain of the Fascist refugees here, who apparently are in the process of receiving at least a new social status as friends who shared a common fate, still are wanted on war-crimes charges in refugees were hampered considerably by the circumstance that the country was under military occupation. The Aid Office, it is understood, will now undertake to provide funds and jobs for them. It has scheduled a census of all such refugees who were volunteers in Hitler's armies or who had other connections with the Nazi side during the war.

Most of the political refugees now in Germany are persons who were on Hitler's side during the war. The post-war volume of democrtaic refugees who, beginning about 1948, started fleeing from Communist rule has not come anywhere near the number of Fascist refugees. More of the democratic refugees moved on to other Western European countries and overseas. The refugees who were allies of Hitler have found it more difficult to emigrate farther west and have shown less inclination to do so.

New York Times, 12. Dez. 1954

F-17

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

AIR

KAPOK

EGQW-21203

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attention: Chief of Base, Pullach/
Chief, EE

Operational/
Evaluation of ZIPPER Production

REFERENCE: EGLA-12979

1. The reports by the Army and Air Force liaison officers which were transmitted under reference will not be used by the Clark Committee. Upon receipt of your cable, FULL-GOAG, the matter was taken up with the committee members who concurred in your position. Upon receipt of the reports on March 25 I again checked on the matter and obtained verification of the non-use of the material. Therefore these reports will not be circulated outside of .

2. We here in the German Branch are very proud of the glowing comments which we understand have been made by the Committee members regarding POB and particularly . Naturally we are prejudiced in our convictions that we have been supporting for so long a really good show but to hear such laudatory descriptions from unbiased observers does provide comfort.

25 March 1955

Distribution:
3-FRAN
2-POB
2-EE/FIG/Z
1-RI

EE/FIG/

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

EE/DCOS EE/FIG/Z EE/FIG

SECRET

Briefing file

EXTENT AND QUALITY OF ZIPPER MILITARY REPORTS ON EAST GERMANY

SECRET

1. INTRODUCTION

Of all positive intelligence targets in East Germany, military installations and activities are among those which have been covered most thoroughly. While there are various sources for this type of information, data on Soviet and German military establishments in East Germany have received their most comprehensive and most reliable coverage through the Zipper organization. Zipper has been outstanding not only in the wealth of material supplied by its numerous informants, but also in the number of subjects included in its reports, the frequency of reporting on individual targets, the speedy availability of salient information, and the analytical facilities in the field. In effect, Zipper has provided a running log on military activities in the area, has given an insight into the state of preparedness of the Communist forces there at all times, and has furnished numerous clues for the analysis of military intentions and capabilities of the Eastern bloc. Zipper has also contributed its own military assessments, ranging from penetrating comments in individual spot reports to consolidated studies of high-level interest. (See, for instance, CSDB-X-21387).

2. STATISTICS

It must be pointed out here that Zipper does not limit its efforts to the collection of purely military information, or to information on East Germany. Generally, between ten and twenty percent of its products have dealt with other areas behind the Iron Curtain, including the USSR itself. Within the East German category, where a few years ago ninety per cent of the reports were military in nature, about fifty per cent are now devoted to other fields, such as economics, politics, and scientific and technical intelligence. There are few Zipper reports of any category, however, which do not have at least an indirect bearing on military intelligence. In recognition of this fact, more than 5,000 of the 5430 reports received during 1954 were forwarded to the intelligence components of the U.S. military services. The vast majority of those reports, and practically all those regarded as "military", were pertinent to requirements issued by the armed forces. To what extent evaluations received from the customer agencies have confirmed the value of the reports will be shown later.

During the last three months of 1954, a total of 1226 Zipper reports on East Germany were received. Of these, 590 were purely military. The average monthly figure for this period shows a production of 409 reports, with 197 (48%) of them military. The 48% can be subdivided further into specific areas of interest. On that basis, about 28% are of primary interest to the Army, 15% to the Air Force, and about 5% to the Navy. These figures provide as accurate a measure of current production as can be found at this juncture.

SECRET

3. REPORTING CATEGORIES

a. Transportation:

A large percentage of Zipper reports cover military and civilian transportation. Zipper has been able to observe trains carrying troops and material to and from the Polish border, as well as shipments moving from one East German garrison to another. In most instances, train and shipment numbers, type of load and other details have been reported, along with periods of arrival and departure. Zipper reports on transportation range from general surveys to detailed descriptions, and include the contents of dispatch documents as well as the details of loading and unloading operations. Trains to and from fuel and ammunition depots have been given special attention. The value of this information for tactical and strategic estimates has been acknowledged by customer agencies.

b. Ground Force Information:

Zipper appears to have large-scale facilities for observing Soviet and East German ground force units and installations, and for exploiting sources of information on these subjects. Equipment and training procedures are regularly described in minute detail. Names and numbers found on personal letters, military documents or plain scraps of paper are exploited to identify units and personnel. In addition to the impressive number of detailed reports, Zipper produces as a combination of all individual efforts a monthly order-of-battle summary which has usually received highest praise from U.S. Army analysts. More significant developments are forwarded by wire, as are regular weekly order-of-battle summaries. Analysis of Soviet vehicle numbers are compiled from time to time by the Zipper organization.

c. Air Information:

Similar detailed reporting has been the rule for information of air interest, with sources largely similar to those of ground force information. More than sixty airfields, occupied, empty or under construction, but always of present or potential value to the Communist forces, are covered by Zipper informants. Active installations are surveyed regularly and often. Figures compiled on four typical airfields show the following:

Airfield	Time	Number of Reports
Brandenburg-Briest	17 July – 15 November 1954	7
Briesen	2 July – 22 November 1954	8
Finow	17 July – 6 November 1954	7
Neuruppin	4 July – 30 October 1954	6

Air information is also summarized in a weekly cable, with important developments wired individually. Reports obtained through liaison channels have often confirmed the accuracy of Zipper reports on air installations. In addition to its regular collection efforts, Zipper conducts technical

SECRET

coverage of Soviet air installations, thereby giving a day-by-day picture of the activities in the area of the 24th Air Army.

d. Naval Information:

The number of Naval reports, while so far below that of the others, appears to be increasing. Zipper sources manage to observe Soviet and East German vessels in Baltic ports as well as on the open sea, have seen and photographed ships and naval installations, and have in a number of cases reported naval exercises.

e. Technical Information:

Zipper has given special attention to the description of technical installations and equipment. Its radar and radio reports have been submitted in individual form and in the form of general surveys, and have been well received by technical analysts. Aircraft and other equipment have been described, photographed and sketched in detail. Not infrequently, Zipper sources have procured parts of Soviet equipment, valuable for technical research on Soviet weapons.

f. East German Military Information:

What has been said above about the collection of military information on Soviet forces in East Germany applies in most instances to intelligence on East Germany's own forces — the KVP (ground), the VdA (air) and the Sea Police. Zipper has had especially good access to KVP personnel, and has submitted East German order-of-battle data along with its general order-of-battle summaries.

SECRET

EVALUATIONS

4.

Army and Air evaluations have acknowledged the contribution of Zipper reports to the total of information on Soviet forces in East Germany and have repeatedly requested continuation of this coverage.

Evaluations are requested of the services for only a small representative proportion of Zipper reports issued to them. Of 57 reports on which evaluations were received in 1954, 11 were evaluated as A(Considerable Value), 37 as B(Of Value), 8 as C(Slight Value Only), and one as E(Already Sufficiently Known). The reliability and the value in terms of new information is attested by the fact that the content of 53 of the 57 reports was evaluated as 2 or 3 (probably or possibly true), while only one was considered doubtful and two as confirming information received previously by other sources.

Given below are excerpts of evaluations received from customer agencies:

CS-K-22413 (EGK-2633) Instruction Schedule for VPL Division in September 1953
Air Force, A-2

Information is of considerable value and probably ture. Other sources have confirmed the cessation of VPL jet training.

CS-K-23264 (EGK-2670) Tutow Airfield
Air Force, B-2

This is an excellent compilation of the intelligence data on this subject installation/activity and we concur in the conclusions made in the report.

CS-K-27660 (EGK-3418) Vietmannsdorf (Schorfheide) Airfield
Air Force, B-3

Certain parts of this report can be verified. It is believed that most of the other information is possibly true.

CS-K-28179 (EGK-3171) Possible Use of Blind Bombing Devices in Soviet IL-28 Aircraft
OSI, A-2

This information is of considerable value to OSI. The presentation of the evidence is logical and well verified by photographs and a number of observers.

CS-K-28333 (EGK-5465) AAA Units Assigned to the Soviet Air Force
Army, B-2

This analysis will be incorporated into our files for further study. Additional research and dissemination will be appreciated. This is the first report on subordination of AAA units.

CS-K-28465 (EGK-3421) Status of Airfields
Air Force, B-2

Information herein agrees very substantially with this headquarters. In Merseburg and [illegible] (Rothenburg) are carried at 8200' by this headquarters; in sub-par d, par 2, Schoenefeld is carried at 6600'. This would place each of the above one category higher than carried in CS-K-28456.

SECRET

CS-X-29633(EGK-3902) Army B-1, B-3 — Main Administration of the German Border Police

The information concerning training and target practise of the Border Patrol was useful.

CS-X-29638(EGK-3855) Air Force, A-2 — Soviet Activities in Werder

Data re airfield construction (and cancellations) checks rather closely with other reports. This type of material is very valuable. Some names mentioned are known to have been associated with airfield construction in the Sovzone.

CS-X-32262 (EGK-4063) Air Force, B-2 — Status of Twenty-Fourth Air Army

HQ USAF carries 64 airfields in East Germany. Referring to CS-X-28465 there appears to be one major airfield not carried by CIA, i.e., Parchim, a Class 1 airfield. The other discrepancies occur in comparatively minor airfields. Information on present construction agrees with other sources as does that on Schorfheide (Vietmannsdorf).

B-2 (Paragraphs 1-9) This office concurs in general with the AOB information contained in this document.

CS-X-32279(EGK-5064) Air Force, B-2 — Vietmannsdorf (Schorfheide) Airfield

This report is an excellent summary of the status of construction of the airfield at the time it was made. Some facts given can be checked against other information and appears to be substantially in agreement.

CS-X-37368(EGK-4656) Army, A-1, A-2 — The Order of Battle of Soviet Ground Forces

The source of this report continually provides high quality Order of Battle intelligence data. Continuing reports of this type are highly desirable.

CS-X-37402(EGK-4658) Air Force, B-2, B-3 — Schoenefeld Airfield

Details as given in paragraph 2 are very interesting and seldom obtained from reports of this nature...1...This report adds additional information with reference to the use of an outer and inner homing beacon for assistance to a pilot during an instrument approach.

CS-X-37421(EGK-4471) Air Force, B-3 — Radio and Radar Installations

This report is valuable in that it throws additional light on some operating factors.

CS-X-37677(EGK-4264) Army, B-2 — Identification of Soviet Vehicle Numbers

The content of report is of considerable value to the Order of Battle Desk. Further reports of this type would be appreciated.

CS-X-38266(EGK-4799) Air Force, B-3 — Possible Airfield Construction near Querfurt.

This is the only report of airport construction received at Querfurt. (Later confirmed).

CS-X-39331(EGK-4856) **Tutow Airfield**
Air, C-3

Report is probably accurate. Gap in runway is confirmed by other sources. Scheduled work on hardstands is interesting but more details on placement, size, etc., would add to value of report. Concur with field comment.

CS-X-40480(EGK-4854) **Order of Battle of Soviet Groundforces**
Army, B-2

Information concerning organizational changes and possible T/E changes in the Soviet units in Germany, reflecting the arrival of material from the USSR, is very useful and is greatly appreciated.

CS-X-43498(EGL-5114) **Status of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army as of 1 May 1954**
Air B-2

1. PARA 1-6. The air order of battle information of this report is generally accurate, and this is an excellent compilation. Thee value of the document will be chiefly as reference material in the future when the facts are needed for background information.

B-2

2. Information on increased motor vehicle equipment in 24th Air Army is of value. This data not previously noted. No additional comments on reason for increase.

C-2

3. Since the airfield information herein is a compilation and "re-hash" of reports already received by 203, it is of slight value. The information is generally true and confirmed by other reports or is probably true.

CS-X-43552(EGL-7000) **Soviet Troops at the Doellersheim Training Camp in Kaisersteinbruch**
Army B-3

No information is available to confirm or to refute the information contained in Paragraph 1. It is considered unlikely that KVP officers would be sent to Poland for training or to participate in maneuvers; they might go as observers for a short time.

Further information is desired concerning the rotation of officers to the Soviet Union for training, where they attend school, the types of courses taken, the prerequisites for selection to attend such school, the grades of the officers selected, and what their assignments will be upon their return to East Germany.

CS-X-45721(EGK-5819) **Radio and Radio Installations**
Air B-3

The information in this report is of distinct interest to this office.

SECRET

SECRET

5. REQUIREMENTS

It is significant that specific intelligence directives and requirements on critical or new Soviet military developments are constantly submitted to Zipper. These requirements are levied by the services in the field as well as by the interested agencies in Washington. The requirements of the latter are frequently channeled, for purposes of coordination, through other components of CIA (ORR, OCI, OSI).

The following are examples of military requirements, completed or still current, levied in the field:

USSR Army Food Requirements
Mine Detector for the KVP
Impulse Repeating Device for Missile Mounted Telemetry for Airplanes
Alleged Radar Installations in the Vicinity of Gotha
Unidentified Installation near Staaken
Coastal Defenses, Arkona Area
Alleged New Type AAA Gun Observed In Naumburg
Soviet Transport Number System
Air Ammunition Depots of the 24th Air Army
Questions on Oranienburg Airfield
MIG-Type Aircraft at Cottbus
Infra-Red Gunsights
USSR and Satellite Naval Ship Observations; Technical Details of Design.

Requirements, levied by Washington customers, which have been fully or partially answered or are still carried on our current files include the following:

Soviet 150 to 180 mm Guns
Atomic Warfare Pamphlets in the KVP
Soviet Twin-Jet Swept Wing Airplane
Soviet Atomic Maneuvers
Soviet Military Railroad Traffic on East German Railroad System
Soviet Flamethrower
IL-28 Aircraft
Information on Radar Sets Assigned to the 1st VPL Division
Equipment of Soviet Army in GOFG
New Russian Amphibious Vehicles
Possible Equipping of Soviet Troops with T-54 Tanks

Evidence of the effectiveness of Zipper operations was particularly shown in the servicing of the latter two requirements. Upon the successful completion of the requirement on amphibious vehicles, the following commendation was received:

"OCI wishes to commend allpersons in your Staff who participated in collecting intelligence concerning the sighting of an "amphibious tank" in East Germany during August 1954. The manner and speed with which additional intelligence information was supplied on this subject was outstanding. The resulting intelligence product is of considerable value to this Office and to Army in light of the rapidly changing military tactics and concepts to meet the threat of atomic weapons.

SECRET

It may be of interest to you to know that the content, except for location, of BGL-7902, dated September 1954, is very similar to a report received through British channels. The intelligence observer of the latter report was an officer of the British Army. Your report and the British report were given added stature by an Air sighting of the same amphibious vehicle. Consequently, the source of BGL-7902 is rated as very reliable in this particular case.

We would also like to call attention to the field comment on paragraph 2 of BGL-7902. This comment is very enlightening and appropriate and assisted greatly in the interpretation of the basic substance of the report.

The requirement on T-54 tanks which was levied on 16 December, had been satisfactorily answered by 20 December, in time for the Watch Committee conference on this topic on 21 December.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

31 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chief of Operations, Deputy Director/Plans

SUBJECT: East German Falsification Concerning Recent Activities of Mr. A. W. Dulles

1. Annexed is the text of an East German radio broadcast (Deutschlandsender station) of 18 May 1955.

2. The broadcast is worthy of note because a complete falsification is couched in reasonably objective terms and certain details are included which suggest to the average reader that the broadcast was based on factual information.

3. It is recalled that the recent East German publicity on the alleged roll-up of U. S. espionage efforts followed somewhat similar lines. We know from reports from Germany that the East German-sponsored spy publicity caused some nervousness and apprehension in the U. S.

4. This falsification concerning the physical presence and activities of Mr. Dulles could well be quoted as an example of Communist propaganda techniques in conversation with U. S. officials who appear to be over impressed with the danger that covert operations will provide substance for Soviet propaganda. The lesson of this case appears to be that the Soviets are perfectly capable of fabricating material implicating us in subversive activity whether or not any actual evidence of such activity exists. Their propaganda blasts are not necessarily tied in with any actual U. S. covert activities, nor would the cessation of such activities mean the end of Communist propaganda efforts.

/S/

John A. Bross
Chief, Eastern European Division

Attachment
Written by [redacted]
Distribution:
1 & 1 to Addressee
1 - Chief, PP
1 - Chief, FI
1 - C/PP/G ✓
1 - C/EE

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN DEUTSCHLANDSENDER IN GERMAN TO EAST AND WEST GERMANY MAY 18, 1955, 1800 GMT.

("FROM GERMANY -- FOR GERMANY": COMMENT ON GEHLEN ORGANIZATION)

(TEXT) THE BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE LOWER HOUSE, FROM MAY 1, HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION OFFICIALLY AS A GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION, OR TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY FUNDS. DEUTSCHLANDSENDER IS ABLE TO PUBLISH A NUMBER OF FACTS ON THIS MATTER WHICH COME FROM THE BLANK OFFICE.

AFTER THE REFUSAL OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEE, THE U. S. AUTHORITIES IN WEST GERMANY, AT THE REQUEST OF ADENAUER, IMMEDIATELY AGREED TO PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL 27 MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE THE GEHLEN ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION. THE MONEY HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT TO MUNICH, WHERE THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION IS LOCATED.

IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAVE LEARNED DETAILS ABOUT THE TALKS, WHICH WERE RECENTLY HELD BETWEEN U. S. ESPIONAGE AUTHORITIES, CHANCELLOR ADENAUER, AND STATE SECRETARY GLOBKE AT BUEHLERHOEHE. ALAN DULLES, HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION FBI (AS BROADCAST -- ED) DECLARED DURING THESE TALKS THAT A COMMISSION OF FBI EXPERTS WILL COME TO WEST GERMANY DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO INVESTIGATE IN DETAIL THE RELIABILITY OF THE STAFF OF THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UNISTED STATES AUTHORITIES.

DULLES HINTED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT WILLING TO ASSUME ANY KIND OF RISK WHEN SPENDING 27 MILLION DOLLARS PER ANNUM. THE COMMISSION HAS FULL POWERS AND IS ABLE TO ORDER DISMISSALS IMMEDIATELY. STATE SECRETARY GLOBKE WAS REQUESTED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FORTHE RECEPTION OF THE COMMISSION AND TO NAME A LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE COMMISSION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WE FURTHER LEARN THAT MINISTERIALDIRIGENT (GUNDOLF), HIMSELF FOR MANY YEARS ON THE STAFF OF THE FBI, HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE THE CHECK ON THE GEHLEN STAFF, ACTING UNDER THE COVER NAME WEBER. THE INVESTIGATION WILL BE CONCERNED WITH ALL MEMBERS OF THE STAFF WHO WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE NAZI PARTY, OF THE SS SECURITY SERVICE, OR OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE FASCIST HIGH COMMAND OF THE WEHRMACHT. (GUNDOLF) STATED IN A CONVERSATION WITH ADENAUER AND GLOBKE THAT AT LEAST 600 MEMBERS OF THE ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION ARE TO BE DISMISSED, SINCE IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD CARRY OUT ALL THE UNITED STATES ORDERS IN EVERY DETAIL.

ADENAUER HAS GIVEN HIS APPROVAL TO THIS PLAN AND HAS STATED THAT, AFTER THE INVESTIGATION, HE WILL INTEGRATE THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION INTO THE GOVERNMENT APPARATUS AS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT BRANCH EVEN WITHOUT THE(APPROVAL OF) THE LOWER HOUSE. IN A SECRET SERVICE INSTRUCTION, BEARING THE NUMBER 3,700/V, THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION WHO ARE TO BE DISMISSED HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
Rel GER



Kevin C. Ruffner compiled and edited this collection of documents and supporting material as a companion volume to *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, published in 1999 and subsequently declassified in 2002.

SECRET

COVER

AIR SECRET MGL-A-5904

~~KAPOK~~ ~~KAPOK~~

Chief, Foreign Division M 2 April 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

ZIPPER - Operational

SATURN Cover Designations and Identity Cards

REF: MGLA-5905 — file PROJ 145

1. After considerable discussion among the POB staff directing SATURN, it was decided that the ZIPPER SATURN operations could best be covered under the usual type military cover unit designation, due to the numerous advantages still to be gained by the use of this type cover. Such cover was needed to obtain operational housing where necessary. In addition, personal identity cards for strictly emergency use only were to be prepared for SATURN personnel. It should be emphasized that no actual SATURN agents or operators will receive such identity cards, however, or be connected in any way with an organized cover.

2. To implement this plan, POB requested and obtained EUCOM approval (see attached orders) of three cover units to cover SATURN activities as follows:

Unit Designation	Cover For
6211 Engineer Service Company	Munich Housing of SATURN Staff
6434 Signal Operations Company	Personal cover for SATURN recruiters and travelling staff members. Frankfurt House.
6440 Engineer Topographical Unit	Burial Teams.

3. Attempt was made, within the narrow scope provided by the EUCOM Station List, to select unit names identical with or similar to actual units, but also names to which suitable cover stories could be adapted. Thus, a member of the Signal Operations Company, who will carry radio equipment on occasion will also carry charts and graphs tending to prove that he is engaged in a radio field intensity survey (note text on reverse side of sample card). And a member of a burial team could, in case of emergency, "prove" that he is justifiably in possession of surveying equipment.

110 — as attachment filed under true name.

move to F&R

SECRET

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☑
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

4. At the same time, we have tried to influence the psychology of SATURN members who will hold identity cards for these units from the usual 'show your identity card at the least provocation' tendency to a 'show your official identity only as a last resort' basis. This idea has been enthusiastically accepted by the ZIPPER leaders of the SATURN effort as consistent with the high degree of security necessary in the whole undertaking. They have in turn promised to sell the idea to all staff members, particularly emphasizing that the identity card, to be sure, is insurance against unjust prosecution for acts done in the course of official duty, but that blowing of cover by production of the identity card automatically ends the usefulness of any given member to the operation.

5. In an attempt to convince the SATURN staff that we are serious about the 'new psychology' of identity cards, we have devised cards (samples attached) which are quite unlike any other ZIPPER identification, which are fairly official in appearance, and not likely to be passed off by other theater agencies as 'just another TIB effort". POB control of the cards (through the necessity of having them laminated) also conveniently results in our obtaining complete ZIPPER SATURN-staff OB, which is quite cheerfully handed over for this purpose, though refused as a matter of principle when demanded on any other basis.

5. We are attaching hereto in tabular form for the three SATURN cover designations, lists of cover names and descriptive data, together with copies of the reverse side of cards we have returned to ZIPPER SATURN staff to date. We have numbered both cover names and card copies clearly in ink. True names and photographs cross-referenced by the same number system follow in MGLA-5905. We shall forward additional data to complete the charts and photographs, when possible.

[ ]

DIST:
✓ 2 - FDM (w/attachment)
1 - COS
2 - File

SECRET

Heusinger

26 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: ZIPPER

The attached memorandum contains the results, as they are known to date, of High Commissioner McCloy's discussion of ZIPPER with Chancellor Adenauer, and also some reflections of Bonn thinking on ZIPPER as relayed to our representatives by General Heusinger.

W. G. WYMAN
Assistant Director
Special Operations

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

[illegible] GU

ZIPPER-BONN Relations

1. General Truscott, Gordon Stewart and our senior representative with ZIPPER met with High Commissioner McCloy and two of his assistants on 11 May 1951 to outline the planned discussion of ZIPPER between Mr. McCloy and Chancellor Adenauer. Our former position was modified somewhat, since it was the opinion of Mr. McCloy's advisors that the December Brussels agreement of the North Atlantic Council prohibited German military intelligence. Rather than attempting to arrange closer cooperation between ZIPPER and Bonn and a token of recognition from Bonn for ZIPPER, Mr. McCloy would restrict himself to suggesting that Adenauer point out to Gehlen that, although Bonn could have no military intelligence now, ZIPPER would be given full consideration when such an organization is permissible. General Truscott and Mr. McCloy also discussed the possibility of protesting, under the terms of the Brussels agreement, the existence of Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz' semi-official intelligence agency in Theodor Blank's office. It was decided that the case against Heinz would be too thin to press, and it was agreed that it would not be brought up.

2. On 17 May Mr. McCloy discussed ZIPPER with Adenauer briefly and according to plan. Herbert Blankenhorn, a German official charged by Adenauer with liaison between his Chancellory and the High Commissioner's office, was present. Mr. McCloy later told his Director of Intelligence, Benjamin Shute, that Adenauer was well informed and fully aware of the problem and that he had agreed to call in Gehlen for discussion.

3. Some additional indications of Bonn feeling on ZIPPER were passed along to our representative by General Heusinger on 22 May 1951. He said that on 10 May, in a meeting of the Allied-German Military Committee, General Hayes spelled out for the first time the specific Brussels prohibitions of a top German staff in the fields of planning, operations, and intelligence. The exchange of views on the definition of intelligence was inconclusive. General Heusinger added to our representative that Bonn still does not recognize the Brussels agreement and that the Germans would accept a prohibition on intelligence only if the French, Dutch, and other North Atlantic nations would likewise forego sovereign intelligence services.

4. Heusinger also said that on 18 May, at a large party at the home of General Jean Ganeval, he had been approached by one of Adenauer's associates who discussed the urgency of the German intelligence problem, inquired as to Heusinger's views on ZIPPER, and posed the problem of what to do about Heinz and his office. Unfortunately, Heusinger did not further identify this official, but it is believed to have been Herbert Blankenhorn, who was present at the McCloy-Adenauer discussion of ZIPPER. It is of interest to note—although it may not be significant—that Blankenhorn is generally believed to be extremely close to British intelligence.

[illegible]

5. One other indication of German political thinking which Heusinger passed on was a recent expression to him by Carlo Schmid of his dissatisfaction with the progress of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and his belief that ZIPPER should be taken over by the government in the near future. Schmid, as you will recall, is the number three man in the SPD.

Refs: MGKA-29312
PUIL 2177 (IN 42689)
PUIL 2184 (IN 43081)

https://web.archive.org/web/20170123111643/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/HEUSINGER%2C%20ADOLF_0035.pdf

Heusinger

26 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: ZIPPER

The attached memorandum contains the results, as they are known to date, of High Commissioner McCloy's discussion of ZIPPER with Chancellor Adenauer, and also some reflections of Bonn thinking on ZIPPER as relayed to our representatives by General Heusinger.

W. G. WYMAN
Assistant Director
Special Operations

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

[illegible] GU

ZIPPER-BONN Relations

1. General Truscott, Gordon Stewart and our senior representative with ZIPPER met with High Commissioner McCloy and two of his assistants on 11 May 1951 to outline the planned discussion of ZIPPER between Mr. McCloy and Chancellor Adenauer. Our former position was modified somewhat, since it was the opinion of Mr. McCloy's advisors that the December Brussels agreement of the North Atlantic Council prohibited German military intelligence. Rather than attempting to arrange closer cooperation between ZIPPER and Bonn and a token of recognition from Bonn for ZIPPER, Mr. McCloy would restrict himself to suggesting that Adenauer point out to Gehlen that, although Bonn could have no military intelligence now, ZIPPER would be given full consideration when such an organization is permissible. General Truscott and Mr. McCloy also discussed the possibility of protesting, under the terms of the Brussels agreement, the existence of Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz' semi-official intelligence agency in Theodor Blank's office. It was decided that the case against Heinz would be too thin to press, and it was agreed that it would not be brought up.

2. On 17 May Mr. McCloy discussed ZIPPER with Adenauer briefly and according to plan. Herbert Blankenhorn, a German official charged by Adenauer with liaison between his Chancellory and the High Commissioner's office, was present. Mr. McCloy later told his Director of Intelligence, Benjamin Shute, that Adenauer was well informed and fully aware of the problem and that he had agreed to call in Gehlen for discussion.

3. Some additional indications of Bonn feeling on ZIPPER were passed along to our representative by General Heusinger on 22 May 1951. He said that on 10 May, in a meeting of the Allied-German Military Committee, General Hayes spelled out for the first time the specific Brussels prohibitions of a top German staff in the fields of planning, operations, and intelligence. The exchange of views on the definition of intelligence was inconclusive. General Heusinger added to our representative that Bonn still does not recognize the Brussels agreement and that the Germans would accept a prohibition on intelligence only if the French, Dutch, and other North Atlantic nations would likewise forego sovereign intelligence services.

4. Heusinger also said that on 18 May, at a large party at the home of General Jean Ganeval, he had been approached by one of Adenauer's associates who discussed the urgency of the German intelligence problem, inquired as to Heusinger's views on ZIPPER, and posed the problem of what to do about Heinz and his office. Unfortunately, Heusinger did not further identify this official, but it is believed to have been Herbert Blankenhorn, who was present at the McCloy-Adenauer discussion of ZIPPER. It is of interest to note—although it may not be significant—that Blankenhorn is generally believed to be extremely close to British intelligence.

TOP SECRET

5. One other indication of German political thinking which Heusinger passed on was a recent expression to him by Carlo Schmid of his dissatisfaction with the progress of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and his belief that ZIPPER should be taken over by the government in the near future. Schmid, as you will recall, is the number three man in the SPD.

Refs: MGKA-29312
PULL 2177 (IN 42689)
PULL 2184 (IN 43081)

FORM NO. 35-5
DEC. 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Mast (alpha)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET PAGE NO.

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

FROM:	PULLACH	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	10 FEB 52
ACTION:	FDM (1-2-3)	IN 19764
INFORMATION:	IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), STC (8), S/C (9-10-11), DDP (12), FDS (13)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

PULL 3240

TO: WASHF, FRANF, VIENF, SALZF CITE: PULLF

1. ZIPPER HAS NOW RECEIVED REPORT BARON HEINRICH VON MAST INVOLVED WITH DR. WILHELM HOETTL.

2. LAST FOUR YEAR ZIPPER AGENT RUNNING AGENTS WHOSE TARGETS ILLEGAL KPOE AND KPOE IN URFAHR, SOVZONE. WE RECOMMENDED DROPPING AS FABRICATOR BUT ZIPPER HAS ASKED DETAILS. PLEASE PROVIDE SUMMARY EVIDENCE FABRICATION, POSSIBLE PASSING SOVIET DECEPTION AND BETRAYAL ZIPPER SECRETS.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 326-6-[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

TOR: 1603Z 10 FEB 52 **SECRET** COPY NO. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2007

I. 5c

Form No. 35-5
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

To:	PULLACH, FRANKFURT	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	13 FEB 52
Confirmation:	FDM (1-2)	OUT 56236
Information:	~~IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), STC (7), S/C (8-9-10)~~ DDP (11), FDS (12)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 27028

TO: PULLF INFO : FRANF CITE: WASHF

RE: PULL 3240 (IN 19764)

1. AUSTRIAN POLICE FAILURE VERIFY MAST'S ALLEGATIONS RE KPOE ORGANIZATION AND SABOTEURS INDICATES HE PEDDLING DUBIOUS INFO. SEE MASA 536.

2. INFORM ZIPPER AUSTRIAN POLICE PRESUMABLY AWARE HIS ZIPPER TIES SINCE MAST HAS BEEN UNPAID INFORMANT OF POLICE SINCE 1947.

3. ZIPPER SHOULD BE URGED DROP MAST BUT IN ANY EVENT ADVISE ZIPPER WE DO NOT WANT MAST REPORTS IN OUR CHANNELS.

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX 3
DATE JUL 17 1952

B. TWEEDY	SD	CIC WJ	D. HUEFNER
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS		AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOR0842Z 13 FEB 52

SECRET

COPY NO. 7

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

10—52325-2 GPO

19 February 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: EE/SO/[redacted]

FROM: EE/SO/C[redacted]

SUBJECT: Division Requirements for Stay-behind Burials

REF: OSO Notice No. 21-51

DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 27 MAY 1981 REVIEWER: 011322

1. Reference memorandum requests information on division requirements for stay-behind burial containers to include the number needed of each type and the items which will be packed inside. The dead line of 3 March 1952 has not permitted the desks to contact the field for their plans in this aspect of their operations. The requirements listed below for Berlin are felt to be complete. The others are most likely to be changed.

2. The following information has been made available:

A. Germany

i. Berlin Operations Base:

Containers:

54 EC-2 type (interior dimensions: 12" x 12" x 6")

Immediate needs: (1 July 1952) 26 EC-2 type (with same dimensions as described above)

Items:

Each container will include:

1. 3 Belgian automatic pistols, calibre 7.65 mm
2. 150 Rounds ammunition, calibre 7.65 mm
3. 1 Set pistol cleaning equipment
4. 6 Clips, Belgian automatic, 7.65 mm
5. 100 Coins, gold, Louis d'Or
6. 2 Hand grenades

ii. KIBITZ:

Containers:

50 EC-2 type (interior dimensions 12" x 12" x 6")

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

50 Zipper type (see paragraph 1(b) reference memorandum. Size as described.)

Immediate needs: (1 July 1952) 8 EC-2 type (as above)
8 Zipper type

Items:

Each container will include approximately the same items as the Berlin caches described above.

iii. ZIPPER:

Containers:

100 EC-2 type (interior dimensions will be forwarded as received)

6 Rolls (4-layer type US Army Ordnance; electric or heat sealed for wrapping purposes)

Items:

Each container will include approximately the same items as the Berlin caches described above with the addition of selected medical supplies.

B. Switzerland

Containers:

3 EC-2 type (suitable for RS-6 radio sets. This is an immediate requirement - 1 July 1952)

Items:

Only radio sets are to be cached by this station.

C. Austria

Containers:

10 EC-2 type (interior dimensions 12" x 12" x 8")

10 Zipper type (dimensions as given in reference memorandum, paragraph 1(b).)

Immediate needs: (1 July 1952) 3 EC-2 (as above)
3 Zipper type (as above)

Items:

Each container will include:

1. Small arms
2. Ammunition
3. Medical supplies
4. Gold coins
5. Barter items (watches, jewelry, etc.)

3. Total division needs are therefore:

a. Total number of containers for all projects:

EC-2 type: 217 [104 12" x 12" x 6"
100 varied
3 RS-6 type
10 12" x 12" x 8"]

Zipper type: 60

Other: 6 rolls (Ordnance wrapping paper)

b. Immediate needs (by 1 July 1952):

EC-2 type: 40 [34 12" x 12" x 6"
3 RS-6 type
3 12" x 12" x 8")

Zipper type: 11

Other: None

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Page No.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

From: PULLACH
To: OPERATIONS
Action: VIEN
Information: EE (1-6), RI (7-8), AD/SO (9), OPS (10), STC (11), S/S (12-13-14), SR (15-16), DDP (17)

12

ROUTINE
4 APR 52
IN 33098

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 80A AR-380-5

PULL 9435

TO: VIENF INFO: WASHF, FRAHF CITE: PULLF

RE: WASH 33606 (OUT 66062)

1. LUKATSCH CONTACT V-11213 ALLEGEDLY BROKEN. UNCLEAR.

2. HE NOW SUBMITTENG GARBAGE MATERIAL ZIPPER THROUGH JOSEF URBAN OF ZIPPER OP ROESSELSPRUNG.

3. WE POUCHING VIEN AND WASH ZIPPER STUDY WHOLE URBAN CASE WHICH EMBRACES MANY ASPECTS AUSTRIAN INTELLIGENCE PICTURE.

32 6 6 4/57
INTELLIGENCE
APR 24 1952
INTEGRATION DIVISION
ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX ✓

CHARGED FROM IP/FI

INDEX

TOR: 0605Z 5 APRIL 52

SECRET

Copy No. 5

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

AIR

SECRET

MGL-A- 12893

BERNAU dossier

Chief, EE

25 August 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

OPERATIONAL

ZIPPER Agents in Berlin

SECURITY INFORMATION

REF: MGQW-14487

1. We have several times asked 40 for further data on the SSD source without result, and we are currently trying again.

2. We agree with your assumption in ref para 2 that the persons mentioned in BONN-109 and MGBA-7084 may be identical with the ZIPPER agents of the same names, but we cannot make any positive statements on the matter and we doubt that ZIPPER is in any position to do so since it seems that they have probably given us most of the information that they have in their files on subjects and BONN-109 does not give any biographical data on subjects that could link them together. We appreciate your calling this matter to our attention since the research involved in clarifying it resulted in the discovery that V-4210 and V-6100 are identical. This person was dropped under the number V-6100 as reported in attachment to MGLA-12883. His true name was Helmuth ROSCH. cd/hms

3. There is no doubt that some leaders of the BAER group must be considered blown to the Berlin KRIPO, the VS and presumably the British and French in Berlin. The CARP report contained in MGFA-5945 is pretty good evidence of this. VS knowledge of the matter is indicated by the fact that a VS report sent to ZIPPER and attached to MGLA-12600 (att 217) is an exact German version of CARP's report. If KRICK is actually guilty as charged of having been an SSD agent, it must of course also be supposed that the unfriendly side is informed. ZIPPER is aware of this state of affairs and tolerates it because reports from the group are of value and would go elsewhere if the group were dropped, and also because there is no evidence to indicate that the ultimate sources are affected by the fact that BAER and his immediate subordinates are rather well known all around. As you will have noted in the Master List, BAER actually has a complete staff of 35 subordinates, 23 of which are agents in East Berlin or the Soviet Zone. We have not asked for a complete list of their identities, since this is not a normal request in connection with Soviet Zone operations. We have, however, requested that all security aspects of the BAER group's operations be reviewed in view of its obviously dubious status.

Original filed
Berlin dossier

Routed
G/VR
G/RE
RI/analysis
[illegible]

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MGL-A- 12893, 25 August 1952, Page 2.

4. There is no evidence whatever that BAER was actually connected with HERRLICH, though this was at one time suspected and followed down with negative results. The BAER group may have been known to HERRLICH and any of her contacts, (assuming she had some significance as an intelligence personality, an assumption which has never been proved to our knowledge) through KRICK, but again the exact nature of the KRICK HERRLICH relationship is also indefinite. In the meantime, we understand that KRICK is now being tried in a German court as an SSD agent. We were notified in advance of this trial and asked if we had objection. On condition that KRICK's former connection to the BAER group not be mentioned in the trial, we raised no objection to the trial.

DIST:
✓2 - EE
2 - COS
2 - Files

SECRET

Suspense 4 Jan

Recommended place out as note to D/COA. 29 Dec.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECURITY INFORMATION

Dec 25 13 56 '52

FROM: SPULL 4648

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN

ROUTINE

24 DEC 52

IN 11972

MSR

KIBITZ 15

RE DIR 30525, 32024

1. OPPOSE TRANSFER KIBITZ 15 NET IN PRESENT FORM TO ZIPPER THIS TIME FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. PERSONALITY AND AMBITIONS K-15 LIKELY MAKE HIM DIFFICULT CONTROL PROBLEM EVEN FOR ZIPPER.

B. UNSAVORY POLITICAL COMPLEXION K-15 AND COHORTS. INOPPORTUNE ADD THIS PROBLEM TO HOST OTHERS AFFECTING ZIPPER LEGALIZATION.

C. IF TRANSFERRED IN PRESENT RATHER DISORGANIZED FORM, ZIPPER IN POSITION GAIN INSIGHT INTO KUFIRE DOCTRINE, OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND KUBARK PERSONNEL WHICH EMBARRASSING AS WELL AS INSECURE.

D. K-15 AND ZIPPER CONCEPTS STAYBEHIND OPERATION DIFFER WIDELY. CONSIDERABLE OVERHAUL INCLUDING INDOCTRINATION K-15 AND RETRAINING SELECTED AGENTS REQUIRED TO BRING INTO LINE ZIPPER OPS.

E. SATURN STAFF LIMITATIONS MENTIONED PULL 4286.

2. FRAN FILES AND CONVERSATIONS STAFF PERSONNEL CONCERNED K-15 CAST DOUBT BASIC SOUNDNESS K-15 NET. NET WOULD APPEAR LOOSELY ORGANIZED, POORLY COMPARTMENTALIZED WHICH HAS GROWN BASIS AVAILABILITY AGENT RATHER THAN ACCESS TO WARTIME TARGETS. CRITERIA OF AGENT STAYABILITY AT LEAST QUESTIONABLE. HOWEVER PROPER EVALUATION DIFFICULT WITHOUT

HB
COM
GD

S-E-C-R-E-T

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☑
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SPULL 4648 PAGE TWO
IN 1972

THOROUGH INVESTIGATION BY QUALIFIED CASE OFFICER PREFERABLY NO PREVIOUS CONTACT K-15. THIS SUGGESTED MOST RECENTLY IN EGQW-1370 BUT NEVER IMPLEMENTED. ILLNESS OF [ ] HANDICAPS CONTINUATION IMPROVEMENT NOTED SINCE HE TOOK OVER AND LEAVES K-15 WITHOUT ATTENTION SENIOR CASE OFFICER.

3. DURING DISCUSSIONS COM-[ ] REQUESTED HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. RECOMMEND ONE OF FOLLOWING:

A. DISSOLUTION NET. THIS ADMITTEDLY PRESENTS KNOTTY DISPOSAL PROBLEM PARTICULARLY K-15 HIMSELF. HOWEVER GENEROUS TERMINATION SETTLEMENT MIGHT HELP PLACATE HIM. DOES ANY CHANNEL OTHER THAN ZIPPER EXIST ASSIST HIM REALIZING HIS AMBITION RETURN TO MILITARY CAREER IN NEW GERMAN ARMY? ZIPPER OR HEUSINGER MIGHT BE INDUCED ASSIST ALTHOUGH [ ] SKEPTICAL.

B. IMPLEMENT INVESTIGATION OF K-15 WITH SERVICES [ ] OR SIMILAR PERSON. FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIAL PRUNING AND REGROUPING JOB, COULD THEN CONSIDER TRANSFER TO ZIPPER. SHOULD THIS REDUCTION K-15'S ACTIVITIES AND AUTHORITY PROVE UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM, HE MAY ATTEMPT SELL NET TO ZIPPER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH BLANK OFFICE. IN SUCH CASE WE MUST BE PREPARED TAKE INITIATIVE INFORMING ZIPPER WE AWARE CASE AND DO NOT APPROVE THEIR PURCHASE.

4. STILL IN QUESTION IS EXTENT ZIPPER PENETRATION AND/OR KNOWLEDGE K-15 NET. WE TRACING LIST K-15 CONTACTS (EGQA-595) IN POB FILES. [

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECURITY INFORMATION

SPULL 4648 PAGE THREE

IN 1972

] ATTEMPTING DETERMINE K-15'S CONTACTS BLANK OFFICE. RECENTLY NOTED LETTER IN K-15'S FILES ADDRESSED GENERAL "H". (HEUSINGER?) ALSO SOLDATENSELBSTHILFEDIENST ANOTHER POSSIBILITY.

5. K-15 AS POSSIBLE AVENUE PENETRATION ZIPPER/SATURN NOT SUITABLE. AGENT LEVEL LIMITED VALUE IN THIS CASE.

AUTO RELAY TO DIR AS OUT NR 02626 TOR: 24/0838Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

**DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008**

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING
1 FI2
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

17 JAN 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 29334

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP PULLACH

PRIORITY

ACTION: EE 6

1419Z 17 JAN 53

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, DD/P-I&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

o Naumann, Dr. Werner

please file NAUMANN dossier

PULL 4755

TO: SFRAN SBONN INFO: DIR CITE: SPULL

1. UTILITY SENT HERDAHL TO [ ] 16 JAN WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

A. ARREST FORMER NAZIS BY BRITISH 15 JAN INVOLVED NO ZIPPER PERSONNEL.

B. UTILITY FEELS ACT WOULD DAMAGE PROSPECT RATIFICATION; HOWEVER, ADMITTED PRESS STATEMENTS THAT ADENAUER HAD BEEN BRIEFED AND DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED AT TOP LEVEL BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE INDICATED PRIOR COORDINATION WITH PERSONS OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY.

2. OFF THE RECORD HERDAHL STATED:

A. COLONEL HANS MARTIN, WARTIME OKW PROPAGANDA LIAISON OFFICER TO GOEBBELS MINISTRY, HAD ACTED AS ZIPPER AGENT KEEPING CONTACT THIS CIRCLE AS POSSIBLE CE TARGET.

B. UTILITY HAD SPECULATED THAT ARRESTS MAY ACTUALLY INVOLVE DIS/RIS OPERATION; THAT NAZI ASPECT ONLY ONE SIDE OF QUESTION.

C. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO UTILITY DISCUSSED CASE WITH GLOBKE WHO ADVISED ZIPPER DROP IN SPITE CE ANGLES. SUBSEQUENTLY SECRETARY ZIPPER STAFF MEMBER KNUTH DISPATCHED TO ADVISE MARTIN TO WITHDRAW.

D. UTILITY PRIVATELY EXPRESSED STRONG CRITICISM OF BRITISH FOR METHOD AND TIMING OF ARRESTS.

3. POB COMMENT: MANNER CONTACT SUGGESTS MARTIN SPECIAL CONNECTION; NOT AGENT. FOR TRACES MARTIN SEE VLASSOV BOOK. WE HAVE NOT YET EXPLORED WITH WORKING LEVEL ZIPPER STAFF BUT WILL DO SO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Copy [ ]

ABSTRACT ~~[ ]~~ INDEX (q.pha)

DATE 10 JAN 1956

(44)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

EASA-961 dated 13 March 1953

Contains copy of dispatch prepared by Salz and sent to G-2 Operations dated 13 March 1953. Dispatch based on preliminary interrogation of Wilhelm KRIECHBAUM, as reported in PULL 5095. Dispatch cleared by POB. Dispatch contains no information on KRIECHBAUM not included in PULL 5095.

VIEN 9793 (IN 11158) dated 30 March 1953

Willi HOETTL claims he discussed only URBAN, KRICHBAUM, OFCZAREK and CAMISE with Ponger. Also the feud between the CAPOTE group and Zipper. Agrees Ponger tried to get him a job with Zipper through KRICHBAUM, but states Ponger never tried to recruit, never showed pro-Communist leanings and never tried to debrief him on clandestine matters. HOETTL claims that he thought Ponger was either Israeli or Zipper contact, but not an active agent of any service.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2006

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

18 MAR 53

IN 47485

ROUTING
1 PPG
2 PPG
3 CHRONO
4 FI2-FI6
5 C/EE
6 COP
7
8

O: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROM: SR REP PULLACH

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1918Z 18 MAR 53

NFORMATION: DD/P, COP, DD/P-I&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

PULL 5233

TO: (PRIORITY) SBRLN INFO:(ROUTINE) SFRAN, DIR, CITE: SPULL

RE: SBRLN 8553 (IN 46900)

1. POB OF OPINION TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS INVOLVED:

A. EXTENT HOEHER KNOWLEDGE OF TPEMBER OBTAINED THROUGH CALES.

B. NATURE, EXTENT AND REASONS ZIPPER PENETRATION ATTEMPT ON TPEMBER THROUGH CALES, IF ANY.

2. RE QUESTION 1 A: INTERROGATION OF CALES MOST UNLIKELY RESULT IN RELIABLE INFO RE PRECISE EXTENT HOEHER INFORMED BY CALES ON TPEMBER AND BASIC ASSUMPTION MUST BE MADE HOEHER KNOWLEDGE IDENTICAL CALES KNOWLEDGE. IN VIEW SBRLN 8377 (IN 42572), THIS COULD NOT BE TOO DAMAGING. IN ANY EVENT USE OF DETAILED INFO REQUESTED REF IN INTERROGATION CALES COULD NOT BE EXPECTED ELICIT DESIRED ANSWER AND WOULD ONLY RESULT IN ZIPPER BEING INFORMED LATER BY CALES THAT DETAILED DATA ON ZIPPER STAFF PERSONNEL HAD BEEN GIVEN BY POB TO AIS UNIT UNKNOWN TO ZIPPER FOR USE IN INTERROGATION WHICH ZIPPER ALMOST CERTAIN TO CONSIDER UNJUSTIFIED. THIS WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO POB EFFORTS OBTAIN ZIPPER STAFF AND AGENT DATA.

~~36-6-33-788 and~~

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

(44)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

3. ASIDE FROM CALES HIMSELF, V-2668, HOEHER CASE OFFICER WHO ALSO KNOWS CALES PERSONALLY AND USED HOEHER AS CUTOUT TO CALES, IS KEY TO QUESTION "A". POB INSISTING ZIPPER OBTAIN FROM V-2668 COMPLETE STATEMENT ON PROBABLE EXTENT HOEHER KNOWLEDGE TPEMBER, BUT MUST POINT OUT THAT EVEN ASSUMING ANSWER MAY BE ENTIRELY HONEST, WE CANNOT EXPECT IT TO BE MORE THAN AN ESTIMATE.

4. BELIEVE HOEHER CASE SHOULD NOT BE USED AS PRETEXT OBTAIN ANSWER TO QUESTION 1B ABOVE. ZIPPER HAS SPECIFICALLY DENIED THAT TPEMBER WAS GIVEN CALES AS TARGET. V-2668 CLAIMS CALES WAS EXTREMELY WORRIED THAT TROUBLES WITH [ ] WOULD GO DOWN AS DEROGATORY INFO IN CALES RECORD, AND FOR THIS REASON V-2668 INSTRUCTED CALES PUT HIS ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP TPEMBER DOWN ON PAPER IN MEMO FOR RECORD. THOUGH WE DO NOT NECESSARILY BELIEVE THIS STORY, NATURE OF REPORT (ATT TO EGBA-3356 17 March [ ]) TENDS CONFIRM. AT ANY RATE, IF ZIPPER WAS ATTEMPTING PENETRATE TPEMBER THROUGH CALES IT DOES NOT SEEM REALISTIC TO EXPECT ZIPPER TO CONFESS TO US DETAILS OF SUCH AN UNFRIENDLY PROJECT.

5. PLEASE KEEP IN MIND POINT THAT SINCE CALES IS A ZIPPER AGENT, ZIPPER WILL CONSIDER ANY INTERROGATIONS OBVIOUSLY DONE BY AIS AND DIRECTED TOWARD CLARIFYING CALES HANDLING AGENTS, BRIEFS AND TARGETS AS AIS EFFORT PENETRATE ZIPPER OPERATIONS.

[ ]

~~32-6-33-788 and~~

THEREFORE ANY INTERROGATION SHOULD BE DONE UNDER COVER PUBLIC SAFETY OR CID EFFORTS SOLVE HOGHER CASE. POB MUST BE IN POSITION DENY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE U.S. AUTHORITIES INTENT INTERROGATE CALES.

END OF MESSAGE

32-6-33-78 encl

AIR

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION

EGLA-3378

23 APR. 1953

UJ Drollery Master List

Chief, EE

Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: COM

Operational/ZIPPER/CART

UJ-DROLLERY General

Ref: MGLA-10483 and EGQW-3931

The following cases have been dropped by Zipper for the reasons indicated:

1. UJ-DROLLERY #4: Failure on the part of the Soviet IS to establish contact with the DA since 1 July 1952. In any event, the DA was not properly amenable to control.

2. UJ-DROLLERY #5: Dropped because progress could not be made in establishing contact with the Soviet IS courier nor in identifying nor locating her contacts in western Germany. According to Zipper, the case was given over to the BfV. Actually there is no evidence that the BfV has done anything about it. MOB has taken up the contact as Case [ ]

3. UJ-DROLLERY #8: The principals were arrested by the British in April 1952, and the case was turned over to the BfV. Trial by German authorities is expected in the near future. Reports of interrogations by the British were either not furnished or were very meager. Likewise, Zipper states that it has obtained virtually no information from the BfV on this case.

4. UJ-DROLLERY #10: Dropped because of the arrest on 1 September 1952 of TONNE by eastern authorities and sentenced to four years imprisonment.

5. UJ-DROLLERY #12: Dropped because the principal turned out to be a fraud -- wanted on criminal charges by the German police. The extent of his contact with the Soviet IS in Turkey and the Near East, if any, if still unclarified. Zipper is attempting to have this cleared up by the LfV Bavaria, with which it has good working relations.

routed
MG
EE/CE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Dist:
~~3~~ - EE
3 - COM

one copy cut up and filed in respective dossiers

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY

22 April 1953

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☑
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

COPY

32-6-11-/328

6. UJ-DROLLERY #103: The case ceased when the source apparently was arrested by eastern German authorities in January 1952.

7. UJ-DROLLERY #109: V-13099 was dropped because the pressure of other activities did not permit continuation of his work for Zipper. From the leads supplied by him, however, Zipper evolved to off-shoot cases which are still going: UJ-DROLLERY #109-A (TRAUUNG I) and UJ-DROLLERY #109-B (TRAUUNG II).

8. UJ-DROLLERY #110: Dropped to avoid crossing lines with the BfV.

9. UJ-DROLLERY #111: Dropped to avoid crossing lines with the BfV.

10. UJ-DROLLERY #375: Dropped because of difficulties in control of V-3090 and the transfer of "Alexander" from Munich. UJ-DROLLERY #378 was considered more promising.

11. UJ-DROLLERY #500: Dropped because of the seeming cessation of clandestine border-crossing activities on the part of the penetrated illegal border-crossing organization which followed the presumed arrest of V-2736, a companion Zipper penetration.

12. UJ-DROLLERY #501: Dropped when V-2736 disappeared in the DDR in April 1952; presumed arrested by eastern authorities.

13. UJ-DROLLERY #504: The remarks pertaining to UJ-DROLLERY #500 are applicable to this case.

14. UJ-DROLLERY# 505-B: Dropped as of 31 March 1953 because the source was not able to furnish leads for eastern operations.

15. UJ-DROLLERY #703: V-883.1's reports were considered useful for comparison with UJ-DROLLERY #704 which was considered to give better coverage of the target. In view of this and the generally low-level of the information obtained, the case, as a CI case, was dropped, and the source returned to positive intelligence work.

16. UJ-DROLLERY #704: V-2998, formerly V-2996/KNAPPE, disappeared in East Berlin in April 1952 and is presumed to have been arrested by eastern authorities.

32-6-11-1328

17. UJ-DROLLERY #1004: Source, V-2997, ceased reporting as an outgrowth of the V-2996 flap.

18. UJ-DROLLERY #1200: V-3016/BLAU was dropped 29 February 1952 because it was impossible to convert him from an unwitting informant to a witting agent. Efforts to recruit him failed; nor was it possible to determine the identity of his sub-sources.

19. UJ-DROLLERY #1210: The case, as such, was dropped by GV G, and V-4190.4 was transferred from GV G to GV B and redesignated V-12858. GV B has now dropped the case as such; although it retains the possibility of affecting occasional contact.

Approved by:

32-6-11-1328

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

EYES ALONE

Proposed UJDREADFUL Solution

RE: M/R 18 June 1953 on UJDREADFUL meeting

1. Although, as [ ] says, his attached comments contain nothing new, they do in [ ] opinion suggest clearly the most logical basic solution of the case. The solution proposed below is predicated upon the fact that Subject's statements to [ ] are consistent with his relationship with [ ], and represent as clear a bid for AIS employment outside ZIPPER as Subject could possibly be expected to make.

2. Based upon the above, the following proposed solution of the case is presented:

a. On the assumption that ZIPPER's forthcoming proposals are likely to be indecisive or otherwise unacceptible, we should plan to raise legitimate and forceful objections and propose solution via an interrogation and second LCFLUTTER under American auspices (since ZIPPER unfortunately has no such facility),"to save ZIPPER the embarrassment".

b. After ZIPPER has agreed to the test entirely under AIS auspices, [ ] should approach UJDREADFUL perhaps after one or two more meetings and should indicate that since UJD is going to leave ZIPPER anyway, perhaps we could be of assistance in his emigration and possibly even later in his employment by AIS. We should flatter UJD and play upon his considerable egotism. After he has expressed interest, he should then be informed that there is only one hitch,--that although we are very interested in obtaining his services, the puzzling and troublesome matter of the previous test results must be cleared up entirely, and that our very strict security regulations positively prohibit assisting or employing him until he is entirely clear. Therefore he must submit to interrogation and LCFLUTTER. (Incidentally, in order to get ZIPPER to accept this solution, we might well use ZIPPER members for certain phases of the interrogation only.)

c. ZIPPER would not be told about the exact nature of our approach in (b) above in order not to disturb possible later UJDRAGNET chances. If at a later date they should discover this pitch through UJD or otherwise, we would inform them that it is quite definite that our security regulations make KUBARK employment of such a person entirely out of the question and that the particular approach was merely made in this guise as a psychological trick to get UJD to submit completely.

d. Should the interrogation and LCFLUTTER result in actual admissions of current or past contact with the enemy intelligence, the possibility of an interesting double agent case would exist.

e. If it should be possible to clear UJD conclusively, the prospects of UJDRAGNET use could be seriously considered. It is felt that POB admission of error on the original LCFLUTTER would

[ ]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

cause ZIPPER to consider UJD completely cleared. Their reaction might even go so far as to incline them to some form of restitution such as transfer, on UJD application, to a more desirable position, though this is probably wishful thinking.

f. Should results be still doubtful, it would simply be necessary to insist that ZIPPER terminate UJD and proceed to drop or reorganize his organization. Fortunately, neither ZIPPER nor UJD would be in any position to refute our conclusions based upon LCFLUTTER effectively, so that regardless of the actual outcome, we would have a free field to construct ostensible results to fit our desired course of action.

3. If the above solution were adopted, it is clear that the crucial point would be prior arrangements of effective physical facilities and personnel for the necessary interrogations and LCFLUTTERs. Holding would be possible at ECIC. UJD could probably be convinced that the procedure is sufficiently important to his future that he should take leave of absence (which the organization would undoubtedly grant) in order to clear up the whole problem.

4. The obvious disadvantage of having POB involved in a potential major UJDRAGNET operation must be considered. In order to obtain the advantage of non-attributability, it might be advisable to arrange for the approach to UJD to be via a third party (perhaps on the recommendation of ⊏ ⊐. However, this course has the disadvantages of loss of POB control, loss of the personal relationship factor which is likely to obtain UJD cooperation, in return for an extremely thin and dubious non-attributability factor. In addition, experience indicates that suitable personnel for such projects are exceedingly difficult to find when needed. Undersigned believes the device provided in para 2 c. above would be preferable, and equally effective.

⊏ ⊐

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

6 July 1953

SUBJECT: Discussion with Blank and Heusinger on the Evening of 3 July 1953

1. Blank and Heusinger had dinner with me on the evening of 3 July, a dinner attended by [redacted] of POB and [redacted] of CCI. After the usual pleasantries and a rather heated discussion on the implications of the disturbances in the Eastern Zone of Germany and on the desirability of Four-Power negotiations on the unification of Germany, we came to the purpose of the evening: the discussion of a future German intelligence service and Blank's objections to ZIPPER. During the entire conversation and the entire evening it was apparent that both Blank and Heusinger work closely together in the greatest of confidence and that Heusinger shared Blank's opinions on the subjects discussed. It is noteworthy that whereas Blank was extremely shy and nervous during the conversation with the Director earlier on 3 July and started being shy and nervous at the beginning of the evening, as the discussion developed he gained self-assurance and by the end of the evening he was self-confident, expressed himself well and was altogether master of the situation. It is also noteworthy that it is [redacted] and my opinion that Blank and Heusinger dealt with us completely honestly on the subject and that good rapport was established. The main conversation was carried by me [redacted] being largely instrumental in creating a favorable atmosphere prior to discussion of the problems.

2. I started the discussion by referring to the Director's conversation earlier on 3 July on the subject of a national intelligence service and how it fitted into the nation as a whole. I again described the separation of procurement from evaluation, the relationship of the Director of CIA to the IAC agencies and his position within the Government. Going further, I also emphasized the importance we attach to the complete separation of an external intelligence agency from an internal security service as well as the importance of an external intelligence service being completely non-political and entirely professional.

3. Both Blank and Heusinger showed great interest in our concept of an intelligence service especially as far as the requirement picture is concerned and especially in the evaluation part of a service. They also asked intelligent questions

about the function of G-2, its limitation to certain types of operations, its dependence for finished product on this Agency as well as the possibility of its procuring raw take in certain cases. After an extensive discussion on organisation and the principles involved, I opened the question of a German intelligence service and the great worry to us of Blank's intention of splitting up ZIPPER into different ministries. Blank, by that time complete master of his own thoughts, talked for about fifteen minutes on ZIPPER, his position towards ZIPPER and his ideas as far as the intelligence service is concerned. He started out by stating that he was greatly impressed by my expose of the functions of CIA, its position within the state, its relationship to different intelligence agencies and other departments and the relationship of its chief to the President and other members of the Government. He said that there were a number of ideas in my expose which had escaped him so far and which he thought were definitely adaptable to the German scene. He felt, however, that with the German weakness towards totalitarian solutions many safeguards were necessary in Germany which were not really necessary in the U. S.

4. He then went on to point out his main reservations about ZIPPER. He started out by stating flatly that whereas he might have been represented in the past as opposing ZIPPER, this was not according to facts. His objections to ZIPPER were the following:

a. Blank, himself, is at present entrusted with planning for a future German armed service. Heusinger, who is charged with the detailed planning rather than the policy aspects, must be able to work out organisational charts, equipment tables, and develop basic philosophies of warfare, both defensive and offensive, which, without detailed intelligence on the potential of the enemy, is a planning exercise in a vacumn. Blank has never received from ZIPPER the intelligence necessary to do this job. Because he has not received such intelligence, he was forced to start his own intelligence service, an intelligence service with meager means able to do part of the job but definitely not able to arrive at the same solutions which a large and wealthy organisation like ZIPPER can. Blank was very bitter on the subject. He said that the briefings of the Chancellor were usually oral and were one of many other briefings on different subjectw which, of course, the Chancellor listened to but would be in no position to pass on to people who needed such briefings and needed them in writing in order to attend to their business. Blank said that as long as ZIPPER was in no position to provide him with intelligence, it would be necessary for him to build up his own intelligence service and it would also be necessary for his office to operate in a virtual vacumn. He claimed that his security and the security of his office was extremely good and that in over two years of operation there has not been one security incident. He felt that intelligence ought to be passed to him by ZIPPER, such intelligence to be used by his planning staff as considered necessary and such intelligence furthermore being used by him to brief both the Chancellor and the head of the opposition, sho, after all, had been completely bipartisan on the question of his office and was entitled to the same briefing the Chancellor received.

b. The second reservation that Blank raised as far as ZIPPER is concerned is ZIPPER's meddling in internal German affairs. He stated that a country like Germany, with its propensities towards subversion by a small organized group of largely disorganised groups, could not afford to create a system of informants and stool pigeons on its own soil. He stated that no chancellor could ever afford to have an intelligence service that was under suspicion of being involved in politics, of gathering information on leading politicians and generally subverting individuals within the state for their own political ends. He stated that ZIPPER was doing this and that until it was established that ZIPPER would not do this, it would not be acceptable to any chancellor or to any part of the government. (Comment: Blank, no doubt, referred to ZIPPER's special contacts and possibly even to ZIPPER's CE show.)

c. Blank next stated that an external intelligence service, as it is in the U.S., must be completely separated from an internal security service and must not be under any suspicion of having an illegal internal security apparatus.

d. Blank next stated that his objections to ZIPPER were also somewhat personal, since ZIPPER, for the last two years, has tried to discredit a loyal member of his own agency and his co-worker by falsified information, by whispering campaigns and by political pressure. He no doubt referred here to Heinz, the head of Blank's intelligence service. Blank stated that he will protect the people under him and he will not succumb to pressure of any kind to get rid of people who have been loyal and have done a good job for him.

5. Blank concluded that he had a very high opinion of ZIPPER itself, of the specialists there and he fully realized that Germany could not afford to lose such qualified personnel and

definitely counted heavily on them. He also understood our anxiety to preserve the agency as a whole and saw the logic in this. Nevertheless, the reservations mentioned above were ones which had to be dealt with before any thought could be given to ZIPPER becoming a part of the government. Quite obviously at this point these discussions were somewhat unrealistic, since ZIPPER could not become part of the government before ratification of EDC and the contractuals, but that immediately after such ratification quite obviously the budget of the military establishment would provide enough loopholes to permit the financing of such an agency as ZIPPER.

6. The rest of the evening was spent discussing problems concerning rights and customs of soldiers in the U.S. Army to specific questions posed by Blank and Heusinger. The evening ended on a very cordial note by Blank and Heusinger requesting my wife and I to help them buy something for their families prior to leaving for Germany.

7. I will meet with Blank and Heusinger on Saturday, 11 July, socially, at which time I will give them details on the meeting with the Director.

[ ]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VIA: ____________________
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. EGLA 5203

SECRET
Security Information

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-12

Date ____________________

To : Chief, EE
(Attn: [redacted])

INFO: COM (Attn: [redacted])

From : Chief of Base, Pullach

Subject: general— OPERATIONAL/ZIPPER/CART
specific— UJDREADFUL

1. [redacted] and I discussed this case in May 1953 in Washington and agreed that it should be brought to a conclusion. Further, [redacted] gave the opinion that the LCFLUTTER graphs on Subject's interrogation were very convincing...in spite of a lack of any confirmatory evidence. However, the results could not be convicting unless UJDREDFUL could be reinterrogated, confronted with the results of his previous LCFLUTTER rerun and interrogated further.

2. ZIPPER is footdragging. It is perfectly clear that they want us to leave this case in their hands. Perhaps half a dozen conversations between POB and the top-level of ZIPPER (i.e., UTILITY, MERKER and SHACK) have produced nothing. We are now at a definite impasse.

3. In the meantime, UJDREADFUL has attempted to strike up an independent personal relationship with his POB case officer, [redacted]. UJDREADFUL has offered [redacted] material and CE leads that he claims he will not give to ZIPPER; he has indicated an interest in emigrating...to the USA if possible; he has stated that he and ZIPPER have little in common and he cannot see a long-range future with ZIPPER.

4. This is the way the case stands as of today. An independent POB approach to UJDREADFUL would cause a POB/ZIPPER flap, if discovered. POB insistence on an immediate ZIPPER solution is probably going to produce considerable friction, an irritant that would be most unwelcome in current POB/ZIPPER relationships. Are COM and Washington in agreement that, regardless of the consequences, we must clear up the case? If so, how? ZIPPER is taking the simple position that LCFLUTTER is the sole evidence and LCFLUTTER is not enough. In a memorandum to us last month they glibly wrote off the whole case as settled "now that LCFLUTTER has been found unreliable and rulled out by UTILITY."

5. POB can suggest no decisive course of action at this time. We could, of course, call for a showdown with ZIPPER; demand that POB and ZIPPER sit down

DISTRIBUTION
3 EE
3 COM

2 ccs destroyed

25 Aug 53

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. MAR 1949 51-28A

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

together with UJDREADFUL and present the evidence. ZIPPER might accept this solution as an effective way to clear UJDREADFUL, however, they will most likely oppose this extent of American intervention in the case and might even be willing to suggest dissolution of CSW as an alternative. More likely, ZIPPER would decline American participation but agree to confront UJDREADFUL and thereby end the matter by the resultant denial on his part. In any event, the case would not be solved, though if CSW were actually liquidated, the immediate security problem of UJDREADFUL's membership in ZIPPER would no longer exist.

6. Realizing its limitations, POB makes the following proposal:

a. We will move gradually towards a showdown with ZIPPER, insisting that ZIPPER take the matter seriously and investigate all possible leads as quickly as possible, in the meantime isolating CSW operations and observing them carefully.

b. At the same time ⊏ ⊐ will draw UJDREADFUL out and appear receptive to discussions on emigration problems. If UJDREADFUL takes the bait and appears really to be serious, ⊏ ⊐ could offer to assist in whatever way possible but at the same time suggest that UFDREADFUL inform ZIPPER of his interest in emigrating. This would increase US equity in a completely aboveboard manner and eliminate ZIPPER's basis for objecting to direct US participation. We would then be in a strong position, both vis-a-vis ZIPPER and vis-a-vis UJDREADFUL to accomplish direct interrogation and additional LCFLUTTERing. Of course the security ramifications of talks directed towards UJDREADFUL emigration to the USA must be carefully considered; however, we believe that actual emigration could be arbitrarily prevented even at the last minute if necessary.

7. We believe the course of action outlined in para 6 might prevent a POB/ZIPPER clash, and provide the pretext for effective interrogation and LCFLUTTER of UJDREADFUL together with a certain amount of pressure on UJDREADFUL which might contribute to the success of these steps.

8. Please let us have your comments soonest.

⊏ ⊐

15 September 1953
Heusinger - 201
orig. ~~West Ger 1 S~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: General Adolf Heusinger's Pre-election Comments on Zipper's Future in the Federal Republic

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

The following are highlights of General Adolf Heusinger's pre-election remarks as reported in EGLA-5241 and EGLA-5291 (attached):

a. Legalization of Zipper: General Heusinger does not share General Gehlen's view that the U. S. label on Zipper is the major deterrent to Zipper's legalization. Heusinger stated definitively that "at no time" has he heard that U. S. trusteeship of Zipper has impaired the organization's future in the Federal Republic. In fact, Heusinger said that U. S. influence in Zipper has been accepted as a logical result of Zipper's U. S. subsidy and the dominant role of the U. S. in Europe.

Heusinger regards Gehlen's preoccupation with a reduction of the CIA staff with Zipper and elimination of the opposite numbers system, i.e. working level liaison, as a product of Gehlen's consuming desire to curtail CIA operational insight to his modus operanda and intelligence assets. Heusinger remarked that Gehlen has been obsessed with this desire "for a long time."

Immediately following a two hour conference with Gehlen on 29 August, Heusinger advised that both he and Gehlen agree that Zipper's legalization can be effected prior to ratification of the Contractual Agreements provided that the U. S. concurs and is prepared to bring pressure to bear upon the British and French.

b. General Gehlen: Heusinger rejected the suggestion that Gehlen be replaced as Zipper chief on the grounds that Gehlen not only enjoys the confidence of Chancellor Adenauer and Dr. Hans Globke but also the loyalty of the rank and file of Zipper. Furthermore, Heusinger does not think that General Horst von Mellenthin, Gehlen's deputy, could hold the organization together as a centralized GIS. Sooner or later the various components of Zipper would be dispersed throughout the Federal Republic.

Heusinger attributes recent criticism of Gehlen's meddling in internal West German affairs to fear founded on rumors regarding Zipper's domestic informants in the "Special Connections" field. Heusinger believes Gehlen can dispell these rumors, which prevail in SPD circles, by establishing better rapport with the SPD leaders. Heusinger conceded Gehlen's need for "Special Connections". It should be noted, however, that only a week or so before Heusinger deplored Gehlen's involvement in West German politics and, on this occasion, said he would again urge Gehlen to abandon his "Special Connections". He also remarked that he had never seen an intelligence report credited to Zipper's "Special Connections".

c. Blank Office: Heusinger again reported that Theodor Blank and the German Defense Planning Group are not discussing the future of German intelligence until Chancellor Adenauer has announced his final decision regarding the establishment of a centralized GIS. Blank has told Heusinger that if the Chancellor establishes a GIS the future Defense Ministry will set up its own small evaluation staff to receive the GIS information reports. If, however, the Chancellor does not establish a GIS then the Defense Ministry will have its own collection group.

Heusinger said that after studying the report on the recent investigation of Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, controversial chief of a G-2 nucleus, he had recommended the latter's dismissal to Blank. Heusinger said he intends to check on Heinz' status early in September 1953.

PETER SICHEL
EE/FI

EE/FIG/Z/[ ]:bw
15 September 1953

Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - EE/FI
2 - EE/FIG/Z

FORM NO. 35—83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 SEP 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 22307

ROUTING
1 E/G
2 E/2
3 [illegible]
4
5 COE
6 OFI
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP PULLACH

SEP 29 1953

HOD

ROUTINE

1906Z 29 SEP 53

ACTION: EE

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

PULL 6477

TO: SBRLN INFO: SFRAN, SBONN, DIR CITE: SPULL

RE: EGBA 6431
Camlet - 2

1. CAMLET-2 VERSION MEETING DESCRIBED REF REACHED ZIPPER HQTRS. ZIPPER CONSIDERABLY PERTURBED AND ON BASIS THIS REPORT HAVE IMPRESSION ⊏ ⊐ ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL CAMLET-2.

2. ZIPPER "CONCERNED LEST ⊏ ⊐ ATTEMPT INDEPENDENT APPROACH SOURCE FRIEDL REPORT AND SPOIL OPERATION". IN EVENT SUCH ACTION CONTEMPLATED REQUEST IT NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION POB.

3. FURTHER REQUEST ISSUE HIS CONNECTIONS WITH ZIPPER NOT BE REOPENED WITH CAMLET-2.

✓ 4. ⊏ ⊐ WILL DISCUSS CASE WITH ⊏ ⊐ FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

END OF MESSAGE

FRAN SIG CEN NOTE: DATE THIS MSG 25 SEPT 53.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

GPO 16—68202-1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGL-A-6028

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

23 OCT 1953

TO : Chief, EE

DATE:

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/ZIPPER

SPECIFIC— Subject of Reference

REF: EGL-A-6027

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Reference gives personality data as known to ZIPPER on former and current members of the Hungarian Trade Delegation which periodically comes to West Germany to conclude trade agreements. ZIPPER (GV G) believes intelligence opportunities are offered by this delegation, and is maintaining contact with the delegation through V-9134,2 (identified in EGLA-6025), whose firm does business with the group. The specific operation currently planned involves the recruitment of Subject of para. 3 of reference, and has been assigned the ZIPPER cryptonym "HENNE".

2. ZIPPER supplies the following information about subjects of reference:

a. Subject of para. 1 of reference was chief of the Hungarian trade delegation until (ZIPPER says) end of June 1953. He was a competent businessman, but was regarded by the Hungarians as politically unreliable, because he allegedly refused to join the Communist Party. V-9134,2 held discussions with him about the possibility of his defecting to the west, but Subject of para. 1 was ordered to return home before any plans could be firmly established. Subject of para. 1 was told that he was to return to Hungary to take over the post of General Director of the firm TECHNO-IMPORT, but when he returned to Hungary, was actually given the post of deputy Section Chief, and is no longer permitted to leave Hungary.

b. Subject of para. 2 of reference appeared as successor to Subject of para. 1, representing the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade. V-9134,2 learned various things about Subject of para. 2 from other members of the delegation over the summer, pointing strongly to the conclusion that he was a sort of "political commissar" of the group. Subject of para. 2 allegedly has no business experience. He allegedly has no areas of business activity within the firm TERIMPEX of which he was representative. He reportedly demanded, during a meeting in BUDAPEST of all Hungarian trade representatives making trips to the West, that each give his impressions of West Germany. Members of the delegation subordinate to Subject of para. 2

Dist:
3 - EE (DIRECT)
3 - COM
1 - VIEN (DIRECT), w/att.

22 Oct 1953

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

INDEX

28 OCT. '53

~~32-1-9-194~~

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

immediately recognized his intentions, and gave negative reports, but members of some other delegations reported positively on West Germany whereupon they were relieved of their duties and of their passports, and may no longer leave Hungary. On the basis of these reports, V-9134,2 resolved to prevent Subject's return to West Germany. He therefore informed the German Federal Trade Ministry of the probable true character of Subject's mission to West Germany, with the result that Subject's request for a visa was refused. A second application was likewise refused. V-9134,2 was thereupon requested by representatives of the permanent Hungarian Mission in FRANKFURT to intercede with German Government officials on behalf of Subject. V-9134,2 thereupon wrote a letter recommending Subject, which he gave to the Hungarian Mission, but then immediately verbally informed the Federal Trade Ministry to ignore the letter when it reached them. The third request for visa for Subject was again rejected by the Germans, but V-9134,2's role in this has (he believes) been fully concealed from the Hungarians.

c. Subject of para. 3 of reference is the target personality of ZIPPER's Operation "HENNE". He was deputy to Subject of para. 2 of reference, but most recently has appeared as chief of the delegation, since subject of para. 2 cannot enter Germany. Subject of para 3 has appeared as chief three times, and V-9134,2 believes he will continue to fulfill this function in the future. V-9134,2, after three months' association with Subject of para. 3, believes he can be approached. He allegedly is not a party member, and is something of a gay blade while in West Germany. He drives an American car of the Hungarian Mission, and enjoys a close association with a German girl employed as barmaid in the "Ellis-Elliot" (ZIPPER questions whether this name is correct) bar in FRANKFURT, which bar is almost exclusively patronized by Americans. Subject has also accepted valuable gifts from V-9134,2 each time he has returned to Hungary, including nylon stockings, underclothing, gold fountain pens, and suiting materials worth about 1000 DM. V-9134,2 believes Subject could be a valuable source of information on Hungarian economic and political affairs, and could also serve as an observer during his frequent business trips within Hungary. In order to protect V-9134,2, it is planned to have the recruitment attempted by V-9109, who will be introduced to Subject by V-9134,2.

d. Subjects of paras. 4 and 5 of reference are other members of the Hungarian delegation doing business with V-9134,2. It is not planned to make any attempt to use them at present. They are regarded as capable businessmen by V-9134,2, but he indicates nothing suggesting that either might be approachable.

3. ZIPPER is aware that the acceptance of gifts by a member of the Hungarian trade delegation is no indication that he is susceptible to approach, and agrees that it may indicate he is playing a "come on" game on behalf of the AVH. We cannot, with the information currently available to us, see any reason to discourage ZIPPER in this attempt, however.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

EGLA-6028

4. We have asked ZIPPER to secure further personal details regarding the persons named in reference, which they agree they should be able to do, at least on the basis of visa applications submitted to the German Government. We will also shortly (we hope) receive further data on V-9134 and V-9109.

5. This case was discussed with [ ] on 15 October, and we are sending VIENNA the entire operational data as we know them, because we are aware of certain potential in the Hungarian field currently held by VOB. It is our opinion that ZIPPER's plans to approach anyone in this Hungarian mission need not deter our own efforts; indeed, we might be able to utilize ZIPPER leads, so long as they were used in such a way as to be non-identifiable by ZIPPER, in carrying out any of our own plans. I do not believe that we can restrain ZIPPER from making the attempt detailed above, however.

(For VIEN: Attached are notes made by [ ])

[MHS]

Approved by:

for WST
[ ]

SECRET

28 OCT '53

[ ]
~~32-6-9-474~~

POB

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EAVA-4743

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

28. Okt. 1953

TO : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
For: Pullach

MAW

FROM : Chief of Base, Vienna

DATE:

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/HIWAY/ZODIAC

SPECIFIC— ZIPPER Operation against Hungarian Trade Mission, Frankfurt

Ref: VIEN-1100

Info: EE
Salzburg

As stated in reference, we are forwarding herewith microfilmed copies of all correspondence in our [redacted] file which pertains to the ZIPPER operation against the Hungarian Trade Mission, Frankfurt.

[redacted]

23 October 1953

Attachment: As described above

Distribution:
- 2 - POB
- 1 - Fran
- 1 - EE
- 1 - Salz
- 1 - Carding
- 2 - Hung/3403

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

561

	Action	Info
25.		
25.0		
25.40		
25.306		
25.50/B ✓		

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGL-A-8025

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 17 MAR. 1954

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/ZIPPER

SPECIFIC— Horst KOERNER

1. Horst KOERNER, born ca 1922 in Dresden and living at Weldergovern 18, Hennef/Sieg, is of interest to ZIPPER

2. Subject is a former SS-Untersturmfuehrer who worked for an American connected intelligence service in 1946 and 1947. ZIPPER describes this organization as having its headquarters in Munich, as recruiting former SS personnel and as having as its area of operations the Soviet Zone of Germany.

3. Traces from all addressees are requested.

[redacted]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Approved:

for [redacted]

DISTR:
- 3 - EE w/attach.
- 3 - COM w/attach
- 2 - CLS w/o attach.

16 March 54

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2006

Deadline:		Check one
Hq Action Req.	by cable	
See para 3	by pouch	✓
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	
See para	by pouch	
For info and files		

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

[redacted]

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

16 April 1954

M/R

SUBJECT: CSW Operations

REF : See @KUEHNE-[redacted] Meeting M/R dated 7 April 1954

1. At a meeting on 13 April with @ KUEHNE, [redacted] introduced the subject of CSW operations. He cited:

   a. The position taken by [redacted] in the 1 January 1954 policy statement to ZIPPER, viz., no funds for CSW.

   b. [redacted]s 13 January 1954 letter to UTILITY, viz., no further support of CSW operations until the security aspects are resolved.

In view of the above-cited letters, a memo from [redacted] to @ Dr. MOMMERT giving approval for three CSW Forschungen to become operations had been held up by [redacted].. As a result of this incident, plus others that would undoubtedly follow, it will soon become evident to [redacted] and to @ Dr. MOMMERT, who are not privy to the security case involved, that something is rotten in Bavaria. [redacted] stated that [redacted] had taken two recent steps with regard to this case. The first was to send Dr. SCHNEIDER a letter on 13 April, just 90 days since the 13 January letter, reiterating his position against all further support of CSW operations unless and until the security aspects were clarified. The second was the designation of [redacted] and [redacted] to review the entire case and to come up with recommendations to Wallop for final resolution.

2. [redacted] asked @ KUEHNE, who is vitally concerned with the case, for his off-the-record reaction to the following proposed solution:

STEP I:

A. POB and ZIPPER together should actively institute all possible means of external investigation of @ PARKER. This should include complete mail and censorship intercepts, installation of clandestine auditory devices in his home, office, and any other places which he principally frequents if this is at all possible, the conduct of physical surveillance wherever and whenever possible in the course of @ PARKER's daily activities to include operational trips to Austria and throughout Germany, the complete tracing and investigation of all known cover names and cover firms which @ PARKER utilizes, the investigation and surveillance of @ PARKER's personal, professional and business contacts wherever indicated.

801
807
841

SECRET

240 UJDREADFUL ~~[illegible]~~
[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

STEP II:

A. Subsequent to pursuing all the leads developed in STEP I and dependent upon the extent of conclusive results therefrom, @ PARKER should be confronted with the derogatory information both by ZIPPER and POB. It is presumed that if the evidence at this stage is conclusive or seriously damaging that ZIPPER will readily participate in this confrontation even to include the re-use of the complete LCFLUTTER testing.

B. If, however, the results are neither conclusive nor sufficiently damaging to permit UTILITY, in good conscience and loyalty to his Staff, to participate in the confrontation of @ PARKER, ZIPPER can then drop out of the investigation at this stage. If this is done, however, it should be clearly understood that POB will insist upon one of the following alternatives:

  (1) @ PARKER is dropped completely, his operations closed out, and his CSW staff thoroughly screened before retention in whole or in part.

  (2) That the POB Staff will, on its own, by virtue of its interest in the support of ZIPPER, go ahead with confrontation of @ PARKER to include full interrogation and investigation of all unanswered questions and a full LCFLUTTER testing program.

C. POB is willing in the event of B(2) above to have UTILITY deny to @ PARKER that he shares any of POB's misgivings as well as any part or assistance his Organization may have given to the whole investigation but that in view of his overall obligations to POB by virtue of its support to ZIPPER he cannot stand in the way of POB's action. Vis-a-vis @ PARKER, POB, in addition to reasons already cited, is certainly justified in pursuing evidences and even allegations of hostile activity by anyone in the American Occupation Zone of Germany if only to determine that such activity has or has not as its goal espionage or sabotage aimed at U.S. interests.

STEP III:

A. Is dependent upon the results of STEP II:

  (1) If @ PARKER resigns at our insistence (alternative B.(1) above) it is then proposed that KUBARK and ODOPAL together pursue the case against @ PARKER as an individual.

  (2) If it is determined that he is or was guilty of hostile activity that he be dropped from ZIPPER and prosecuted if feasible. Due regard, however, should be devoted to the possibility of exploiting him CE-wise against his Eastern sponsor (if such should be the case).

  (3) If the case should wind up inconclusive but still leave him highly suspect, then the minimum solution POB will insist upon is his neutralization, certainly while ZIPPER is still dependent upon U.S. support.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

3. @ KUEHNE stated that the proposal as outlined by [ ] was one with which he could say, off-the-record, that he was in agreement. Moreover, he promised to feel out UTILITY's viewpoint and reactions to such a line of action without, however, making it appear that @ KUEHNE and [ ] had gotten their heads together on the case nor indicating in any way that the initiative or the handling of this matter was as yet any other than on the UTILITY-[ ] level. He added that it was his personal feeling that UTILITY might very probably be willing to accept the plan, if not in detail at least in principle. In closing @ KUEHNE stated that it is his belief that mail and telephone intercepts already existed in this case and had been agreed upon by the ZIPPER and POB Staffs. [ ], who was not clear on this point, stated that as far as he knew there had been no such agreement but he could not say for sure without completing his review of the entire case.

[KGI.]

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

19 May 1954

M/R

SUBJECT: UJDREADFUL Conference

ATTENDANCE: @ KUEHNE
@ SCHACH
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

1. Agenda agreed upon:

a. Presentation by [redacted] of POB case against UJDREADFUL in resumé form.

b. Presentation of ZIPPER investigation results to date by @ SCHACH in resumé form.

c. Limited discussion of points raised in a. and b.

d. Formulation of combined POB-ZIPPER committee (those in attendance) recommendations for solution of problem.

2. [redacted], utilizing summary of investigative findings prepared by [redacted], gave a quick run-through, condensed to 16 points, of derogatory information against UJDREADFUL. These points were noted in writing by ZIPPER representatives.

3. @ SCHACH presented results of ZIPPER's investigation to date. In brief this consisted of following:

a. Shortly after start of case, @ REISSNER was inserted into Dienststelle 5 Staff as deputy to UJDREADFUL. @ REISSNER is a former German General Staff Officer who was not briefed on the UJDREADFUL case but who was informed that he had the mission to examine the security of Dienststelle 5's operations and personnel (including UJDREADFUL himself) and to report to headquarters upon any item or incident that might appear to him suspicious in any way. He was placed upon his honor as a former German General Staff Officer in the fulfillment of this commitment. According to @ SCHACH, the results of this investigation/surveillance since January 1953 have been completely negative.

b. @ SCHACH interrogated those two present members of the Organization who are most knowledgeable, he felt, on the personal and professional abilities of UJDREADFUL. The first of these was @ ACKERMANN, the leader of Dienststelle 73. Again @ ACKERMANN was not briefed as to headquarters' suspicions of UJDREADFUL but was asked to give his personal assessment. The results of this, and these were based in part upon @ WONDRAK's assessment which had been ex-

SECRET

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

pressed to @ ACKERMANN, consisted of 100% endorsement of UJDREADFUL. (Incidentally, in the course of this, it was learned that the person who recruited UJDREADFUL for ZIPPER was one @ HAASE, fnu, who has since been dropped by ZIPPER, and not @ WONDRAK as had been previously supposed.) The second person interviewed by @ SCHACH was @ PFEIFFER, who also gave a 100% endorsement of UJDREADFUL in his assessment.

c. The next step in the investigation was to examine all of the Forschungen and operations of Dienststelle 5 since it was established in 1952. This consisted of a detailed review of each operation and a general review of the Forschungen. It was thorough and extensive in form but concluded in each case with a finding not unfavorable to UJDREADFUL. Each adverse aspect in this operational review was explained plausibly at least to ZIPPER. (Incidentally, in the course of discussing this point, @ SCHACH alluded to the fact that he depended for his basic material upon the compilation efforts of @ HAMMER and @ WINTER. [ ] inquired as to the extent of briefing on UJDREADFUL case of these two gentlemen to which @ SCHACH replied that they had both been briefed in December and January just past, but @ WINTER less so than @ HAMMER.)

d. The next step in the investigation centered around the results of two graphology reports on UJDREADFUL's handwriting. @ SCHACH did not have with him, or at least pretended not to have with him, the dates when these two reports were composed.* The first of these, however, was conducted some time ago based upon a handwritten Lebenslauf submitted by UJDREADFUL. The second of these is purported to have been given the psychological analysis treatment by an unidentified professor from the University of Munich. In both cases, according to @ SCHACH, UJDREADFUL came off with a clean bill of health insofar as the UJDREADFUL aspects are concerned.

e. The final step of the ZIPPER investigation thus far, according to @ SCHACH, is not yet completed. This centers around the overall Organization security self-examination now in progress. (Incidentally, POB was lead to believe that this had already been completed.) Specifically, it involved the issuance of a Personal History Questionnaire being disseminated by headquarters to all members of the Organization. @ SCHACH stated that for the express purpose of eliciting information from UJDREADFUL on certain key questions about his past that he had inserted several questions which would not otherwise have been included. This phase is not completed, however, since the questionnaire in its final form has not yet received final approval from UTILITY. After this occurs the questionnaire will then be printed and disseminated. All in all @ SCHACH foresaw a delay of circa 4 or more weeks. This, in turn, would create more delay waiting for the forms to be completed and sent in to headquarters.

4. A brief discussion ensued during which some theorizing was done by both sides as to the possible significance of different points in the adverse informa-

* The 1st by Frau LERSNER is in the box dated 2/12/52 and is based on the handwritten Lebenslauf which we lent to ZIPPER.
RJB.

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

tion discussed. It was pointed out to ZIPPER that the investigations conducted so far fell into two categories:

a. ZIPPER's attempt at evaluation and assessment of UJDREADFUL based upon an examination of his operational achievements.

b. POB's investigation of UJDREADFUL's personal affairs, conduct and background history.

(Co-incidentally, the two categories above point up the long-known differences in the German and American approaches to establishing reliability of information, that is, the Germans look solely to the product to determine the good of the source; the Americans look principally to the source to determine the validity and authenticity of the product.)

a. POB pointed out to ZIPPER that whatever solution was found our KUBARK headquarters would have to concur therein. Also stressed very heavily was the fact that POB insisted upon a solution of this case prior to any positive operational commitments by UJDREADFUL of agents into the CSR. ZIPPER was told that KUBARK would accept no responsibility nor give any support to any such dispatches until this case was resolved. They were further told that the responsibility for whatever might happen to any such agents would rest squarely on the shoulders of UTILITY.

5. [ ] stated that we were of the opinion that a joint investigation and a completely mutual approach to the case was necessary. ZIPPER representatives agreed fully. In such an approach ZIPPER was told that we would like to be as thorough as possible, investigating all leads through all available means and measures. However, since this would be time-consuming and time was of the essence, especially in view of UJDREADFUL's plans for positive operational commitments into CSR, a faster solution was absolutely essential. @ SCHACH, anticipating the POB recommendation, stated that he felt the best and fastest solution would be to bring the case to a head by a confrontation of UJDREADFUL. Consequently the following plan to accomplish this end was mutually agreed upon as the joint recommendation of this committee for consideration by UTILITY and [ ].

a. UJDREADFUL would be personally confronted by a joint investigative team who would interrogate him orally on all the points of doubt or suspicion resulting from the joint POB-ZIPPER investigation. This interrogation, it was agreed, should take place under the most favorable conditions to insure best results including electric recordings of all the conversations. UJDREADFUL would then be asked to answer in writing all of the questions previously asked.

b. A period of oral re-interrogation would be conducted to attempt to reconcile any differences between the previous two interrogations.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

c. A final re-interrogation would then be conducted utilizing LCFLUTTER. It was agreed that at this time UJDREADFUL would be asked if he would be willing to submit to re-interrogation involving the use of LCFLUTTER. If he agrees the interrogation would proceed as planned. If he failed to agree then, in view of the history of the case and his previous voluntary acceptance of LCFLUTTER, UJDREADFUL would be dismissed from the Organization. (Towards the end of this meeting, after the above program had been decided upon and while some minor points were still being discussed, @ SCHACH left the room to get a message from his headquarters. During this time @ KUEHNE, who had previously expressed no objections to the use of LCFLUTTER in this case stated that the only part he worried about in the proposed joint solution was the possible emotional reaction of UTILITY to the LCFLUTTER use. [ ] then pointed out to @ KUEHNE that it might be worthwhile to tell UTILITY that indeed the re-use of LCFLUTTER as proposed might in itself serve to clarify the first adverse LCFLUTTER report on UJDREADFUL. He stressed the fact that in fairness to all concerned, especially to UJDREADFUL himself, in a case such as this where an initial LCFLUTTER has been unfavorable, additional trials are very desirable and can indeed result in the subsequent exoneration of a person who has been brought under suspicion by a one-time run-through. @ KUEHNE noted this suggestion with great interest and stated that he would bring out this point when reporting to UTILITY.)

6. It was agreed that both sides of the committee would make a complete report of this meeting to their Staff chiefs, after which, if the proposal was acceptable and approved by KUBARK headquarters, detailed plans for its implementation would be formulated.

[ ]

SECRET

9966-a

SECRET

DD/P 1-4290a

20 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT : ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program

REFERENCE : EGLA-11579. Chief of Base, Pullach to Chief, EE, dated 23 November 1954

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain approval for initiation of the Evasion and Escape program proposed by ZIPPER in Reference (attached).

2. GENERAL BACKGROUND

a. Evasion and Escape Requirements. CINCEUR E & E requirements placing highest priority on the German area were forwarded to EE Division in June 1953. While they have not yet been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are not yet formal, it is not anticipated that the JCS will modify them substantially.

b. Past Efforts to Establish Evasion and Escape Facilities in Germany. On the basis of existing and anticipated future requirements three formal German Mission projects with E & E aspects have been mounted but did not prove worthwhile and were therefore terminated.

c. Present Status. No present capabilities for E & E exist in either East or West Germany. A new unilateral project (CACINNABAR), which is currently being mounted, may have a very limited capability for E & E within another year. Since the project is designed, however, only to create nuclei for help in fulfilling all unconventional warfare requirements, this project can at best only partially fulfill East German E & E needs.

d. Stay-Behind Policy in Western Germany. Since the fall of 1952, it has been CIA policy not to conduct stay-behind activities in Western Germany, other than those involving intelligence collection, except with the knowledge and consent of the host government. The Director specifically stated that no unconventional warfare stay-behind activities would be conducted in West Germany without the knowledge of the Federal Republic government. (There is no policy restriction against the creation of unilateral unconventional warfare assets in denied areas).

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

3. **SPECIFIC BACKGROUND RELATIVE TO EVASION AND ESCAPE ACTIVITIES BY ZIPPER.**

a. After extensive discussion, it has been generally agreed within EE Division that any substantial E & E assets in Germany would most appropriately be developed by ZIPPER. Earlier this year, the Deputy Chief, German Mission, requested Chief/POB informally to determine the attitude of Chief/ZIPPER towards this type of operation. Chief/ZIPPER recognized the need and agreed to develop a program within the framework of his organization.

b. The assignment of U. S. officer of the rank of colonel for stay-behind matters on the Pullach Staff was based, among other reasons, on the knowledge that Chief/ZIPPER was favorably disposed towards planning stay-behind operations, including E & E, and on the assumption that such a ZIPPER program was desired by CIA.

c. Subsequently this headquarters was requested by the German Mission to release certain E & E doctrinal materials to Chief/ZIPPER and selected members of his staff. On the basis of this request, the participation of ZIPPER in E & E planning activities was approved.

4. **PRESENT ZIPPER PROPOSAL:** The attached reference contains ZIPPER's developmental plan for an E & E network in West Germany through the calendar year 1956. Organizationally, the program is to be tied into ZIPPER's existing general stay-behind effort at the top staff level but with rigid compartmentation in all lower echelons. The plan calls for a gradual build-up to begin with the creation of a small headquarters staff nucleus (already accomplished) and to be followed by the recruitment of case officers and finally agents. It is estimated that by the end of 1956 the program will consist of sixteen staff members and forty-eight agents organized into eight cadres of six men each who will be in various stages of training. Estimated semi-annual costs for the program are: first half of 1955, [ ] second half of 1955, [ ] first half of 1956, [ ] second half of 1956, [ ]

5. **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.**

a. For policy reasons, any E & E program in West Germany must be undertaken in collaboration with the Federal Republic government. The ZIPPER program can therefore be initiated only if the German Government is so advised and offers no objections. From the viewpoint of our relationship with the Federal Republic government, until ZIPPER is legalized this program must be regarded as a unilateral effort.

b. ZIPPER is the only instrumentality with a probable present capability of making significant progress towards the fulfillment of CIA E & E requirements. The magnitude of these requirements is such that even with ZIPPER's participation only partial fulfillment is possible. Past experience suggests that a unilateral effort, to meet existing requirements, even if authorized, would fall short of the goal.

SECRET

6. ADMINISTRATION.

a. The attached Reference, paragraph 1, indicates that funds allocated to the Pullach Operations Base are available to cover developmental activity in the E & E field until the end of FY 1955.

b. EE Division may have to request a certain increase in the ZIPPER FY 1956 budget in order to subsidize the enlarged activity of this E & E program. The actual amount involved will be determined on the basis of development of the project between now and 1 July 1955. Such development will be coordinated with the staffs concerned.

7. RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that approval be granted for initiation of the ZIPPER proposal contained in attached reference, provided the Federal Republic government is informed and offers no objection. Such approval will pertain only to that portion of the attached reference which covers the period up to 1 July 1955.

[ ]
Chief, Eastern European Division

Concur, C/PP [ ] (Subject to comment, attached.)

Concur, C/FI [ ]

SECRET

MOP-1-4454

SECRET

JAN 14 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Eastern Europe Division

SUBJECT: ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program

REFERENCES: A. Memorandum from C/EE to COPS dtd. 20 Dec. 1954, Subject as above

B. Memorandum from C/FI to C/EE dtd. 7 Jan. 1955, Subject as above

1. Concur in the proposal and recommendations contained in Reference A, (attached,) and in the comments of FI in Reference B, (attached,) subject to the following:

a. That any negotiations with ZIPPER will be based on a plan to be developed at and approved by Headquarters, CIA, toward meeting US CINCEUR E&E Requirements for West Germany.

b. That appropriate documentation to be agreed upon by the Office of C/PP and EE Division will be effected for this activity prior to extension into FY '56 and that monthly status reports for this activity will be submitted to the PP Staff effective immediately.

~~Chief~~
Psychological & Paramilitary
Operations Staff

Attachments:
References as stated above.

SECRET

f.1883
4966

SECRET

JAN 7 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE

SUBJECT: ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Chief, EE to Chief of Operations, Subject as above, dated 20 December 1954

1. Concurrence of the FI staff in the proposal for the initiation of ZIPPER's E and E program discussed in referenced memorandum is subject to the following understanding reached in discussions on 4 and 5 January between representatives of FI/PLANS, PP/SAC, PPC/WPD, and EE/PP/G:

a. E and E is the only type of activity in the U/W field which the ZIPPER organization is willing to undertake at this time.

b. It will be made clear to the PULLACH base that any approval granted for the "initiation" of the ZIPPER proposal is to be interpreted as an approval for ZIPPER to initiate the action outlined in paragraph 6 of EGLA-11579 covering ZIPPER's timetable for the period through the first half of 1955.

c. Although FI appreciates the restrictions on disclosure of EUCOM's specific U/W requirements, further expansion of ZIPPER's E and E program will be based upon and as closely as possible coincident with EUCOM's specific E and E requirements.

2. The FI staff has one further reservation and that with the respect to indications (on the attached map) that ZIPPER plans to operate in the British as well as the French Zones of Germany. This action is not in consonance with the views of SWPE expressed in dispatch EGQA-38047 dated 29 March 1954 that, in any planning in the E and E field that involves the British Zone, local liaison with the British should be considered in order that our planning can be coordinated with any plans the British may undertake in the E and E field. A similar approach might be considered advisable with respect to the French area.

GORDON M. STEWART
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

SECRET

SECRET

9966-a

DD/P 1-4790a

20 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT : ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program

REFERENCE : EGLA-11579. Chief of Base, Pullach to Chief, EE, dated 23 November 1954

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain approval for initiation of the Evasion and Escape program proposed by ZIPPER in Reference (attached).

2. GENERAL BACKGROUND

a. Evasion and Escape Requirements. CINCEUR E & E requirements placing highest priority on the German area were forwarded to EE Division in June 1953. While they have not yet been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are not yet formal, it is not anticipated that the JCS will modify them substantially.

b. Past Efforts to Establish Evasion and Escape Facilities in Germany. On the basis of existing and anticipated/future requirements three formal German Mission projects with E & E aspects have been mounted but did not prove worthwhile and were therefore terminated.

c. Present Status. No present capabilities for E & E exist in either East or West Germany. A new unilateral project (CACINNABAR), which is currently being mounted, may have a very limited capability for E & E within another year. Since the project is designed, however, only to create nuclei for help in fulfilling all unconventional warfare requirements, this project can at best only partially fulfill East German E & E needs.

d. Stay-Behind Policy in Western Germany. Since the fall of 1952, it has been CIA policy not to conduct stay-behind activities in Western Germany, other than those involving intelligence collection, except with the knowledge and consent of the host government. The Director specifically stated that no unconventional warfare stay-behind activities would be conducted in West Germany without the knowledge of the Federal Republic government. (There is no policy restriction against the creation of unilateral unconventional warfare assets in denied areas).

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☑
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

3. **SPECIFIC BACKGROUND RELATIVE TO EVASION AND ESCAPE ACTIVITIES BY ZIPPER.**

a. After extensive discussion, it has been generally agreed within EE Division that any substantial E & E assets in Germany would most appropriately be developed by ZIPPER. Earlier this year, the Deputy Chief, German Mission, requested Chief/POB informally to determine the attitude of Chief/ZIPPER towards this type of operation. Chief/ZIPPER recognized the need and agreed to develop a program within the framework of his organization.

b. The assignment of U. S. officer of the rank of colonel for stay-behind matters on the Pullach Staff was based, among other reasons, on the knowledge that Chief/ZIPPER was favorably disposed towards planning stay-behind operations, including E & E, and on the assumption that such a ZIPPER program was desired by CIA.

c. Subsequently this headquarters was requested by the German Mission to release certain E & E doctrinal materials to Chief/ZIPPER and selected members of his staff. On the basis of this request, the participation of ZIPPER in E & E planning activities was approved.

4. **PRESENT ZIPPER PROPOSAL:** The attached reference contains ZIPPER's developmental plan for an E & E network in West Germany through the calendar year 1956. Organizationally, the program is to be tied into ZIPPER's existing general stay-behind effort at the top staff level but with rigid compartmentation in all lower echelons. The plan calls for a gradual build-up to begin with the creation of a small headquarters staff nucleus (already accomplished) and to be followed by the recruitment of case officers and finally agents. It is estimated that by the end of 1956 the program will consist of sixteen staff members and forty-eight agents organized into eight cadres of six men each who will be in various stages of training. Estimated semi-annual costs for the program are: first half of 1955, [ ] second half of 1955, [ ] first half of 1956, [ ] second half of 1956, [ ]

5. **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.**

a. For policy reasons, any E & E program in West Germany must be undertaken in collaboration with the Federal Republic government. The ZIPPER program can therefore be initiated only if the German Government is so advised and offers no objections. From the viewpoint of our relationship with the Federal Republic government, until ZIPPER is legalized this program must be regarded as a unilateral effort.

b. ZIPPER is the only instrumentality with a probable present capability of making significant progress towards the fulfillment of CIA E & E requirements. The magnitude of these requirements is such that even with ZIPPER's participation only partial fulfillment is possible. Past experience suggests that a unilateral effort, to meet existing requirements, even if authorized, would fall short of the goal.

SECRET

6. ADMINISTRATION.

a. The attached Reference, paragraph 1, indicates that funds allocated to the Pullach Operations Base are available to cover developmental activity in the E & E field until the end of FY 1955.

b. EE Division may have to request a certain increase in the ZIPPER FY 1956 budget in order to subsidize the enlarged activity of this E & E program. The actual amount involved will be determined on the basis of development of the project between now and 1 July 1955. Such development will be coordinated with the staffs concerned.

7. RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that approval be granted for initiation of the ZIPPER proposal contained in attached reference, provided the Federal Republic government is informed and offers no objection. Such approval will pertain only to that portion of the attached reference which covers the period up to 1 July 1955.

[redacted]
Chief, Eastern European Division

Concur, C/PP [redacted] (Subject to comment, attached.)

Concur, C/F [redacted]

SECRET

MOP-1-4454

SECRET

JAN 14 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Eastern Europe Division

SUBJECT: ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program

REFERENCES: A. Memorandum from C/EE to COPS dtd. 20 Dec. 1954, Subject as above

B. Memorandum from C/FI to C/EE dtd. 7 Jan. 1955, Subject as above

1. Concur in the proposal and recommendations contained in Reference A, (attached,) and in the comments of FI in Reference B, (attached,) subject to the following:

a. That any negotiations with ZIPPER will be based on a plan to be developed at and approved by Headquarters, CIA, toward meeting US CINCEUR E&E Requirements for West Germany.

b. That appropriate documentation to be agreed upon by the Office of C/PP and EE Division will be effected for this activity prior to extension into FY '56 and that monthly status reports for this activity will be submitted to the PP Staff effective immediately.

~~Chief~~
Psychological & Paramilitary
Operations Staff

Attachments:
References as stated above.

SECRET

SECRET

f.1883
4466

JAN 7 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE

SUBJECT: ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Chief, EE to Chief of Operations, Subject as above, dated 20 December 1954

1. Concurrence of the FI staff in the proposal for the initiation of ZIPPER's E and E program discussed in referenced memorandum is subject to the following understanding reached in discussions on 4 and 5 January between representatives of FI/PLANS, PP/SAC, PPC/WPD, and EE/PP/G:

a. E and E is the only type of activity in the U/W field which the ZIPPER organization is willing to undertake at this time.

b. It will be made clear to the PULLACH base that any approval granted for the "initiation" of the ZIPPER proposal is to be interpreted as an approval for ZIPPER to initiate the action outlined in paragraph 6 of EGLA-11579 covering ZIPPER's timetable for the period through the first half of 1955.

c. Although FI appreciates the restrictions on disclosure of EUCOM's specific U/W requirements, further expansion of ZIPPER's E and E program will be based upon and as closely as possible coincident with EUCOM's specific E and E requirements.

2. The FI staff has one further reservation and that with the respect to indications (on the attached map) that ZIPPER plans to operate in the British as well as the French Zones of Germany. This action is not in consonance with the views of SWPE expressed in dispatch EGQA-38047 dated 29 March 1954 that, in any planning in the E and E field that involves the British Zone, local liaison with the British should be considered in order that our planning can be coordinated with any plans the British may undertake in the E and E field. A similar approach might be considered advisable with respect to the French area.

[ ]
GORDON M. STEWART
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

C
O
P
Y

Via AIR

Dispatch No. MGL-A-9989

SECRET

16 January 1952

TO : Chief, Foreign Division, M

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT : General - Operational

Specific - ZIPPER/ROESSLSPRUNG

Reference: MGL-A-9990, MGLA-8740

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2006

1. ZIPPER has produced a proposal named "ROESSLSPRUNG" which is producing GARBAGE material from the Vienna area, Austrian OB, and KPOe Central Committee information. The obvious, and admitted ties to other agencies, plus the very unsavoury reputation of one of the leading figures in the proposal would have led to the immediate rejection of the proposal except for one fact -- the ZIPPER evaluation group rates the GARBAGE production so highly and states that the possibility of fabrication is so remote that we cannot reject this proposal without further study.

2. We plan to play along with this proposal for about four months during which time we will send you the report numbers of all reports emanating from this operation as well as samples of the original material it supplies. In this way we should be able to determine whether we are already getting this material, and, if so, where it is coming from. The net supplying this information is allegedly a group of ANDERS Poles working in Austria. This information is submitted to a Polish Colonel in Innsbruck who in turn sends it to another Polish Colonel in Paris who is working for the French. ZIPPER now allegedly gets half the original materialcollected and photocopies of the rest which goes in the original form to the French via Innsbruck. ZIPPER allegedly gets all the intelligence produced. The great bulk of this material is still being processed and no MGLs have gone out as yet. The ZIPPER CI/CE section is following this with interest. To date ZIPPER has invested about DM 6000 in the operation. The Colonel in Innsbruck reportedly pays circa 1400 dollars per month for his part of the take. The ZIPPER contact offered to cut out the French but this was rejected since it would have meant that we would have had to make up the $1400 per month. Paris, London or Austria would appear to be the most likely sources of this information if we are getting it through other channels.

3. The ZIPPER evaluation group has sent us the following material already supplied by "ROESSLSPRUNG":

DIST:
2 - FDM
1 - COS
1 - SALZ
1 - Vienna
1 - File

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Through analysis of GARBAGE material they have identified:

A Gd. Schutz Division in Moscow.
A Gd. Gebirgs Schutz Division in Carpathia.
The staff of a Gd. Mechanized Army in Weissus.

They have also numerous confirmations and new identities of units of the 13th Gd. Mechanized Division, the 23rd Flak Division and other units of the central group of troops in western Russia.

NOTE: We assume that ZIPPER has no confirmation on the Divisions in Moscow and Carpathia, or on the Army in Weissus. Their acceptance of this information as genuine is due to the fact that it was culled from original material (letters, orders, etc.) picked-up at Soviet installations.

4. ROESSLSPRUNG also has provided us with copies of the following Russian publications:

TANKIST
SCHURNAL WOSDUSCHNOW FLOTA
WOJENNYJ WESTNIK
WOJENNAJA WYAL
ARTILLERIJSKIJ SCHURNAL
KRASSNEJ SVESDA
STALINSKIJ SSOKOL

5. a. The original approach came to ZIPPER in the fall of 1951 and contact was sought or established to several parts of ZIPPER. V-13690 (see MGLA-9990, para. 1) who knew the leader of ZIPPER's UM very well from the old Sicherheitsdienst days tried through him many times to contact ZIPPER. The UM leader, MANDL, insisted that he had no such connection.

b. Two other men (see MGLA-9990 paras. 6 and 7) approached an unidentified source of GV I with no results.

c. V-13690 through (see MGLA-9990 para. 8) approached ZIPPER's BV S with an offer to supply them with photocopies of material which they were allegedly giving to the BIS in Graz, Austria. BV S was told by ZIPPER's CI/CE staff to play along but to make no commitment. BV S gave the contact man AS 1000 as a sort of retainer but this was later returned to them with the explanation that the case needed reconsideration.

d. Obviously V-13690 preferred his contact to GV G, who had given him retainers of DM 2000 on two occasions. The contact to GV G is the one which now exists, but we know as yet nothing about the method or the personalities of the approach.

3. In September 1951 V-13692 approached the 35 section of ZIPPER and offered them the services of a group collecting intelligence in the Soviet Zone of Austria.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

NOTE: This multiple approach naturally indicates a fairly extensive knowledge of ZIPPER by the net of V-13690. We do not yet know how this was possible, but will try to tape the matter.

6. The following personalities appear in this proposal:

URBAN

a. V-13690 (see MGLA-9990, para. 1), formerly employed by CIC, Linz, dropped for fabrication and intelligence peddling. Former Hauptbeauftragter of the RSHA, AMT VI, for Hungary, and Obersturmbahnfuehrer of the SD. GVA reported to ZIPPER in October 1949 on Subject's connection to the Sicherheitsdirektion, Austria. We know this from his CIC days that he was close to RUPERTSBERGER of that organization. He was also reported by GV A to be working with the man now known as V-13692 (see MGLA-9990 para. 2) and with two Austrians (see MGLA-9990, para. 3) for CIC, Linz. V-13690 was at one time head of a net in the CSR for the RSHA and was known as "AMTMANN".

[illegible]

b. V-13691 (see MGLA-9990, para.4) who carries reports and material over the Austro-German border. No information in POB or ZIPPER files.

[illegible]

c. V-13692 (see MGLA-9990 para.2), former Hungarian specialist for Willi HOETTL. As alias KEILER he had an Austrian OB net. GVA reported in 1951 that he was trying to contact ZIPPER.

[illegible]

d. V-13671 (see MGLA-9990 para.5), ZIPPER employee as of June 1951 and probably earlier since ZIPPER requested a Zuzugsgenehmigung for him in October 1949. He worked for BARANOVSKY.

[illegible]

e. Former Polish Officer, (see MGLA-9990 para.9), has contact to the FIS and probably to the BIS. Also to emigrant Hungarian groups dabbling in intelligence. It was reported in March 1950 by GV A that Subject had intelligence dealings with (see MGLA-9990 para.10) who in turn has contact with (see MGLA-9990 para.11) and contact to the FSS in Graz. The wife of Subject born in Hungary nee (see MGLA-9990 para 12) disappeared early in 1950 with documents and valuables belonging to her husband and was reported later in Budapest. V-13690 passes information and material to Subject who in turn passes it to another Pole (see MGLA-9990 para.13) living in Paris.

7. As we stated in paragraph 1 of this memo the above outlined morass would have been rejected out of hand had not the evaluation section of ZIPPER rated the product so highly. We hope that with the small amount of production cited and the names given we can determine quickly whether this is stuff we are getting from another source or sources and whether in truth the ZIPPER evaluation section has not fallen victim to an exceptionally able fabrication ring. They admit that a lot of the reporting shows signs of collation, sifting and evaluation which would point to a rather large and organized agency. If the information included in this memo is not enough to tag the operation as already tapped or known to be a fabrication, we will send all original material possible and reports numbers in the coming months.

Attn: [redacted] - I suggest you discuss with FDM Chief of Opns at earliest opportunity and provide us with basis for dealing with ZIPPER - This really looks phoney!

W ? ?

SECRET

DD/P 1-7280

23 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program - Request for Extension

REFERENCES : A. Memorandum from Chief, EE to COP, dated 20 December 1954.
B. Memorandum from Chief, EE to COP, dated 2 February 1955
C. EE Division Dispatch to the German Mission - EGQW-22188

1. Authority is requested for continuation of ZIPPER developmental E&E activity for the first three months of FY 1956. COP authorized $17,000.00 for the second half of FY 1955. The same rate of expenditure would be continued in FY 1956, requiring $8,500.00 for the period 1 July-1 October 1955. This amount would be chargeable to the over-all ZIPPER budget. For reasons explained below, the detailed operational plan established as a pre-condition for continuation of the program into FY 1956 has not yet been submitted for DD/P approval. It is requested that this requirement be temporarily waived and that authority be granted for continuation of the ZIPPER E&E program to 1 October 1955. It is expected that the operational plan will have been submitted and approved by that date, at which time the program will be established on a more permanent basis.

2. In approving FY 1955 developmental activity, COP also approved the principle of continuation of the ZIPPER E&E program into FY 1956. This approval was subject to the condition that satisfactory progress would be achieved during FY 1955, and was subject to further conditions set forth in paragraph 2 of Reference C. One condition was that ZIPPER's FY 1956 E&E activities would be based on a detailed operations plan to be developed and approved at CIA headquarters. While the other conditions have been met, submission of the operational plan has been delayed.

3. The concept of E&E and the nature of E&E requirements have been undergoing considerable change in recent months, thereby delaying the development of the operational plan for ZIPPER E&E. The plan is now ready for submission to the Field for suggestions and comment. In view of this unavoidable delay, it will not be possible for the Field to submit by 1 July its comments which are needed before final action on the operational plan can be initiated by us.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☑
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

4. It is recommended that continued developmental activity be approved and that the authorizing cable (attached) be released.

Chief, Eastern European Division

5-355

DD/P 1-4790

SECRET

2 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program

ATTACHMENTS:
A. Proposed EE Division Dispatch to the German Mission
B. Memorandum from Chief, EE, to COP, above subject, dated 20 December 1954
C. Memorandum from Chief, PP, to COP, above subject, dated 14 January 1954
D. Memorandum from Chief, FI, to COP, above subject, dated 7 January 1954

1. The attached dispatch to the German Mission (Attachment A) incorporates the comments of the Chiefs, PP and FI (Attachments C and D) on the previous EE Division recommendations (Attachment B) for the initiation of a ZIPPER West German war-preparatory Evasion and Escape program. The dispatch is to be considered an extension and integral part of our original memorandum on this matter entitled "ZIPPER Evasion and Escape Program" (Attachment B).

2. The dispatch to the German Mission modifies our original recommendation by providing approval in principle for the continuation of a ZIPPER West German E&E program into FY 56, on the condition that progress satisfactory to CIA Headquarters is made during the balance of FY 55. The dispatch however requires the submission and approval of a more detailed operational plan as the prerequisite for authorization of a specific FY 56 budget.

3. In response to your query, we now estimate the FY 56 ZIPPER E&E budget at approximately $65,000. This figure is based on preliminary ZIPPER plans and may be adjusted somewhat.

4. It is recommended that our original memorandum, (Attachment B) as amended by the dispatch to the German Mission (Attachment A), be approved, and that the Attachment A dispatch be released.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☑
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Chief, Eastern European Division

Attachments: (4) as listed above

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

VIA: ______________________
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGLA-13049 13 P

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 MAR 1955

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CART

SPECIFIC— Bruno KLAUS

KAPOK

5 OCT 1960

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED OCT 11 1960

Ref: SPULL-9957, SPULL-9929

1. The attachment is a copy of the dead letter story as related by KLAUS to his ZIPPER superiors.

2. In view of the danger to ZIPPER operatives and operations in Vienna, the ZIPPER headquarters staff was informed of our suspicions that KLAUS was a Soviet agent. They were informed that our suspicions stemmed from an operation which we considered too sensitive to describe in any further detail.

3. In making an estimate of the damage already done, we have come up with the following:

a. ZIPPER surveillants who must be presumed blown: V-14808 and V-14818

b. KLAUS has spotted for recruitment purposes:
   (1) [illegible]IDA, Alfred. Subj. of EGLA-11955-6, EASA-4316.
   (2) [illegible]SCHMIDT, Josef. Subject of EGLA-12975, 12976.

c. KLAUS knows by true name the Chief of Field Base 2; his immediate superior in Vienna, V-14801; and Field Base 2's CI man, V-14402. He may possibly know V-14405 and V-14490.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

4. Further pursuit of the case at the moment is stymied until we can obtain the information which ZIPPER is collecting and which Vienna has requested. The undersigned plans to travel to Vienna on receipt of the information to discuss any further action which Vienna might contemplate.

11 OCT 1960

Att: as above

Approved:

3 - EE w/1 of att. (DIRECT)
3 - COM w/1 att.

10 March 1955

(4)

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED
per CSU

~~ABSTRACT~~ X INDEX X
DATE 14 Mar 55

~~32-2-1-1134~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Geheim

AH EGL-A 13049

9.Februar 1955
Memo Nr. 11 402
Nr. 1911/55 geh.

AN : 831
VON : 127,5
BETR : Auffindung eines toten Briefkastens.

Anlage.

1.) In der Anlage wird ein Bericht der Dienststelle 2 ueber einen angeblich "zufaellig" aufgefundenen toten Briefkasten in WIEN durch V-14 802 vorgelegt.

2.) Dienststelle 2 nimmt zu der Angelegenheit wie folgt Stellung :

Am 8.12.54 fand V-14 802 angeblich in dem BK eine schriftliche Notiz – offenbar die Stellungnahme eines naeher unbekannten Auftraggebers, die sich u.a. auf das "Kinderkleidergeschaeft BISEA in SALZBURG" bezieht. Am 15.1.55 fand V-14 802 im BK angebl. einen "kuenstlichen Stein" der ein Filmnegativ enthielt.
Durch unvorsichtiges Oeffnen fiel auf das Filmnegativ Licht.

Anmerkung 127,5 :
Das Filmnegativ wurde von 280/x untersucht. Das Untersuchungsergebnis -Text- wird als Anlage 2 beigefuegt.
Der Stein befindet sich noch bei 280/x.

Um allen Moeglichkeiten gerecht zu werden, [illegible] auf die Person des V-14 802, des Entdeckers des TBK's eingegangen werden : V-14 802 ist dem [illegible]

①

DESENSITIZED
CSM 43-26

201-[illegible]
~~201-[illegible]~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

7H E6LA 13049

seit Jahren bekannt und kann ohne weiteres als sehr geschickt, aber auch als undurehsichtig beseichnet werden. Seine Verwendung bei hiesiger Stelle dient letstenendes u.a. auch seiner eigenen Klaerung. Erweist sich V-14 802 in jeder Beziehung als "echt", kann seine Mitarbeit nur ein Gewinn fuer den ND sein. Jedenfalls ist sein Aufgabenkreis so gehalten (III/F), dass in verhaeltnismaessig kurzer Frist endgueltige Klarheit ueber die Person des V-14802 in positiven oder gegebenenfalls auch in negativen Sinne geschaffen werden kann.

Da diese endgueltige Klaerung noch nicht erfolgt ist, muessen daher folgende Moeglichkeiten in Erwaegung gezogen werden :

a) V-14 802 koennte die Sache erfunden haben, um "Erfolge" nachsuweisen. Es faellt immerhin auf, dass er gerade dann einen "handgreiflichen Erfolg" (Auffindung des "Steins" aufsuweisen hatte, als er zur Berichterstattung nach SALZBURG beordert wurde.
   Immerhin ist auch su bedenken, dass V-14 802 sowohl als Maurer, als auch als Fotograf Erfahrungen hat.
   Andererseits ist kaum ansunehmen, dass V-14 802 ohne fremde Hilfe auf die Firma RISKA, SALZBURG, (bei der tatsaechlich gewisse ND-Zusammenhaenge bestehen) gekommen ist.
   Auch auf die Methode von dem "kuenstlichen Stein" duerfte er kaum von selbst gekommen sein. (Hier ist aus dem Fall KIM bekannt, dass der sowj.ND "kuenstliche Steine" im Zusammenhang mit BK's verwendet, doch duerfte diese Methode im allgemeinen wenig bekannt sein.)

②

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RH EGFA 18049

b) V-14 802 koennte mit einer "befreundeten Linie" in Verbindung stehen, die ihn steuert und moeglicherweise provoziert.

c) V-14 802 koennte schliesslich auch mit einem gegnerischen Dienst in Kontakt stehen, der V-14 802 hier auf diese Weise ins Geschaeft bringen will, wobei V-14 802 beim Feind zur Beantwortung von Fragen (z.B. Fe./ZISKA) beitragen soll.

d) V-14 802 koennte zufaellig auf den BK einer befreundeten Stelle gestossen sein, was aber nicht allzuwahrscheinlich ist, da eine solche in WIEN kaum ein so kompliziertes Vorgehen noetig haette.

e) Schliesslich bleibt die Moeglichkeit, dass V-14 802 tatsaechlich durch Zufall auf den BK eines gegnerischen Dienstes gestossen ist. Vielleicht koennte es sich auch um den jugosl. ND handeln, der sich ja in WIEN auf jeden Fall in Feindes-bzw. Niemandsland befindet.

Es sei nochmals betont, dass alle diese Hypothesen als moeglich angesehen werden muessen, weil V-14 802 noch nicht in zufriedenstellender Weise geklaert erscheint und seine unbestreitbare Intelligenz und Geschicklichkeit noch nicht unbedingt als positive Faktoren in Rechnung zu setzen sind.
Der gegenstaendliche Fall kann von hier aus auch kaum einer Loesung zugefuehrt werden, da die Gegenseite nach dem Verschwinden des Steines den BK sicherlich nicht mehr benuetzen, sondern nun ihrerseits ueberwachen duerfte, so dass ein weiteres Herangehen eigener Mitarbeiter sinnlos und gefaehrlich waere.
Vielleicht erbringt jedoch die dortige Untersuchung von Film und Stein weitere Aufschluesse, die den

②

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RH-EGLA-13049

Fall der Klaerung naeher bringen koennen. V-14 802 wird von Dienststelle 2 mit aller gebotenen Vorsicht weiter geklaert, so dass seine endgueltige Beurteilung in absehbarer Zeit moeglich wird.

3.) Kuenftiger Schriftwechsel in dieser Angelegenheit wird unter dem Stichwort "LORELEY" vorgelegt.

1275

②

26L-13049

~~[illegible]~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2.Anlage zu Memo 11 402/ 1911/geh.

Anmerkung :

Die einmal unterstrichenen Stellen lauten sehr wahrscheinlich so. Die zweimal unterstrichenen Stellen sind in ihrem Wortlaut zweifelhaft.

Text des Filmes :

" Bestaetigung ueber die Erhaltungdes Koffers
haben wir bis jetzt noch nicht bekommen
Beschlaunigen Sie Herstellung des Punktes
e
TEDDI
P.

Schlagen Sie 2 Johann vor ....
(?)

der .... in der Weise uber ..... FORNER
(w) (i)

Karl ... Nr. 5 .... Gasse 50 ... zu uber
pruffen.Er war langere Zeit mit uns in Verbindung, hat A 1 gekannt.
Zu anderen Zwecken kann er nicht verwendet werden.
Wenn "Johann" entscheidet mit F in der ....
.... zu kommen - teilen Sie uns mit
Berichten Sie dass F in Holtin ist.

Gruss von Dicken
(m)

D S."

②

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RH EGFA-13 049

Anlage 1 zu Memo 11 402/1911/55 g

Auffindung eines toten Briefkastens.

1) Am 30.11.54 befand sich V-14 802 im Cafe "Muenzamt", WIEN III, Muenzamtstrasse. Es fielen ihm dabei zwei Herren auf, die sich leise unterhielten, wobei sich einer derselben (kurz "A" genannt) Notizen machte. Nach ca. 10 Minuten uebergab "A" seinem Gespraechspartner (kurz "B" genannt) einen zusammengefalteten Geldbetrag, worauf "B" sich entfernte. Nach ca. 15 Minuten verliess auch "A" das Lokal.

2) V-14 802 folgte dem "A". Dieser ging Richtung Tieraerztliche Hochschule entlang der Verbindungsbahn (Bahngasse) Am Ende der Tieraerztlichen Hochschule ging er dicht neben der Bahnbruestung, die dort den Weg von der 6 Meter tiefer liegenden Bahnstrasse abgrenzt. "A" blieb ca. 3 Minuten bei der Bruestung stehen, was er tat, konnte V-14 802 aus der Entfernung nicht genau erkennen. V-14 802 betrachtete dann beim Vorbeigehen die Stelle der Bruestung, konnte aber in der Dunkelheit - es war ca 19^{00} Uhr geworden- nichts entdecken. "A" war inzwischen weitergegangen und bog links in die Neulinggasse ein. Als V-14 802 die Neulinggasse erreichte, war von "A" nichts mehr zu sehen.

3) V-14 802 beschreibt A und B wie folgt :
A/ ca. 170 cm, schlank, leicht welltes, gescheiteltes blondes Haar, blaue Augen, ca. 46 Jahre alt. Trug dunkelgrauen Anzug, Trenchcoat ohne Guertel, braunen Hut, braune Nylonaktentasche.
B/ ca. 50-55 Jahre, ca. 1[illegible]5 cm, dunkles Haar, breites rundes Gesicht, Brillentraeger, trug dunklen Ulster.

② 4) Am naechsten Morgen (1.12.54) begab sich V-14 802 nochmals zu der bekannten Stelle, da ihm die Sache keine Ruhe liess. Bei aufmerksamen Betrachten bemerkte V-14802

-2-

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

AH-E6L17-13049

dass bei einem der Ziegel der Moertelverputz zwischen den Ziegeln fehlte und der Ziegel etwa einen cm hervorstand. Der Ziegel liess sich muehelos herausziehen. Es handelte sich um einen halben Ziegel, hinter dem sich ein kleiner Hohlraum befand, der jedoch leer war.

5) V-14 302 besuchte in den folgenden Tagen das Cafe "Muensamt" und kontrollierte taeglich das Versteck in der Ziegelmauer.

Am 8.12.54, 19,30 Uhr, fand V-14 802 im Versteck ein kleines Papproellchen, das er herausnahm und gleich in der Sache untersuchte. Im Roellchen befand sich ein Zettel aus duennem Schreibmaschinenpapier, auf dem mit Maschinenschrift folgender Text stand :

> " Die Meldungen sind endlich eingetroffen. Sagen Sie Guenter, dass er in Zukunft vorsichtiger sein solle. Die Meldungen ueber das Kinderkleidergeschaeft "Riska" in SALZBURG muessen noch ueberprueft werden Mit Ihrem Vorschlag wegen K. sind wir einverstanden. Gruss vom Dicken.
>
> G."

6) V-14 302 schrieb den Text ab, steckte den Zettel wieder in das Roellchen und brachte dieses wieder an seinen alten Platz. V-14 802 beobachtete den Platz noch zwei Stunden, konnte aber nichts feststellen.

Am 9.12.54, 17°° Uhr, war das Papproellchen noch vorhanden. Um 19.30 Uhr war das Roellchen verschwunden, das Fach war leer.

7) In seiner Stellungnahme legte V-14 302 dar, dass es nur seinem durch Maurerarbeit geschultem Auge zu verdanken sei, dass das Versteck gefunden wurde.

Ob ein Kinderkleidergeschaeft "RISKA" in SALZBURG existiere, koenne er nicht ueberpruefen.

②

Die aufgefundene Nachricht koennte allenfalls auch von einem befreundeten ND stammen.

Es sei ihm (V-14 302) am 30.11.54 nicht gelungen, den weiteren Weg des "A" zu verfolgen, obwohl er nur 30

-3-

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ABLE COPY

RH-EGLA-13049

Schritte hinter diesem gewesen sei, als "A" in die Neulinggasse einbog. "A" muesste sich demnach in einem Haustor verborgen gehalten haben, oder in ein Auto eingestiegen sein, oder, was am wenigsten wahrscheinlich sei, in der Naehe wohnen.
Beim Kellner des Cafe "Muenzamt" sei auf Grund der Personenbeschreibungen nichts zu erfahren gewesen, so dass anzunehmen sei, dass das Cafe "Muenzamt" nicht regelmaessig oder nur selten von "A" und "B" zu Treffs benutzt wird.
Die Lage des Verstecks sei guenstig, da der Weg neben der Verbindungsbahn nicht befahren werden koenne und am Abend nur geringer Fussgaengerverkehr herrsche.

8) Auf Grund obigen Berichtes wurde V-14 802 angewiesen, in vorsichtiger Form weitere Beobachtungen durchzufuehren, aber keine Handlungen vorzunehmen, die die weitere Arbeit stoeren koennten.
V-14 802 fuehrte demgemaess folgende Beobachtungen durch :

Cafe "Muenzamt" :

13.12.54, 18,30 - 19,15 Uhr,
14.12.54, 19,15 - 20,45 "
15.12.54, 18,oo - 19,oo ",
16.12.54, 18,30 - 19,45 ".

Briefkasten :

13.12.54, 18,oo, 19,30 Uhr,
14,12.54, 12,oo, 19,oo, 21,oo Uhr
15.12.54, o7,oo, 14,30, 19,15 "
16.12.54, o7,oo, 15,oo, 20,oo ",
18.12.54, o7,30 - 11,30, 12,30 - 20,oo Uhr
19.12.54, 16,oo - 19,30,
20.12.54, 16,oo - 20,oo,
21.12.54, o7,30 - 11,30, 16,oo - 21,oo Uhr
22.12.54, 16,oo - 21.30,
23.12.54, 14,oo - 21,oo,
27,12.54, 14,oo - 20,oo,
28.12.54, o7,20 - 10,oo, 16,oo - 20,oo Uhr
29.12.54, 11,oo - 14,oo, 18,oo - 21,oo Uhr

②

-4-

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

NH-EGLA 13049

30.12.54, 11,00 - 14,00 Uhr, 17,00 - 20,00 Uhr
3.1.55 , 16,00 - 19,30 "
4.1.55 , 17,00 - 21,00 "
5.1.55 , 10,00 - 14,00 ", 18,00 - 21,00 Uhr
6.1.55 , 07,00 - 8,30 ",
7.1.55 , 15,00 - 17,00 ", 18,00 - 20,00 "
10.1.55 , 16,30 - 18,00 ", 18,30 - 20,30 "
12.1.55 , 18,00 - 23,00 ",
13,1.55 , 06,00 - 08,00 ", 18,00 - 23,00 "
14.1.55 , 06,30 - 08,00 ". 18,00 - 22,30 "
15.1.55 , 06,30 - 07,00.

V-14 802 gibt an, unabhaengig von obigen Zeiten, jedoch wesentlich seltener, auch im Briefkasten selbst Nachschau gehalten zu haben, doch sei dieser stets leer gewesen.

9) Unabhaengig von obiger Beobachtungstaetigkeit des V-14 802 wurde der Briefkasten und dessen Umgebung zu Kontrollzwecken auch von V-14 808 und V-14 818 beobachtet und zwar fast taeglich stichprobenweise in den fruehen Morgen - und spaeten Abendstunden zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten.
Am 3.1.55 wurde dabei festgestellt, dass der Ziegel am Briefkasten festgefroren war und mit der blossen Hand nicht mehr entfernt werden konnte. Nach gewaltsamer Entfernung (ohne Beschaedigung) stellte sich heraus, dass der Briefkasten nach wie vor leer war.

10) Am 15.1.55 bemerkte V-14 802 im Zuge der routinemaessigen Beobachtung kurz vor 0700 Uhr einen Mann, der sich am Briefkasten zu schaffen machte und diesen offenbar oeffnete.
Der Mann, der aus der Richtung HEUMARKT gekommen war, trug schwarzen Ledermantel, schwarzen Hut, dunkle Hose, war ca. 172-174 cm gross, schlank und war offenbar nicht mit "A" oder "B" identisch.
Er entfernte sich nach ca. 5 Minuten in Richtung Neulinggasse, wo er sich einige Male umblickte und

②

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

AH EGLA-13049

auch einmal stehen blieb. V-14 802 folgte ihm in entsprechendem Abstand. An der Kreuzung Bahngasse-Neulinggasse suchte der Mann eine Beduerfnisanstalt auf. V-14 802 ging daran vorbei und in ein nahes Telefonhaeuschen. Der Mann kam nach einiger Zeit wieder heraus, bog in die Neulinggasse ein, ging entlang des Modenaparks und blickte sich oefters um. Nach Ansicht V-14 802 hatte der Mann bereits gemerkt, dass ihm jemand folgte. Er wechselte wiederholt das Tempo, bog dann am Ende des Modenaparks rechts ab und ging in die Reisnerstrasse. Als V-14 802 diese erreichte, war der Mann nirgends zu sehen, doch fuhr im gleichen Augenblick ein dort haltendes Taxi (W 40 110) mit einem Fahrgast in Richtung Heumarkt ab. Unmittelbar darauf folgte eine schwarze Limousine mit dem russischen Kennzeichen B 17 501.

11) V-14 802 begab sich sofort wieder zum Briefkasten zurueck. (Dieser war bei einer Kontrolle am Morgen des 15.1.55 noch leer gewesen). Es fiel sofort auf, dass der Ziegel etwas weiter vorstand als zuerst.
Im Briefkasten fand sich nur ein eigentuemlicher Stein, so dass V-14 802 sich zunaechst genarrt glaubte. Es fiel jedoch sofort auf, dass der "Stein" sehr leicht war. Beim Ritzen mit dem Fingernagel stellte sich heraus, dass der "Stein" aus einer gipsartigen Masse bestand. V-14 802 entschloss sich darauf, den Stein mitzunehmen und unversehrt weiterzugeben.

②

12) Der Stein wurde von V-14 801 und 14 802 nach SALZBURG gebracht. Bei naeherer Untersuchung stellte sich heraus, dass dieser "kuenstliche Stein" ein Filmnegativ enthielt, auf das durch unvorsichtiges Oeffnen ungluecklicherweise Licht fiel. Film und "Stein" wurden 127 zur Untersuchung vorgelegt.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RA EGLA-13049

13) **Stellungnahme V-14 802 :**

V-14 802 nahm zu den unter Punkt 10 und 11 geschilderten Ereignissen wie folgt Stellung :

Als der Mann festgestellt wurde, machte sich V-14 802 sofort an die Verfolgung. Leider war es gegen o7,15 Uhr schon etwas hell geworden, so dass nach Ansicht des V-14 802 der Mann schon in dem Augenblick Verdacht schoepfte, als er in die oeffentliche Beduerfnisanstalt ging. Ob er V-14 802 im Telefonhaeuschen sah, ist nicht bekannt, doch ist anzunehmen, dass er diesen auf dem weiteren Wege sah, da er sich immer wieder umblickte.

Bevor V-14 802 in die Reisnerstrasse bog, hoerte er das Anfahren eines Autos, bzw. das Anlassen eines Motors. V-14 802 blieb nach Abfahrt der beiden Autos noch einige Zeit in der Reisnerstrasse, ging in die benachbarten Haeuser, doch war von dem Mann nichts zu sehen. Dieser muss also mit ziemlicher Sicherheit in eins der beiden Autos eingestiegen sein. Da die Nummer des Taxis bekannt ist, koennte ohne weiteres festgestellt werden, wohin der Fahrgast gebracht wurde, bzw. koennte dessen Personenbeschreibung festgestellt werden.

Als V-14 802 den "Stein" im Briefkasten fand, stellte er folgende Ueberlegungen an :

Wenn, wie V-14 802 annehmen musste, der Mann sich beobachtet fuehlte, ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Gegenseite nun ihrerseits den Briefkasten beobachtet, um fremde "Kontrolleure" ihrerseits unter Kontrolle nehmen zu koennen. Weiters ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Gegenseite die Umgebung des Briefkastens abschirmt.

②

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RH EGLA 13049

damit ihre eigenen Leute gewarnt werden koennen und den Briefkasten nicht mehr aufsuchen.
Da im BK keine schriftliche Mitteilung aufgefunden wurde, sondern nur der besagte "Stein", mit dem V-14 802 nichts anfangen konnte, der ihm aber doch verdaechtig schien, entschloss sich V-14 802, den "Stein" mitzunehmen, da mit einer weiteren Benuetzung des BKs kaum noch gerechnet werden konnte.
Ausserdem musste angenommen werden, dass der Hinterleger vielleicht versuchen werde, den hinterlegten Gegenstand wieder in die Hand zu bekommen.
In diesem Fall haette man den BK keinen Augenblick aus dem Auge lassen duerfen, was technisch schwierig gewesen waere und zwar insbesondere im Hinblick auf die zu erwartende Massnahmen der Gegenseite.
Aus allen diesen Gruenden wurde der "Stein" nicht im BK belassen, sondern mitgenommen. Wenn der Mann den V-14 802 tatsaechlich bemerkt hat (was angenommen werden muss), dann war dies die einzig moegliche Konsequenz.

②

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VIA: COURIER
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGL-A-14563

SECRET
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 28 JUN 1955

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COS, MOB

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CART/LCIMPROVE

SPECIFIC— ZIPPER CE Sitrep, March-April, 1955

x 2178

REF: EGP-91

32-4-1-7/2
6 July

1. Attached is a copy of ZIPPER's key to the sources of Eastern Intelligence missions reported in attachment to reference. This key is self-explanatory. The letters EM designate a one-time report or an interrogation report. For greater ease of reference, the following additional identifications are submitted:

a. SRIS	Fall LENA	UJ-DROLLERY # 112-D
	Fall LOTTERIE	UJ-DROLLERY # 15
b. EGIS (Sfs)	Fall KRAEHE	UJ-DROLLERY # 120
	Fall SCHREINER	UJ-DROLLERY # 113
	Fall ZWICKMUEHLE	See EGLA-13829
	Fall SARDINE	A new case; this is the first time ZIPPER has reported on this operation.
c. Czech IS	Fall BURSCHENSCHAFT	UJ-DROLLERY # 230
	Fall REISELUST	UJ-DROLLERY # 235
d. Polish IS	Fall PFERDCHEN	A new case; this is the first time ZIPPER has reported on this operation.
e. Hungarian IS	Fall ADLER	UJ-DROLLERY # 300
	Fall FILIUS	UJ-DROLLERY # 302
	Fall PFEIFFER	UJ-DROLLERY # 305

Encls: 1, As Stated Above

Distribution:
3 - EE, w/1 Cy Att. (DIRECT)
3 - COS, w/1 Cy Att.
2 - MOB, w/1 Cy Att. (DIRECT)

22 June 1955

32W	5	38	7
ABSTRACT	4	INDEX	
DATE 28 June 1955			

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☑
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

32W-5-38/7

~~32-6-~~

2. POB had the following comments regarding the attachment to reference:

a. Re Paragraph 1	We know of no ZIPPER report to us to that effect. [redacted] reported that both ZIPPER's @ Dr. ALBERTI and @ HERRMANN have stated to him that they expected such a move.
b. Re Paragraph 2	These telephone numbers have recurred in UJ-DROLLERY # 15 after appearing first in the HOEHER case (Hqs. File No. [redacted], UJ-DROLLERY # 11, Operation WELLE (EGLA-10466), and in the case reported in EGLA-4058. According to [redacted] the last sentence of paragraph 2 represents the ZIPPER Hqs. case officer's (@ KUTZBACH's) evaluation of UJ-DROLLERY # 15.
c. Re Paragraph 3	We believe that the information about the St. Antonius hospital was largely acquired from "KUERASSIER" (see EGLA-13809). Information on other buildings inside the Karlshorst Compound is believed to be the product of UJ-DROLLERY # 112-D and of "KUERASSIER." A specific run-down on reports dealing with these buildings was promised [redacted] by ZIPPER's @ HERRMANN several months ago, but has not been received.
d. Re Paragraph 5	Sub-paragraph 2 of this paragraph is believed to be based on interrogations of technicians returned from the Soviet Union, while sub-paragraph 3 is considered to represent information which we had passed to ZIPPER in the form of a sanitized version of EGQW-21894.
e. Re Paragraph 6	This instance is believed to have been based on the case of an unidentified secretary or typist working for a West German Government office in Bonn (possibly the Foreign Office). According to ZIPPER, she was approached by the SRIS while visiting her parents in the Soviet Zone. Upon her return, she immediately reported this approach, but refused to become involved in any double-play. In connection with this story, ZIPPER mentioned the alleged incompetence of the security officer of the Foreign Office in Bonn whom they claimed had fumbled several leads.
f. Re Paragraph 9	We have not yet seen any ZIPPER reports on this.
g. Re the "Beurteilung"	[redacted] reports the statements contained in paragraph 1 of the "Beurteilung" to be those of @ Dr

	ALBERTI who disagrees with the MVD/KGB breakdown as given by [redacted] [redacted] expects this to cause some confusion since other ZIPPER staffers such as @ HERRMANN are obliged to accept @ Dr. ALBERTI's views.
h. Re Paragraph 16	[redacted] comments that the EEI referred to in this paragraph is from UJ-DROLLERY # 120.
i. Re Paragraph 19	[redacted] Comment: The use of West German KP functionaries by Eastern Intelligence Services was reported on in EGLA-13147 and is, of course, of interest to USAREUR, who commented that they have received sufficient reports to indicate an increase of this type of activity. ZIPPER's source of this report is in the Bavarian Border Police.
k. Re Anlage 2	References for this SRIS deception effort are EGLA-12470, EGLA-10630 and others.
l. Re Anlage 3	Paragraph 1 is possibly based on UJ-DROLLERY # 112-D and on UJ DROLLERY # 1201. However, in # 1201, "ERFINDER" was not asked, as far as we know, to invite West German members of parliament.
m. Re Paragraph 4	The second SRIS mission listed here was given to the agents in UJ-DROLLERY's # 15 and # 1201.
n. Re Paragraph 5	For the SRIS mission listed in fourth place, see EGLA-13627; re the fifth, see PULL-9632, BRLN-7385, MUNI-9032, etc.
o. Re Paragraph 6	The SRIS mission listed in fifth place is believed to have appeared in ZIPPER's Fall SCHAPER (see EGLA-14519), while the one listed in ninth place appeared in UJ-DROLLERY # 15.
p. Re Paragraph 7	The one SRIS mission listed here is believed to have been taken from UJ-DROLLERY # 15.

[redacted]

Approved by:

[redacted]

32w - 5 - 38/7
~~32-6-11-1536~~

Streng Geheim

Anl e zu Nr. 7o9/55 Str.Ge

Aufschlüsselung der Aufklärungsaufträge aus CI-Sitrep März-April 1955 nach ihrer Herkunft.

Bemerkung: EM bedeutet Einzel- oder Vernehmungsmeldung

1. Aufträge auf politischem Gebiet

Aufträge des SU-ND	Fall LENA
Aufträge des ND der SBZD "Gesprächserkundung"	EM
Übrige Aufträge	Fall KRÄHE

2. Dienststellen und Einrichtungen westlicher Streitkräfte

Aufträge des ung.ND "Erkundung von Neubauten" und "Feststellung der Standorte"	Fall ADLER
"Beschaffung von Betriebsanleitungen"	Fall FILIUS
Aufträge des CS-ND	EM
Auftrag des bulg.ND	EM
Aufträge des ND der SBZD	
"Aussenklärungen HANNOVER"	Fall KRÄHE
"Beobachtung eines Flugplatzes"	EM
"Fortsetzung der Aufklärung"	Fall SCHREINER
Übrige Aufträge	EM

3. Westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag

Auftrag des CS-ND	BURSCHENSCHAFT
Auftrag des ND der SBZD	EM

ATT# 1 to EGLA-14563

RI Copy

32W-5-38/7

~~32-5-[illegible]~~

4. Deutsche Dienststellen und Einrichtungen

Aufträge des SU-ND	EM
Auftrag des CS-ND	REISELUST
Aufträge des ND der SBZD	
"Feststellung von Dienststellen" und "Klärung von Stärke" usw.	EM
"Beschaffung von Material"	ZWICKMÜHLE

5. Westliche Nachrichtendienste

Aufträge des SU-ND	
"Herstellung einer Verbindung" "Versuch der Penetrierung" und "Versuch der Werbung"	EM
"Briefliche Aufforderung"	REPTIL
"Eindringen"	EM
Auftrag des ung.ND	PFEIFER
Auftrag des CS-ND	EM
Auftrag des poln. ND	PFERDCHEN
Aufträge des ND der SBZD	
"Erpressung"	ZWICKMÜHLE
"Verbindungsaufnahme" bis "Anlaufen einer Behörde"	SCHREINER
Übrige Aufträge	EM

6. Forschungs- und Anbahnungstätigkeit östlicher ND

Aufträge des SU-ND	
Alle Aufträge ohne den letzten	LENA
"Sammeln von Anschriften"	EM
Auftrag des ung.ND	FILIUS
Auftrag des CS-ND	BURSCHENSCHAFT
Aufträge des ND der SBZD	
"Einladung führender Persönlichkeiten" bis "Forschung nach Verbindungsmöglichkeiten"	SARDINE
"Ansprechen von bestimmten Flüchtlingen" bis "Überprüfung des Geschäftsführers"	EM
"Erkundung von Toten Briefkästen"	KRÄHE

7. Wirtschaft und Rüstung

Auftrag des SU-ND	LOTTERIE
Auftrag des CS-ND	BURSCHENSCHAFT
Aufträge des ND der SBZD	
"Klärung eines Treibstofflagers" bis "Bewerbung um Anstellung"	EM
Übrige Aufträge	SARDINE

8. Verschiedene Aufträge

Auftrag des SU-ND	LENA
Auftrag des ung. ND	PFEIFER
Auftrag des CS-ND	REISELUST
Aufträge des ND der SBZD	
Alle Aufträge	EM

32W-5-38/7
~~32-6-77-1-536~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Operational/ZIPPER 90 Days TDY for Alias MERKER in Washington	2. RI FILE NO. 32 6 7 5541 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. EGLA 16 469 4. DATE 2 Nov 1955 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST [redacted] 6. DATE PROCESSED 16 June 1961	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

X	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

UTILITY is still having trouble getting HEUSINGER's agreement on the appointment of @MERKER to a military post in Washington. This is partly because HEUSINGER feels MERKER is too senior; partly because he is too much UTILITY's man; and partly because Hans SPEIDEL and the former General BERENDSEN are also under consideration for the military attache assignment.

MERKER still has his own sights set on a year or two in Washington as a member of the Military Representatives Committee of NATO which is in permanent session in Washington, D.C. He feels this would give him more freedom than he would enjoy in the M.A. position which will, according to HEUSINGER, be very much under the control of the German Ambassador. At the end of his Washington tour MERKER aspires to command a military district in Germany.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ [redacted]

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET

REPORT 14 Feb. 1956

PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN OPERATION:

MEIER	ZIPPER Technician
KURZ	ZIPPER Technician
V-70	ZIPPER Agent, Berlin
[redacted]	Chief, Pullach Operations Base
[redacted]	Pullach Case Officer
[redacted]	Berlin Case Officer
Identity "A"	Woman Occupying Target Apartment
[redacted]	KURIOT Technician at Berlin
[redacted]	KURIOT Technician

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET

SUBJECT: **General** Report on the Operational TDY of [redacted] in Support of ZIPPER Project UJDRIZZLY between 6 - 25 January 1956.

Specific Technical Aid Provided ZIPPER Against UJDOWN

I PROJECT OBJECTIVE:

The KURIOT objective was to supply technical assistance to ZIPPER for an operation against a high-level German target in Berlin.

II TDY OBJECTIVES:

A. Provide the requested assistance.

B. Participate as much as possible in the installation to gain more information on the Project.

C. To evaluate the ZIPPER audio surveillance capability.

D. To avoid the exposure of a PCS technician of the area to ZIPPER by using a Headquarter's technician.

III BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

At the time of departure it was known that UTILITY-3 had approached [redacted] with a request for technical support for UJDRIZZLY in an attempt to obtain audio coverage of UJDOWN.

It was known that V-70 had established an apartment for use by UJDOWN in Berlin and that this would be the target.

It was Headquarter's opinion that this operation should be supported technically in such as way as to satisfy ZIPPER that it was getting the best equipment available for the purpose while not revealing any highly senstivie devices. In view of the publicity regarding [redacted], [redacted] etc., it was felt that the use of purely conventional devices might make ZIPPER feel that KUBARK was not fully supporting this operation, which was important to them. Transistorized microphones, [redacted] and the new WT-1 transmitter appeared to fit this situation.

IV REFERENCES ARE:

IN 47585; IN 49484; IN 12030.

V LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS:

See above and below.

/VI SUMMARY OF EVENTS/

SECRET

VI SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN THE INSTALLATION:

9 January - Pullach:

During a meeting with the ZIPPER representatives, [redacted] and [redacted] received a briefing on the proposed installation. It was learned that the subject apartment was rented in the name of a woman (Identity "A" in IN 49484). The ZIPPER representatives indicated a willingness for [redacted] to travel to Berlin to act as a consultant during the installation. [redacted] was selected to travel to Berlin as Pullach representative for the Project. The ZIPPERS felt that a transmitter used in conjunction with a hidden microphone would probably be the only immediate solution due to the difficulty of locating a listening post within the range of a microphone/wire installation. The use of a transmitter seemed like a good idea as it would enable independent monitoring by KUBARK. A cable was forwarded to Headquarters requesting that two WT-1 line-powered transmitters be sent to Berlin.

11 January - Frankfurt:

Briefed [redacted] on the technical aspects of the operation in Berlin and attempted to determine the nature of equipment at Berlin which could be used for the installation work.

20 January - Berlin:

Met with KURZ and MEIER and demonstrated the WT-1 transmitter. MEIER was visibly impressed with the type and quality of construction and commented on it at length. Arrangements were made for a survey of the target on the following day.

21 January - Berlin:

0930 Hours: Met KURZ and MEIER and proceeded to the target apartment and were admitted by V-70. Photographs were taken and the various aspects of the problem were discussed. The walls, ceilings and floors appeared to be of solid concrete. The walls had wallpaper to the ceiling, the ceiling was painted and the floor had a glued-down linoleum covering. It was decided that the floor lamp in the living room was the only possible location for the transmitter without extensive installation work in the apartment. Departed from the apartment at 1030 hours with parts of the lamp for modification.

2015 Hours: Re-entered the apartment with KURZ and MEIER and discovered that Identity "A" was present with V-70. The assembly of the lamp was begun but some difficulty was experienced which delayed completion of the work. The ZIPPERS and [redacted] were asked to leave the apartment at 2230.

2250 Hours: In a meeting between KURZ, MEIER, [redacted], and [redacted] the ZIPPERS stated that Identity "A" was dissatisfied with the technical arrangements and wished to have either a switch on the lamp which would independently control the transmitter or a separate lamp entirely. This

/desire appeared/

desire appeared reasonable when the lighting arrangement of the room was considered. Nevertheless the wisdom of making Identity "A" witting of the installation details was subject to some silent conjecture. The ZIPPERS decided to use an existing switch on the lamp to control the transmitter. This switch was originally used for a large bulb in the center of the lamp but had not been used for some time as individual pull-switches were available for the smaller bulbs that were used.

22 January - Berlin:

1200 Hours: [redacted] and MEIER worked on the assembly of the lamp at the apartment. Identity "A" spent a considerable time in conversation with MEIER and appeared quite happy about the whole arrangement. At 1330 hours it became apparent that something was wrong with the manner of installation as the transmitter radiated very poorly when the lamp was finally assembled. KURZ arranged with V-70 and Identity "A" to remove the entire lamp that evening for conversion. This was heartily endorsed by [redacted] as working conditions in the apartment were not good. The lamp was picked up by KURZ and MEIER and delivered t[redacted] and [redacted] later that evening.

22-23 January - Berlin:

2100 - 0200 Hours: This time was spent in the KURIOT shop revising the transmitter installation in the lamp. A final bench test indicated satisfactory operation with slight hum in the output. (See attached detailed report).

23 January - Berlin:

1000 Hours: Briefed [redacted] on the details of the installation and tested the transmission range of the unit. From the KURIOT shop to a point approximately 1000 yards away the signal was received with very good strength and quality.

1830 Hours: The lamp was returned to the apartment by KURZ, MEIER, and [redacted]. It was tested briefly and the fact that the switch actually controlled the transmitter was demonstrated to Identity "A". MEIER and [redacted] departed at 1845 hours leaving KURZ in the apartment for a thirty minute test transmission.

[redacted] left MEIER outside the apartment and met [redacted] who had the receiving equipment needed for the range test. A signal strength test of the area was conducted and finished by 1930. A map was prepared of the area indicating the limits of the range of the transmitter.

24 January - Berlin:

0900 Hours: [redacted] briefed MEIER on the operation of the receiver to be used at the listening post and presented him with a copy of the field strength map. It was explained that this was only a preliminary test and did not indicate the extreme limits at which the transmitter could be

/received but only/

received but only the area in which a reliable signal could be expected at street level with a vertical receiving antenna. Above street level and with a horizontal receiving antenna much greater range could be expected. MEIER was advised that a suitable recorder could be obtained commercially on the local market and that the receiver transfer to ZIPPER and subsequent servicing and repair work would be handled by [redacted]. The meeting ended at 1000 hours.

VII SUMMARY:

Insofar as the TDY objectives are concerned, the mission was successfully completed. KUBARK supplied the equipment, made the installation, and provided technical information which would lead to the establishment of the listening post. The location of the apartment and the identity of V-70 and Identity "A" were established. A separate report will be written discussing the audio capabilities of ZIPPER as indicated by the undersigned's observations during this operation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment a/s

6 February 1956

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM: EGLA-16027 (UPSWING/SECURITY)

Alfred BENTZINGER @ Alfred LEIDL

4. ALBERT/LEIDL

Ludwig ALBERT was a longtime ZIPPER staff employee who consistently held sensitive jobs in ZIPPER's CI/CE field agency. When denounced as an SfS agent by a reliable informant and arrested for interrogation, ALBERT hanged himself. It is now assumed that ALBERT, who had as broad a view of ZIPPER operations and personalities as almost any conceivable ZIPPER field staff member could have had, was an SfS penetration of ZIPPER, probably for several years. Simultaneously, ALBERT was employed by CIC to penetrate ZIPPER, and kept UTILITY completely informed of the EEI's given him by CIC. In effect, the CIC operation, which was entirely uncoordinated with KUBARK and specifically denied on several occasions, provided insignificant results (compared to the results of POB's UJDREDGER project), but served the SfS well as cover for an extremely effective penetration of ZIPPER. Ironically, the ZIPPER CI/CE agency, headed by LEIDL has emerged as the principal known successful target of hostile penetration (since the catastrophic ALBERT case is not the only one). By now there appear reason enough to terminate LEIDL, on grounds of incompetence if not actual suspicion of complicity with ALBERT, but until now he has successfully played the role of the injured innocent bystander, as UTILITY does not see fit to take final action against him

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

ALBERT - 201
(also to BENTZINGER - 201)

SECRET